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History, despite its wrenching pain,
Cannot be unlived, but if faced
With courage, need not be lived again.
Maya Angelou
excerpted from,
On the Pulse of Morning
I. A TYPICAL DAY
Everyday in Florida children are placed in foster care because of sus-
pected abuse or neglect at the hands of their parents. The intent is to protect,
nurture, and restore these children, while either helping their families become
healthy and safe for reunification or, where that is not possible or safe,
placing the children with new permanent families. However, on any given
day the very system intended to protect these children will neglect or abuse
many of them, emotionally and physically. On any given day, Florida's
foster children will have the following types of experiences: 1) A child will
go to bed curled up in anguish because yet another day went by, more than
thirty now, in which he has not seen his mother. A court-approved case plan,
written by the Department of Children and Families ("DCF' or "Depart-
ment"), dictates that mom be at work during all of the hours that supervised
visitation is offered. For the same reason, another foster child hardly knows
her mom and dad because she has seen them only a handful of times in the
last three years. Knowing this, today her parents will give up and surrender
[Vol. 25:547
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their parental rights without a trial; 2) A child will awake in foster care, very
excited, anxiously expecting the arrival of her mother. She has counted the
days. She may go to bed tonight weeping. Her DCF case worker will never
arrive to supervise visitation; 3) A child's health and progress in the Depart-
ment's care will be reviewed in court. The review will consist of about forty
seconds of testimony from two witnesses. Coordinating calendars for the
next review will take four minutes. The lawyers, guardian ad litem, parents,
and caseworker will spend forty minutes waiting for the hearing to begin; 4)
A two-year-old child will have spent five months with strangers in state care.
No one has started the process of providing her father with constitutionally
required legal notice of the case. As of today, neither the DCF nor its attor-
neys have asked anyone where her father is. They have not even asked for
his name. Today, the Department, through its attorney, will ask for and
receive from the court permission to take another sixty days to give him
notice, for a total of seven months, even though the law requires this process
to be completed in the first twenty-eight days of the case; 5) If she could
understand, a child would see her mother offered a case plan for rehabilita-
tive services today, five months after the infant was taken from her mother.
By law, these services should have been offered no later than sixty days after
the Department took the baby; 6) A nine-year-old child will conclude her
ninth month without seeing or speaking to her mother. A DCF case worker
felt that the mother's alcoholism recovery was not advanced enough to allow
any contact. Today, a judge will find out for the first time that the case
worker has violated state law which requires court approval to block visita-
tion; 7) A child's mother will still not have met her attorney, even though the
attorney was appointed by the court four months ago; 8) A child will awake
in foster care, having been taken from his parents several months ago be-
cause of bruising. Today, the DCF will admit in court that they have "no
basis to prove the source of the bruising;" 9) A child's mother will be in
violation of her case plan because she lacks transportation to reach the
services required in the plan, a fact known when the case plan was written
and approved by the court; 10) A child's volunteer guardian ad litem will not
appear for a statutorily-required shelter review to report on the child's condi-
tion and progress of the child's welfare; 11) An infant child will spend his
fifth month in State care away from his mother, recovering from an injury
alleged to have been caused by abuse at her hands. Today, the DCF's attor-
ney will brag in the mother's presence that she is going to terminate the
mother-son relationship at trial because of the alleged abuse. Tomorrow, for
the first time, that attorney will obtain the child's medical records from
before he was taken from his mon, records which may vindicate her; 12) A
child's protective care will almost be ended when a DCF attorney, with the
child's caseworker sitting silently at her side, assures a judge the case can be
dismissed. The Department, she says, is satisfied the child can be safely
2001]
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returned to her mother. The mother's attorney will sit idly by. The child's
guardian ad litem will not attend the hearing, sending an unknowledgeable
sit-in. A cautious judge will ask probing questions of the case worker, only
to learn that the child's mother not only failed to complete required counsel-
ing and evaluation, but expressly refused to do so. The Department's attor-
ney did not know. She did not speak with the caseworker before the court
hearing; 13) A judge will order that a child's best interests be overseen by the
Guardian Ad Litem Program. The child may not have an actual volunteer
guardian for months. Today, the program is assigned to over 1000 cases, for
which it does not have volunteers to serve as guardians, in just one judicial
circuit; and 14) A brother and sister will be escorted from the home of foster
parents they lived with for two and a half years. The foster parents had
intended to adopt them. The adoption fell through because the foster parents
could no longer stand the agony and uncertainty of waiting for the system to
terminate the birth parents' rights to clear the case for adoption, and the
children had become unmanageable, acting out on their frustrations with an
uncertain future. The most recent continuance of the termination trial was
for ten months. Given the advancing age of the children and their current
disposition, child welfare professionals will comment that the children will
likely be separated from each other if even one of them is lucky enough to be
adopted.
These are real cases from a typical day in August 2000.1 These types of
things, and perhaps worse, will likely happen again today all over Florida to
1. The cases were observed by or reported to the author on August 7, 2000, or
August 18, 2000, in the Broward County Courthouse, Florida's 17th Judicial Circuit (notes on
file with author). Various child welfare professionals, including guardians ad litem, attorneys,
and judicial officers confirmed on those dates that the cases and circumstances were typi-
cal. Interviews with child welfare professionals experienced in other Florida judicial circuits
confirmed that the observations in the Seventeenth Circuit are relatively typical of other
judicial circuits. Interview with Jeanette Wagner, Circuit Director, Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit Guardian Ad Litem Program in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Aug. 7 & 18, 2000); Confidential
Interview with child welfare professional, private sector service provider (May 23, 2000);
Interview with Howard M. Talenfeld, child attorney/class action attorney (Sept. 14, 2000);
Interview with Ann C. Jones, Staff Attorney, Sixth Judicial Circuit in Orlando, Fla. (Aug. 30,
2000); Interview with Russell Querry, Staff Attorney, Sixth Judicial Circuit in Orlando, Fla.
(Aug. 30, 2000); Confidential Interview with child welfare professional, public sector supervi-
sory employee, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Oct. 17, 2000); Telephone Interview with Victoria
A. Vilchez, birth parent attorney, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Aug. 25, 2000); Interview with
Karen Gievers, child attorney/class action attorney, in Tallahassee, Fla. (June 26, 2000);
Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Aug. 30-Sept. 1, 2000, Orlando,
Fla., pertinent public comments from a variety of child welfare professionals statewide were
obtained at the DCF District 10 breakout sessions; Innovations in Dependency Practice
workshop; Lawyers in the Courtroom workshop; and Case Conferencing workshop) (notes of
summit and all interviews on file with author).
[Vol. 25:547
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children who the state is supposed to be protecting, nurturing, and restoring.
These types of things, and worse, have been happening to Florida's foster
children for decades, and Florida's children are not alone.2
Despite typical days like these, the DCF, the agency principally respon-
sible for the welfare of Florida's dependent children, proclaims on its Inter-
net site on the same typical day in August 2000 that some ninety-eight
percent of the children receiving Department services are safe from abuse or
neglect.3 Were the observed cases simply among the remaining two percent?
Apparently not. Ample evidence indicates that far more than two percent of
foster children are not safe from, at the very least, passive abuse or neglect
by the dependency system of their basic needs and their interest in reunifica-
tion with their families, or in achieving other permanent family arrange-
ments. These problems are so endemic to the system that the child welfare
community recognizes them with widely used terms, like "foster care drift"
and "program abuse." For foster children, all too often the problems are
viewed simply as a way of life.4 The problems are simply not defined offi-
cially as rendering children "unsafe," but they should be.
II. A STUDY OF FLORIDA'S DEPENDENCY SYSTEM
This article reports the findings of a study of Florida's child welfare and
dependency system. The recommendations which follow propose legislative
action to ensure that foster children in all cases can be expected to achieve
the permanent and stable family placements that they need to thrive, and to
ensure that dependency proceedings resolve as quickly as possible. These
are not new or novel goals. These are long-held, existing goals of child
welfare law which, this study finds, escape fruition in far too many cases.
Tragically, child after child still spends excruciatingly long periods of time in
foster care to the detriment of their safety and health--on average, over three
years. Many children spend five, six, or even seven years of their childhood
2. Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in Accordance with the Law: The
Failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 6 (1999),
noting, inter alia, recognition within the child welfare community of the term, "program
abuse," to describe the failure of foster care systems to provide stable homes and needed
services for foster children. Also noted is the fact that by 1995, the foster care system in 22
states and the District of Columbia were under some form of court supervision for inadequate
or inappropriate care of foster children. Id. at 8.
3. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMIuES, AUGUST 2000 SrrUATION REPORT M0077,
available at http:llwww.state.fl.uslcfweb/newslsptlsitr/0800.html. Of note, approximately
the same statewide average is reported for children being safe from abuse and neglect while
their families are receiving in-home services. Id. at FSP-017.
4. Confidential Interview with attorney for dependent children in Broward County,
Fla. (July 26, 2000) (notes on file with author).
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in foster care, leaving them day after typical day with uncertain futures,
depriving many of them of nurturing childhoods. The children may survive
physically, but far too many reach adulthood damaged, scarred, and weak.
To understand why our legislative and social goals for child welfare are
not met in so many cases, this study examines extensive statistical and
anecdotal evidence of a consensus in Florida's child welfare community that
many foster children suffer from protracted uncertainty for their future in
lengthy dependency proceedings, leaving them at risk of significant psycho-
logical damage. The study also looks across the nation and at the history of
child welfare law and public policy to understand why, despite decades of
efforts and better intentions, the dependency systems in Florida and else-
where seem impervious to federal and state government efforts and mandates
to expedite cases to ensure the safety and stability of children. Principally,
the study concludes that the statutory assignment of responsibilities in the
system itself fundamentally and adversely prevent efficacy on a case-by-case
basis. This conclusion may well be contrary to the belief of many readers
that the primary culprits are inadequate funding, failures of child welfare
officials within the Department, or insufficient action by the judiciary. These
matters will be explored, but placed in perspective.
The proposed solutions keep in mind two practical constraints of public
policy. First, not all problems are best redressed by legislative action. Statu-
tory reform will not always help when a problem arises and greater funding
appropriations are not always needed simply because a problem exists.
Second, problems of public policy typically take time to redress, often more
time than is comfortable. Efforts to redress problems which are underway
need to be considered, evaluated and given a respectful opportunity to suc-
ceed. Finally, the problems identified in this study are not all which are
present in Florida's dependency system, but are limited to those which call
into question the effectiveness of child welfare policy imposed statewide by
statute.
5
5. Other studies have concluded that child welfare system problems require the
concerted efforts of the several participating groups, including a variety of non-legislative
efforts. Donald N. Duquette et al., We Know Better Than We Do: A Policy Framework for
Child Welfare Reform, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93 (1997).
Our central message is that child welfare reform must be broad-based and in-
terdisciplinary. No single group and no single element of a system or a
community-social agencies, family advocacy groups, the courts, the state
legislature, or a state administrative agency-has the ability to meaningfully
improve foster care on its own.
Id. at 101. See also Donald N. Duquette et al., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs.,
ADOPTION 2002: THE PRESIDEmT's INITIATIVE ON ADOPTION AND FosTER CARE; GuIDEuINEs
FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN (June
1999), available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/adoptO2/index.htm;
[Vol. 25:547
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111. CONCERNING METHODOLOGY AND HUSHED DISCLOSURES
The study was conducted by the author from May to November
2000. Interviews were conducted with over sixty public and private sector
child welfare professionals throughout Florida, though many had experience
in both. Included were attorneys and guardians ad litem for children, as were
birth parent attorneys. Birth parents were interviewed, including one who
had prevailed in litigation brought by the Department and two whose parental
rights were ultimately terminated at trial. Foster parents were interviewed.
Input was received from attorneys for the state at the circuit and statewide
level, and from low and high-level supervisory officials and case-level
workers at the DCF. Child protection investigators were interviewed, as
were supervisory protective investigation officials. Court officials, including
dependency judges, at the statewide and circuit level were also consulted.
Citizens and parents who have made reports to the Child Abuse Hotline
provided their perspectives and experiences. Professionals involved in the
delivery of social services to dependent children and their families of origin
were also interviewed. Some persons were interviewed multiple times as the
study progressed.
Observations were made in visits to dependency court hearings in one
Florida circuit and to Department service centers. Additional information,
perspectives, and first hand accounts of what is and is not working in the
dependency system were obtained over a three-day period at Florida's 2000
Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, co-sponsored by the
Department and the Office of the State Courts Administrator and attended by
over 1000 child welfare professionals from across Florida.
Applicable Florida and federal laws were examined, as were statutory
approaches to child welfare in other states. Problems with child welfare
experienced by other states and their reform efforts were also studied through
written materials and interviews. State and federal government reports and
studies of child abuse and neglect and the overall performance of the child
welfare system were reviewed. Data, forms, various planning documents,
and reports obtained from the DCF were examined. Several articles, com-
mentaries, and books on the topic were considered.
In some instances, persons interviewed for this study asked not to be
identified in any oral or written findings. Maintaining these confidences
does not compromise the value of the information and perspectives received
for two reasons. One, it appeared in each instance that confidentiality pro-
vided the reporter desired safety to discuss candidly facts and impressions
from extensive experience in the dependency system. There was no sugges-
BErn A. BARRETr ET AL, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY INFANT AND TODDLER STUDY 25-27 (Aug.
2000), available at http://www.childrensboard.orglanalysisreports.html.
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tion of malice. Two, information and perspectives provided in confidence
proved to be consistent with the statistical data relied upon in this study, and
anecdotal information and impressions tended to repeat themselves among
reporters in varied parts of the state and of varied levels of authority. It is left
to the reader to assess any significance of so many child welfare profession-
als requesting anonymity in this report. This study draws no conclusions
from this fact.
IV. A NOTE ON DATA
While federal law requires that states, like Florida, which receive fed-
eral funding for their foster care system, maintain an information system
which tracks, among other things, placement goals for all children in foster
care,6 Florida is apparently having problems with the reliability of its
data. Even basic data currently maintained and reported by the DCF, such as
the number of children in foster care, can be significantly unreliable, though
efforts are underway to solve this problem. 7 For example, recently, children
in one DCF District were reportedly uncounted by as much as 1000, depriv-
ing the system of funding opportunities. 8 DCF reports reviewed for this
study also revealed disparities in baseline performance measures and statis-
tics. For example, the DCF Agency Strategic Plan for fiscal year 2000-2001
reports that in fiscal year 1997-1998, the rate of child protective investiga-
tions were 37.2 per 1000 children.9 The DCF Agency Strategic Plan for
fiscal years 1999-2000/2003-2004, issued earlier, indicates that the rate was
36.2 per 1000 children. 10 Similarly confusing is Department data reflecting
that ninety-five percent of children who exited foster care over the past two
years did not re-enter within twelve months, while data collected by the
6. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(9)(B) (1994).
7. Interview with Peggy Sanford, Assistant General Counsel, Fla. Dep't of Children
& Families and Mary C. Allegretti, Chief, Child Protection Policy, Fla. Dep't of Children &
Families, in Tallahassee (June 27, 2000).
8. Jacqueline Charles, Foster Kids Often Lost in Shuffle, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 3,
2000, at 7B.
9. FiA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMIEs, FY 2000-2001 AGENCY STRATEGIC PLAN
(PROGRAM Focus) 2 (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.myflorida.con/cf web/myflorida/
healthfamily/publications/bureaus/dcf/pubs.html.
10. FLA. DEP'T OF CHnDREN & FAmmS, AGENCY STRATEGIC PLAN, FY 1999-2000/
2003-2004 10, available at http:llwww.myflorida.comlcf_ web/myfloridalhealthfaniily/
publications/bureaus/dcf/pubs.html.
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federal government reports that this was the case with only eighty-seven
percent of Florida's cases.11
V. PART I-CHILD WELFARE LAWS-AN EFFORT TO ENSURE THE BEST
INTERESTS OF CHILDREN
A. Legal Tender-The Influence of Federal Money
State government intervention in cases of child abuse, neglect, and
abandonment began in the late 1800s, when state governments joined private
charitable and religious organizations for the first time in their efforts to
protect and care for children. By the 1950s, all states had agencies to redress
child abuse, neglect, and abandonment. Federal involvement began in 1935
with the expansion of the Social Security Act to include a child welfare
services program. Notwithstanding a relatively minimal financial commit-
ment up to the 1970s, totaling approximately $200 million annually by the
close of that decade, the last two decades have seen explosive growth in the
federal commitment to approximately $4.5 billion in 2000.12 With that
growth, the influence of federal policies on state child welfare laws and
practices has become very significant.
Under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, federal funding is to pro-
vide for "foster care and transitional independent living programs" for ap-
propriate foster children, as well as assistance and incentives for adoption of
special needs children. 13 To be eligible for any federal funding, a state must
submit a child welfare services plan (the "state plan") to the United States
Department of Health and Human Services, which has been jointly devel-
oped by the state agency and the federal Department's Secretary.14 The state
plan must meet several requirements, including that the applying agency
"administers or supervises" the state's child welfare services and various
other matters demonstrating compliance with the substantive and procedural
requirements discussed here.15
11. U.S. DEs"T OF HEA.TH AND HUMAN SExvs. CniLDREN's BUREAU, CHm WELFARE
OUTcOMES 1998: ANNUAL REPORT 3-2-3, 5-59 (1998), available at http://www.acf.dhhs.govl
programs/cb/ publications/index.htm.
12. Howard Davidson, Child Protection Policy and Practice at Century's End, 33
FAM. L. Q. 765, 766-67 (1999).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 670 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 622(a) (1994). "Child welfare services" includes those related to
dependent or neglected children. See § 625(a)(1). Regarding case plans, see generally
§§ 670-79.
15. § 622(b)(1).
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Substantively, federal influence begins with the primary guiding princi-
ple of child welfare law. In accord, the health and safety of children are to be
the paramount concerns in dependency cases under Florida law, while pro-
viding that state intervention into families is to be "constructive," "nonadver-
sarial," and respectful of "the integrity of families."16 Receipt of federal
funding is contingent on states pursuing reunification of families where "safe
and appropriate;" alternatively, children are to be placed for adoption or
"other planned, permanent living arrangement.' 7
With the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
("AACWA"), the federal government sought to better ensure that children
are only removed from their families of origin if "reasonable efforts" are
made to prevent the need for removal and, likewise, that permanent termina-
tion of parental rights only follows efforts to create a safe environment for
the children to return home. This effort was inspired in part by a concern
that states were overusing foster care, both as an intervention method and as
the ultimate solution to familial problems. Concerns that AACWA's provi-
sions were promoting protracted and futile efforts at reunification to the
detriment of foster children, and that reunification efforts were being made in
cases of aggravating circumstances which warranted immediate termination
of parental rights, contributed to the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
("ASFA"), which further amended the Social Security Act.'8
This act is credited with fundamentally changing the national approach
to foster care, in particular targeting the problem of how long children stay in
foster care.19 The legislation recognized that a better balance was needed
between efforts to ensure a child's safety, employing reasonable efforts to
preserve a child's family of origin while achieving permanency for a child in
each case. The goal was to address the problem of children languishing in
foster care while protracted efforts were made to reunify their families of
origin.2° In accord with federal funding eligibility requirements, Florida law
indicates that the child welfare system is supposed "[t]o preserve and
strengthen ... family ties whenever possible"21  Children should only be
removed from their homes and remain in shelter care if "the department has
made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal .... ,22
16. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(b)2, (e) (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (Supp.
IV 1998).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(9)(B)(iii) (1994).
18. See Chaifetz, supra note 2, at 4-5; Davidson, supra note 12, at 770-73.
19. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: STATES EARLY EXPERIENCES
IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILES ACT I, 3-4 (Dec. 1999), available at
http:llwww.gao.gov/new.items/heOOOOl.pdf; see also Davidson, supra note 12, at 772.
20. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 1, 4.
21. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(f) (2000).
22. § 39.402(10).
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Reasonable efforts are not to be required if a parent has subjected a
child to an "aggravated circumstance." Such circumstances are to be defined
by state law, but federal law offers as possible examples abandonment,
torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse. For example, reasonable efforts are
not to be required where a parent has committed murder or voluntary man-
slaughter of another child of the parent, where a parent has committed a
felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another child
of the parent, nor where a parent's parental rights have been involuntarily
terminated as to a sibling of the child at issue. Reasonable efforts to keep
families together are presumed if an emergency exists at the time of the
Department's first contact. Similarly, a presumption arises from a "substan-
tial and immediate danger" to a child's health or safety which preventative
services can not mitigate or, in cases of extreme abuse, where grounds for
expedited termination of parental rights are apparent. Significantly, while
the law prohibits children being removed or kept from their homes pending
disposition if in-home intervention or preventative services would render the
home safe, reasonable efforts are nonetheless presumed if there are no pre-
ventative services available which can ensure the child's health or safety in
the home.24 Thus, the standard will keep a child away from his or her family
and in shelter care if preventative services are simply not available.
Among other things to promote "reasonable efforts" to prevent the need
for removal or termination of parental rights, federal law requires a tailored
case Blan for each child aimed at achieving permanent, safe place-
ment. Federal law permits so-called "concurrent planning," that is, that
reasonable efforts to reunify a family may be made at the same time that
efforts are being made to place the child for adoption, a practice that Florida
has adopted.2 Florida law seeks to implement these conditions, requiring
that unless a statutory exception for expedited termination of parental rights
exists, the Department must demonstrate that it has made "reasonable efforts
to reunify" a family where a child is in out-of-home care. Significantly, this
includes "the exercise of reasonable diligence and care ... to provide the
services.., delineated in the case plan." 27
Florida law must provide for compliance with federal requirements to
support its heavy reliance on federal funding of the dependency sys-
tem. Almost one-third of Florida's $724 million child welfare budget comes
23. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Similarly, reunification is
not required for aiding, abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting for such offenses.
§ 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)(III).
24. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(7) (2000).
25. See generally Davidson, supra note 12, at 771; Chaifetz, supra note 2, at 4-5.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B), (F) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); FLA. STAT. § 39.601(3)(a)
(2000).
27. FLA. STAT. § 39.521(1)(01. (2000).
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from two parts of the Social Security Act, twenty-five percent from Title IV-
E and approximately four percent from Title IV-B.28 Title IV-E provides for
partial reimbursement of the costs of foster care in return for making reason-
able efforts to prevent removal or termination of parental rights. Title IV-B
of the Social Security Act addresses services to be provided through the
dependency system. Accounting for all sources, a full fifty percent of all
foster care expenditures in Florida are from the federal government. Almost
ten thousand foster children in Florida are relying on Tile IV-E fund-
ing. Title 1V-E funding pays for many costs of foster care, including food,
clothing, shelter, visitation travel expenses, and the like. Similarly, adminis-
trative and operational expenses connected with institutional care are recov-
erable.29
The time it takes for dependency cases to conclude is a significant
federal concern which has been met with specific case goals. Safe, perma-
nent homes for children are supposed to be found more quickly as a result of
ASFAs enactment; cases were supposed to end where children wait eighteen
months or more before adoption or other alternatives to reunification are
pursued.30  ASFA employs several measures to attempt to ensure that its
goals are met, some substantive in nature, others procedural. Types of
extreme abuse cases are identified in which no reunification efforts are
required (though these cases are relatively rare) and in those cases alternative
permanent homes must be sought within thirty days of the determination that
such circumstances apply, provisions which Florida law now contains. 31 In
other cases where reunification might be appropriate, but cannot be accom-
plished in a reasonable amount of time, time frames are set in which proceed-
ings to terminate parental rights are to begin.32 This includes cases where
children have been in foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two
months, though Florida has adopted a more restrictive twelve-month stan-
dard.33 Federal law allows exceptions for cases where children are in relative
care or where the state has failed to provide sufficient services for improving
28. The precise percentages are 24.29% for IV-E dollars and 3.81% for IV-B dol-
lars. See Letter from Margaret Taylor, Financial Administrator, Fla. Dep't of Children &
Families (enclosures) (Aug. 29, 2000) (on file with author).
29. Id.
30. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OMCE, supra note 19, at 3-4.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D), (E) (Supp. IV 1998); FLA. STAT. § 39.521(1)(f)
(2000); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(l)(e), (2) (2000); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OMCE,
supra note 19, at 1-2, 4. Only between three and ten percent of removal cases are estimated to
meet the reasonable efforts waiver provision. Id. at 9.
32. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFICE, supra note 19, at 1; see also FLA. STAT.
§§ 39.601(3)(k), .703 (2000).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (Supp. IV 1998); FLA. STAT. § 39.703(2) (2000); U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 4.
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the home of origin such that it is safe for the child to return, standards of
which Florida law takes advantage.
34
ASFA contains a number of other strict substantive and time standards
from the inception of a case to its close which are designed to achieve the
balance between a child's need for permanency and an interest in maintain-
ing familial ties, and which Florida law embodies. With ties to receipt of
federal funding, the standards include: 1) At the first hearing regarding the
removal of a child from his or her home, the court must find that return to the
home is "contrary to [his or her] welfare." Failing this, the case is ineligible
for Title IV-E funding, a failure which cannot be remedied at a later hear-
ing.35 Florida law includes this standard to allow for funding eligibility;36 2)
Within sixty days of a child's actual removal from his or her home, a written
and tailored case plan must be prepared, a requirement also embodied in
current Florida law. In this same time frame, a court must enter a finding
that "reasonable efforts" were made to prevent the child's removal from the
home in the first instance, barring which the case becomes completely ineli-
gible for Title IV-E funding, a standard Florida has actually expanded to
require three such findings in sixty days;38 3) Within twelve months of a
child's entry into foster care,39 and thereafter each twelve months if neces-
sary, federal law requires that the state's child welfare agency make reason-
able efforts to finalize a permanency plan, evidenced by a court finding that
this has occurred. While the failure to do so violates the state plan, it does
not permanently disqualify the individual case for Title IV-E funds. 40 It
would appear that failure to meet these requirements renders the child's case
ineligible for Title IV-E funding until the proper court finding is made.4 1 The
permanency hearing is to determine whether and when the child will be
returned to their birth parent or placed for adoption, under legal guardians or
other permanent living arrangement, as well as the related issue of whether
34. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E); FLA. STAT. § 39.703(2) (2000); U.S. GENERAL AccoUNT-
ING OFFmic, supra note 19, at 4.
35. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(a), (c) (2000).
36. See FLA. STAT. § 39.402(2), (6), (8)(h) (2000).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(1)-(2)
(2000); FLA. STAT. § 39.601(1)-(2), (9)(a) (2000).
38. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (2000); FLA. STAT. §§ 39.402(8)(h)5., .506(7), .521(1)(t)
(2000).
39. The date of entry into foster care is the earlier of the date of the first judicial
hearing finding that abuse or neglect has occurred or 60 days after the child is removed from
his or her home. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(F) (Supp. IV 1998).
40. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(e) (2000). See also Davidson, supra note 12, at 772.
41. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(a) (2000); see 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
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the state will file a petition for termination of parental rights.42 Florida law
calls for these matters to occur; 43 and 4) That the child's status is reviewed at
least every six months by the court or by administrative review for purposes
of assessing the safety and appropriate nature of the child's placement, the
need for ongoing placement, case plan compliance, and progress towards
reunification or other permanency goals. Florida law requires court review.
44
Aside from the foregoing, federal law leaves to the states development
of legal procedures and assignment of responsibilities within the dependency
system. While adopting the federal time standards, Florida sets forth in its
statutes rather detailed time standards and hearing schedules to direct de-
pendency litigation. Responsibility for various aspects of dependency pro-
ceedings and the substantive content of proceedings is also set forth in great
detail in Florida law.
B. Florida Dependency Law-Scrutinizing Every Move
A dependency case begins with a report of suspected child abuse or
neglect. By law, every person has the responsibility to report suspected child
abuse or neglect at the hands of a parent, custodian, care giver, or other
person responsible for a child's welfare. Reports are made to the Department
through its central abuse telephone hotline.4 5  Acting through its fifteen
districts, the Department then becomes primarily responsible for the welfare
of these children in a variety of ways and in an extensive manner.
After receiving a report, DCF is responsible for undertaking a protective
investigation to determine whether the child has been subjected to, or is at
risk of, abuse or neglect, except where that responsibility is transferred to a
county Sheriffs office (as it has been in four counties).46 Immediate investi-
gations are required if the immediate safety of a child is at risk or if the
family may flee from the investigation.47 In all other cases, an investigation
must begin within twenty-four hours, in conjunction with law enforcement if
warranted.48 Unannounced, onsite investigations are required, with specific
statutory requirements that in-person interviews must be had with the child,
42. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
43. See FLA. STAT. § 39.701(8)(e), (f) (2000).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); FLA. STAT. § 39.701(1)(a), (2)(a)
(2000); FLA. R . Juv. P. 8.410(e). "Administrative review" refers to a process, which is to be
open to the parents, of case review involving a panel of persons where at least one member is
not responsible for case management or service delivery to the child or parents. 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(6) (1994).
45. FLA. STAT. § 39.201(1), (2) (2000).
46. See §§ 39.201,.301,.3065.
47. § 39.201(5).
48. Id.
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any siblings, parents, and any other adult household members.49 The investi-
gation must also include various records checks on each household mem-
ber.50 A standardized risk assessment instrument must also be completed
within forty-eight hours of the initial report.
51
Where abuse or neglect is confirmed, the Department must decide
whether voluntary in-home services should be offered to the children and
parents involved or whether the child must be removed to ensure his or her
safety.5 2 A child must be removed in "high-risk" cases, loosely defined as
those involving young parents or custodians, the use of illegal drugs, or
domestic violence. The Department is required to complete its child
protective investigations within sixty days, with no exceptions provided at
law.54 A child may be taken into protective custody for up to twenty-four
hours by law enforcement or Department agents based on a probable cause
belief that abuse, neglect, or abandonment has occurred, or that there is
imminent danger of the same.55 Beyond twenty-four hours, a court order
finding probable cause is required, typically as a ruling on a "shelter petition"
at a "shelter hearing."56 The court must specifically find that removal is
necessary and that "appropriate and available services" would not change
that necessity.5 7 "Shelter" care is intended to be a "temporary" placement
"of a child who is alleged to be or who has been found to be dependent,
pending court disposition before or after adjudication," with a relative or
nonrelative, or a licensed home or facility. Without an adjudication of
dependency a child is not supposed to remain in shelter care for more than
sixty days. Similarly, a child is not to remain in shelter for more than thirty
days after adjudication unless an order of disposition has been entered.6
Following a shelter determination, a dependency case proceeds with the
filing of a dependency petition, followed by an arraignment, an adjudication,
and a disposition. Following or during an ongoing child protective investiga-
tion, formal dependency proceedings can be initiated in a circuit court by the
Department or any other person with pertinent information by filing a peti-
49. § 39.301(11).
50. § 39.301(9)(c).
51. § 39.301(9)(e).
52. See § 39.402.
53. § 39.301(8)(b).
54. § 39.301(14).
55. § 39.402(1)(a).
56. § 39.402(6)(b), (8)(a).
57. §§ 39.01(65), .401, .402(I)-(2), (8)(a), (h).
58. § 39.01(64).
59. § 39.402(13). Dependency is explained in more detail infra Part V.D.
60. Id.
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tion for dependency in the name of the child.61 A petition to terminate
parental rights may be filed at any time, but at the least, a dependency peti-
tion must be filed within twenty-one days of a hearing in which a child is
placed in shelter by court order, or within seven days of any party filing a
demand for early filing of a petition. 62 In any other case, a dependency
petition is to be filed within a "reasonable time" of the referral for protective
investigation.63
Arraignment hearings are to be conducted for any parent within twenty-
eight days of a child being placed in shelter care by court order, or within
seven days of filing a dependency petition if demand for early filing has been
made. 64 Likewise, in cases where a child is in shelter care, disposition
hearings are to be held within fifteen days of the arraignment if a parent
admits or consents to the findings of a dependency petition, absent a continu-
ance.65 If there is a denial, an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether a
child is dependent must be held within thirty days of the arraignment, absent
a continuance granted in accord with the law.66 Adjudication is necessary for
a child to remain in out-of-home placement.
67
Within thirty days of the adjudicatory hearing, a disposition hearing for
the purpose of receiving and considering a case plan and predisposition study
must be held. 8 The Department prepares the case plan and predisposition
study.69 A predisposition study includes, among other things, an assessment
of the parents' ability to meet a child's basic needs and care; an assessment
of the child's historical stability, including exposure to domestic violence;
the mental and physical health of the parents; the child's conduct at home,
school, and in the community; an assessment of the child's risk at home; and
resources available to address those risks, including prevention and reunifica-
tion services.
70
Disposition hearings are to be held as to any child adjudicated depend-
ent, at which time the case plan is supposed to be approved, though the court
may opt to do so at a second hearing within thirty days of the disposition. A
diligent search should have been completed for any parent who cannot be
located before a disposition hearing can go forward. At disposition, the court
61. §§ 39.501(1), .802(1); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.220.
62 § 39.501(4).
63. Id.
64. § 39.506(1).
65. Id.
66 Id.
67. §§ 39.506(1), (5), .521(1)(a). Similar time frames exist for children who are still
in a parent's custody. See § 39.506(2).
68 § 39.507(7).
69. §§ 39.507(7), .521(a); see discussion infra Part V.C.
70. § 39.521(2).
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must approve several things. This includes approving the child's continued
placement in out-of-home care or custody, if this is the case, and setting any
special conditions on same, setting any "[e]valuation, counseling, treatment
activities, and other actions to be taken by the parties;" and identifying
supervisors or monitors of services; and child support matters.
71
Virtually every move in a dependency case is reviewed and approved by
the circuit court. As noted, there is almost immediate court involvement
when a child has been removed and placed in a temporary shelter. The court
reviews and approves continued placement in a shelter, and then conducts
shelter reviews at least within thirty days after the shelter hearing, and every
fifteen days thereafter, each time to review the child's status and approve the
continuation of the shelter placement. 72 These hearings continue beyond
arraignment and no more than fifteen days thereafter until a child is either
returned home or a disposition hearing is conducted. 73 Written determina-
tions regarding a child remaining in a shelter are required within twenty-four
hours of any time violation for filing a dependencypetition or before grant-
ing a continuance for holding a disposition hearing.7
At the disposition hearing, the court is to schedule the initial judicial
review essentially within ninety days, though the case plan review and
approval may be postponed for thirty days from the disposition hearing.75 In
no event is the initial judicial review to occur more than six months after the
child is removed from the home.76 Under all circumstances, the court is
required to review the status of any dependent child at least once every six
months, including as to case plan progress.
77
Under state law, there are to be no fewer than eight court hearings in a
year in every dependency case, presuming that all statutory deadlines are
met, no continuances are sought or granted, and no extraordinary circum-
stances arise requiring any hearing not otherwise dictated by law. Particularly
because of required shelter reviews every fifteen days, the number of hear-
ings can be much greater if the filing of a case plan is delayed or arraign-
ments are not timely held, problems which regularly occur as discussed
below. Due to delays, cases reviewed in this study would have required as
many as sixteen court hearings in a year.
Under concurrent case planning, the Department may be responsible for
simultaneously providing rehabilitative services to abusive or neglectful
parents and preparing to terminate the parental rights. The Department is
71. § 39.521(I)(d)3.; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.340.
72 § 39.506(8).
73 Id.
74. §§ 39.402(14), .506(8).
75. § 39.521(1)(a), (c).
76. §§ 39.521(1)(c), .701(3)(a).
77. § 39.701(1)(a), (2)(a); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.410(e), 8.415(b).
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directed that when children are removed from their homes, permanent
placement with a biological or adoptive family is to be "achieved as soon as
possible" and in no case are children to "remain[] in foster care longer than 1
year. 78 As the foregoing indicates, the court is to ensure that these goals are
met.
C. Case Plans as a Guiding Light Under Florida and Federal Law
Under federal and state law, the Department is responsible for develop-
ing a case plan with input from all parties. The plan is intended to be a tool
to direct a rehabilitative plan for parents and to coordinate services for
children, birth parents, and foster parents, whether or not a child is removed
from his or her home, or termination of parental rights is sought.79 Case
plans are to be prepared within sixty days of a child's removal from his or
her home. 0 Only for good cause shown should this be extended, and if so,
for no more than one extension of thirty days.8 1 Amendments, even with the
consent of all the parties, require court approval.8 2
In accord with the goal that children spend no more than twelve months
in foster care, case plans may only continue in effect for more than twelve
months if an extension is granted by the court.8 3 The twelve-month period
begins the earlier of the child's removal from the home or date of court
approval of the case plan.8 4 Case plans may be extended due to the Depart-
ment's failure to provide necessary services to the parents, but extensions are
limited to six months.85 There is no provision to extend a case plan based on
a parent's failure to meet plan requirements. Indeed, failure to comply
substantially is grounds to terminate parental rights.
8 6
D. Florida and Federal Law on Concluding Dependency Cases
In addition to the time standards of state and federal laws, a number of
substantive provisions apply to the conclusion of dependency cases. In cases
where reunification is an option, it is contingent on a showing that the parent
has "substantially complied with the terms of the case plan to the extent that
78. § 39.001(1)(h).
79. §§ 39.01(11), .601(1)(a); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.400(a)(1), (2).
80. §§ 39.601(9)(a), .603(1); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.400(a), 8.410(a).
81. § 39.601(9)(a); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.400(a)(3), 8.410(c).
82. § 39.601(9)(f); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.400(b).
83 § 39.601(7).
84. Id.
85. § 39.701(0; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.415(e)(3).
86. §§ 39.601(3)(k),.703.
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the safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and emotional health of the child
is not endangered by the return of the child to the home.,8 7 However, termi-
nation of parental rights must be sought if a child is not returned home by the
twelve-month judicial review hearinF, and the petition for same must be filed
within thirty days of that hearing.8 - The standard for court waiver of this
requirement and extension of the case plan is extreme, "[o]nly if the court
finds that the situation of the child is so extraordinary" and in accord with the
child's best interests.8 9 The petition need not be filed if the child is being
cared for by relatives who choose not to adopt, or where the state has failed
to make reasonable efforts at reunification by providing appropriate services
to the parents.90
Once a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights is filed, an
advisory hearing is to be held as soon as possible, followed within forty-five
days by an adjudicatory hearing on the petition's merits, barring consent of
the parties otherwise, or based on a reasonable continuance for preparation or
attendance of witnesses, or under court rules, for good cause.9 At the advi-
sory hearing, parents are informed of their right to counsel and receive
appointed counsel, if appropriate. 92 The court must also consider whether the
parents will admit or deny the petition, or otherwise consent to the petition;
and appoint a guardian ad litem.93 At the adjudicatory hearing, the court
determines whether clear and convincing evidence exists to terminate paren-
tal rights.
94
In cases where the birth parents' rights are to be terminated, the perma-
nency options authorized by law include the favored goal of adoption, with
four other options if that is not achievable or in the child's best interest,
including: 1) legal guardianship; 2) long-term custody with an adult,
whether or not a relative of the child; 3) long-term licensed custody for
certain children over the age of fourteen; and 4) independent living.95 Long-
term custody can be a permanency option for any dependent child over
fourteen who has been in foster care for more than six months, reunification
at a later date is not precluded, and protective services or supervision are no
longer indicated. 96 Long-term licensed custody may be a permanency option
for children over fourteen years of age who have been in a stable foster care
87. § 39.522(2).
88. § 39.703(2).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. § 39.809(1), (2); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.525(b).
92. FLA. R. Juv. P 8.510(a)(2).
93. Id.
94. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.525(a).
95. §§ 39.621-.624.
96. § 39.622(1)-(4).
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placement for more than twelve months, and continue the foster placement
until the child's majority.97 Independent living may be a permanency option
for children over the age of sixteen if found to be the most appropriate option
consistent with the child's safety.98
E. Representation of the Parties Under Florida and Federal Law
Court proceedings significantly influence how dependency cases impact
the parties. Providing for legal representation of the interests, perspectives,
and responsibilities for the various participants is rather disparate under
Florida law. The Department must be represented by an attorney in all
proceedings. 99 Depending on the particular district, the Department may be
represented by an in-house attorney, the state attorney's office, or the state
attorney general's office.
Birth parents are entitled to legal representation at all stages of depend-
ency proceedings, including appointed counsel if they are indigent, which
they typically are.10 By state law, the right to counsel arises at the time of
the shelter hearing such that if a parent arrives at a shelter hearing without
counsel, but requests one, the shelter hearing may be continued for up to
seventy-two hours to obtain and consult with counsel. 10 1 During that time,
the child remains in shelter care.102 The fees paid to court appointed attor-
neys for parents in dependency cases are limited by statute.'0 3 They are to be
paid by and as established by the county.1°4 In termination of parental rights
proceedings, compensation is capped at $1000 at the trial level and $2500 at
the appellate level, though these caps are raised at least in some counties
where warranted by the demands of the case.'05 There are no such caps
under state law on the expenditure per case by Department attorneys.
Under state law, the best interests of children are to be represented by a
guardian ad litem.10 6 Like their parents, an appointment is to be made at a
shelter hearing, unless the court finds it unnecessary. 0 7 However, unlike
their parents, there is no provision in state law to continue a shelter hearing
97. § 39.623.
98. § 39.624.
99. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.255(a).
100. § 39.013(9)(a).
101. § 39.402(5)(b).
102. Id.
103. See § 39.0134.
104 § 39.0134(1).
105. § 39.0134(2); Telephone Interview with Mary Ann Scherer, birth parent attorney,
in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Aug. 16, 2000) (notes on file with author).
106. § 39.402(8)(c)1.
107. Id.
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because a guardian is not available or has not had time to consult with the
child or otherwise learn of the details of the case. A guardian ad litem is a
volunteer who need not be a licensed attorney competent to address a child's
legal interests. 10 8 The guardian him or herself, or another guardian ad litem
program representative, becomes a party to the proceedings, required to be
present for "all critical stages of the dependency proceeding," to review
disposition recommendations, and any proposed changes in a child's place-
ment.109 The duties of a guardian ad litem in representing "the interests of
the child" include: 1) investigating and reporting in writing to the court as to
the allegations of abuse or neglect and any other subsequently arising mat-
ters; 2) reporting to the court as to a child's wishes; and 3) making recom-
mendations to the court.'10 The Guardian Ad Litem Program does have a
limited number of staff attorneys. However, due to either a shortage of
volunteers or shortage of paid and skilled staff to supervise more guardians,
many children do not have a guardian to monitor their progress and safety, or
evaluate and report to the court on their best interests. " In the limited
instances where an attorney ad litem is appointed for a dependent child, there
are no statutory directives as to representation of a child's legal interests, nor
are there any directives in court rules, with the exception of a pilot program
for attorneys ad litem, discussed below."
2
Federal law does not require the appointment of an attorney to represent
a child in dependency cases, nor a court appointed special advocate, known
as a "CASA.""' 3 Commentators suggest that this leaves the child's interests
lacking for a need of an attorney .or similar advocate in dependency
cases. Federal law does require appointment of a guardian ad litem for
children who are the subject of judicial proceedings involving abuse or
neglect, though there is some debate as to whether this provision was in-
tended to require appointment of attorneys for children." 5 There is no
specific requirement that the state plan filed for Title IV-E funding eligibility
provide, in any particular fashion or manner, for legal representation for
children or the state in child welfare cases. Florida law simply does not
108. See §§ 39.820-.822; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(c), (f).
109. § 39.822(3); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.210(a).
110. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(c).
111. Wagner, supra note 1.
112. See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CnmiREN AND FAMmlEs, HB 2125, 14 (May 24, 2000);
see also infra notes 302-07 and accompanying text.
113. Davidson, supra note 12, at 768.
114. Id. at 768-69.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix) (Supp. IV 1998). See also Susan Vivian Mangold,
Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in Public Family Law: The Importance of
Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1397, 1450-51 (1999).
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guarantee that anyone in a dependency case will represent the child's legal
interests.
F. Assumptions of the Dependency System
Emerging from the laws creating Florida's dependency system are some
fundamental assumptions about the roles and expectations of the parties and
their representatives. The core assumption is that the DCF will act in accord
with the best interest of dependent children, even protect those interests, as it
fulfills the extensive duties assigned to it. The Department is entrusted with
the needs and care of dependent children, including safeguarding their inter-
est in family reunification or preservation. The Department is to plan a
course for those children and their families to achieve better health and
functioning. The Department is expected to balance tensions between the
needs of children and families with what services and resources may be
available. In many cases, the Department is expected to reconcile its role of
helping families reunite, while concurrently planning for and even pursuing
the family's demise. The Department's attorneys are expected to file and
prosecute civil dependency actions, literally acting in the name of the child
and, presumably, in accord with the best interests of the child, though their
client remains the Department itself.
It is likewise assumed that when volunteer guardians ad litem are ap-
pointed in dependency cases that they will advise the courts as neutral par-
ticipants to safeguard the best interests of children in a timely manner. As
the only party expressly charged with representing the best interests of
children, it may also be assumed that the guardian can and will act to monitor
the child's needs on a regular basis. It may also be assumed that the guardian
will promptly seek to remedy any failings of the system which threaten to
visit harm on the child. For children in out-of-home care, the guardian would
also presumably be a check on abuses in foster care or other such place-
ments.
There appears an expectation that the circuit court will oversee and
ensure in a timely manner that the Department and other parties act expedi-
tiously in the best interests of children and families. In an effort to ensure
that the courts actually do this, an extensive hearing schedule is established
by statute to review and approve everything that happens to a child and
everything that is planned for the child. The detail of the statute and its
demands for timely and extensive hearings suggest that none of the parties
were actually trusted when the statutes were written. A similar sentiment of
distrust can be construed from the painstaking detail of case plan require-
ments to guide the conduct of parties, discussed below. The courts check up
on everyone and the courts are told how and when to do this.
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It is presumed that the court can accomplish its oversight role based on
most probably complete information received from the other system actors,
including the DCF and its attorneys, the parents and their attorneys, and any
guardian ad litem who may be assigned to a child. This point is particularly
significant because the courts must necessarily rely upon information re-
ceived from the parties and the lawyers. As the National Council of Juvenile
and Family Court Judges (the "Council") recognizes, not only do attorneys
largely control what information a judge sees, but also that "[e]ach party
must be competently and diligently represented" for the system to function as
it is intended. 1 6 More significantly, the Council notes that the failure of
attorneys to behave timely, both in correcting errors and advancing cases,
adversely impacts "the quality and timeliness of the court's decision-
making"'  Child welfare professionals in Florida recognize that this is a
problem for Florida now, even as to statutorily required information at status
hearings." 8
It is presumed that the courts can and will act as a check to ensure that
all involved act at virtually every step and decision point in accord with the
best interests of the children involved. This basic structure and its core
assumptions, particularly as to the role of the court, exist nationally. The
Council observes that "judges make critical legal decisions and oversee
social services efforts to rehabilitate and maintain families, or to provide
permanent alternative care for child victims."'1 19 The current reliance on the
courts as the key mechanism to ensure that children are not re-abused or
neglected within or by the dependency or foster care system is one which has
certainly not escaped the courts' attention.12 The Council notes the "more
active" and "significant new role" the courts play in ensuring that "a safe,
permanent and stable home is secured" and making decisions for each de-
pendent child.
121
This present role of the courts, arising from changes in federal and state
law, including the Adoption and Safe Families Act ("ASFA"), constitutes a
significant expansion from their limited role in the 1970s to determine simply
whether a child had suffered from abuse or neglect, and whether in-home
services or out-of-home placement was the necessary response.1 22 The
116. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENIE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOURcE
GuimmNEs; IMPROViNG COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES 22 (SPRING
1995), available at http:llwww.pppncjfcj.org/html/publications.html.
117. Id. at 10, 22; see also DUQUETTEETAL., supra note 5, at ch. VII.
118. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, supra note 1.
119. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 116, at
10.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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expanded role necessitates handling more complex issues, more hearings,
and more people. Dependency litigation places courts in a "managerial and
directive" role, which is unsurpassed in the degree to which it intrudes into
the actions of an executive branch agency. The Council finds that "many
courts have neither the ability nor the resources to meet these new demands."
The demands on judges render the dependency division among the most
stressful, if not the most stressful, in a courthouse.12 3 The Council finds that
the present day structure of the dependency system effectively requires that
"step-by-step the judge must determine how best to assure the safe upbring-
ing of the child, and that the child is eventually placed in a safe and perma-
nent home."
If these statutory assumptions were seeing fruition when practically
applied, dependency cases might be progressing well and timely. However,
in practice, the assumptions of the dependency system are failing in many
cases. Dependency system participants are aware of this and trying to com-
pensate for the failures, and children and their families in the system are still
being hurt.
VI. PART 11-THE FINDINGS-HOW THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF
DEPENDENCY LAW RESULTS IN SIGNIFICANT HARM TO CHILDREN
A. Dependency Litigation Delays Are Harming Children Significantly
A foster child described her nine years in foster care this way:
I've moved most of my life and, I tell you, it's like a wave getting
ready to come for you while you are on the sea. And in my life, I
have experienced that, I am still experiencing it and I will experi-
ence it the rest of my life. It's like a storm getting ready to wreck
the ship and everything aboard, like my life, my soul, my heart, my
future.124
It is widely agreed that prolonged stays in foster care are detrimental in the
precise manner indicated by this child, resulting in serious, life-long prob-
lems.1 5 As reported by the National Conference of State Legislatures:
123. Interview with Judge John Frusciante, Circuit Judge, Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit, in
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Aug. 18, 2000) (notes on file with author).
124. Madeleine M. Landrieu & Jesse R. Adams, Jr., On Behalf of Our Children, 46 LA.
B.J. 469, 470 (April 1999).
125. For an excellent report of first-hand experiences and perspectives of foster
children themselves, see Chaifetz, supra note 2.
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Child welfare experts generally agree that prolonged stays in foster
care and frequent moves from one foster home to another are not
conducive to a child's healthy development. Children who grow
up in foster care often exhibit emotional and behavioral problems
that contribute to expensive social problems such as school failure,
teen pregnancy, homelessness, unemployment, criminal activity,
incarceration and welfare dependency. 2
Similarly, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges has
cited the "widely accepted principle[]" that "stable and continuous care
givers for children are very important to normal emotional growth... [and
that] children need secure and uninterrupted emotional relationships with
adults who are responsible for their care."1 27 Failing this, the Council ac-
knowledges damage to "a child's ability to form close emotional relation-
ships after reaching maturity."' 1 Legal commentators have recognized for
decades that even the best of foster care placements can be detrimental to
children, simply because they have been separated from the families and
lives that they know and to which they are bonded. As one commentator
explains, foster children "suffer anxiety and depression from being separated
from their parents, and they are forced to deal with new caretakers, play-
mates, school teachers, etc. As a result, they often suffer emotional damage
and their development is delayed.
129
The American Bar Association likewise recognizes these circumstances
in its model standards for lawyers who represent children:
In general, a child needs decisions about the custodial environment
to be made quickly.... [I]f the child must be removed from the
home, it is generally in the child's best interests to have rehabilita-
tive or reunification services offered to the family quickly.... [Ihf
it appears that reunification will be unlikely, it is generally in the
child's best interests to move quickly toward an alternative perma-
126. National Conference of State Legislatures, A Place to Call Home: Adoption and
Guardianship for Children in Foster Care: Executive Summary, at http://www.ncsl.org
programs/pubs/BKFSTR2.HTM (last visited May 15, 2001); see also Duquette et al., supra
note 5, at 130 (stating that "[l]ong delays in the courts and in matching children with nurturing
families are extremely detrimental to healthy emotional development").
127. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 116, at
13.
128. Id.
129. Michael S. Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect of
Children: A Review of Before the Best Interests of the Child, 78 MICH. L. Rnv. 645, 662
(1980).
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nent plan. Delay and indecision are rarely in a child's best inter-
ests.
130
Unfortunately, Florida's foster children are subjected to delay and
indecision on a regular basis. The statewide average length of stay in active
cases for foster care children is almost three years, at 34.3 months (excluding
relative care giver cases), with a range among the fifteen DCF districts of
twenty-two months to fifty-six months.' 3' While the head of one DCF
district reportedly counters these statistics by explaining that the average stay
for children who have entered the system since 1997 is only two years,
statewide data still shows an increase in these numbers over the previous
year, when the average length of stay statewide was 32.4 months, with a
district range of twenty-six months to 55.6 months.1 33 The target of eighteen
months under the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, which no district
meets.134 Similarly, as of August 1999, the percentage of dependent children
exiting foster care within fifteen months averaged only 26.4% statewide,
with a district range of 14.3 to 44.7%.135
Undue delay exists regardless of the permanency goal in the case. In
fiscal year 1995/1996, the statewide average length of stay in foster care with
a reunification goal was approximately 20.5 months, which actually crept up
to 23.3 months by 1999.136 In fiscal year 1995/1996, for termination cases
with a goal of adoption, the statewide average length of stay was approxi-
mately forty-five months. 37 These numbers are not far from the national
average stay in foster care of three years. 38 Not until parental rights are
terminated do delays ease for Florida's children. The average length of timefrom termination of parental rights to finalization in fiscal year 1998/1999
130. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT
CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES pt. I § B-5, commentaly (1996).
131. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 3, at FSP-027.
132. Carol Marbin-Miller, S. Fla. Kids 'Growing Up' in Foster Care, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 20, 2000, at IA.
133. See FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 3, at FSP-027.
134. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, AUGUST 1999 SITUATION REPORT FSP-003
(Aug. 1999), available at http:llstate.fl.us/cf weblnewslmsptldocslsitrl0899admin.pdf.
135. kIL
136. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, PERFORMANCE REPORT, THIRD QUARTER,
FY 96/97 5 (June 1997), available at http:l/www5.myflorida.com/cfweb/myflorida/health
family/publications/bureaus/dcf/docs/3rdquart.pdf; OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMIN-
ISTRATOR MEANINGFUL REFORM ON THE FRONT LINES: DEPENDENCY COURT IMPROVEMENT
INrriATIvEs 1997-2000 (undated).
137. Id.
138. Duquette et al., supra note 5, at ch. I.
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was 12.52 months, compared with an ASFA goal of twelve months.1 39 This
would seem to indicate that advancing cases to termination of parental rights
or other such permanency determination is a more significant problem than
the process of finalizing a permanent placement once a child is legally
available for adoption or other permanency option.
Protracted dependency litigation and delayed permanency also impacts
foster families as a unit. At least one court has recognized the severe strain
on foster parents or prospective adoptive parents due to protracted litigation
and delayed permanency, and how those factors may put children at further
risk of unstable lives: "[a]t some point in time, custodial parents must earn
the right to claim a child permanently, lest they discharge their duty with
something less than completeness or worse yet, throw up their hands and
abandon their efforts for the sake of their own emotional well-being.
'14
As noted at the opening of this article, a glance into a typical day in
Florida's dependency system revealed one foster family, likely destined to be
an adoptive family, which simply crumbled under delay-induced stress. Not
only did the potential adoptive family fail to solidify, but the siblings may
now grow up without each other for support, a sense of stability, and the
nurturing experience of a family. Still, other families which may have
reunited never do simply because protracted litigation causes their bonds to
dissolve, an example of which was also seen with a glance into a typical day
in Florida's dependency system. Commentators have noted that a family's
integrity is increasingly eroded in its own eyes, as well as the community at
large, the longer children remain in foster care without final adjudication of
their cases. 14r Other families may simply have no chance when delays in
planning for and providing rehabilitative services clash with legal require-
ments for expediency, discussed in greater detail below. Several examples of
this were seen in the glance taken by this study into a typical day in Florida's
dependency system.
Like Florida, Connecticut courts have also suffered from difficulty
meeting basic statutory deadlines, with initial evidentiary hearings typically
being delayed twice as many days as permitted by statute in the mid-1990s,
though eventually recovering to an average much closer to statutory require-
ments. 42 In the interim, the state was sued in Pamela B. v. Ment 3 for
139. FLA. DEP'T OF CHMDREN & FAmLIs, supra note 134, at FSP-033.
140. In re Adoption of M.A.H., 411 So. 2d 1380, 1384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
141. Pamela McAvay, Note, Families, Child Removal Hearings, and Due Process: A
Look at Connecticut's Law, 19 Qu~iNIc L. REv. 125, 137 (2000) (stating that "[w]here
investigation is improperly motivated, delay between removal and hearing simply allows more
time during which the internal and external perception of the parents and the family may be
denigrated")
142. See id. at 130.
143. 709 A.2d 1089 (Conn. 1998).
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constitutional due process violations. The fundamental constitutional right to
family integrity was at issue for taking several months to completely adjudi-
cate removal hearings. 44 The Pamela B. court recognized that judicial delay
can interfere with the constitutional right to family integrity to the degree that
any delay is only constitutionally justified to the extent it is "unequivocally
needed to safeguard and preserve the child's best interests."' 45 The court
spoke of a need for a "congruence of rights and remedies" in such cases,
which require timely and enforced hearing schedules. 146 Significantly, the
court found that its responsibility in this regard was restricted to the proper
allocation of its resources and that any remaining responsibility rested with
the legislature. 147 The court would not be responsible for delays, even if
considered objectively undue, if those delays resulted from a lack of appro-
priated resources.' 48
Similarly, in Florida, the Department's predecessor, the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services, was found in a class action lawsuit to
have violated statutory rights to six-month foster care review hearings by
failing to initiate such proceedings, "creat[ing] irreparable harm for which
injunctive relief is particularly appropriate. 9' 49 The court highlighted that the
statutory review hearings were intended to promote permanency and adop-
tion of foster children in out-of-home care for more than a year.'
144. McAvay, supra note 141, at 131-32.
145. 709 A.2d at 1100.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 1 101.
148. A concurring opinion in that case disagreed, asserting that a constitutional due
process violation occurred when the statutory time frame requiring a substantive hearing in ten
days was not met, taking instead up to six months under colloquially accepted continuances,
and that summary judgment on this point for the parents was warranted. Id. at 1110. (Berdon,
A.J., concurring) The concurring Justice highlighted the fact that fundamental constitutional
liberty interests were at issue, demanding that due process be afforded regardless of resource
allocation issues. Id. at 1111. The criticism of the majority opinion was blunt and direct,
stating:
[T]he majority would have us believe that the state could remove a child from
a parent's custody on the ground of neglect and then deny that parent a timely
hearing if [the court administrator] could prove insufficient resources caused
the delay. This reasoning is fundamentally flawed....
Any suggestion that this unusual theory of constitutional "hydraulics" can
dissipate the fundamental federal constitutional rights of the plaintiff class-
rights that do not depend upon the state's resources, [the court administra-
tor's] discretion or any other such state consideration-is also unavailing.
Pamela B., 709 A.2d at 1113.
149. Pingree v. Quaintance, 394 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
150. Id.
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The integrity of the family unit is constitutionally protected, and there-
fore, more than worthy of protection under the actual functioning of law,
appropriately balanced with considerations of child safety. 5 ' The right to
family integrity is one to which a child has an equal claim to that of a par-
ent. 5  Federal courts have characterized this right for children in terms of
their interest in regular, emotional contact with their parents, stating, "[the
right to family integrity] is the interest of. . . the children in not being dislo-
cated from the 'emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association,' with the parent."' 53 As the foregoing demonstrates, expediency
in dependency litigation is inextricably tied with the best possible balance
between a child's interest in family integrity and a child's interest in stability
and permanent family placement.
For the foregoing reasons, this study finds that children in foster care in
Florida, likely thousands of them, are being significantly harmed by pro-
tracted delays in dependency litigation, before even addressing the day-to-
day conditions in foster care and even if the children appear to be physically
"safe." It cannot be assumed that children will be any safer or better off in
foster care than they were with their families of origin. While life for most
does improve markedly, many others are placed in neglectful and over-
crowded foster homes, many are subjected to serious physical violence and
sexual abuse from foster parents or other foster children, possibly of a worse
nature than they ever suffered with their birth parents, and some have even
died.154
These are not isolated risks. In one DCF district, at least sixty-five
foster homes currently have more foster children than the home is licensed to
have. 55 Last year, almost four hundred dependent children under protective
supervision either ran away or simply "aged out" of the system without
resolution of their cases. 56 Still others are believed to be subjected to worse
abuse in the system than experienced with their parents. Consider reports of
one child's lawyer, that in Broward County alone, some fifty instances of
child on child sexual abuse in foster care were brought to his attention in an
eighteen-month period. 57 Based on all of these conditions and risks, ad-
151. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
152. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equity & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
153. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977).
154. Interview with Howard M. Talenfeld, children's attorney/class action attorney, in
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (July 28, 2000) (notes on file with author).
155. Editorial, Foster Parents Needed, FLA. TMEs-UNION, May 22,1999, at B4.
156. Letter from Maria Leon, Family Safety, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families,
(enclosures) (Oct. 18, 2000) (on file with author).
157. National Coalition for Child Protection Reform, Foster Care vs. Family Preserva-
tion: The Track Record on Safety, text at note 5 (citing Aff. of David S. Bazerman, Esq., filed
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dressing the factors which cause dependency litigation to be delayed is
warranted.
B. Gobbledy Guck, Cookies and Other Debris Gunking up the System
A main statutory mechanism under state and federal law enacted to
ensure timely permanency for children is the required court hearing to ap-
prove a permanency goal within twelve months of children entering the
system. This is a key indicator of system efficacy. One of the main reasons
that permanency is not being achieved timely is that often these hearings are
simply not being held within twelve months. 158 Some data and anecdotal
experience gathered by others suggest why, as do matters observed in this
study.
As noted, in a typical day in Florida's dependency system observed in
this study, cases simply were not advancing in accord with interim time
deadlines leading up to the one-year permanency hearing. Adjudications
were not occurring within twenty-eight days and the Department was seeking
extensions of time to do so, and in one case seeking and obtaining from the
court sixty additional days in a case already five months old. Case plans to
map the progress of a case were being prepared as much as three months late,
when the law provides for only sixty days to prepare the plan. Department
investigations were not being completed timely and lengthy continuances of
court proceedings were being granted. Department attorneys were simply
not communicating with their client to verify and assess progress and com-
pliance with the law.
Observations made on that typical day are confirmed by the Department
itself and others to be, indeed, typical and widespread. In one judicial circuit,
a committee of a dependency court improvement program concluded that the
Department is simply not prepared to address permanency at one year due to
a failure to staff cases for permanency far enough in advance. 59 In accord
with this conclusion, a preliminary investigation by federal officials, as to
state response to ASFA, finds that Florida has not incorporated changes into
its social work practice relating to ASFAs requirement that termination
petitions be sought for any parent whose child is in foster care for fifteen of
in Ward v. Feaver, Case # 98-7137, U. S. District Court, Southern District of Fla. (Dec. 16
1998)), at http://www.nccpr.org/newissues/1.html (last visited May 15, 2001).
158. Margaret Taylor, Financial Administrator, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families,
Address at Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Prelude to ASFA Audit
(workshop) (Aug. 30, 2000) (notes on file with author).
159. Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit Dependency Court Improvement Program, Children's
Services Comm., Notes on "Permanency Delays" (April 2000) (on file with author).
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twenty-two consecutive months.16° Federal officials also note the need for
"establishing effective working relationships with agency attorneys" which
could also impact on Departmental awareness and planning for statutory
guidelines in individual cases.
161
The Department itself has identified, in its handling of dependency
litigation, extensive failures to use state and federally authorized mechanisms
to advance cases promptly. When the Department audited cases in eight of
its districts for pursuing expedited termination of parental rights in cases of
the most egregious abuse or neglect, no district had qualified cases which
were regularly supported by a court finding to expedite the case, and in only
one district were petitions for expedited termination filed in all cases. 162 in
the best of the remaining districts, petitions for expedited termination were
filed in only forty-three percent of the audited cases. One district was found
to file expedited petitions in as few as fourteen percent of qualified cases,
while one district completely failed to file in any of its cases. These failures
keep foster children from being available for adoption and compromise their
ability to ever be adopted as they grow older and older in "temporary"
care.1
63
The Department similarly identified a widespread failure to take advan-
tage of concurrent case planning as a method of expediting cases. In appli-
cable cases, the Department found that more often than not its districts fail to
place children in a home that could serve as an adoptive placement or with a
legal custodian while reasonable efforts for reunification were pursued
concurrently. Concurrent case planning was not pursued in as much as
ninety-three percent of qualifying cases in one DCF district. The average
failure rate among districts was over sixty-eight percent.164 Another study
specific to dependency cases in Hillsborough County similarly found that a
lack of concurrent case planning was a "barrier" to achieving permanence for
children, calling it "one of the most frequently observed" problems. 165
160. U.S. GENERAL ACCOuNTING OFFCE, supra note 19, at 8-9.
161. Id. at 9.
162. See Address by Taylor, supra note 158. The Department used an auditing
procedure identical to that which the federal government will use to determine Florida's
compliance with the Adoption and Safe Families Act. Id. For a detailed description of audit
procedures, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERvs., CHrD AND FAMILY SERvICES
REviEws, PROCEDURES MANUAL ch. 4 (Aug. 2000).
163. The courts were typically more responsive. In cases where the expedited petition
was actually filed, termination hearings were conducted within 60 days in as high as 75
percent of the cases in one district, though none was held in District Fourteen. The remaining
districts for which data was available had hearings held within 60 days 60, 50, 38, and 20
percent of the time. Letter from Taylor, supra note 28.
164. Id.
165. BARRETr, supra note 5, at 23.
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It is critical to recognize that simply conducting court hearings and
issuing court orders is apparently not sufficient to ensure timely progress of
cases. A Department audit of its files found cases where court orders were
signed several months after a hearing because Department attorneys failed to
provide drafts to judges as ordered. In one case, a draft order directing the
Department to file a petition for termination of parental rights within ninety
days of the hearing was sent to the judge 150 days after the hearing. The
petition had not been filed, a fact not detected by the court and not remedied
by any participant to the proceedings. 166 A case worker supervisor reported
regular delays of six to seven weeks in getting court orders signed because
Department attorneys were not sending orders. 167 Problems of this type
prompted one judge interviewed for this study to request resources for a case
coordinator to check on the status of compliance with court orders, recogniz-
ing that simply rendering an order is not enough to ensure that action ordered
to ensure the best interests children is actually taken timely.
168
Lest all the blame be placed on the Department, it warrants note that the
courts themselves acknowledge that their functioning is a significant prob-
lem. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges states:
in many jurisdictions, the quality of the court process has gravely
suffered. Hearings are often rushed in child abuse and neglect
cases. There are also frequent and unfortunate delays in the timing
of hearings and decisions, causing children to grow up without
permanent homes. Many courts know little about relevant agency
operations or services. All too often, child welfare agency em-
ployees spend unnecessary hours waiting for court hearings while
they could be "out working in the field."'169
Especially with heavy and increasing case loads, time to "work in the
field" is critical, particularly as to case planning and execution. Numerous
child welfare professionals interviewed in this study reported that the amount
of time spent in statutorily mandated court hearings detracts from the abili 0
of caseworkers to spend time with dependent children and assist parents.
The impact on parents is also significant. As one judge interviewed for this
study emphasized, parents are attending excessive court hearings rather than
166. Address by Taylor, supra note 158.
167. Confidential Interview in Broward County, Fla. (Sept. 29, 2000) (notes on file
with author).
168. Interview with Judge Frusciante, supra note 123.
169. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 116, at
10.
170. See Confidential Interviews, supra notes 1 & 4; Telephone Interview with
Scherer, supra note 105.
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being at work or attending rehabilitative services, giving rise to a plea that
we "get these people out of this building" for their own good.
171
While court time is a factor, it must also be concluded that low quality
in case planning is a significant problem. While case plans are intended by
statute to be individualized to the needs of the families involved and a unique
map of how many families can be restored, a Department audit of cases in
eight of its districts found that only one district regularly maintained indi-
vidualized case plans, with goals "behaviorally stated and measurable." On
average, the remaining seven districts failed to do so in twenty-five percent
of their cases.172 Case plans are routinely "cookie cutter" in nature, rather
than being tailored to the specific needs of the children and families in-
volved. 173 In some cases, "cookie cut" case plans, which obtain court ap-
proval, fail to comply with logic and the facts of the case. A Department
audit discovered at least one case plan which discussed the efforts of birth
parents in a completely different case towards meeting reunification tasks.
The case in which the plan was filed and approved was solely a termination
case, in which reunification services were not being pursued at all.174
The failure to include parents and guardians in case plan development
was also independently observed in this investigation.175 In addition, De-
partment officials acknowledge that, "routinely parents are not included in
case planning, and reasons are not documented," and further that, "many
[DCF] districts are not developing case plans within sixty days of removal,"
as is legally required. 76 It appeared in this study that the practical impact of
failing to include parents in case plans was to render the plans impracti-
cal. For example, it was regularly acknowledged by child welfare officials
and even a judge that case plans are knowingly written to include rehabilita-
tive services which parents cannot access for lack of transportation, a prob-
lem even in urbanized areas. The Department reports that standards of care
171. Interview with Dorian Damoorgian, Circuit Judge, Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit (Nov.
1, 2000) (notes on file with author).
172. Letter from Taylor (enclosures), supra note 28.
173. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, supra note 1, with
reports from at least four DCF districts.
174. Address by Taylor, supra note 158.
175. Visit to DCF Service Center, North Lauderdale (Sept. 29, 2000). During this visit,
a case worker, who requested anonymity, acknowledged preparing a case plan unilaterally for
a hearing the next business day. The case worker requested anonymity (notes on file with
author).
176. Address by Taylor, supra note 158. One should not conclude that the DCF is the
only party responsible for delays in case plan development. For example, one case was
reported in this study in which a birth parent insisted on use of her psychologist, which caused
delay, as the DCF needed to check the psychologist's credentials. Interview with Judge
Frusciante, supra note 123.
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can vary significantly in different areas of the state.177 Parents, guardians,
dependency system attorneys, and department officials all reported that case
plans are regularly difficult to understand, particularly for parents of limited
formal education. 78 One Department official described case plans as "gob-
bledly guck."'179 This consensus is all the more troubling considering that
courts must review and approve all case plans.
Another study, which performed a case-by-case sampling and review of
sixty dependency cases in Hillsborough County, similarly found case plans
lacking in addressing the comprehensive needs of families to achieve reunifi-
cation. That study found that most cases failed to address services needed to
resolve such core "collateral" issues contributing to family disfunction as,
"substance abuse, domestic violence, or chaotic lifestyles." 80  Appropriate
case plans "were the exception, rather than the rule." 181 Similarly, case plans
often fail to include all tasks and services ordered by the court. Only in one
of its districts did the DCF find that all case plans included all court ordered
tasks and services. The remaining audited districts failed in at least five
percent of the cases and in as much as forty-four percent of the cases, with an
average failure rate among audited districts of twenty-three percent.1 82
Moreover, case plans effectively continue beyond their expiration without
required court approval in "many areas" and case plans are extended because
the Department has failed to provide reasonable efforts towards reunifica-
tion. 83
The problems extend beyond simply writing a good case plan. The
Department's failure to provide timely services can directly hinder the ability
of parents to comply with case plan requirements. Typical of the complaints
that this study received from birth parent attorneys was that of a birth parent
required to pass fifteen random drug screenings within the time frame of the
case plan. As of the date the case plan expired, the Department had only
subjected the parent to three screenings, causing the case to be delayed. Such
177. Telephone Interview with Vilchez, supra note 1; Confidential Interviews of May
23, 2000 and July 26, 2000, supra notes I & 4; Interview with Judge Frusciante, supra note
123; FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIEs, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO REORGANIZE THE
DEPARTmT OF CHnIDRN AND FAnUS 6 (Jan. 1, 2000).
178. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Case Conferencing
Workshop and Circuit Breakout, supra note 1; Interview with Wagner, supra note 1; Tele-
phone Interview with Scherer, supra note 105; Confidential Interview, supra note 4;
Confidential Telephone Interview with birth parent in Broward County (Oct. 2, 2000) (notes
on file with author).
179. Interview with Allegretti & Sanford, supra note 7.
180. BARRET, supra note 5, at 22.
181. Id.
182. Letter from Taylor (enclosures), supra note 28.
183. Address by Taylor, supra note 158.
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failures can cause even further delay. For example, the delay may cause a
need for an updated psychological evaluation ' 4  Another experienced
dependency attorney interviewed for this study reported extended delays
waiting for department action, such as waiting for approval of a psychologi-
cal evaluation and another cited one case in which a DCF expert witness took
nine months to complete a report.18 5 Similar problems were cited by a
committee of one judicial circuit's dependency court improvement project,
described as a "waiting list for services," and further that new tasks are added
after completion of those in the written case plan. 86 Reports of identical
problems were cited by a Department caseworker supervisor.
87
An independent study of dependency cases in Hillsborough County
finds conclusively that these conditions delay cases and, necessarily, perma-
nency and stability that children need for their safety and health:
delays [by the Department] in following up with parents led judges
and parents' attorneys to demand additional time for the parent to
complete case plan tasks, and therefore extended children's time in
temporary out-of-home care. This, in addition to frequency of
movement, led children to have increasing problems with attach-
ment and behavioral development.
1 88
C. Social Conditions Joining Public Policy to Harm System Efficacy
The dependency system's overall case load can impact the length of
dependency litigation in each individual case. There has been a significant
increase in the child welfare caseload in recent years, including a rapid
escalation in the number of reports of suspected child abuse or neglect and
responsive protective investigations. The number of calls to the child abuse
hotline from August 1998 to August 1999 increased fifty-three percent.'8 9
The past five years has seen a sixteen percent increase in the number of
investigations, from 109,869 to 127,859.' Caseload increases do not appear
to be due merely to population increases, because the number of investiga-
184. Telephone Interview with Vilchez, supra note 1.
185. Telephone Interview with Scherer, supra note 105. Telephone Interview with
John Coleman, in Ft. Myers, Fla. (Aug. 17, 2000) (notes on file with author).
186. See Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit Dependency Court Improvement Program, Chil-
dren's Services Comm., supra note 159.
187. Confidential Interview with DCF caseworker in Broward County (Sept. 29, 2000)
(notes on file with author).
188. BARREIT, supra note 5, at 23.
189. FLA. DEP'TOFCHILDREN & FAMmns, supra note 9 at 4.
190. Id. at 2.
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tions per 1000 children in the past five years has risen from 32.3 to 37.2.191
This has contributed to a significant increase in the number of cases of
verified abuse or neglect. For example, in Hillsborough county, the number
of verified reports of child maltreatment increased ten percent in just one
year.1 92 The Department identifies three social conditions as the main con-
tributors to a rise in the incidence of abuse and neglect, including rising
substance abuse among adults, lack of affordable child care, and increasing
incidence of family violence. 
193
The societal dynamics contributing to high case loads may not yet have
been met with sufficient resources, as the Department is calling for additional
resources and alternative approaches to prevention, including greater funding
of the primary prevention program sponsored by the Department, Healthy
Families Florida. 194 Prevention efforts may need substantial reinforcement,
as they appear inadequate now. At present, only forty-three of Florida's
sixty-seven counties even have the main child abuse prevention program
provided through the Department, Healthy Families Florida, and a few more
counties only have partial coverage. The fiscal year 2000-2001 budget
allocation of the child abuse and prevention program is $24.5 million. By
contrast, spending for intervention after child abuse or neglect that has
already occurred is almost twenty times that amount, at $482.8 million. 195
Failing to address this disparity will have long-term impact. The De-
partment reports that because prevention services are currently insufficient,
there is a risk of more serious problems for children, families, and the state at
large to face later "many other critical services, particularly in the area of
prevention and early intervention, remain limited or nonexistent. As a result,
many individuals and families are unable to access services until they are in
crisis when the costs in dollars and human terms are much higher.'
196
A related issue is the impact on current resources from the growing
number of children removed from their families. Removal of a child places
particular stress on the child welfare system, because removal requires
financial and other resources to address greater needs, perhaps most signifi-
cantly, recruiting suitable foster homes. The number of children alleged to
be victims of abuse or neglect who enter out-of-home care is increasing
significantly. Hillsborough County, for example, saw a staggering eighty
percent increase in the number of children entering out-of-home care from
191. Id.
192. Elizabeth Bettendorf, Report: Child Abuse Climbs 10%, TAMPA TRmuNE, Oct.
25, 2000.
193. FLA. DEP'T OFCH.DREN & FAMILIEs, supra note 9, at 2-3.
194. Id. at 4.
195. Id. at DCF/Faniily Safety charts 2-4.
196. FLA. DEP'TOF CHDREN & FAMILIEs, supra note 177, at 6.
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1999 to 2000.'97 However, it does not appear that child removal cases are
out pacing the increase in the total number of cases. Statewide, a recent
measure showed an eighteen percent increase in child protective investiga-
tions, but only a thirteen percent increase in the number of children in foster
care.
198
Notwithstanding data indicating a lack of proportional increases in
dependent children being removed from their families, many child welfare
professionals believe that removal often occurs when it is not needed. The
primary reason cited is a lack of sufficient in-home services.' 99 A sampling
and review of dependency cases in Hillsborough County by child welfare
professionals concluded that the availability of in-home services would have
prevented removal in five percent of the cases.20 In another DCF District,
the District Administrator reportedly estimates that some thirty-five percent
of her District's foster children could have been left with their families of
origin if appropriate services had been available.01
Aside from a lack of in-home services, many attribute unnecessary
removal of children from their families to a perceived shift in Departmental
philosophy, originating with the Department's Secretary. It is asserted that
the Secretary has created an atmosphere of overreaction in the "emergency"
removal of scores of children by caseworkers and investigators attempting to
protect their jobs, while claiming "safety" for children. The criticism has
been put this way:
[Secretary] Kearney's policies set off a foster-care panic. Workers
quickly got the message that they could be suspended, fired, maybe
even prosecuted for wrongly leaving a child in his or her own
home. But take away scores of children needlessly from loving
homes and, while enormous harm would come to the child, the
workers and their jobs were safe.2°2
197. BARRETT, supra note 5, at 5.
198. TEEA MARKOWrIZ, FLORIDA COMMUNITY BASED CAPE EVALUATION 1999-2000
7 (rev. Mar. 17, 2000) (prepared for the Fla. Dep't of Children & Families).
199. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Circuit Breakout and
Case Conferencing Workshop; supra note 1; Interview with Karen Gievers, supra note 1;
Confidential Interview of May 23, 2000, supra note 1; Interview with George B. Atkinson,
Program Administrator, Broward Sheriff's Office, Child Protective Investigations Section, in
Plantation, Fla. (July 27, 2000) (notes on file with author).
200. BARRE-r, supra note 5, at 21.
201. Richard Wexler, Children Paying High Price for Panic at DCF, PALM BEACH
POST, Oct. 1, 2000, at 1E.
202. Id.
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The perception is shared by others. One news account characterized the
Department's philosophy as, "remove [the] child at all costs," while noting
that a child's death resulted in the suspension or firing of five workers and
resignation of the two top district administrators.2 3 One may also find
historical support for this belief in an appellate case concerning a ruling by
the DCF Secretary, while serving in her previous capacity as a circuit judge
in the dependency division.2°4 In that case, she was cited for "bureaucratic
overkill" for erring too much on the side of caution in the interest of child
safety.2°5 A DCF official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, reported
in this study that, "I don't dare say 'reunification' in [the Secretary's] pres-
ence."2 6 Another Department spokeswoman is reported to have described a
"new philosophy" at the DCF under Secretary Kearney's leadership this
way: "If there's even a shadow of doubt about safety, that child will be
removed.... Our new philosophy is to remove the child at all costs. 20 7
However, the Secretary attributes current conditions not to any personal
disposition, but rather a necessary reaction to the federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act and to the state Kayla McKean Child Protection Act.208 Others
apparently agree with her. The National Center for Youth Law reports a
"widespread impression among [Florida] caseworkers and administrators that
ASFA 'ended family preservation,"' as well as a general belief that this
federal legislation is "widening the net" of children placed in out-of-home
care. M 9 A report prepared for the Department likewise concludes that the
Kayla McKean Act causes "a built-in implication that.., if one is to err in
their professional judgment, the error must be on the side of safety for the
child.' 210 At least one attorney who regularly represents birth parents re-
ported to this study that if too many children are being removed, the Kayla
McKean Act is the reason.2 Other Department officials indicate that the
Department's philosophy actually has a greater emphasis on preserving
families, reporting the Department's efforts to fund and promote community
203. Sarah Eisenhauer, Foster Parent Shortage on Treasure Coast 'A Crisis' Officials
Say, FORT PIERCE NEWS, July 9, 1999, at A4.
204. See In re C.G., 570 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
205. Id.
206. Confidential Interview with child welfare professional, public sector supervisory
employee, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (June 13, 2000) (notes on file with author).
207. Eisenhauer, supra note 203, at A4.
208. Gwyneth K. Shaw, Parents Say State Overreacts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 11,
2000, at B 1.
209. MARTHA MAT'HEWS & MICHELLE C-ENG, REPORT ON CHILD WELFARE
ADVOCATES' CONFERENCE, YOUTH LAW NEWS 3 (undated report of Nat'l Center for Youth
Law conference held November 5-6, 1999).
210. MARKowrrz, supra note 198, at 9.
211. Telephone Interview with Scherer, supra note 105.
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involvement in prevention efforts, consistent with the agency's published
212
strategic plan.
Given the noted statistical evidence that the proportion of abuse and
neglect cases which result in removal of children has not increased under
Secretary Kearney's stewardship, the claim that she has created an atmos-
phere of overreaction to almost arbitrarily remove children would be hard to
endorse. Likewise, the percentage of confirmed cases of abuse and neglect
where children are actually removed remains relatively low at approximately
seven percent.2 3 Also noteworthy is the fact that over the past five years (the
Secretary was appointed two and a half years ago) approximately the same
percentage of all protective service cases, sixty percent, are closed with the
children remaining with or being reunified with their parents. 14
The evidence indicates that any "unnecessary" removal of children is
occurring due to a lack of in-home services, which accords with legal stan-
dards described above, not from any personal philosophy of Secretary Kear-
ney. It would actually be more appropriate to recognize these cases as
"avoidable" removals. As noted, federal and state law, which the Secretary
is obligated to enforce, were amended at approximately the same time her
tenure began to require removal of children when "available" services will
not render the child safe in the home. At most, the anecdotal evidence would
indicate that the Secretary requires personal accountability from child wel-
fare professionals not to look past dangers to children based on consideration
of scare resources, which is certainly a commendable policy in the best
interests of children and in accord with the law. The issue raised by this
debate is whether the child welfare system at large is equipped to redress
timely, and on a case-by-case basis, the inappropriate removal of children
from their homes which can happen in individual cases. It is submitted that it
is not due to the lack of independent representation for children's legal
interests and the lack of reasonable assurance that court proceedings will
adhere to statutory deadlines necessary for the health and welfare of children,
as more fully explored below.
212. Shaw, supra note 208; Interview with Allegretti & Sanford, supra note 7; FLA.
DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES supra note 9.
213. FLA. DEP'T OF CILDREN & FAMIIES, CHILD PRRo'irEnv SERVICES, ANNUAL
STATISTiCAL DATA TABLES, FIScAL YEAR 1998-99 Table D-2, available at http://
www5.myflorida.co mLcf-web/MyfloridalhealthfamiIy/publications/childrensissues/childabuse/
9899chnt.pdf. This is the most recent data available. See Letter from Maria B. Leon, Family
Safety, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (July 31, 2000) (on file with author).
214. See Letter from Leon (enclosures), supra note 156.
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D. On Visitation Resources and Family Integrity
On that typical day in Florida's dependency system, when a judge
learned that a DCF case worker had blocked contact between a mother and
her nine-year-old child for nine months without court approval and in contra-
vention of state law, the judge queried as to how the case worker expected to
achieve reunification for the family, which was the case plan goal, by keep-
ing the family apart.215 The judge's query recognized not only the child's
constitutionally protected interest in the integrity of her family unit, but also
the practical and significant damage done to the parent-child bond when
contact is deprived for a protracted period of time. Florida courts have also
recognized expert testimony that a lack of sufficient visitation can deprive a
parent of an opportunity to demonstrate the ability to safely parent a child
and thereby achieve reunification. 16
Department officials expressed confusion over whose rights are at issue
regarding visitation, specifically whether it is a right of the child or a right of
the parent.217 In practice, visitation is so infrequent as to be almost meaning-
less in maintaining the child's bond to a parent. There appears consensus in
the child welfare community that foster children are developing attachment
disorders due to the limited visitation they are afforded with their parents, a
devastating condition that harms the child's ability to form bonded relation-
ships with anyone. 18 Visitation occurs once a month at best in most cases 19
Visitation occurs frequently in locations which are impersonal and intimidat-
ing to parents and perhaps even the children, like a courthouse or at DCF
offices. There are efforts to make visitation rooms appear like a "home" with
noninstitutional furniture and ddcor, as were viewed in this study, but the
parental awareness of the circumstances and surroundings calls into question
the fairness of DCF workers subsequently critiquing parents in court for
220
showing a lack of "intimacy" with their children during visitation.
215. Under Florida law, visitation is supposed to be granted absent clear and convinc-
ing evidence that such would not be in the child's best interest. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(9)
(2000). Visitation is to be ordered at the time of arraignment for any child in out-of-home
placement, unless there is a "clear and convincing showing that visitation is not in the best
interest of the child." § 39.506(6).
216. See Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So. 2d 957, 963 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (Jorgenson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217. Interview with Allegretti & Sanford, supra note 7.
218. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, supra note 1.
219. Telephone Interview with Vilchez, supra note 1.
220. A visitation room was viewed during the course of this study in DCF District 10
on September 29, 2000. Additional testimony on this point was received from Vilchez, supra
note 1.
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It would stand to reason that it is hard for a parent and child to maintain
or improve a close relationship with visitation only once a month. However,
Florida law does not even guarantee that to a child and a parent, setting only
nonbinding "goals" for children who are in shelter or foster care to visit with
their parents "at least" once a month, and siblings once a week.221 Time and
again in this study it was made clear that greater frequency of visitation
would only be possible with greater resources, and that monthly visitation
was often not achieved. Case workers already burdened with case loads
above recommended levels and still spending too much time in court, away
from the children who are their wards, lack the time to supervise visitation
more frequently, not to mention scheduling problems with case plans that
require parents to be at work during the same hours that supervised visitation•222
is offered. It will be truly hard to ever forget the faces of the mom and the
dad, holding hands and choking back tears on that typical day in Florida's
dependency system, as they tried to find words to explain how they could
give up on reunifying their family after three years because their daughter
simply did not know them any more.
E. The Significance of a National Problem
Florida is not alone in the nature or extent of dependency system prob-
lems, the tragedies it creates, and those it fails to stop. State child welfare
systems nationally face questions about their efficacy. 2 3 The federal gov-
ernment acknowledges that state programs are "plagued" by problems,
including substantially increasing caseloads, persistent and growing social
conditions contributing to the incidence of abuse and neglect, and weak-
nesses in state response systems, all of which are present in Flor-
ida. Workforce issues and poor agency relations with the courts are also
specifically identified.22 Similarly, the efficacy of court involvement is
221. FLA. STAT. § 39.4085(15), (16) (2000).
222. Confidential Interview of May 23, 2000, supra note 1; Confidential Interview of
July 26, 2000, supra note 4; Interview with Lisa Magrino, Program Operations Administrator
(District 10), Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (Sept. 29, 2000) (notes on file with author);
Telephone Interview with Vilchez, supra note I.
223. National Conference of State Legislatures, Child Welfare Project: New Direc-
tions for Child Protective Services, Executive Summary, at http://www.ncsl.org/pro-
gramslcyf/cpsexsum.htm (last visited May 15, 2001) (stating that "[Child Protective Services]
is widely viewed as a system in crisis.... [n]ot protecting children from abuse and ... not
supporting families that need help."); Duquette et al., supra note 5, at 93. (stating that "[t]he
need for comprehensive reform of child welfare policies and systems has long been evident.")
224. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE NYDIA
VELAZQUEZ, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CHILD PROTECrIvE SERvIcES: COMPLEX CHAL-
LENGES REQuiRE NEw STRATEGrES 6-7 (July 1997) (GAO/HEHS-97-115).
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cited, with causes for delays in permanency identified as high case volume,
inefficient case scheduling, and unprepared and burdened attorneys, all
factors identified in this study as problematic in Florida.225
Along with growing public awareness and increased reporting of child
abuse and neglect, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
cites poverty, drug use, and dissolved family units as social conditions
contributing to increased case volume, similar to the problems identified by
Florida's DCF.226 A major critique of child welfare systems nationally is a
belief that resources for investigation and prosecution of abuse and neglect
are overemphasized, while insufficient resources are directed to families in
need of services to address these problems, including preventative or reme-
dial services. 227 Again, like Florida.
Commentators in other states lament the same impact on foster children
which concern Florida. These comments about Louisiana's dependency
system could just as soon have been made about Florida:
Unfortunately, in Louisiana and across our nation, too many chil-
dren go to sleep at night not knowing where they will be tomor-
row. These are our nation's foster care children.... It is not
enough that these children are abused and neglected but, once re-
moved from their homes by the state in an effort to protect them,
their fate often does not improve. Too many of these children end
up in "foster care drift" and spend their childhood waiting either to
be reunited with their families or to be placed in new homes. Far
too many of them simply wait away their childhood. 22
The reasons identified for problems in dependency systems are also
shared from state to state. Consider, for example, a recent task force report
to the Georgia Department of Human Resources citing inadequate prevention
resources and a lack of a comprehensive plan to address problems within its
child welfare agency.229 Specifically cited are inexperienced and inade-
quately trained caseworkers, high caseloads, and, notably, systemic "mis-
trust" marked with private providers who "fear retribution and negative
225. Id. at 12.
226. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 116, at
10; see also, National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 223.
227. State and federal expenditures for out-of-home care total approximately seven
billion dollars annually, more than is spent on child abuse prevention, child protection, family
support and adoption services combined. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra
note 126.
228. Landrieu, supra note 124, at 469-70.
229. GA. DEP'T OF HUM. RES., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICE TASK FORCE REPORT TO THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 3 (Apr. 20, 2000).
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consequences" for raising complaints about the functioning of the state
agency. 230 Similar problems are reported in Pennsylvania, where at least one
county-based child welfare agency is alleged to be interfering with the ability
of birth parents to accomplish goals to achieve reunification.231 Of note,
there is a specific allegation that supervised visitation with foster children is
"routinely" scheduled when parents have to be at work, and that the parents
are criticized regardless of their response.232 They are either criticized for
missing visitation or for missing work, precisely the complaints received in
this study.233
The fact that Florida's problems exist so prevalently elsewhere, and
have done so for so long, suggest that the problems must continue. It does
suggest that some reform is still necessary. Reform of a type which may not
have been tried elsewhere. Perhaps fortunately for Florida's children, the
dependency system is about to be put to a substantial test by the federal
government, with significant incentives for improvement. Or perhaps there
is more reason than ever to worry.
F. A Looming Moral Crisis Created by the Law
With its extensive problems likely unresolved, in 2001 Florida's de-
pendency system will be audited by the federal government relative to its
participation in Social Security Act funding of foster care. Approximately
twenty-eight percent of the state's child welfare budget will be at stake.
Among other things, the audit will assess whether court reviews and perma-
nency hearings are occurring timely, whether expedited termination of
parental rights is pursued when warranted, and whether adoptions occur
timely.34 Excepting the latter item, Florida's performance appears below
standards. 235 If Florida fails to meet ASFA requirements in more than ten
230. Id. at 7-8.
231. Barbara White Stack, When the Bough Breaks: Beaver County Moves Faster
Than Average to Sever Parents' Legal Rights to Their Children, PnrSBURGH POST-GAzEr-r,
Dec. 13, 1999, at A17.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Secretary Judge Kathleen A. Keamey, Address at the Fourth Annual Dependency
Court Improvement Summit (Aug. 30, 2000).
235. Federal auditors are also expected to be assessing the quality of rehabilitation
services provided to parents and the quality of reunification decisions, emphasizing results
over methods. It is expected that auditors will be examining data on the re-entry into foster
care by children who have been re-united with their parents to ensure that children are not
returned too soon or inappropriately. Address by Taylor, supra note 158. By one measure,
the percentage of children who exit foster care who do not re-enter foster care within twelve
months after protective supervision is terminated, Florida is doing relatively well. The
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percent of its cases, the Department will be placed under a two-year correc-
tive action plan, after which significant sanctions will be levied against its
Title IV-B grant for persisting failures.236  "Substantial conformity" must
ultimately be achieved in ninety-five percent of cases.237
On a case-by-case basis, ASFA presents a significant moral crisis for
state intervention in the lives of children and families. As discussed, state
failures to advance the initial stages of proceedings significantly contributes
to keeping many children in foster care for fifteen of twenty-two consecutive
months, thus implicating federal funding.238 This includes delays in conduct-
ing arraignments, preparing case plans, and providing meaningful and timely
rehabilitative services to birth parents. Where statutory deadlines are hon-
ored, a child's parent should have no less than ten months to take advantage
of rehabilitative services outlined in a case plan. State caused delays are
contributing to parent-child relationships becoming subject to automatic
termination, where the circumstances may not have otherwise warranted that
in the first instance.
Federal law effectively decides that, regardless of whether delayed
litigation is caused by the state or a birth parent, children will not suffer with
delayed permanency. Even if the state fails to provide reunification services
in the first fifteen months of the case, it is effectively relieved of providing
such services because it must pursue termination of parental rights at that
time.239 The plan to achieve permanent placement for the child is to prevail
statewide average for the past two fiscal years has maintained a steady 95%, an improvement
from 89% in fiscal year 1995/1996. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, FY 96/97
PERFORMANCE REPORT ii (Dec. 1997), available at http://www5.myfloridacomlcf_web/
myfloridalhealthfamily/publicationslbureaus/dcf/docslannual.pdf; FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN &
FAMILIES, supra note 134, at FSP-026; FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 3, at
FSP-026.
236. Address by Taylor, supra note 158; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs.,
supra note 162, at ch. 7 § B, F. As discussed above, individual cases can also lose Title IV-E
funding eligibility.
237. Id. at ch. 6 § A-3, A-4.
238. As noted, Florida law actually imposes a more stringent requirement, that termina-
tions be sought once a child has been in foster care for twelve months if parents have not
substantially complied with case plan requirements. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e) (2000).
239. AACWA has also been criticized for promoting placement of children in out-of-
home care by providing open-ended funding for foster care, while funding for rehabilitative
and preventative services are limited. There is no indication that the scheme adopted by
ASFA remedied this problem because the state is effectively relieved of its rehabilitative
obligation once a child has been in foster care for fifteen of twenty-two consecutive months,
even if delays are caused by the state. See Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care
Reform: Revolutionizing the Most Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 19
(1994-1995).
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over continuation of "reasonable efforts" towards reunification.2A Federal
law presumes that the state will responsibly pursue cases, with any delay
caused by birth parents themselves, leaving them responsible for whether
their families reunify or are destroyed. Given these standards, the arrival of
federal auditors to Florida can create significant pressure to compromise
familial and child interests in order to maintain federal funding." The
pressure to make the wrong and arguably immoral choices has been sug-
gested by other commentators:
Through [ASFA], Congress now wants federal and local officials
responsible for oversight of the nation's foster care population to
concentrate primarily on reducing the time children spend in foster
care. This focus will divert attention from both the prevention of
foster care and the devotion of money and services to reunification
efforts. Instead, new federal policy will encourage adoptions once
children have been in foster care for a certain length of time, even
in cases where there was no compelling need for foster care
placement or where no efforts were undertaken to reunify children
with their birth families.
42
In order to prevail in the face of the moral dilemma created by ASFA,
and embrace its invitation to honor family integrity without sacrificing child
safety, efficacy at the case level must be addressed and assured, precisely
because that is where success or failure for a child and a family is and must
be made.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (Supp. IV 1998).
241. Federal authorities will assuredly be cognizant of ASFAs intent to reduce the
number of children in foster care and the length of stay in foster care. See NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 1998 STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE ADOPTION
AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT OF 1997, 24 STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT 5 (Mar. 1999), available at
http://www.ncsl.orgprograms/cyf/asfaslr.htm. For this reason, latitude given to states as to
these ultimate performance measures will likely be limited. Federal auditors affirmatively
indicate an intent "to use a new, results-oriented approach to monitor states' child welfare
programs, including compliance with ASFA amendments." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFICE, supra note 19, at 16. Moreover, these auditors indicate an intent to depart from tradi-
tional evaluations of "the accuracy and completeness of case files," in favor of evaluating
compliance with "required legal processes and protections" which impact on child perma-
nency and safety. Id.
242. Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What To Do About It: Is the
Problem That Too Many Children Are Not Being Adopted Out of Foster Care or That Too
Many Children Are Entering Foster Care?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 144 (1999). Mr.
Guggenheim's discussion of the adverse impact that these circumstances will have on the poor
and minorities, who are overrepresented in the foster care system, warrants serious considera-
tion. Id. at 145-46.
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VII. PART In-TAMING THE HYDRA-HOW TO ENSURE
CASE-BY-CASE EFFICACY
A. Two Heads Are Not Better Than One
"The Department is like a hydra, with many heads, each not knowing
what the other is doing," commented a widely respected general master
interviewed for this study.243 His remark aptly describes the multiplicity of
roles that the Department is expected to fulfill in each dependency case and
the difficulty attendant with that task. The inherent conflict between the
missions of caring for families and of investigating and prosecuting parents is
recognized by federal authorities, who state:
Caseworkers must balance the often conflicting roles of investiga-
tor and social worker. As investigators, [child protective services]
caseworkers collect evidence and work with law enforcement offi-
cials; as social workers, they work with families to identify ser-
vices needed to improve conditions in the home and provide a safe
environment for the child. 244
In a similar manner, the National Association of Child Advocates finds
this to be the case in the "traditional" child protective services model.245 The
Association describes the traditional role of child protective services to be
"semi-prosecutorial," !ven the role of fact-finding to support legal findings
of abuse and neglect.' Assigning the task of providing or coordinating
rehabilitative services with this prosecutorial role makes it "difficult to
achieve the necessary trust between families and the [child protective ser-
vices] agency worker" and interferes with open communication necessary for
provision of successful services.24'
Following the traditional child welfare model, Florida law provides for
termination of parental rights if a parent fails to comply substantially with a
case plan, while also providing that the Department is primarily responsible
for preparing the case plan and assisting the parent in pursuing case plan
243. Interview with Nicholas Lopane, General Master, Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit, in Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla. (Aug. 7, 2000) (notes on file with author). Several child welfare officials
interviewed in the Circuit provided unsolicited and very high praise for General Master
Lopane's performance in the dependency division.
244. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 224, at 3.
245. HErrzi EPSTEIN, NAT'L Assoc. OF CHD ADvOcATEs, A CHILD ADvocATE's GUIDE
TO STATE CHILD PRoTEcTIvE SERvicEs REFoRM 1 (Winter 1999).
246. Id. at 3.
247. Id. at 6.
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requirements. These are roles which, in order to succeed, require trust and
cooperation between the Department and the parent. The ethics and wisdom
are suspect of also requiring the Department in many cases to simultaneously
develop evidence to prove that the parent has failed to pursue case plan
requirements. It would seem that this arrangement would be analogous to, in
criminal matters, asking the prosecutor to try to rehabilitate the accused
while pursuing prosecution, and expecting trust to develop between the
prosecutor and the accused. Clearly, the prosecutor could only pursue one of
these roles in good faith at a time. The accused is only going to develop
limited, if any, trust for the person who may ultimately seek to prose-
cute. Given that the Department's participation in the case plan is at least
intended to protect a child's interests in family integrity, the arrangement
also calls into question whether the child's interests will be appropriately
protected in every case.
These observations are not merely academic. One caseworker inter-
viewed for this study reported that the impact of this dual role was for fami-
lies in need of help to become simply "defensive," a view shared by many
child welfare professionals who note that parents often mistrust caseworkers
for this reason.m Anger regularly develops between parents and DCF
caseworkers relative to testimony over case plan progress, rising to the level
of shouting in courtrooms. 249
Concern exists that in cases where the Department believes that birth
parents will ultimately fail to rehabilitate themselves and achieve reunifica-
tion, lackluster assistance is provided to the birth parents in accomplishing
the requirements of their case plan; in short, the Department displays limited
interest in rehabilitation when its attention shifts to proving a case for termi-
nation of parental rights.250 Confirmation of this concern is found in reports
of Department caseworkers in another recent study. These workers objected
both to judges and parents' attorneys who sought to maintain family reunifi-
cation as a goal until the parent "proved" they were unable to achieve case
goals, particularly where the caseworker's assessment was that the parents
were "unlikely" to rehabilitate themselves into safe parents for their chil-
dren.25
1
When the Department fails to provide appropriate support and services
for a birth parent to achieve reunification, a birth parent can receive addi-
248. Confidential Interview with DCF case counselor in Broward County (Sept. 29,
2000) (notes on file with author); Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit,
Case Conferencing workshop, supra note 1; Confidential Interview, supra note 4.
249. Interview with Lopane, supra note 243; Fourth Annual Dependency Court
Improvement Summit, Lawyers in the Courtroom workshop, supra note 1.
250. Interview with Vilchez, supra note 1; Confidential Interview of September 29,
2000, supra note 248.
251. BARRr, supra note 5, at23.
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tional time to pursue reunification services. This is consistent with state law
and Florida's state plan for Title IV-E funding, which acknowledges that
case-by-case eligibility is contingent on a judicial determination that reason-
able efforts are made by the Department (as the agency responsible for
implementing the plan) to, at the least, make it possible for a child to return
home if not stay there in the first instance.2 2 Knowing that its failure to
demonstrate this to the Court compromises funding provides a strong disin-
centive for the DCF to bring to the court's attention that it has failed to
provide such services timely, despite the detriment to the child. Likewise, a
particular case worker may risk employment-related sanctions. This study,
in viewing a typical day in Florida's child welfare system, saw multiple cases
with significant case plan delays and other actions contrary to a child's best
interests, such as providing for parental visitation, none of which were
reaching the court's attention on a timely basis. In many cases, the simple
passing of time can be contrary to the child's best interest or, at the least,
contrary to the child's interests in maintaining family integrity, particularly in
light of federal law pressures.
Even in cases where services are provided timely under a case plan,
undue litigation delay may very well result nonetheless from the melding of
the caretaking role and the prosecutorial role within the Department. Confu-
sion and lack of resolve would be expected. One child welfare professional
interviewed for this study emphatically attributed delayed cases resulting
from neither the courts nor the DCF having "the guts" to proceed to termina-
tion of parental rights. 2 3 A similar perception is that case workers are slow
to advance cases and make decisions due to a generalized fear of making
wrong decisions. 4 Likewise, many find "confusion" in the roles of Depart-
ment attorneys given the fact that the Department is the client, but the real
party in interest is a child2~5 As one caseworker described it, "our interest is
the child's. '' 256 Despite the Department's mission to safeguard the child's
interests in family integrity, the same caseworker described parents' attor-
neys as being "on the family's side."5
7
The inherent conflict of missions between reunification and prosecution
can be aggravated when case counselors and their supervisors disagree as to
252. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., STATE PLAN FOR TITLE IV-E OF THE
SOCIAL SECURrrY ACT, FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION ASSISTANCE, STATE OF FLORIDA § 2, at 1
(1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 472(a)(1); FLA. STAT. §§ 39.395, .401-02, .501-08).
253. Telephone Interview with Peter Ballisaris, co-chair, Broward Child Welfare
Initiative (Aug. 3, 2000) (notes on file with author).
254. Confidential Interview, supra note 4.
255. Id.; Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Lawyers in the
Courtroom workshop, supra note 1.
256. Confidential Interview, supra note 248.
257. Id.
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whether termination of parental rights should be pursued. Department
employees report cases where a case counselor and a supervisor disagree on
what is best for the child, leaving the case counselor in conflict over court
testimony on the best interests of a child. 58 In these cases, while the case-
worker would have an obligation to provide accurate testimony to the court
as to observations and facts supporting one position, the caseworker would at
the same time be acting contrary to the will and direction of a supervisor.
The position of the caseworker would seem to be untenable, especially given
personal concerns for performance evaluations, career references, and the
like. The best interests of the child would seem to be left hanging in the
balance.
The conflict of missions imposed by statute on the Department has not
escaped the attention of Florida courts. The Third District Court of Appeal
commented that, "there are instances in which the best interests of the child
and the [Department] may differ."5 9 The First District Court of Appeal
expounded further:
In keeping with the welfare and best interests of the child or chil-
dren being the dominant or controlling consideration in all custody
proceedings we may not overlook the probabilities that instances
may occur wherein the best interests of the child and of the agency
may be divergent. Indeed, in the case sub judice, one of the agents
of the Division of Family Services testified that there were agency
fears that their foster home or shelter would be lost if the agency
insisted that the five children remain there together. We recognize
the validity of the agency's concern for the loss of a facility but
that fear, though a legitimate interest of the agency, may not be
permitted to interfere with the best interests of the subject chil-
dren.m°
The court's observations underscore the fallibility of a system which
requires the service provider role to be responsible for proving that service
provision failed. The statutory assumption that the Department will always
act in accord with the best interests of children is likewise invalidated. The
National Court Appointed Special Advocations Association similarly ac-
knowledges that the interests of children during dependency litigation may
not only be adverse to their parents, but also adverse to the state, thus giving
258. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Lawyers in the Court-
room workshop, supra note 1.
259. Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. 641 So. 2d 957, 962 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
260. Div. of Family Servs. v. State, 319 So. 2d 72, 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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rise to the need for independent representation. 261 Notably, the primary
advocate for including a guardian for a child as a federal law mandate has
proposed a broad role for the guardian to include both legal and nonlegal
matters. 2
Other comments note how a child's best interests may be compromised
by the conflict of interest that may arise when the governmental agency
charged with providing reunification services is the same agency empowered
to petition for termination of parental rights. One argues that use of private
sector agency case petitioners would relieve the conflict:
The burden is on the public child welfare agency to provide ser-
vices, but it is often the private agency that is actually delivering
services and in frequent contact with the family. When the private
agency is allowed to petition for termination, in effect it acts to re-
lease the public agency from the responsibility of providing further
reunification services.... Allowing the private provider, not just
the public agency, to make this petition avoids resource conflicts
for the public agency and helps to insure that the petition is in the
individual child's best interest.26
3
Above all else, these perspectives underscore the untenable position that
the Department is placed in by the multiplicity of missions and roles assigned
to it by statute. It would stand to reason that by removing from the Depart-
ment its "prosecutorial" role, the Department ought to be better positioned to
stay focused on the mission of simply helping families achieve case plan
goals and developing services for them, the mission it is uniquely equipped
to fill. Likewise, by removing the Department's prosecutorial mission,
parents will more likely develop trusting relationships with the Department
that are necessary for successfully rehabilitating parents in a timely manner,
as well as helping children. This can only serve to improve the safety and
stability of dependent children and provide for the best possible protection
for their interest in family integrity as well as permanency. Concluding that
the Department ought to be relieved of its prosecutorial role in dependency
cases necessarily gives rise to the question of where else that role ought to be
reposited.z64 It is submitted that it can be reposited with counsel for children
261. Rebecca Heartz, Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings:
Clarifying the Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 FAM. L.Q. 327, 330 (1993).
262. Id. at 331.
263. Mangold, supra note 115, at 1447.
264. This report is not the first to recommend that a person other than a representative
of the Department be the primary moving party in dependency litigation. See generally Albert
E. Hartmann, Crafting an Advocate for a Child: In Support of Legislation Redefining the Role
596 [Vol. 25:547
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who, in addition to helping resolve the problems of conflicting missions for
the DCF, would provide other benefits to children in dependency litigation.
B. Counsel for Children
Child welfare professionals working in jurisdictions where children
have attorneys report a positive impact on case progress. One highly placed
child welfare professional reported in this study that counsel for children
"yield a more vigorous case process" and help ensure that the parties are on
equal footing.265 In accord, the American Bar Association ("ABA") took the
opportunity when promulgating its proposed standards for lawyers represent-
ing children in dependency cases, to express a belief that "all children subject
to court proceedings involving allegations of child abuse and neglect should
have legal representation.",266 Some forty states require that children who are
the subject of dependency actions be represented by an attorney. Of those,
approximately thirty provide for an attorney who attempts to jointly represent
the best interests and the wishes or express interests of the child, while the
remaining ten states keep these functions split between an attorney to repre-
sent the child's wishes and a guardian to represent the child's best inter-
ests.2 7
Where adequately funded and provided sufficient direction as to duties,
counsel for children promotes the interests of children in prompt case pro-
gress. Efforts in Utah demonstrate this point. In a study of efforts to provide
counsel for children in Utah (termed "attorney guardian ad litems") it was
found that use of privately contracted attorneys, who split their professional
energies with more lucrative private practices, "had strong incentives to do as
little work as possible on their dependency cases, for which they were paid
almost nothing."2 8 The pay was approximately $120 per case at best.29 The
role of the attorney was also vaguely defined.2 0 Needed legislative reforms,
which were implemented, included funding to train children's attorneys and
of the Guardian Ad Litem in Michigan Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 31 U. MicH. J.L.
REFORM. 237 (1997).
265. Telephone Interview with Peter Digre, formerly Deputy Secretary of Operations
for the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services, DCF's predecessor, Los
Angeles County child welfare services agency (Aug. 25, 2000).
266. AMEmCAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 130, at Preface.
267. DUQUETTEET AL, supra note 5, at ch. 7, § 11.
268. Pat McElroy, New Guardian Ad Litem System Key to Utah Child Welfare Reform
XVYoUTH LAW NEws 3, 5 (Sept./Oct. 1994), available at http://www.youthlaw.org/ advocacy
.htm.
269. Id. at 2.
270. Id.
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increased funding to adequate levels for compensation and expenses of
representation.
Clarification of the attorney's role was also critical. Among other
things, Utah law directs the attorney to independently investigate and inform
the court where services are not being provided to a child or the child's
family, assess options of residential placement, when parents are not using
court-ordered services or where services are not working as expected, and
where the agency fails in its duties, including holding statutorily-required
administrative reviews and hearings. Of particular interest, Utah law
requires the child's attorney to notify the court of "any violation of orders,
new developments, or changes.., that justify a review of the case."2 2 With
these reforms in place in 1998, Utah markedly achieved more timely perma-
nency for foster children than Florida achieved. In reunification cases, the
average length of stay in foster care was only 9.7 months.273 Adoption cases
saw children in foster care an average of 27.8 months. 274 The average length
of stay in "permanent foster" homes, as a case goal, was thirty-four
months.2 75 A permanency decision was achieved in twelve months in ninety-
three percent of cases, forty-three percent were assigned a permanency goal
and parental rights were terminated in fifty-one percent in twelve months. 2
76
By January 1999, only twenty-six percent of Utah's foster children lacked a
permanency goal after six months in care.277 Of foster children under the age
of six, permanency goals were lacking after six months for only three of
them-not three percent-three children.278 Moreover, the average time to
close a case with a successful adoption after termination of parental rights
was less than thirteen months in the fiscal year 1997 and less than ten months
in the fiscal year 1998.279
It would seem that counsel for children can help ensure that children's
legal interests do not fall victim to the litigation interests of other parties,
particularly as to delays in the progress of litigation which may only be in the
interests of the child welfare agency or birth parents, several examples of
which were seen during this study. However, it would seem that the child
welfare agency must not be the one to represent the child's legal interests or
even to execute the interests of the state in protecting the welfare of children.
271. Id. at 4; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-912(3)(x) (1996 & Lexis Supp. 1990).
272. § 78-3a-912(3)(x)(v).
273. See infra note 275.
274. See id.
275. UTAH Div. OF CHLDREN & FAMILY SERvS., STATE OF UTAH, DIvIsION OF CHILD
AND FAMILY SERvIcEs OuTcOME MEASURES REPORT, 1998 11 (Jan 15, 1999).
276. Id. at 21.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 23.
279. Id. at 24.
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The Supreme Court of Florida, for example, has recognized that any agency
or person may do so, stating that "a petition for termination of parental rights
is not a criminal prosecution which must be brought and prosecuted by the
state.... It is a civil action initiated to protect the rights of abused, neglected
or abandoned children. 280
Observations and reports received in this study reveal that reliance on
the Department and its attorneys to protect a child's legal interests is simply
not working. Communication between Department caseworkers and their
legal representatives is extremely poor in many areas of the state, causing
information to simply not be available for the court.2' Regularly, casework-
ers and Department attorneys communicate for the first time only shortly
before a hearing or during the hearing itself. One caseworker reported that in
four years with the DCF, the earliest consultation he had with a Department
attorney was in the court hallway right before a hearing and that regularly
"we go into hearings with no consultation with" Department attorneys. He
also reported being threatened with a contempt of court charge because he
failed to attend three hearings, each time because Department lawyers failed
to provide advance notice of the hearing. Ironically, this caseworker reported
that communication with parents' attorneys was reported to be "very
good."' , 2 Likewise, Department attorneys do not follow up with caseworkers
or supervisors to ensure that court orders are followed, nor do caseworkers
believe their written reports are read by the attorneys.
U 3
Accepting that counsel for a child can be expected to provide better
protection for the child's legal interests, and that a state's child welfare
agency need not represent the legal interests of the state in dependency
litigation, the issue of whether a child's attorney can act in a manner consis-
tent with the child's legal interests while also ensuring that the state's interest
in protecting the welfare of the child is not compromised ought to be ad-
dressed. This would seem possible for two reasons. Most importantly, the
child's best interests ought not be different from the interests desired by the
state in dependency litigation. Any information that the state acquires
through its child welfare agency about the-progress or condition of the parties
can still be conveyed to the court for due consideration, guided by the
agency's counsel, in a fact witness capacity. In addition, any changes made
to the model of legal representation would not change the role of the court as
280. Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So. 2d 957, 961 (1994) (stating
that the guardian ad litem can "exercise[] concurrent power" with the state child welfare
agency "to initiate and litigate" dependency proceedings).
281. Confidential Interviews, supra notes 187, 206, and 248; Interviews with Querry,
and Jones, supra note 1.
282. Confidential Interview, supra note 248.
283. Id.
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the state's ultimate representative in adjudicating what is in the best interests
of a child.
As noted, some states provide for counsel to represent a child's best
interests as well as express interests, while others provide for an attorney
simply to represent a child's legal and express interests. A review of the
debate over which model is more appropriate will help reveal why the latter
model is best suited for supplanting the role of the child welfare agency as
the primary moving party in dependency litigation, while ensuring that a
child's legal interests and best interests are duly protected. The debate
necessarily begins with an assessment of whether a single attorney can
represent both the child in the traditional sense of representing a client's
wishes and representing the child's best interests.
Many opine that the roles are incompatible, giving rise to serious confu-
sion and ethical dilemmas. 84 The ABA likewise takes the position, in its
standards for legal representation of dependent children, that the role of
representing a child's best interests as a guardian ad litem and as a traditional
attorney for a child will not be compatible in many cases. The ABA ob-
serves that:
A lawyer appointed as guardian ad litem is almost inevitably ex-
pected to perform legal functions on behalf of the child.... [I]n
many states, a guardian ad litem may be required by statute or cus-
tom to perform specific tasks, such as submitting a report or testi-
fying as a fact or expert witness. These tasks are not part of func-
tioning as a "lawyer. '
285
For these reasons, the ABA recommends appointment of a separate
guardian when the child expresses a wish which is not simply contrary to the
attorney's view of the child's best interest, but potentially "seriously injuri-
ous to the child.
2 86
While these concerns exist, note that the attorneys representing the
Department have for years been effectively conducting litigation regarding
childrens' best interests under the auspices of representing the Department,
though at best representing the Department's point of view of the child's best
interest. This is because the Department is the client. Where the Depart-
ment's interests are contrary to the child's best interests, the responsibility to
ensure the child's best interests are upheld has fallen to the courts. This
reliance is misplaced. As specific cases revealed in this study demonstrate,
much damage can be done to a child while information is either not brought
284. Hartmann, supra note 264, at 238.
285. AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, supra note 130, at pt. I, § A-2.
286. Id. at B-4(3).
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to the court's attention or simply escapes its attention for a protracted period
of time. This condition is aggravated by operation of certain child welfare
laws, particularly laws mandating that time frames be met notwithstanding
the state's failures to perform reasonable efforts to protect a child's interests
in family integrity and rehabilitation.
Counsel for a child, assigned solely to protect their legal interests, can
be an effective mechanism to ensure that matters are brought timely to the
court's attention. Under this model, litigation can be advanced without
decisions being compromised by agency interests which are contrary to a
child's best interests. Unlike agency attorneys responsible for the agency as
their client, a child's attorney remains accountable to the child, ethically and
otherwise, particularly where litigation must be advanced in accord with the
child's legal interests. Nonetheless, it is important that the Department
maintain counsel to present to the court its professional recommendations
and perspectives, and information held as a fact witness.2 7 A child's legal
interests are defined by the ABA as follows:
The determination of the child's legal interests should be based on
objective criteria as set forth in the law that are related to the pur-
poses of the proceedings. The criteria should address the child's
specific needs and preferences, the goal of expeditious resolution
of the case so the child can remain or return home or be placed in a
safe, nurturing, and permanent environment, and the use of the
least restrictive or detrimental alternatives available.
288
In practice, it would also seem possible for representation of dependent
children to proceed in accord with the lawyer's assessment of the child's
"best interests," subject to objective presentation of all pertinent evidence for
the court's determination of the child's best interests, an approach consistent
with representing a child's legal interests. 289 For children old enough to have
some appreciation of what their interests or wishes might be, an attorney
representing the legal interests of a child can advocate for the wishes of the
child, while also executing statutory responsibilities for ensuring that the
legal rights of the child are met.29 As the ABA points out, where this role
287. Consistent with this point of view, see DUQUErTE ET AL., supra note 5, at ch. 7
§ 8.
288. AMBIUCAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 130, at pt. I, § B-5.
289. Mangold, supra note 115, at 1452.
290. One must be cautious to consider the motivations of the child and the capacity of
the child to appreciate why they may choose a particular viewpoint, even as to wishing to
remain silent. Commentators have observed: "
From a developmental perspective, children's cognitive perception of the
world is quite egocentric until age eight or so. The child sees self as the cen-
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may become problematic, a guardian ad litem can be effective in achieving
resolution.
At present, Florida law relies upon volunteer guardians ad litem to
represent the best interests of children in essentially all dependency litiga-
tion. Representing a child in this manner satisfies federal law, which re-
quires only that a nonlawyer guardian ad litem or court appointed special
advocate be appointed to represent the child in every abuse or neglect
case. The guardian is supposed to obtain first hand knowledge of the perti-
nent facts to assess and advise the court of a child's best interests, but need
not address a child's legal interests and may very well not be legally compe-
tent to do so.291 In practice, the guardian program is often assigned to cases
for which it lacks an actual embodied guardian. In addition to first hand
reports received in this study, the Florida House of Representatives Commit-
tee on Children and Families cites to "unofficial reports" that as many as fifty
percent of foster children do not have guardians ad litem appointed to repre-
sent their interests. 292 In the limited instances where attorneys ad litem are
appointed, the statutes lack even a definition of "attorney ad litem," and lack
any further direction on the role or expectations of the attorney.293 In many
cases, an appointed volunteer guardian ad litem will only visit a child a few
times, perhaps even just once, during the course of a case.294
The guardian ad litem program itself recognizes that its role is not
primarily to safeguard the legal interests of a child. As indicated in a memo-
randum of law filed by the guardian ad litem program in one dependency
case, the program only sends one of its attorneys to dependency hearings
with the volunteer lay guardian if it anticipates that legal arguments will have
to be advanced or the program is affirmatively seeking relief through a
motion to execute its role in the case.295 The guardian program observed that
"the legislature has entrusted the Court with ensuring that the legal rights of
ter and cause of all that happens, which-when traumatic events such as se-
vere sexual and physical abuse are occurring, being removed from one's
home, etc.-is terrifying. Telling the child to take on even more responsibil-
ity and "direct" his or her adult attorney may be overwhelming and traumatic
for the child and exacerbate feelings of blame.
DuQuErra ET AL., supra note 5, at ch. 7, § 14.
291. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix) (Supp. IV 1998).
292. FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CRiLDENAND FAmILaIs, HB 2125, 13 (May 24, 2000).
293. Id. at 14.
294. Interview with Judge Frusciante, supra note 123.
295. See Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Shelter Review Hearings, § V,
In re Minor Children (17th Cir. Filed April 5, 2000) (No. 99-770-DP) (on file with au-
thor) The memorandum was supplied by the guardian program with the childrens' identifying
information redacted due to confidentiality in the case.
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children are protected .... ,,296 While one may suggest that the legislature
has otherwise assigned this task to the Department, one must recognize that
in the conduct of litigation the Department may and does have instances
when its interests, or at least its actions, depart from the child's best interests.
Expecting the Department's attorneys to seek out court assistance or even
inform the court of these instances is wholly contrary to the professional
responsibilities of these attorneys to their client, the Department.
291
For these reasons, it is clear that counsel for children would not only
serve different purposes than a guardian ad litem, but may also provide a
basis for more selective appointment of volunteer guardians, particularly to
cases where the child is old enough to express wishes which may be contrary
to the attorney's assessment of the child's best interests. 298 This would allow
for a more readily directed guardian program as a specialized and limited
resource, rather than its widespread assignment in what appears to be a vain
attempt to provide all children with some degree of independent representa-
tion through the guardian ad litem program.
For an additional reason, the guardian ad litem function would still be
necessary in some cases. Having an attorney represent the legal interests of
children cannot be assured to provide for the best interests of the children, for
example, where an abuse victim wishes to return to an abusive home. The
express wish to return would still have to be represented by a child's attorney
while representing the child's legal interests and would call into question the
efficacy of best interests advocacy. The converse is true of a guardian ad
litem representing the best interests of children.29
The ABA recommends appointment of counsel for children at the
earliest point, including upon removal from their home and when the court
obtains jurisdiction.300 To best ensure that the goals of this proposal are
achieved, it is recommended that counsel for children be appointed at the
time of shelter review hearings, at which time the prosecutorial function
would be assumed from the Department. Following this appointment, coun-
sel for children should operate under statutory standards for representation
and duties. The failure to provide specificity has decreased efficacy in other
296. Id. § VII.
297. There should be no doubt that the Department itself, not a dependent child, is the
client recognized by Department attorneys, even when the attorney is employed and housed
outside of the Department itself. See Letter from Patrice Paldino, Assistant Attorney General
(Apr. 25, 2000) (on file with author).
298. See also AvmlcAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 130, at pt. I, § B-4(1) (wherein the
A.B.A. recommended that attorneys for children seek a separate guardian ad litem where a
child is unable to express a position or appreciate the proceedings, such as with younger and
preverbal children).
299. See generally McElroy, supra note 268.
300. AMERIcAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 130, at pt. II, § H-I, commentary.
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jurisdictions, such as Utah prior to recent statutory changes, as discussed
above.
State laws typically do not, but perhaps should, adopt standards for
lawyers who represent children in dependency cases. 30' The ABA developed
nonbinding model standards.30 2 It is reported that these standards "have
become de facto standards of practice" for lawyers representing chil-
dren. 30 3 A similar need for clear standards for attorneys representing child
welfare agencies is expressed as follows:
Ambiguity of role and lack of clear practice standards is not only a
problem for lawyers representing children, it is also a challenge for
attorneys who represent parents or the child welfare agency. Na-
tional standards for legal representation of the child welfare agency
and of parents accused of child maltreatment are not currently
available, but their development may be very important to improve
professional practices.304
Notwithstanding these cautions, in 2000, the Florida Legislature created
an attorney ad litem pilot program (hereinafter "the Program") to provide
attorneys for some children in out-of-home care without articulating such
standards. The Program is established by the Office of State Courts Admin-
istrator either a private or public entity, independent of any other agency
responsible for the care of the dependent children. 30 5 In part, the program
aspires to reduce the length of time children spend in foster care. In cases
where the court determines that attorney ad litem representation is necessary,
the Program is appointed at the shelter hearing, though the court may appoint
the Program later if the need arises. 30 7 Once appointed, the attorney ad litem
represents "the child's wishes.., as long as the child's wishes are consistent
with the safety and well being of the child.' 308 The role of the attorney in
representing the child is consistent with those representing an adult client.309
Beyond this statutory direction, the "duties, responsibilities, and con-
duct" of attorneys in the Program are left to the courts to establish by rule.310
301. Duquette et al., supra note 5, at 122-23.
302. Id. at 123.
303. See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CHiLDREN AND FAMILIES, HB 2125, 15 n.1 (May 24,
2000).
304. Duquette et al., supra note 5, at 123.
305. FLA. STAT. § 39.4086(2)(b) (2000).
306. See id.
307. § 39.4086(2)(f).
308. § 39.4086(2)(g).
309. Id.
310. § 39.4086(3).
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While perhaps practical for attorneys simply representing the child's express
wishes, such an approach would be ill-advised for the proposal for counsel
for children made in this report, particularly due to the proposed responsibil-
ity for progress of the litigation. Statutory standards ought to specify what
legal interests of children ought to be protected, as suggested by the ABA.
For example, it would seem that representing the child's legal interests ought
to include many of the matters set forth in the Utah model, particularly as to
timely progress of litigation, receipt of appropriate foster care services for
children in out-of-home care, parental access to rehabilitative services, and
regular visitation if reunification is a case plan goal. The ABA identifies
several other litigation-related duties, including conducting independent
investigation and discovery, maintaining contact with other litigants and
representatives, requesting services for the child and parents, and negotiating
settlements.
311
Given the need for independence, as well as the value of specialized
representation, it is recommended that counsel for children be primarily pro-
vided through a discreet independent office, similar to the Program already
established by the Florida Legislature. Another model of publicly-sponsored
representation established in Florida presents a similar and successful ap-
proach, that being providing appellate legal representation of criminallyconvctedersos sntened t ca312
convicted persons sentenced to capital punishment. This model, termed
"capital collateral regional counsels," provides for fiscal control in the pub-
lic's interest, as well as quality control to ensure efficient and timely repre-
sentation, and independence of the office.313
A significant advantage of this proposed model of representation is the
ability of dependency proceedings to be "self-executing," that is requiring
less frequent judicial intervention. Existing law calls for such a multitude of
regular hearings to utilize the court to ensure timely case progress. With
counsel for children monitoring a child's circumstances, case plan progress,
compliance with court orders and the like, the need for such regular hearings
should be diminished. Matters requiring court attention would be brought to
its attention by the parties, rather than presuming that the parties must all be
brought to court regularly for inspection.
C. Enough Already-Reducing the Number of Dependency Hearings
A committee of one circuit's dependency court improvement project
attributed to the courts four main reasons contributing to delays in perma-
nency for dependent children. Two reasons pertain to caseload and hearing
311. AMERicAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 130, at pt. I.C.
312. See §§ 27.7001-.708.
313. See §§ 27.7001, .702, .705.
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volume, specifically an "inability to get timely trials [sic] dates" and "piece
meal trial dates. 31  The remaining two reasons cited reveal an attitude or
belief that dependency judges should be, or at least have been directed to be,
responsible for monitoring cases. The cited reasons were, "the Courts are not
always assertive in directing that cases are staffed for permanency when
appropriate (in a timely manner)" and "the Courts are not always assertive in
holding the parents and parties to target dates and time frames to accomplish
tasks."' 15 These viewpoints suggest that the parties themselves ought not be
responsible for their failure to meet time standards, but rather that the judge
is at fault for not checking to make sure deadlines of which all parties are
aware are actually met.
While it is easy to criticize the parties for not accepting responsibility,
the attitudes expressed arguably match those of the statutes. The statutes set
forth a rigorous hearing schedule, including conducting hearings in every
case on average every two weeks for the first three months of the case, and
every fifteen days until an arraignment occurs, all to require the court to
monitor what the parties are doing. As discussed above, the efficacy of this
approach is questionable for a number of reasons. At the least, it seems clear
that the aggressive hearing schedule is certainly not working to reduce
litigation delays, evidenced by the longstanding problem of protracted litiga-
tion delays that dependent children experience despite all the court hearings.
Moreover, it appears that statutory mandates of court hearings may actually
be impeding effective court monitoring of cases. At least one judge and one
DCF supervisory official commented in this study that some cases warrant
more frequent review hearings, while others could go with less frequent
hearings. 316 However, the demands of conducting all statutorily-required
hearings consumes all available court time, preventing courts from exercising
discretion to monitor cases as it sees appropriate.317
Federal law requirements for in-court reviews, as a condition of receipt
of federal funding, are relatively modest, numbering no more than three a
year and tied to necessary substantive steps. Case plans must be prepared
within sixty days of a child's removal from the home to detail the efforts and
services which will be expended to attempt to achieve safe conditions for
reunification, unless reunification is not appropriate, in which case perma-
nent homes must be sought within thirty days of the determination that
reunification will not be pursued. Within twelve months of removal, and
314. Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit Dependency Court Improvement Program, Children's
Services Comm., supra note 159.
315. Id.
316. Interview with Judge Frusciante, supra note 123; Interview with Lori I. Day,
Service Center Director, District 10, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (Sept. 29, 2000).
317. Interview with Judge Frusciante, supra note 123.
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every twelve months thereafter if necessary, a permanency hearing must be
held to assess efforts towards permanency and make decisions for perma-
nency, with interim six month reviews to assess the safety and appropriate-
ness of the child's placement. Florida directs all of these hearings and then
adds fifteen day shelter reviews up to the time of case adjudication, almost
tripling federal requirements even in cases where all other deadlines are
achieved. It is submitted that these excess reviews could be safely eliminated
in favor of additional court hearings only as needed in the judgment of the
court and on petition of a party, provided counsel for children is provided to
ensure that the measures can become "self-executing," as discussed above.
D. Shortened Permanency Deadlines for Younger Children
Recognizing the damage that results to children from delayed perma-
nency has contributed significantly to the philosophy of child welfare laws.
For this basic reason, time limits are placed on reunification of families,
failing which, other permanency options must be pursued.318 While recog-
nizing that, especially for younger children, delays in legal status are less
important than the actual commitment of their caretakers, older children
likely confer greater significance to their legal status.3 19 It appears that foster
care nonetheless carries significant pain for children, including the shame
and stigma of being foster children and the pain of family separa-
tion.320 However, damage to children and their parental bonds is exacerbated
with younger children:
Emotionally, and intellectually, an infant or toddler cannot stretch
her waiting more than a few days without feeling overwhelmed by
the absence of her parents.... [Hjer emotional and intellectual
memory has not matured sufficiently to enable her to hold on to the
parent she has "lost." During such an absence, the child under two
years of age "quickly" latches on to the new adult who cares for
the child's needs.321
318. See Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights vs. Children's Interests: The Case of the
Foster Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371, 377 (1996) (stating that "it is the
child's need for an undisrupted parental relationship in a permanent home that provides the
basis for proposals to sever the parent-child bond at the end of a time-limited period in foster
care")
319. Id. at 388--89.
320. Chaifetz, supra note 2, at 21; Confidential Interview of May 23, 2000, supra note
1; Confidential Interview, supra note 4.
321. McAvay, supra note 141, at 138, (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN Er AL., THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 42(1996)).
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Not until adolescence does a child's sense of time resemble that of an
adult.322 As to all children, the Department seems to recognize that delays in
permanency do result in "detachment from the parents.",321 One attorney for
children reported that long delays in permanency cause children to "lose
hope and become angry." 32 The National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges provides this succinct statement of the prejudicial passage of
time on children subjected to dependency proceedings:
The passage of time is magnified for children in both anxiety lev-
els and direct effect. Three years is not a terribly long period of
time for an adult. For a six-year-old, it is half a lifetime, for a
three-year-old, it is the formative state for trust and security, and
for a nine-year-old, it can mean the difference between finding an
adoptive family and failing to gain permanence because of age. If
too much time is spent in foster care during these formative years,
lifetime problems can be created.325
Approximately two-thirds of Florida's dependent children are within
these critical, formative years. Twenty-one percent are under the age of two,
nineteen percent are between three and five, and twenty-six percent are
between six and nine years of age.326 The average dependent child in Florida
is just over eight-years-old.327
Three states attempt to address the particular need for permanency for
younger children. Minnesota requires permanency hearings for children
under the age of eight to be held no later than six months after out-of-home
placement, while permitting twelve months for cases involving children over
the age of eight. 2 Similarly, Oklahoma requires a permanency hearing for a
child under three within six months, instead of the usual twelve months.329
322. Id. at 138-39.
323. Interview with Allegretti & Sanford, supra note 7.
324. Confidential Interview, supra note 4.
325. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 116, at
14.
326. FLA. DEP'T CHILDREN & FAMILiS, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES ANNUAL
STATISTICAL DATA TABLES FISCAL YEAR 1998-99 Table D-5 (July-June), available at
http://www5.myflorida.com/cf-web/myfloridahealthfamily/publications/childrensissues/child
abuse/9899chnt.pdf.
327. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY,
SUBJECTS OF CHILD PROTECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS: SURVEY RESULTS AND CASE CHARACTERIS-
TICS 8 (Report No. 98-26) (1998), available at http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us
/reports/pdf/9826rpt.pdf.
328. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.201Subd 11. (West Supp. 2001).
329. OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 10 § 7003-5.6g (West Supp. 2001).
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Vermont law provides for permanency hearings every six months for child-
ren between the ages of three and six, and every three months for children
under three.33t Florida joins most other states in making no adjustments to
dependency systems of procedures for these younger children.
Given the foregoing, it is recommended that Florida consider shortening
permanency deadlines in cases involving younger children who are in foster
care. However, implementation of such efforts should likely be delayed until
such time as case planning more regularly accords with statutory deadlines
and assurances can be made that rehabilitative services can be promptly
provided. These measures would seem to be necessary to provide due re-
spect for a young child's interest in family integrity while balancing the
uniquely pronounced need for permanency experienced by younger children.
E. Time Out on Continuances
In football games they are called "time outs"--two-minute pauses in the
action so a team can regroup before getting back into the fray. The other side
waits. Under the strict rules, teams get only three for each thirty minute half
of the game. For this reason, time outs are used sparingly and only when
really needed. In child welfare litigation they are called "continuances."
Unlike football, they can be days or weeks or even months long as a party
catches up on delinquent tasks. The other parties wait, including the child.
Unlike football, each party gets as many time outs as the judge is willing to
issue. Use them too early or too often and, well, nothing really happens.
You can always get another, with no accounting required for previous delay.
Significantly, the legislature has specified only the following four
circumstances when continuances may be granted in dependency litiga-
tion: 1) Continuances at the request of, or with the consent of, a child's
counsel or guardian ad litem;331 2) Continuances at the request of the De-
partment's attorney, but only if material evidence is unavailable, due dili-
gence has been exercised to obtain the evidence timely, and it is believed that
the evidence will be available within thirty days, or otherwise under excep-
tional circumstances;332 3) Continuances for "[r]easonable... delay neces-
sary to accomplish notice of the hearing to the child's parents[," though the
Department must "continue regular efforts to provide notice" during such
330. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 5531(a)(2) (Lexis Supp. 1999). These provisions are not
self-executing; they require an order on a party's motion or a sua sponte order.
331. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(10)(a) (2000).
332. § 39.013(10)(b). If the Department will not be prepared in 30 days, the statute
empowers the parent to move for an order to show cause for sanctions, including dismissal of
the case. § 39.013(10)(b)l.
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delay;333 and 4) Continuances for reasonable delay at the request of the birth
parent.
334
Under court rules governing dependency cases, continuances may be
granted simply on a showing of good cause.335 In cases witnessed in this
study, continuances were granted and waiver of time standards were made
typically without the parties addressing the statutory criteria. This included
waiver of statutory time standards in advance of an express or demonstrated
need. It appeared in some instances that judges really had no choice but to
grant continuances grudgingly because certain tasks must be completed for
cases to progress. By placing the interests of parents and the Department
above children's interests in permanency in this manner, the intent of the law
to provide deadlines to ensure that children achieve permanency in their lives
is being frustrated.
The observations made in this study were confirmed by others in re-
ports. For example, a Department employee complained that significant
litigation delays are resulting from multiple rescheduling of the same hear-
ings due to continuance requests and scheduling conflicts.336 A committee of
the dependency court improvement program in one judicial circuit similarly
concluded that attorneys for parents are "getting excessive continuances for
trials, months of delays."3 " Football teams are limited in their time outs so
that the players can go home at a reasonable hour. It would stand to reason
that dependency litigants, especially children, should be assured that they get
a permanent home in a reasonable amount of time.
The foregoing suggests two legislative changes. One is to add a statu-
tory provision that any continuance or waiver of time standards must be
considered individually and not be waived in advance of the particular
circumstances arising which may warrant a continuance. Another is to limit
the parties to a total number of days of continuances which can be sought
during the pendency of litigation, in order to provide an incentive for parties
to limit the number of times delays in litigation are sought. This is intended
to balance the litigation interests of the various parties with the interests of
children in expediency. It is recommended that continuance requests be
limited to sixty days annually.
333. § 39.013(10)(c).
334. § 39.013(10)(d).
335. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.255(f).
336. Interview with Day, supra note 316; Confidential Interview, supra note 4.
337. Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit Dependency Court Improvement Program, Children's
Services Comm., supra note 159.
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F. Simplified Case Planning
As discussed above, case planning is supposed to provide direction on
all key matters in a dependency case, including what services will be pro-
vided to the children and parents, and what expectations are made for efforts
to reunify families or to keep children safely in their homes.338 Case plan
requirements under federal law are rather straightforward and to be applied
for all foster children. 339 To qualify for federal funding under the Social
Security Act, states are to require that case plans address the following four
basic matters: 1) A description of services offered and provided to prevent
removal of the child or to reunify the family, as applicable; 340 2) A descrip-
tion of the type of home or institution where the child will be placed, with a
discussion of safety and appropriateness of the placement;341 3) A plan for
assuring safe and proper care is provided to the child and services provided
to parents for reunification or other permanent placement, and description of
those that have been provided;342 and 4) A plan for necessary services for the
child and foster parents.343
The case plan should also have attached documentation of efforts to
achieve adoption or other permanency and the child's health and education
records.3 " Under special circumstances, the case plan must include: 1) If
pertaining to foster children over sixteen-years of age, a transition plan,
including provisions as to independent living;345 and 2) If a child is to be
placed in a foster family home or institutional placement far from the home
of origin, or is to be placed in an out-of-state foster placement, a statement of
how a child's best interest will be served by that placement and plans for an
annual visit by a caseworker in that state, with a report to the state of ori-
gin.3
46
As with required court reviews, Florida law substantially exceeds
federal case plan requirements for cases involving children in out-of-home
care by including at least the following eleven matters: 1) A description of
the problem being addressed, including that which precipitated the depend-
ency case;347 2) The tasks required of the parent, and the services and treat-
ments to be provided, including the type, frequency, location and accountable
338. § 39.601.
339. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
340. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(4) (2000).
341. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
342. § 675(1)(B).
343. Id.
344. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(C), (E) (Supp. IV 1998).
345. § 675(1)(D).
346. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
347. FLA. STAT. § 39.601(2)(a) (2000).
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Department staff person or service provider; 34 3) Performance measures,
including time frame, relative to the services and treatment; 349 4) The child's
permanency goal and type of placement;350 5) The reasonable efforts to be
made to place the child in an adoptive home or legal custodial relationship if
reunification efforts fail, and any concurrent plan to prepare for termination
and reunification; 351 6) The type of home or institution where the child is
placed, as well as a description of its safety and appropriateness, including as
to how it is the least restrictive and most family-like option, and in close
proximity to the child's home;352 7) Ongoing financial obligations, including
health insurance, to be maintained by the parents; 353 8) A description of the
foster parents' or legal guardians' role in providing or developing services
for themselves or the child; 354 9) A description of the child's need for ser-
vices and how they will be implemented;355 10) How the child's educational
placement will remain stable; 56 and 11) Written notice to the parent that
failure to comply substantially with the case plan may result in termination of
parental rights and, somewhat ironically, that a petition to terminate rights
may actually be filed sooner than required by statute based on such fail-
ures.
357
As if the foregoing is not enough, there is an entirely separate require-
ment that the Department describe how it will actually assure that the ser-
vices set forth in the case plan will actually be provided, and how they will
improve the home and facilitate reunification or other permanent placement
with those services. 358 Moreover, a separate description is required of how
the Department will assure that the services described in the case plan will be
provided and will address the child's needs and why all of this is appropriate
in the first place.359 In addition, one case plan requirement suggests the need
for a crystal ball or other such fortune telling device. In the first sixty days of
the case before the court has made any truly final decisions about a child or a
family, the Department is supposed to explain how it "plans to carry out the
judicial determination made by the court, with respect to the child, in accor-
348. § 39.601(2)(b).
349. § 39.601(2)(c).
350. § 39.601(3)(a).
351. Id.
352. § 39.601(3)(b), (e).
353. § 39.601(3)(c).
354. § 39.601(3)(e).
355. Id.
356. § 39.601(3)(0.
357. § 39.601(3)(k).
358. § 39.601(3)(h).
359. § 39.601(3)(i).
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dance with this chapter and applicable federal regulations. ''360 By law, the
case plan needs to be created before any substantial judicial determinations
are actually made at the time of adjudication.
The meticulous case plan requirements under state law give rise to
arguably onerous and confusing case plans. The Department has attempted
to develop a streamlined, standardized form to be used to report all of the
foregoing in a case plan. When completely blank, the form is twenty-eight
pages long.361 As set forth above, the result of the state case plan require-
ments are widely cited among child welfare professionals as promoting
confusing case plans. Moreover, it would seem that the painstaking statutory
detail promotes "cookie cutting" of case plans. The extensive statutory
directives leave little room for case by case determinations of the individual-
ized needs of the parties, detracting from the overriding directive and intent
that case plans be specially tailored and remain flexible to the needs of the
children and families involved.
Case plan requirements in some other states are much simpler than in
Florida. Ohio, for example, simply directs that case plans be standardized
under rules developed by the child welfare agency which comply with con-
tent requirements of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act and the stated
goals under federal laws for funding eligibility.362 Given the foregoing
considerations, it is proposed that Florida replace its detailed case plan
requirements with an approach similar to that taken in Ohio.
VI. PART IV-WHAT WORKS-GUIDANCE FOR FLORIDA
FROM OTHERS' SUCCESS
A. Quit Weighing Pigs and Other Lessons from Alabama
In 1991, the State of Alabama settled a class action lawsuit brought on
behalf of foster children for the impact of similar systemic problems to those
currently experienced in Florida. The consent decree embodying the settle-
ment is credited as being "the first, state-wide, bottom-up reform of a child
welfare system in the United States. 363 It is founded on "reform... driven
not by procedural requirements but by the principles of good practice. ' '3 '
360. § 39.601(3)(g).
361. See Letter with enclosure from Maria B. Leon, Family Safety, Fla. Dep't of
Children & Family Servs. (July 18, 2000) (on file with author).
362. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.412(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1998).
363. BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MAKING CHLD WELFARE WORK:
How THE R.C. LAwsuIT FORGED NEW PARTNERSHIPS TO PROTECT CHmIDREN AND SUSTAIN
FAMmmS 1 (1998).
364 Id. at 6.
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Results are measured simply by whether the system "is meeting the child's
needs for stability and family integrity, by whatever means it takes.
365
"Bottom-up reform" refers to reform which begins with principles on
how agency social workers are to work with children and families, and what
supports they will need for that interaction, rather than starting with agency
structure from the "top down."366 For example, promoting visitation between
dependent children and their parents is recognized in the Alabama consent
decree as being one of guiding principles for an appropriate "system of
care." Visitation is "viewed as an essential ingredient of family reunification
services.... [to] be actively encouraged" and any necessary transportation
assistance is to be provided.367 Resources needed to support this principle are
then to be put in place.
Alabama's focus on principles and resources, directed essentially from
the child's view, have allowed Alabama, unlike Florida, to enjoy a decrease
in the number of child abuse and neglect reports received each year since
1997 which result in a finding of abuse or neglect or reason to suspect such
maltreatment.368 Similar success is found when measuring the number of
children in out-of-home care, which has fluctuated over the past several
years, but in raw numbers never reaches the levels experienced prior to
1992.369 Given that the Alabama model has been phased in over time among
the counties, as a so-called "conversion" process, Alabama has been able to
measure contemporaneous success of its reform efforts among its coun-
ties. Of particular note is the fact that the rate of children in foster care
(cases per 1000 children) in "converted" counties versus "non-converted"
counties has been lower every year since 1992.370 Moreover, the rate differ-
ence between converted and non-converted counties has steadily widened
virtually every year since 1992.371 Alabama's success has come without any
significant change in the permanency goal for children over the past five
years, with statewide trends remaining relatively constant for all permanency
options. 3
72
From Alabama's experience, the federal court monitor, Dr. Ivor Groves,
concludes that "child safety does not correlate strongly with the number of
children taken into custody ... and, in fact, exposes children to other poten-
365. Id.; see app. 1.
366. Id. at 26-27.
367. Id. at 89.
368. IVOR D. GROVES, A STATUS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE R. C. v. PETELOS
CONSENT DEcREE 32 (Dec. 1999).
369. Id. at 38.
370. Id. at 40.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 46.
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tial sources of harm., 373 Dr. Groves attributes Alabama's success in foster
care primarily to the strengthening service provision on initial con-
tact. Suggesting support for reducing reliance on court hearings to ensure
compliance and actions in the best interests of children, as this article urges,
Dr. Groves opines that you "cannot monitor into compliance." In a similar,
though more colorful manner, Dr. Groves comments, "you can weigh the pig,
but that can't make it fatter." 374 Resource development is critical to success
and much of Alabama's efforts in this regard have been geared towards
home-based services.375
In part for this reason, this article proposes allowing the DCF to focus
on providing social services without contending with potential conflicts in its
missions, especially for generating a trusting relationship with birth parents
and providing services to protect the interest of children in family integ-
rity. Moreover, providing counsel for children can allow for reduced litiga-
tion, allowing all of the parties to focus on services.
Consistent with the successes in Alabama, the need for "front-end"
services is routinely recognized.376 Compliance with federal ASFA require-
ments is also recognized by the National Conference of State Legislatures to
place urgency on the need to ensure that social services are available:
Even after ASFA, the permanency goal for most children in state
care will be to return home as quickly as possible. States will find
it hard to achieve that goal if appropriate and effective services are
not provided to families in a timely manner. When services are de-
layed, agencies and courts are unable to make informed decisions
about parents' ability to protect and care for their children, and
such children will continue to languish in foster care.3
Dr. Groves opines that Florida is weak in its provision of services
immediately following the child protective investigation, causing more
children to be removed from their families.378 At the least, the finding of this
373. Id.
374. Telephone Interview with Ivor D. Groves, Federal Court Monitor (Aug. 25, 2000)
(notes on file with author).
375. BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL H .ALm LAw, supra note 363, at 62-64.
376. See, e.g., Duquette et al., supra note 5, at 96 (stating that "[t]he child welfare
system still focuses its efforts to develop family support services on families who enter the
system by way of child maltreatment reporting mechanisms.... [O]ur social policies activate
the most extensive interventions when we believe that disruption or severing of family ties is
required.")
377. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGIsLATIVE REPORT,
supra note 241.
378. Telephone Interview with Groves, supra note 374.
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study that case plan development is seriously delayed in many cases in itself
prevents Florida's dependency system from providing early services in a
case, as has been successful in Alabama. Likewise, Alabama's model priori-
tizes flexibility in service provision and, therefore, case planning. For this
reason, this article urges simplifying Florida's statutes on case planning.
B. The Partial Promise of Community-Based Care
Efforts are underway in Florida to improve the provision of ser-
vices. With the reorganization of the Department by the legislature in the
2000 legislative session, steps are to be taken to privatize the delivery of
direct child welfare services, with the Department remaining primarily
responsible for "contract management, monitoring compliance with contract
requirements, and assuring fiscal integrity and quality in the service provided
by private entities." 379 This direction follows legislative mandates for the
privatization of the delivery of foster care and related services, commonly
referred to as "community based care," beginning in 1996 with model pro-
grams and then in 1998 with a directive that privatization be implemented
state-wide.3 80 Florida's efforts in this regard accord with methods being tried
nationally to improve overall system performance.38'
The promise of community-based care is to improve service delivery
and availability, which, as seen in Alabama, is the proven method to solving
many of the problems experienced by children and families in the depend-
ency system. Reliance on the implementation of community-based care
initiatives as the sole means to ensure timely permanency and appropriate
care of all foster children and families would be suspect for two reasons.
One, community-based care systems do not have a direct impact on the role
or expectations of the judiciary. Two, the model community-based care
systems implemented over the past four years in Florida have faltered. A
report prepared for the Department reviewed model community-based care
projects that have been implemented in five of the Department's fifteen
districts at various points over the past three years.382 The deficiencies in one
project go to the core of the dependency system mission, the report noting
that the "Department of Children and Families does not have confidence that
the coalition staff can achieve the required levels of safety and permanence
for the children and families being served .... ,3 The oldest program was
found to suffer from at least one significant problem historically experienced
379. FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CHILDREN AND FAMLIs, HB 2125, 9 (May 24, 2000).
380. FLA. STAT. § 409.1671 (2000).
381. MARKOWrrZ, supra note 198, at 13-14.
382. See generally id.
383. Id. at 19.
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by the DCF itself, high staff turnover, as well as "little confidence [among
Department staff] that the [private] provider line staff knew what they were
doing."3
84
The transition to privatization, though not necessarily privatization
itself, presents an interim (though potentially lasting for a number of years)
risk to the provision of needed services for family reunification, children's
needs in foster care, and other such services. A principal source of the
problem lies with compensation methods under the private sector con-
tracts. The Department has observed that an unresolved "risk factor" exists
with some private service contracts, particularly from "unanticipated
caseload increases or an unusual incidence of families with catastrophic
service needs. ' 385 The Department projects that these risk problems can
ultimately be addressed "by moving toward a case-rate funding approach,"
but that will take "experience data" which is not available at this time.386
C. What We Teach Our Children
Public policy and government action are teaching tools for society,
particularly for children, whose appreciation and understanding of the values
and expectations conveyed through laws and governmental acts grow as they
do. Jurisprudential philosopher H.L.A. Hart wrote, "[t]he law of every
modem state shows at a thousand points the influence of both the accepted
social morality and wider moral ideals., 387 In the spirit of Professor Hart's
observations, we know that when the State exercises its parens patriae role
and acts through its dependency system to raise a foster child, its daily
impact inevitably teaches that child. Two years after I adopted my son at age
four from an overseas orphanage, he asked, "why are you my dad?" The
silence of my long pause to grasp for the right answer caused him to ask
further, "because you teach me things?" To this day, I can find no better
answer, but I do find myself awed by the responsibility that his questions
remind me I have. I must be ever vigilant in my actions, because he will be
looking to me to learn, even when I am not trying to teach, and I will make
mistakes.
When our public policy fails to achieve for a foster child a permanent,
stable family over the course of many years, the child may learn that family
is not important to us whether we intend that or not. No child will be reading
legislative intent language to discover otherwise. When we move a child
from one crowded foster home to another every few weeks or months, we
384. Id. at 29.
385. FLA. DEP'T0oFCHILDRM & FAMImS, supra note 177, at 23.
386. Id.
387. H.L.A. HART, THECONCEPrOFLAiw203-04 (2d ed.1961).
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teach that child to have a life of temporary, poorly-developed relation-
ships. When we fail to keep our promises to a child, such as by failing
simply to show up to supervise anxiously awaited visitation with a parent, the
child learns that we, the State, cannot be trusted. Public policy must be
prepared to act timely and responsibly in dependency cases when things go
wrong, because they will. Accomplishing this goal will help ensure that a
child does not learn the wrong things, because on the typical day that we
create for Florida's dependent children, they will learn from their parents,
even the lessons that we do not want to impart.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Election ballots and international custody battles aside, all eyes are on
Florida for yet another reason: Florida's steady push to privatize the opera-
tion of its social services programs. Part of Governor Jeb Bush's plan to
trim the government payroll by transferring state functions to private com-
munity groups, including faith-based organizations, privatization in Florida
has hit industries ranging from nursing homes for veterans to the child
welfare system.'
Privatization is also known as "managed care" and resembles managed
care in the health care setting.2 Both terms refer to the use of a variety of
approaches intended to balance the cost of services with quality and cus-
tomer access by reconciling the provision of care to each individual with the
resources available to serve an entire pool of customers. "Cost effective-
ness is achieved by efficiently delivering the most appropriate services to
J.D., University of Virginia School of Law (1977); M.A. in Public Policy and
Administration, University of Wisconsin (1971). Director of the Children First Project at
Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.
1. See Steve Bousquet, Veterans Blast Bush Plan to Privatize, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Jan. 29, 2001, at IA; Steve Bousquet, Faith-Based Initiative Familiar to Florida,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Jan. 30, 2001, at 1A.
2. Florida calls this movement "community-based care." See FLA. DEP'T OF CHILD-
REN & FAMILmS, COMMUNrTY-BASED CARE END OF YEAR REPORT 2, available at http:/Iwww.
dcf. state.fl.us/cf_web/mspt (Dec. 2000) [hereinafter REPORT].
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each individual served.",3 The following strategies are typically used by
managed care systems to balance cost, quality, and access: pre-authorized
care; gatekeeping and utilization review; use of standardized practice guide-
lines; management of data through information technology; built-in financial
risks and incentives; and outcome-based contracting.
While Florida is unique in the breadth and scope of its privatization
movement, many other states are experimenting with the transfer of pieces of
state government functions to private organizations, particularly in the area
of child welfare services.5 By 1999, twenty-nine states had one or more
initiatives to change their management, financing, or child welfare service
6delivery practices by adopting one or more principles of managed care.
There are two basic elements to managed care arrangements in child welfare:
fixed or capitated prospective payments to at least one service provider,
rather than traditional fee-for-service reimbursement payments; a single
7private entity responsible for providing appropriate and quality services.
The majority of the twenty-nine states that operate child welfare "man-
aged care" initiatives are experimenting with the delivery of services to
emotionally disturbed children, only one segment of the child welfare popu-
lation. In some states, certain counties, most notably Jefferson and Mesa
Counties in Colorado, serve all children in foster care in privatized systems.8
Kansas was the first state to develop a statewide system of managed care for
all of its child welfare services. 9 Now Florida has joined Kansas in this
endeavor.
3. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., MANAGED CARE INsTrruTE 1, available at
http://www.cwla.orglprograis/managedcare (last visited Mar. 10, 2001).
4. Id.
5. Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Child Welfare: New Financing and Service Strategies Hold
Promise, but Effects Unknown, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources,
Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Representatives (July 20, 2000), in U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFFICE (GAO), GAO/T-HEHS-00-158 (2000) [hereinafter GAO Statement]. For purposes of
this article, "child welfare" or "child welfare system" will refer to the full range of functions
and services operated to protect Florida's abused, neglected or dependent children, including
protective investigations, early intervention services, family preservation and support services,
shelter care, foster care, therapeutic foster care, group care, residential care, independent
living, postadjudication case management, postplacement superversion, permanent foster care,
and adoption.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
8. See generally Patricia Callahan & Kirk Mitchell, Foster Care Too Often Fails to
Keep Kids Safe, available at http:llwww.denverpost.comnews/fosterO521a.htm (last visited
Mar. 17, 2001).
9. GAO Statement, supra note 5, app., at 16.
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This article will first describe the statutory characteristics of the child
welfare community-based care movement in Florida, as well as the shift in
statutory philosophy regarding the roles and responsibilities of Florida's
state child welfare agency, the Department of Children and Families. Next,
the national and state contextual drivers serving as the impetus for Florida's
child welfare community-based care and the attributes of successful com-
munity-based care will be described. This will serve as background for a
discussion of the following three challenges facing Florida's implementation
process: adequate state funding; limitation of legal liability; and preserva-
tion of appropriate state parens patriae roles.
The article will conclude with recommendations designed to assure that
Florida's process is effective in protecting children, rather than abdicating
state responsibility and devolving state obligations upon local communities
and private providers without adequate resources.
I. CHILD WELFARE CoMMUNrTY-BASED CARE IN FLORIDA
The Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF'), Florida's
child welfare agency, began privatizing child welfare services in several
Florida communities in the early 1990s by purchasing an extensive array of
services from private sector providers such as the Florida Sheriffs Youth
Association and the Children's Home Society. "Of Florida's $373 million
child protection budget [in 1999], $240 million or [sixty-three] percent [was]
spent on services provided by the private sector."' ° Some seventy licensed
child-placing agencies offered foster, group, and shelter placements, and
some 104 offered only adoption services.
But in 1996, the sea change in the delivery of child welfare services in
Florida began in earnest. The Florida Legislature authorized DCF to con-
tract with competent community-based agencies for the provision of foster
care and related services,12 and to establish five model community-based
pilot programs, one of which had to be operated by a for-profit corporation.
1 3
10. THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, COMMITrEE ON CHILDREN & FAMILIES, SENATE STAFF
ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIc IMPACT STATEMENT, CS/SB 660, at 1 (1999).
11. Susan Vivian Mangold, Protection, Privatization, and Profit in the Foster Care
System, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1295, 1313 n.81 (1999).
12. These services are to include: "family preservation, independent living, emer-
gency shelter, residential group care, foster care, therapeutic foster care, intensive residential
treatment .... postadjudication case management, postplacement supervision, permanent
foster care, family reunification, the filing of a petition for the termination of parental rights,
and adoption." FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(1) (Supp. 1996).
13. § 409.1671(1), (5). The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act
amended the Social Security Act shortly after the 1996 session of the Florida Legislature
adjourned to allow federal reimbursement of costs by Title IV-E for foster care provided by
2001]
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The expressed intent of the Florida Legislature in creating this community-
based care model was to strengthen the support and commitment of commu-
nities for the reunification of families and to promote efficiency and in-
creased accountability in the care of children and families.'
4
In 1998 the Florida Legislature expanded the concept of community-
based care and directed DCF to privatize all foster care and related services
statewide, phased in over a three-year period beginning on January 1, 2000. "
The legislature required DCF to prepare a plan to transfer all available funds,
including federal funds, to such community-based agencies. 16
The concept of an "eligible lead community-based provider," a single
agency that contracts with DCF for the provision of child protective services
in a community no smaller than a county, was established with the following
parameters:
[t]he ability to coordinate, integrate, and manage all child
protective services in the... community in cooperation
with child protective investigations; [t]he ability to ensure
continuity of care from entry to exit for all children re-
ferred [by] ... protective investigation and court[s]... ;
[t]he ability to provide directly, or contract for through a
local network of providers, all necessary... services;
[t]he willingness to accept accountability for meeting the
outcomes and performance standards... established by
the Legislature and the Federal Government; [t]he capabil-
ity and the willingness to serve all children referred to it
from the protective investigation and court systems, re-
gardless of the level of funding allocated to the commu-
nity by the state, provided all related funding is trans-
ferred; [t]he willingness to ensure that each individual
who provides child protective services completes the train-
ing required ....
DCF, the contracting agency, retained responsibility for the quality of
contracted services and programs, for ensuring services were delivered in
accordance with applicable federal and state statutes and regulations, and for
private for-profit companies. See 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (Supp. III 1997). Some argue that "[tihe
entrance of profit making into the system raises issues of accountability and oversight unique
to the profit making structure of the corporations." Mangold, supra note 11, at 1295.
14. FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(1)(a) (Supp. 1998).
15. Id.
16. Id. The services to be privatized include the list of services authorized in 1996
minus the filing of petitions for the termination of parental rights. Id.
17. § 409.1671(1)(b).
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establishing a quality assurance program and an annual evaluation of com-
munity-based agencies. IS
Emboldened by its 1996 and 1998 legislative successes, DCF sought
and obtained permission from the legislature in 1999 to suspend its statutory
duties and responsibilities and to submit a comprehensive reorganization
plan to achieve more effective and efficient service delivery and improve
accountability.' 9 The Department's comprehensive plan articulated an eye-
catching vision for community-based care that created local community
alliances to draw together lead agencies, networks of service providers, and
the department in implementing the reorganization.20 The effort would begin
with community-based care for child welfare services, but would incremen-
tally expand to include all other services.21
According to DCF, such a bold step was necessitated by the following
factors: a statutory mission too enormous to fulfill, with a span of control
too broad and communications between central offices and districts often
problematic; "[1lack of true partnership with local communities; [a]bsence of
local systems of care ... characterized by a single point of intake for as-
sessment, service planning, and care management with necessary specialized
services carefully coordinated and integrated to meet the needs of...
client[s]; [lack of uniformity in] contract management [of] over 1700 indi-
vidual contracts;... [lack of resource coordination between the state and
localities]. 22
DCF's proposed solution would be to create a responsive system of care
in local communities which would produce an integrated service plan for
each family and which would be accessible, individualized, family-centered,
respectful, integrated, effective, efficient, normalized, and community
focused.23 Community-based care would be composed of the community, a
Community Alliance serving as the focal point of community ownership and
oversight of the system of care, a lead agency providing core services, and a
network of local service providers.24
While DCF would "continue to be responsible for the overall provision
of state and federally mandated and funded services,"5 the most controver-
sial portion of the plan would require local communities to share both the
18. § 409.1671(2), (3)(a).
19. Ch. 99-219, § 1(1), 1999 Fla. Laws 1351 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.19).
20. FLA. DE"T OF CHI)R.DN & FAMnmS, CoMPREHENsvE PLAN TO REORGANTE Thm
DEPARTmENT OF CHILDREN & FAMuI 8, available at http://www.state.fl.us/cf-web/reorg
(Jan. 1, 2000) [hereinafter COMPSREHENsE PLAN].
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. at 5-6.
23. Id. at 9-10.
24. Id. at 11-12.
25. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 20, at 19.
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costs and the risks of operating the system and delivering services. 26 Local
communities would be expected to commit increased funds and might be
expected to develop local match funds in order to obtain an increment of
state funding.27 Risk would be shared through a case rate funding approach
with a state set-aside of a risk pool.
28
The Florida Legislature balked at the notion of requiring local govern-
ments to share greater costs, and specifically provided in year 2000 that "the
Legislature does not intend by its privatization of foster care and related
services that any county, municipality, or special district be required to assist
in funding programs that have previously been funded by the state., 29 The
legislature was silent, however, with regard to expectations of private pro-
viders, although it authorized the creation of a risk pool to reduce the finan-
cial risk to eligible lead agencies resulting from unanticipated caseload
growth30 and agreed to establish community alliances to oversee the devolu-
tion to local communities.31 The legislature further put some skids on DCF's
adventurous plan, limiting application of the larger plan to one prototype
region and requiring demonstrated improvement in management and over-
sight of services or cost savings from more efficient administration before
32the Secretary of DCF could expand the plan to other districts.
Perhaps the greatest change in Floridalaw regarding the administration
of its child welfare system is the reduced mission of the state child welfare
agency and its Secretary. In 1995, the mission of the then Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services, was "to deliver, or provide for the deliv-
ery of, all health, social, and rehabilitative services offered by the state
through the department to its citizens," 33 and the duties of the department
were statutorily prescribed. Most notably, they included providing assis-
tance to individuals, preventing and remedying neglect, abuse, exploitation
of children, and aiding in the preservation, rehabilitation, and reuniting of
families.34
26. Id. at 23.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(l)(a) (2000).
30. § 409.1671(7). The legislature appropriated $4.5 million for the risk pool in
2000. REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
31. § 20.19(6). The initial membership of each community alliance is a representative
of county government, school district, county United Way, sheriffs office, circuit court, and
children's board. Id. § 20.19(6)(d)(1)-(7).
32. § 20.19(7). The prototype region is the geographical area including counties in
the 6th, 12th, and 13th judicial circuits. Id. § 20.19(5)(a)(7), (16), (17).
33. FLA. STAT. § 20.19(1)(a) (1995).
34. Id. Other responsibilites included but were not limited to: cooperating with other
state and local agencies in integrating the delivery of all health, social, and rehabilitative
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In 1996, this mission was changed, along with the name of the depart-
ment. DCF was "to work in partnership with local communities to help
people be self-sufficient and live in stable families and communities.,, 35 The
1996 statute, however, retained the prescribed duties of DCF.36 By 2000,
these defined purposes had disappeared. The mission of DCF now is "to
work in partnership with local communitiese' to help people be self-sufficient
and live in stable families and communities.37 The duties of the Secretary
are, simply, to assure "that the mission of the department is fulfilled in
accordance with state and federal laws, rules, and regulations." 38 Gone are
the obligations to provide assistance to individuals and to prevent or remedy
neglect, abuse, and exploitation and to aid in the preservation, rehabilitation
and reunification of families.
The community-based care revolution in Florida is now complete. No
longer is the focus of ownership, responsibility, and service delivery. The
state child welfare agency, according to state law, at best, holds shared
responsibility for the protection of children with local communities and
enjoys a vast diminution of duties.
II. IMPETUS FOR CHILD WELFARE COMMUNMTY-BASED CARE
The motivation for community-based care comes from different
sources. One driving force, certainly one prevalent in Florida, is the desire
to shrink the size of state government and eliminate the need for civil service
protections that make it difficult or impossible to discipline or fire incom-
petent employees. Community-based agencies can terminate ineffective
employees at the will of the supervisor.
39
A stronger motivating force, however, is the desire to fix what most
commentators describe as a broken child welfare system: one beset with
escalating costs and a poorly integrated patchwork of services.40 Nationally,
state child welfare systems are currently responsible for more than one
services offered by the state to those in need of assistance; providing such assistance as is
authorized so that clients might achieve or maintain economic self-support and self-suffi-
ciency; preventing or reducing inappropriate institutional care, as well as functions related to
health and mental health. Id.
35. FLA. STAT. § 20.19()(a) (Supp. 1996).
36. Id. The prescribed purposes are almost identical to the purposes contained in the
1995 statute. See FLA. STAT. § 20.19(1)(a) (1995).
37. FLA. STAT. § 20.19(1)(a) (2000).
38. § 20.19(1), (2).
39. See Bousquet, Veterans Blast Bush Plan to Privatize, supra note 1, at 6A.
40. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE (GAO), GAO/HEHS-99-8, CHILD WELFARE: EARLY Ex-
PERIENCES IMPLEMENTING A MANAGED CARE APPROACH 2 (Oct. 1998).
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million children needing protection or care.4 1 "Foster care is intended to
provide a temporary, safe haven for children whose parents are unable to
care for them," according to Michael Mushlin.42 Yet more than half a mil-
lion children currently languish in government foster care at a cost of $12
billion.4 3 In the current child welfare delivery system, there are many prob-
lems. Among these problems is the lack of permanence; "children remain in
foster care too long without being reunited with their parents or adopted into
a permanent home."" Compromised safety is another issue; "children are
sent back to abusive homes or placed with abusive foster parents or in
overcrowded conditions." 45 There are a high number of placements; "chil-
dren move from foster home to foster home within short time periods, jeop-
ardizing their safety and stability." Heavy caseloads is yet another prob-
lem; "social workers are responsible for far too many children to supervise
all cases thoroughly." 47 Finally, caseworker turnover is among the problems;
"foster children face many changes and have to adjust to many casework-
ers."
48
In the latter half of the 1990s, the march toward foster care drift for
abused and neglected children seemed almost inexorable. While
[i]n 1996, approximately 520,000 children were in foster care; by
March 1999, 547,000 children were in foster care. In 1996, 11
percent had been in foster care for three to four years, and 10 per-
cent had been there for five years or longer. By March 1999, 15
percent had been in foster care three to four years and 18 percent
had been in foster care 5 years or longer. In 1996, 54,000 children
were legally available for adoption; by March 1999, 117,000 were
legally available for adoption.
The average length of stay of a child in foster care in Florida in November,
2000 was 35.6 months.
5 0
41. Id. at 5.
42. Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of
Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARv. C. R.-C.L. L. REv. 199, 204 (1988).
43. Lisa Snell, Reason Public Policy Study #271, Child Welfare and the Role of
Privatization 6, available at http://www.rppi.org/ps271html (Oct. 2000).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Snell, supra note 43.
49. Id.
50. REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.
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Jill Chaifetz observes the incalculable human loss behind these statis-
tics, the enormous personal pain and hurt, and the tangible, detrimental
societal costs. "Children who have grown up or left foster care fill the
nation's jails, mental hospitals and welfare rolls," according to documented
studies. 5
These results have occurred despite the passage of good laws. The
federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) was
designed to address the decades old problem of foster care drift: the phe-
nomenon of a child literally growing up in foster care. 2 The AACWA
provided fiscal incentives to states to "prevent the removal of children from
their homes unless necessary and to reunify them with parents or relatives as
soon as possible. Adoption or other permanent living arrangements were to
be found if prevention or reunification was lacking.53 The AACWA required
states to make "reasonable efforts" to prevent removal or to reunify through
services; ' 4 to develop written case plans to direct the provision of services
for each child;55 to judicially or administratively review the status of each
child at least every six months;56 and to hold a permanency hearing within
eighteen months of placement. 
5
The promise of the AACWA was never fulfilled. The federal law's
financing scheme incentivized keeping children in foster care. Lack of state
funds for services, insufficient foster homes, and lax federal monitoring of
state programs contributed to the problem.58
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) sought to cure
some of the defects of the AACWA. It makes federal reimbursement con-
tingent on speeding up the process of cases heading towards termination of
parental rights, by removing the mandate for reasonable efforts to reunify
children under certain circumstances,5 9 requiring permanency hearings
within twelve months instead of eighteen,60 and providing fiscal incentives to
states to foster more adoptions. As another impetus, President Clinton
issued a challenge to states to double the number of children moved from
51. Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in Accordance with the Law: The
Failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 8 (1999).
52. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REv. 637, 639 (1999).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1) (1994).
54. § 671(a)(15) (Supp. IV 1999).
55. § 671(a)(16).
56. § 675(6).
57. § 675(5)(c).
58. Chaifetz, supra note 51, at 9.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (Supp. IV 1999).
60. § 675(5)(c).
61. § 673(b) (West Supp. 2000).
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62foster care to adoption by 2002. The ASFA changes have placed enormous
pressure upon child welfare agencies to improve service delivery.
63
Another force behind community-based care has been the influence of
class action lawsuits and high profile media stories about the "failure" of the
system to protect and serve children. 64 Class action lawsuits against public
child welfare agencies on behalf of children have driven more than twenty
states to operate under court consent decrees.
65
Florida is currently plagued with three such class action lawsuits. M.E.
66v. Bush, filed in 1990, challenges the failure of the state to provide mental
health services to children in state custody. 67 Ward v. Kearney, filed in
1998, challenges unconstitutional conditions in the child welfare system in
69 70Broward County, while Foster Children v. Bush, filed in 2000, challenges
such failures on a statewide basis. 71 Another systemic child welfare lawsuit,
Children v. Chiles,72 was settled in 1995. 73 In addition, a celebrated circuit
court damage action, Two Forgotten Children v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services,74 resulted in a jury award of some $4.4 million.
Hardly a day goes by without media attention to the inability of Flor-
76ida's child welfare system to protect children. The most famous case of
62. William Eggers & Adrian Moore, Privatization: A Growing Trend in Child
Welfare, HEARTLAND INST.: INTELL. AMMUNrrION (June/July 1997), available at http:llwww.
heartland.orglialjunjul97/privatization.htm.
63. See Gordon, supra note 52, at 639; Mangold, supra note 11, at 1312.
64. CHIMD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., supra note 3.
65. Id.
66. No. 90-1008-Civ-Moore (S.D. Fla. 1990).
67. Id. at 2.
68. No. 98-7137-Civ-Moreno (S.D. Fla.) (settlement approved May 31, 2000).
69. Id. at 2.
70. No. 00-2116-Civ-Moreno (S.D. Fla. 2000).
71. Id. at 3.
72. No. 90-2416-Civ-Kehoe (S.D. Fla.) (Apr. 19, 1995).
73. Memorandum Opinion in Support of the Court's Order Approving the Parties
Settlement and Granting Intervention, Children v. Chiles, No. 90-2416-Civ-Kehoe (S.D. Fla.
1995).
74. Final Judgment at 2, Two Forgotten Children v. Dep't of Health & Rehab Serv.,
No. 95-19835 CA2 & No. 96-5980 CA27 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 1999).
75. Id.
76. Just three months into 2000 produced the following reports in only two newspa-
pers in Florida: Shana Gruskin, Child Abuse Suspect Should Not Have Been Allowed Near
Troubled Boy, SUN-SENTINEL, web-posted July 19, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com; Shana
Gruskin, Child-Welfare Workers Criticized for Defying Judge's Order on Troubled Child,
SUN-SENTINEL, web-posted Aug. 22, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com; Shana Gruskin,
Parents of Tough Teens Say Government Help Often is Offered Too Late, SUN-SENTINEL,
web-posted July 17, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com; Shana Gruskin, Teen Argues State
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late has been that of Kayla McKean, whose death in 1998, after repeated
reports of abuse to the state child abuse hotline, failed to prompt her removal
from her parents' home, resulted in the Kayla McKean Child Protection Act
of 1999.7' Against this backdrop of documented failures, federal pressure,
lawsuits, and media attention, a methodology that saves costs and improves
outcomes, tested in the public health care delivery system, looks very attrac-
tive to Florida policy makers.
7 8
I. ATmRIBUTES OF SUCCESSFUL COMMUNTY-BASED CARE
Community-based care is not a new phenomenon in child welfare. For
much of this country's history prior to the middle of the twentieth century,
private agencies "championed interventions on behalf of abused and ne-
glected children," while governments made "fledgling efforts." 79
The federal government "became financially involved through [passage
of] the Social Security Act of 1935" and the creation of the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program.80 Only with the passage of the AACWA,
ASFA,8 and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 did the
federal government assume a major role in the funding of child welfare
Care Failed Him, StrN-SENTwEt, web-posted Aug. 4, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com;
Margarita Martin-Hidalgo & Ellis Berger, 13-Year-Old's Search for Life Ended in Death in
Miami, SUN-SENTIEL, Aug. 20, 2000, at IA; Carol Marbin Miller, Agency Probes Claim
Girl, 5, Was Abused, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Aug. 9, 2000, at IB; Carol Marbin Miller,
'Red Flags' Didn't Save 11-Year-Old From Abuse: Broward Case Indicated Risk, at IA,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), July 20, 2000; Carol Marbin Miller, Shelter Has Reported 40 Kids
Missing, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), July 13, 2000, at IA; Carol Marbin Miller, Shelter
Running Without License: Suicide Try Leads to Check of Facility in Oakland Park, MIAMI
HERAL (Broward), June 30, 2000, at IA; Carol Marbin Miller, State is Sued Again, Ripped
for Failures in Foster Care, MIAMI HERAL (Broward), June 15, 2000, at 3B; Carol Marbin
Miller, Teens Try to Help Troubled State Agency, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), June 16, 2000, at
3B; Shannon O'Boye, Suicidal Teen Left Hanging Because Workers Mistakenly Thought He
Was Dead, SUN-SENTRNE, web-posted July 14, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com; Shari
Rudavsky, Lawsuit: Child Welfare System Abusive, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), June 7, 2000,
at 2B.
77. Kayla McKean Child Protection Act, ch. 99-168, 1999 Fla. Laws (amending FLA.
STAT. § 39 et seq. (2000)). See Snell, supra note 43, Introduction.
78. See generally CHIrn WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., supra note 3, at 2; see Bousquet,
Faith-Based Initiative Familiar to Florida, supra note 1, at 6A.
79. Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in Public
Family Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L.
REV. 1397, 1429 (1999); Gordon, supra note 52, at 642; Mangold, supra note 11, at 1301-11.
80. Gordon, supra note 52, at 642; Mangold, supra note 11, at 1306-07.
81. Gordon, supra note 52, at 642.
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services through incentive payments to states. 82 Even with increased federal
funding, however, states still retain a great deal of discretion in the operation
of their child welfare systems.
8 3
The lessons of the past have led to increased motivation for systemic
reform. Thanks to research, it is now possible to identify attributes of suc-
cessful community-based care. One of these attributes includes design and
pricing; good systems ensure access to the full range of services needed and
adequate funding to support service delivery and ensure quality.4 Another
attribute is quality; good systems have quality as the centerpiece and use best
practices and procedural protocols that are followed. Role clarity is yet
another attribute; "public and private sector responsibilities must be clearly
defined and delineated. ' '86 Outcomes are another factor to consider; good
systems have "meaningful, measurable, and attainable outcome measures
and performance benchmarks. ' '87 Management information systems should
also be considered; such systems "must be capable of monitoring and evalu-
ating critical information on an ongoing basis."88  Finally, an inclusive
planning process is important- all stakeholders must be included in the
design and evaluation process.
The General Accounting Office (GAO), in its study of child welfare
managed care initiatives around the country, reports that states and localities
are meeting some of these attributes better than they did under public deliv-
ery, to the encouragement of state and local officials.90 Child welfare sys-
tems are becoming more results oriented and performance based through
outcome measures for child safety, child permanency, child and family well-
being, stability, and client satisfaction for which providers are accountable. 9'
Initial evaluation of Florida's community-based care pilot projects
established by the 1996 Legislature also demonstrated mixed results. Some
improvements over the DCF run system were noted. These included: weekly
in-person contact with the child in 65% of the cases, reduction of number of
children per foster home to 1.6, average caseload of 18.9, average number of
placements per child in the community-based system was 2.79, length of stay
82. Id.; Mangold, supra note 11, at 1308-10, 1312.
83. Gordon, supra note 52, at 643.
84. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., supra note 3, Overview.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. CHmD WELFARE LEAGUE OFAM., supra note 3, at 2.
90. GAO Statement, supra note 5, at 1-2.
91. Id.
(Vol. 25:619
86
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss3/1
Zawisza
in foster care shortened 66%, counselor turnover three or more times in only
12.8% of cases, and foster parent satisfaction in 78.9% of cases.92
On the other hand, for the three pilot projects for which data is avail-
able, two of the three were not successful in meeting the following perform-
ance goals: children not re-abused during service provision, children not re-
abused one year after service closure, average length of stay for children
whose goal was family reunification, and reentry into foster care within one
year after reunification.93 Even the most successful project, the Sarasota
County Coalition, failed to meet its performance Fgoal regarding prevention
of re-abuse during one year after service closure.9 Evaluations of the Kan-
sas privatization effort also showed mixed results on key performance
measures.95 Performance regarding lack of re-abuse improved in care and
stabilization of placements, while performance on timely achievement of
permanency and remaining home after reunification worsened.96
The GAO, therefore, sounds a cautionary note. In some states, overall
costs have increased. 97 Kansas, for example, experienced cost overruns of
45.2 million dollars.98 Many state and local agencies do not have appropri-
ate data systems in place.99 In Florida, for example, the legislature's Office
of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA)
found that monitoring focused on contract compliance instead of on the
quality of services provided. 10 The GAO calls for increased rigorous
evaluation of these managed care initiatives so that we have a true picture of
their outcomes.101
92. Snell, supra note 43, at 10.
93. See generally OPPAGA Draft, infra note 94.
94. The Florida Legislature, Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability (OPPAGA), Justification Review, Child Protection Program, Florida Depart-
ment of Children & Families, Report No. 01-Draft, 45-46 (Feb. 2001) [hereinafter OPPAGA
Draft]; See generally OPPAGA, Justification Review, Child Protection Program, Florida
Department of Children and Families, Report No. 01-14 (Mar. 2001). The Sarasota Coalition
has since become a lead agency. OPPAGA Draft, supra, at 48. Among the factors in the
success of this agency are the agency's already established infrastructure and experience, a
"well developed and active community stakeholder group," executive leadership, the county's
wealth of local resources, and a small child population. Id.
95. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 55-56.
96. Id. at 56.
97. GAO Statement, supra note 5, at 12.
98. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 55.
99. GAO Statement, supra note 5, at 2.
100. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 58.
101. See GAO Statement, supra note 5, at 2.
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IV. LIMITATIONS OF COMMUNITY-BASED CARE IN FLORIDA
Florida faces considerable challenges in implementing community-
based care in a way that will produce consistently positive outcomes for
children and families. OPPAGA reports that DCF is experiencing difficult-
ties in establishing lead agencies and will not meet its statutory deadline of
January 2003 for statewide child welfare privatization. 10 Among the barri-
ers cited by OPPAGA are lack of capacity and experience of community-
based providers to assume additional management responsibilities; reluc-
tance to assume financial risk; and sentiment that child protection should
remain a state function.
10 3
This section will discuss three hot spots: 1) adequate funding; 2) limita-
tion of legal liability; and 3) preservation of appropriate state parens patriae
roles.
A. Adequate Funding
As discussed previously, Florida's community-based care vision re-
quires shared costs and risks with local communities. But community-
based care often costs more than traditional child welfare service delivery.'
r 5
One of the attributes of successful programs is adequate funding to support
service delivery and ensure quality.
While Governor Bush has committed record levels of funding for child
welfare programs and the total funding for child welfare in the Executive
Budget for Fiscal Year 2001-2002 is $761 million, an eighty-seven percent
increase since Governor Bush took office, 10 7 this budget must be viewed
against a backdrop of years of under funding and a currently soaring child
welfare population in Florida. By June 2001, the number of children in out-
of-home care in Florida is expected to rise to over 18,000 children.'0 8 Cur-
102. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 41.
103. Id.
104. See COMPREHENSWE PLAN, supra note 20, at 23.
105. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 55; GAO Statement, supra note 5, at 11; Carol
Marbin Miller, Private Services "Better" for Kids, But State Strategy Could Get Costly, Early
Figures Show, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Mar. 1, 2001, at IA. DCF expects Community
Alliances to share ownership and responsibility for resource development. REPORT, supra
note 2, at 25.
106. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
107. Florida's e-Budget, Health and Human Services, at http://www.ebudget.state.fl.us/
priorities/ebudgethealthandhumanservices. asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2001).
108. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMIMS., FAMILY SAFETY, LEGISLATIVE BUDGET RE-
QUEST 2000-2001.
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rently there are approximately 12,164 children in out-of-home care; 09 in mid
1997, there were 9045.10 The DCF admits that this huge growth has re-
sulted in insufficient foster homes to meet the demand, resulting in over-
crowded conditions with children and staff staying in motels, children placed
at serious risk of harm, unrealistic expectations for care and supervision by
foster parents, rapid turnover, and failure in meeting statutory expectations
for permanency within twelve months."
1
OPPAGA lists financial risk as one of the obstacles to successful imple-
mentation of community-based care in Florida,1 2 a finding that is not sur-
prising. Providers worry that the state will not give them the resources to do
the job right and that community-based care is just another under funded
state mandate.!
13
One measure of anxiety centers around the availability of a "Risk Pool"
to protect lead agencies from the risks of uncompensated growth due to
unexpected caseload increases, legislative and policy changes, and media
awareness. Under a state-run child welfare system, the DCF had the ability
to transfer funds from other programs or districts to address costs associated
with these risks, a remedy no longer available under community based care.
The Florida Legislature set aside $4.5 million in budget authority for a "Risk
Pool" in the fiscal year 2000-2001,114 a minuscule amount compared to
DCF's projected 2002 child welfare budget of $761 million and the pro-
jected growth of numbers of children in out-of-home care.1 5 No administra-
tive rules have been promulgated to allow providers to access even these
limited "Risk Pool" funds.
Adding to the apprehension is the language of the Statement of Assur-
ances contained in the proposed DCF contracts with lead agencies. Appli-
cants must agree to "ensure continuity of care from entry to exit for all
109. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, FAMILY SAFETY, SUBSTITUTE CARE REPORT
(July 2000-Sept. 2000).
110. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILES, FAMILY SAFETY AND PRESERVATION,
MANAGEENT PLAN SUMMARY (July 1997).
111. See generally REPORT, supra note 2.
112. See OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 41. This consternation might be expressed
by existing agencies not showing interest in serving as a lead agency; lack of capacity to serve
as lead agency; or demands for more resources. REPORT, supra note 2, at 17-18.
113. Shana Gruskin, Two Agencies Team Up To Bolster Foster Care in Palm Beach
County, SUN-SENTDNE, web-posted Dec. 11, 2000, http://www.sun-sentinel.com. One fiscal
advantage of community-based care is that private agencies can earn Medicaid dollars at a
higher rate than can the state. The Sarasota Coalition, for example, earns $1 million in
Medicaid billings to supplement its $14 million in DCF funding. Miller, supra note 105, at
2A.
114. REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
115. See generally OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94.
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children referred" and "serve all children referred, regardless of the level of
funding allocated by the State of Florida."'116 The Statement of Assurances
omits the clear language of statutory law containing the clarifier, "provided
all related funding is transferred." Community-based agencies under-
standably see this contract clause as an administrative abdication." 8
Illustrative of the depth of community misgivings about the ultimate
success of community-based care, is the analysis of a prospective lead
agency in Miami-Dade County, which claims that DCF's new direction has
thrown the foster care system into crisis. It says:
The cost of recruiting, training services, and supporting foster
homes, while creating an infrastructure to provide services properly
without adequate financial support, has threatened the viability of
the privatization movement in Miami-Dade County. In turn, this
has placed a great strain and created apprehension among the cor-
porations, foundations, and community partners that have already
joined the effort. 11
9
This agency's Supported Foster Care Program costs $28 a day per child.12
Although the initial reimbursement rate provided by the state for two years
was $20 a day, DCF now provides $15.66 ?er day, leaving the agency to
make up $12.32 a day through private funds. This is in contrast to the $36
that Florida spends on receiving, screening, and referring just one call to the
Child Abuse Hotline.1
22
Cost issues have already spawned litigation in Florida. The Lake
County Boys Ranch, a privatized lead agency, has sued DCF for injunctive
relief and damages after DCF notified the Ranch that the state agency would
116. CHiLDREN'S HOMESOC'Y, APPENDIXXII, STATEMENTOFASSURANCES, 86-87.
117. See FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(1)(b)(5) (1998).
118. Interview with Kathryn O'Day, Vice-President for Program Development and
Evaluation, Children's Home Society (Feb. 14, 2001).
119. CHARLEE HOMES FOR CHILDREN, FOsTER CARE CRISIs 1.
120. Jacqueline Charles, Funding Puts Pressure on Foster-Care Agencies, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 2, 2001 at lB.
121. Id. The Children's Home Society receives $15.00 per day. Charles, supra note
120, at 1B, citing DCF's need to divert the money to create new programs and increase the
number of children in others. In contrast, Florida provides $23.83 for care of an adult in an
assisted living facility, a rate also deemed woefully inadequate. Carol Marbin Miller, Crisis of
Care for Florida's Mentally Ill, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Feb. 11, 2001, IA.
122. OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 9.
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take over all child welfare functions by December 31, 1999.123 The suit
alleges, inter alia, failure of the state to protect children, failure to allocate
sufficient funds, failure to follow the statute, contract breaches, negligence,
fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and defamation.1
4
The agency had originally contracted to care for all new children entering
state care each month, a number that averaged twelve children per month.
After the death of Kayla McKean,'25 the number of new cases each month
exceeded 100, with sometimes as many as 170. When the Ranch first signed
its contract, there were 200 children in care in Lake County; when the
lawsuit was filed, there were 1500. The Ranch was providing care for fifty
percent of DCF's children, while receivinz only thirty percent of funds
allocated.1 6 The lawsuit is now on appeal.
2F
Resource issues need to be squarely resolved by DCF. Without resolu-
tion, communities will either decline to step up to the plate, will be unable to
meet quality performance measures, or will embroil the state in mounds of
litigation.
B. Limitation of Legal Liability
Closely linked to the above discussion is the question of legal liability.
While the state retains legal responsibility for children in its care, and sover-
eign immunity is waived for negligence in the performance of operational
level activities of DCF caseworkers, 28 a statutory cap limits the state's
123. Petition, Lake County Boys Ranch v. Kearney, No. 00-3055, (Fla. 5th Jud. Cir.,
Lake County, FL) (Sept. 20, 1999), appeal pending, No. 99-2413 CA, (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App.).
124. Id.
125. See Snell, supra note 43, at 4.
126. Lake County Boys Ranch, No. 00-3055, at 12.
127. Id. In addition, officials of the Ranch were indicted in April 2000 for Medicaid
fraud and grand theft for over-billing, double billing, and fraud in their billing practices.
OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94, at 48.
128. See Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1988)
(calling actions of caseworkers investigating and responding to reports of child abuse opera-
tional level activities and legally actionable); Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Whaley,
574 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1991) (calling the care of youth in detention an operational level activity
and legally actionable). But see Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M., 627 So. 2d 512
(Fla. 1993) (holding that decisions about where to place a child and the kind of services to
give them are planning level activities and not actionable); Lee v. Dep't of Health & Rehab.
Servs., 698 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1997) (holding that decisions about staffing and staffing levels
are planning activities and not actionable).
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financial risk.1 29 Private providers, on the other hand, do not have sovereign
immunity and can be held legally responsible for negligence in the delivery
of their services.'
30
In the 1999 Florida Legislature, private providers attempted to secure
passage of a law to make any community agency that delivers foster care and
related services under contract with DCF an instrumentality of the state and,
thus, subject to the same statutory damage cap as the Department.' 3 ' They
feared that one or two major jury verdicts for children would drive them out
of business. But some legislators were leery of opening the door to nonchild
welfare corporations doing business with the state and worried that such a
provision might reduce accountability among private providers and encour-
age the same indifferent services that led to child welfare tragedies. 32
The 1999 Legislature required lead agencies and subcontracters to
acquire a liability insurance policy of at least $1 million dollars per claim
and $3 million per incident. The outcome was that the legislature also
limited economic damages (past and future medical expenses, wage loss, and
loss of earning capacity) to $1 million and noneconomic damages (pain and
suffering) to $200,000 per claim.133 Community-based care providers secur-
ed some degree of lessened liability, but certainly liability remains of great
concern in the decision to enter into contracts with the state.134
C. Preservation of Appropriate State Parens Patriae Role
Another attribute of successful community-based care is role clarity.
Not only does Florida law and practice fail to clearly delineate the role of the
state versus the role of communities in its "partnership," the very nature of
the "partnership" described in Florida law 13may run afoul of state parens
patriae and police powers to protect children. Implicit in the state's desire
to "share costs and risks" is the desire to diminish the state's liability. This,
however, may not be legally possible.
129. The cap is $100,000 per incident of negligence and $200,000 total per victim.
FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1999). A successful litigant would have to seek a special claims bill
from the legislature to exceed the statutory cap. Id.
130. The United States Supreme Court, in Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399
(1997), held that private persons performing governmental functions are not entitled to
qualified immunity. Id. at 402.
131. THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, supra note 10, at 2.
132. See John D. McKinnon, Question of Liability Limit Clouds Future of Privatized
Child Welfare, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1999, at Fl.
133. FLA. STAT. § 409.1671(1)(f) (2000).
134. Interview with Kathryn O'Day, supra note 118.
135. See generally CoMPREHENsIvE PLAN, supra note 20, at 5.
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The state may constitutionally delegate "functions" that are traditionally
performed by the government to a private entity, but it may not delegate
governmental "power."' 36 A private entity exercises governmental power
whenever it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property under government
directive,137 giving rise to a claim of "state action." Under the "state action"
theory, the state retains responsibility to protect the constitutional rights of
the children and families over whom community-based care providers
exercise control because the responsibility is nondelegable.
138
The nondelegation doctrine is particularly applicable to the child wel-
fare system for reasons other than the "state action" theory. The state is
prohibited from interfering in family life except to protect children 139 be-
cause of: the state's constitutional police powers; and the state's common
law parens patriae responsibilities.
4
u
Historically the care and protection of children was the prerogative of
the crown, 141 a prerogative which devolved upon the state, as sovereign, for
example, the parens patriae.142 Parens patriae responsibilities are vested
only in the state and are the basis for state laws which protect children.
143
These powers cannot be surrendered, bargained, or contracted away.'"
In the community-based care context, the state can lawfully delegate the
performance of state "functions," such as the delivery of shelter care, foster
care, adoption, and other services to private providers, but it must retain the
136. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J.
647 (1986); Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization,
35 UCLA L. REv. 911, 930-31 (1988); Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An
Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15 HOFsTRA L. RE'. 649, 668 (1987).
137. Robbins, supra note 136, at 931.
138. Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985). See Robbins,
supra note 136, at 931; Field, supra note 120, at 669.
139. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
140. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
141. 3 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTrARms 426-27.
142. Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369, 384 (1854). See Wilhelm v. Spokane Cmty.
Mental Health Ctr., 726 P.2d 479, 483-84 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (Mclnturff, J., concurring)
(discussing the roots of the parens patriae doctrine).
143. See In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 485 (Fla. 1977). The Third District Court of
Appeal in Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So. 2d 957, 960-61 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) recognized that two branches of government, the courts and the executive
branch, can simultaneously exercise protective powers over children but did not reach the
question of sharing power with private entities.
144. Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Util. Bd., 40 So. 2d 350, 356 (Fla. 1949); 10 FLA.
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 203 (1997).
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"power" and duty to protect children assigned to these services.145 The state
cannot delegate the removal of children from their homes to a non-govem-
mental actor. Nor can the state delegate its ultimate responsibility for chil-
dren once they are in state custody and deprived of their liberty. The logical
implication of this analysis is that the state cannot require private providers
to assume the costs and risks of fulfilling governmental obligations. The
state can ask the community for assistance, but ultimately the state remains
responsible for the adequacy of resources, caseload sizes, and the quality of
services provided.'46
Practically speaking, then, the state is responsible for the costs of
delivery of services in a community-based care environment, costs which are
inevitably greater than in a completely state-run system. 47 The state must
maintain oversight and monitoring responsibilities over the child welfare
system, including the obligation to represent the agency in juvenile depend-
ency proceedings. On top of that fiscal obligation, the state must pay for a
child's daily care and associated services delivered by community providers.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Some say that privatization represents an abdication of the state's
responsibility to promote the general welfare of its citizenry.148 On the other
hand, because of its unique ability to foster meaningful, measurable and
attainable outcome measures and performance standards, child welfare
privatization represents one of the best strategies to date to cure the historic
and current ills of the child welfare system.
Will Florida innovate or abdicate? In order to innovate, Florida must be
true to the attributes of successful community-based care. This article has
revealed that Florida is struggling to achieve at least two of those attributes:
appropriate pricing and role clarity.
145. See FLA. STAT. § 39.521(1)(f)(5) (2000), which does not alter the requirement for
placing legal custody of dependent children with DCF, not with a private agency; OPPAGA
Draft, supra note 94, at 58.
146. Some argue that the non-delegation doctrine has been for all practical purposes
discredited, but it still holds firm in instances where the power delegated was never lawfully
delegable. See A.A. v. State, 605 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Ervin, J.,
concurring) (citing Chiles v. Children A-F, 589 So. 2d 260, 265-66 (Fla. 1991) for an
excellent summary of these points).
147. For example, sheriffs' offices now conducting child protective investigations
spend $654 per investigation, which is $183 more than DCF's average cost per investigation
of $471. Miller, supra note 105, at 2A.
148. See OPPAGA Draft, supra note 94; Chiles v. Children A-F, 589 So. 2d 260, 267
(Fla. 1991) (agreeing that exercising powers that are not capable of delegation is an exercise in
abdication of responsibility); see also Field, supra note 136, at 668-69.
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If Florida will successfully innovate, it must accomplish the following
reforms: clearly establish in law that, while community partnerships are
beneficial, the ultimate responsibility for the welfare of dependent children
lies with the state, i.e. the state is the lead or primary partner in community-
based care; reinstate the prescribed duties of DCF and those its Secretary
recently abolished, i.e. the duty to actually provide services, the duty to
prevent or remedy the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children, and the
duty to aid in the preservation, rehabilitation, and reuniting of families;
clearly establish in law that the ultimate fiscal responsibility for dependent
children lies with the state, by enacting similar language to that which the
legislature used in 2000 absolved local governments of responsibility, for
example, the legislature does not intend by its privatization of foster care and
related services that any private provider of child welfare services be re-
quired to assist in funding programs previously funded by the state;149 fund
an adequate financial "Risk Pool" for community-based care; remove lan-
guage from community-based agency contracts that negate the clear lan-
guage of Florida law that requires the transfer of all appropriate state funds;
appropriate sufficient funds to allow DCF to exercise its oversight and
monitoring obligations while enabling community-based providers to suc-
ceed in daily care responsibilities; reduce the statutorily prescribed legal
liability of private providers to an acceptable level.
The future of Florida's children is in the hands of Florida's elected
officials. Rafts of litigation and media attention are poor substitutes for
informed public policy and skilled public policy implementation. The path
to innovation is clear, but unfortunately the spectrum of government abdica-
tion also lurks ominously on Florida's horizon.
149. FA. STAT. § 409.1671(1)(a) (2000).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's child welfare system fails to protect children placed in the
state's foster care system from neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional
abuse, and psychological harm.1 Florida's systemic failure incorporates many
Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Children and Family Law Clinic at
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. B.S., Pennslyvania State Univer-
sity; J.D., Thomas Cooley Law School. The author thanks Gabrielle Bozza and Josh Berlin
for their research assistance in preparation of this article.
1. Carol Marbin Miller, Report: Child Services Worsen, DCF Official Calls Rating
Premature, MiAMI HERALD, Feb. 22, 2001, at 1B ("In virtually every category studied by state
watchdogs... performance by ... the Department of Children and Families, declined during
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elements concomitant to what is described as "a national collapse in child
welfare services. ' 2 A particularly disturbing aspect of Florida's dereliction of
duty is illustrated by the state's handling of child sexual abuse complaints
involving foster children, and the lack of appropriate attention given to foster
children with sexual behavioral problems. The breakdown of systemic
protections within the foster care setting creates an environment that has
enabled further victimization.4 Failing to properly identify children with
sexual behavior problems and placing those children with appropriate foster
care placements and services has led to an implosion of incidents involving
inappropriate sexual conduct between foster children.5 Legislative, administra-
tive, and social indifference to the plight of Florida's foster children has contri-
buted to the catastrophic damage they have suffered under the auspices of
"state care. ' 6
This article will attempt to draw attention to the pervasive problem of
child sexual abuse in foster care by identifying circumstances that contribute to
sexual victimization. Hopefully the discussion will illuminate the plight of
child victims of sexual abuse and generate discourse on a new paradigm of
protection initiatives for foster children. Part I of the article will explain child
protection proceedings and how children enter the foster care system. Part II
will describe common characteristics of state foster care systems. Part I will
discuss traditional notions of child sexual abuse and their illusory application
in the context of sexual behaviors that occur solely between minor children.
Part IV will discuss the prevalence of child sexual abuse in the foster care
system and the factors that increase the likelihood of such incidents. Part V
the last two years while the amount of money spent doubled... [floster children continue to
be abused at alarming rates").
2. Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform: Revolutionizing the
Most Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IsSUES 1, 7 (1994/1995) (attributing the
overall failure of the American foster care system to three determinative factors: an upsurge in
the number of children in need of care; an overburdened system and agencies; an inadequate
number of foster parents).
3. See Interim Report, Broward County Grand Jury, Spring Term 1998 [hereinafter
Grand Jury Report] (noting the failure to report, investigate, or respond to allegations of child
sexual abuse complaints from foster children exposed them to additional victimization).
4. Id. Accounting for the marked increase in child sexual abuse incidents the Report
included the following: the failure to carefully plan foster care placements for children known
to have sexual behavioral problems; the exposure of children to victimization through in-
appropriate placements; the failure to provide foster parents with necessary background
information on children placed in their care which interferes with the parent's ability to make
informed decisions on supervision and care.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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will examine Florida's acquiescence in the systemic abuse of foster children,
the state's failure to take corrective action on the issue of child sexual abuse,
and the resultant impact on foster children placed in its care. Part VI will
examine judicial intervention and the right of foster children to be protected
from harm while in foster care. Finally, Part VII will conclude the article by
addressing the need for increased attention to the problem of child sexual
abuse in the foster care system.
II. CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS
It is well established that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the
care, custody, and raising of their children.7 Although those rights are "essen-
tial, they are not absolute."8 The government may invade the sanctity of family
when a compelling governmental interest can be demonstrated to justify intru-
sion.9 The governmental interest must be especially lPronounced where it is
necessary to protect children from parents themselves.' Under the doctrine of
parent's patiae," the state clearly has the authority to pursue the over-
whelming societal interest in protecting children from abuse.12 This premise
has lead to an ever-increasing intervention of state action, which has dis-
placed the role of private actors in providing children with basic necessities,
such as teaching and nurturing.13 Once the state removes a child from his
7. See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
8. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
9. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
10. See Meyer, 262 U.S. 390; Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
11. Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First
Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children's Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
381 (2000) (parens patriae, literally "parent of the county," is defined as the government's
power and responsibility, beyond state police power, to protect, care for, and control citizens
who cannot take care of themselves-traditionally infants, idiots, lunatics, and others who
have no other protector).
12. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-67; Myers, 810 F.2d at 1437 (holding that qualified
immunity may apply where state officials take proper action to investigate abuse complaints
when founded upon reasonable suspicion); see also Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Deci-
sionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745 (1987) (noting that
deference should be given to the social consensus that the family should raise the child rather
than the state, and that traditional family law clearly points to harm of the child as a requisite
for state action).
13. See generally LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, FAMILY AND STATE: Th PHILOsOPHY OF
FAMILY LAW (1998); Theodore Caplow, The Loco Parent: Federal Policy and Family Life,
1976 BYU L. REV. 709 (1976).
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parent, the state assumes the role of primary caregiver and the fundamental
obligation of safekeeping. 14
In Florida, the competing interests of protecting children from abuse and
neglect while respecting a parent's fundamental right of family integrity often
collide in state dependency proceedings. Child protection proceedings, known
15
as dependency proceedings in Florida, authorize state intervention in suspect-
ed cases of child abandonment,' 6 abuse, or neglect.18 The legislative intent
behind Florida's child protection laws is: "[t]o provide for the care, safety, and
protection of children in an environment that fosters healthy social, emotional,
intellectual, and physical development; to ensure secure and safe custody; and
to promote the health and well-being of all children under the state's care."' 9
Florida's child protection laws closely resemble those enacted in numerous
14. Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding
liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 where a child was killed after county officials placed
the child in a foster home and negligently supervised that home); see also LaShawn v. Dixon,
762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that a section 1983 claim provided a federal
remedy for violations of the federal Adoption Assistance Act; by virtue of official policy or
custom, deprived children of rights conferred by the Act; and district officials deprived
children in district's foster care of their constitutionally protected liberty interests); Norfleet v.
Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that children in foster care have
constitutionally protected due process rights).
15. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.01(14)(a) (2000) (defining a dependent as "a child
who ... is found by [the court] to have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's
parent[s] or legal custodian ....").
16. § 39.01(1) of the Florida Statutes defines abandonment as:
A situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence
of a parent or legal custodian, the caregiver responsible for the child's wel-
fare, while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes
no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to
evince a willful rejection of parental obligations.
Id.
17. § 39.01(2) (defining abuse as "any willful act or threatened act that results in any
physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical,
mental or emotional health to be significantly impaired"); see also § 827.03(1)(b) (defining
the crimes of child abuse as "an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in
physical or mental injury to a child").
18. § 39.01(45) (defining neglect as "when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be
deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or a child is permitted to
live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical,
mental [condition] ... to be significantly impaired").
19. § 39.001(l)(a).
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jurisdictions in what some suggest is the "federalization of child protectionlegislation. ' 20
A child protective investigation is often initiated after child maltreatment
allegations are reported to the Florida State Department of Children and
Family Services ("DCF"). 21 Allegations are then investigated by DCF or its
agent to determine their merit.22 If a child's safety with the custodial parent
cannot reasonably be assured, the child may be physically removed and placed
temporarily in shelter status., Due process entitles the parent to notice, a
hearing, and proof of unfitness when the state endeavors to remove the child
from the parent.24 In Florida, a hearing is scheduled within twenty-four hours
of the child's removal, as state law requires a detention or shelter hearing to
determine probable cause of dependency and assess the need for continued
shelter placement. In general, only a small portion of all substantiated cases
are ultimately brought before the court for judicial intervention. 26 These cases
commonly require court intervention to involuntarily remove children from the
care of their parents.27
When DCF believes the conditions of maltreatment cannot be remedied
by a voluntary agreement with the parents, a petition for dependency may be
filed . If the parent consents or admits to the allegations to the dependency
petition, or if the allegations in the petition are established by a preponderance
20. Levesque, supra note 2 (describing the influence of CAPTA, AACWA, and ASFA
in shaping state law to comport with federal requirements in order to obtain much needed federal
reimbursement for child protection and child welfare proceedings); see also Stephanie Jill
Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First 3 Years of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act Implementation, 39 FAM. & CONCnIATION Crs. REv. 25 (2001). By July 1999,
every state passed the requisite enabling legislation which mirrored the federal language.
21. §§ 39.201-.206 (reporting child abuse); see also Caroline T. Trost, Chilling Child
Abuse Reporting" Rethinking the CAPTA Amendments, 51 VAND. L. REv. 183, 188 (1998)
(summarizing various state reporting obligations concomitant with federal regulations and
implications and the implications of potential claims to immunity for reporting).
22. §§ 39.201-.206.
23. § 39.402. It should be noted that at the shelter hearing and anytime thereafter, the
court does have the authority to place the child with a related adult or any other person as a
temporary physical placement. Such decisions usually vest legal custody with the state agency
and temporary physical custody with a temporary custodian. Additionally, under Florida law,
any person has the right to file a petition for dependency-also known as a private petition.
24. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
25. § 39.402; see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.305.
26. Randi Mandelbaum, Revisiting the Question of Whether Young Children in Child
Protection Proceedings Should be Represented by Lawyers, 32 LoY. U. CM. L.J. 1, 20 (2000).
27. Id.
28. § 39.501.
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of the evidence, an order of adjudication of dependency is entered.29 The case
is then set for a disposition hearing where the court addresses placement issues
and parenting defects through a case plan. When the child cannot be returned
to the parent and no other adult is available to care for the child, the child is
31placed in the temporary legal custody of DCF and placed in foster care.
III. FOSTER CARE
Established as early as 1832, foster care in America was rooted in social
32concerns for orphaned, poor, and needy children. Until the end of the
nineteenth century, this system of care was based on "child rescue philo-
sophy."33 In theory, modem foster care systems envision a temporary home
like setting for the protection and nurturing of children unable to live in a
parental home due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment.34 In reality, many states
have failed to provide even the most rudimentary protections to foster child-
ren.35 For too many children, foster care is a dangerous place.36 Research
29. § 39.507.
30. Garrison, supra note 12 (specifying that judicial supervision of the case plan
determining where the child will be placed, the steps that will be undertaken to return the
child home, and the actions that will be undertaken to maintain parent-child ties is warranted
in light of consistent reports of agency failure to plan and implement treatment programs
carefully).
31. § 39.623. Foster care is but one placement alternative, for purposes of this article
only foster care placements are considered as dispositional alternatives.
32. See Gendell, supra note 20.
33. Karoline S. Homer, Program Abuse in Foster Care: A Search for Solutions, 1
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 177, 182-83 (1993) (explaining the historical overview of foster care
and the philosophical development of rehabilitating parents as being superior to removal and
permanent placement of children outside the home).
34. Daniel L. Skoler, A Constitutional Right to Safe Foster Care?-Time for the
Supreme Court to Pay Its LO.U., 18 PEPP. L. REv. 353, 356 (1991).
35. See generally Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional
Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199
(1988); see also Sally Kestin, Failures of Foster Care; Saving Money Comes First, SUN-
SENTiNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 23, 1998, at IA (detailing how children were consistently left
in dangerous foster homes by child welfare officials because it takes time and money to move
them; caseworkers were admonished for seeking to protect too many children); Shana
Gruskin, DCF Slapped with Federal Suit, SUN-SEqTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 15, 2000, at
LB (state class action filed on behalf of over 14,000 children in the Florida child welfare
system alleging sexual abuse, beatings, malnutrition, torture, and neglect).
36. Emily Buss, Parent's Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 O-o ST. L.J. 431, 439
(1996) (stating that the child welfare system plays out abysmally for children often exposing
them to neglect, physical, and or sexual abuse); see also Mandelbaum, supra note 26 (citing to
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suggests that once a child is removed from abusive parents, and placed in
foster care, the child may not be safer from harm, which "undermines the
belief that foster care placements are less dangerous and detrimental to
children than remaining with their biological parents who have abused or
neglected them. 37 In fact, evidence to the contrary suggests that rates of
abuse and neglect of children in foster care may be greater than those in the
general population.38 The failure of foster care systems to follow minimum
standards of care that may otherwise ensure care and protection of children,
has led to increased rates of foster care abuse and neglect.39  The latest
national data on child abuse fatalities suggest that a child is nearly three
times more likely to die of abuse in foster care than in the general
population.40 Children may also be at greater risk of abuse in nontraditional
family structures, although few studies have actually tested the premise.41
42With the national foster care population around 500,000 children, there is
tremendous exposure to harm.
Foster care placements, although intended as a temporary respite on the
service continuum, often become a final stopping ground for too many
children.43 The average stay in foster care has risen over the past fifteen
years with many children spending more than two years in care on a national
level and over three years in Florida.44 The term "foster care drift" was
adopted to describe the experience for too many foster children-protracted
S. Rep. No. 104-117, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490, 3492 testimony of
Professor Richard Wexler at Senate Committee hearing, "foster care is not a haven. Often it is
not even safe. Most people assume that removing children from their parents means removing
them from danger and placing them in safety. Often it is the other way around.").
37. Richard J. Gelles & Ira Schwartz, Children and the Child Welfare System, 2 U.
PA. J. CONsT. L. 95, 107 (1999).
38. Levesque, supra note 2; Skoler, supra note 34.
39. Mandelbaum, supra note 26, at 199.
40. NATIONAL COALTION FOR CHID PRoTECrION RjuORM [hereinafter NCCPR],
Foster Care vs. Family Preservation: The Track Record on Safety, Issue Paper #1, (citing
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Administration on Children, Youth & Families,
Child Maltreatment 1998: Reports from the States to the National Child Abuse and Neglect
Data System, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Ch. 7, Sec. 4 (2000)).
41. See generally, Adam M. Tomison, Child Maltreatment and Family Structure,
NAT'LCHMD. PROTECTION CLEARGHOUSE (1996), available at http://www.arfs.au/extemal/
nch/discussings.html.
42. Gendell, supra note 20; Levesque, supra note 2, at 14-15; see also Robert M.
Gordon, Drifting Through Byzanitium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, 83 MwNN. L. Rnv. 637 (1999).
43. Gordon, supra note 42, at 643.
44. Id. at 648.
20011
102
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
stays in foster care which frequently involve numerous placements.45 The
phenomenon is not new and has attenuated modem foster care systems since
the late 1970s.46 Multiple placements have become a reality for most chil-
dren in foster care.47 Research has firmly established that these placements
have "a variety of negative consequences for children and adolescents.
' ' 8
IV. FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON STATE FOSTER CARE SYSTEMS
Systemic deficiencies associated with the child welfare system have
evaded governmental eradication efforts over past thirty years. The federal
government entered the child protection movement with the promulgation of
the Child Abuse Prevention Treatment Act of 1974 ("CAPTA"). 49 CAPTA
was the first in a series of comprehensive federal legislation designed to
combat child maltreatment and neglect.50 Primarily a funding act, CAPTA was
designed to provide support for and improve operating standards of local and
state child protective services. 5' Of major significance, the act required states
52to pass reporting laws for known cases of child abuse, provide for promptinvestigation of child abuse complaints,53 and also provide for the appointment
45. Madelyn Freundlich, Expediting Termination of Parental Rights Procedures:
Solving a Problem or Sewing the Seeds of a New Predicament?, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 97, 97;
(1999); see also Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect
Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 254-55 (1989-1990) (discussing the
implications for leaving the term "reasonable efforts" for state interpretation under the Child
Welfare Act); see also Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care: An Impirical Analysis in Two
States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995) (comparing adoption rates in Michigan and New York after
implementation of the Child Welfare Act).
46. Gordon, supra note 42, at 643; see also LELA B. SosnN ET AL., Tim PoLTICs OF
CHmLD ABUSE IN AMERICA, 82, 97-99 (1996) (citing studies from the late 70s and early 80s
showing that seventy percent of children in foster care had been there for longer than one year,
that thirty-four percent had been there for longer than four years or more, and that fifty-three
percent experienced multiple placements).
47. Gordon, supra note 42, at 643.
48. Id. at 655 (quoting Robert George et al., A Foster Care Research Agenda for the
90s, 73 CHLD WELFARE 525, 537 (1994)).
49. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4
(1974). [hereinafter CAPTA].
50. Id.
51. MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, 4.04(4) (Matthew
Bender 2000) (summarizing state reporting obligations in exchange for receipt of federal
grants to combat child abuse); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106a (2000).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
53. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ii).
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of a guardian ad litem to represent the best interest of child victims of abuse
and neglect.
5 4
Based on child development theory, many policy makers of the 1970s
became convinced that lengthy foster care placements resulted in significant
harm to children.55 Foster children were being harmed in many other ways.
Foster care placements were often utilized as a substitute for providing much
needed reunification services to families. 6 Children were not only remaining
in foster care for extended periods of time, they were often experiencing
multiple placements. Financial incentives were wrongly placed on keeping
children with special needs in foster care instead of promoting their placement
in pre-adoptive homes58 and reliable data was not being adequately collected
on the number of children actually using foster care services 59 -making it
difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate program services.
The high cost of foster care maintenance and the increasing evidence that
foster care was being misused6o prompted the federal government to revisit
child welfare through the passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act ("AACWA") of 1980.6' The AACWA had three major goals: 1)
to provide families with sufficient pre-placement, remedial, and support
services to keep families together and prevent removal of the child; 2) to
provide appropriate care and services to children in foster care; and 3) to
reunify families where possible or expedite permanency by locating permanent
adoptive homes for children that could not be reunited with their parents.
62
54. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix).
55. David . Herring, The Adoption and Safe Families Act- Hope and its Subversion,
34 FAM. L.Q. 329, 332 (2000); see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEN ET AL, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Ne-
glected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the
Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 625
(1976).
56. Levesque, supra note 2, at 14.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN
AGENDA FOR CHI.DREN AND FAMLMS 290 (1991). The Commission found that children are
removed from their families prematurely or unnecessarily because federal reimbursement
provides a strong financial incentive to do so.
60. Levesque, supra note 2, at 14.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 620 (1994) Adoption Assistance Welfare Act of 1980, repealed by
Pub. L. No. 103-432, 108 Stat. 4398, Oct. 31, 1994.
62. Gordon, supra note 42, at 638; Levesque, supra note 2, at 14-15.
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Although the AACWA did not expressly address child safety,63 it made
considerable progress to ensure that states would move forward with a
comprehensive approach to meet basic human needs of children placed in
foster care 64 and required that states do a better job documenting their efforts. 65
States were able to demonstrate a procedural conformity with the
AACWA but this superficial compliance subverted the substantive value of
the act.66  AACWA anticipated that states would report to Congress on
67
compliance, but it was the duty of the states to police themselves. This
"called for [state] officials to make major, painful changes, and if they did not
effect these changes, to report themselves so that the federal government could
cut off their funding. ' 6 As states came to rely on federal funds, they reported
compliance with the AACWA and funding for a failing system continued to
flow. 69 Despite the high hopes of foster care reform, the AACWA failed to
realize its objectives.70
Due to the system of federal reimbursement for foster care services, the
AACWA had the "unfortunate effect of contributing to the unprecedented rise
in the number of children placed in foster care.",7 1 The AACWA's financial
incentive scheme provided for "partial reimbursement to state and local
agencies for the cost of keeping children in foster homes. 72 Conversely, it
failed to provide reimbursement for other social services designed to
rehabilitate the child/parent relationship within the home setting.73 Other than
the threat of lost funding, the AACWA did not allow for appropriate remedies
63. Herring, supra note 55, at 33 (describing how noncompliance with the dictates
and intent of ASFA will minimize the overall impact of the act).
64. Levesque, supra note 2, at 14.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 675(l)(A), (B) (1992).
66. Pursuant to the AACWA, case planning, review hearings, and judicial scrutiny
were all designed to give the Act meaning. The result was different. Child welfare agencies
developed cookie-cutter forms for case plans, review hearings were cursory at best with the
court spending less than ten minutes to review cases, and judicial scrutiny gave way to system
pressures. Herring, supra note 55, at 335.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 336.
69. Id.
70. Id. (explaining the realities behind a flawed funding system for AACWA).
71. Levesque, supra note 2, at 19.
72. Stacy Robinson, Comment, Remedying Our Foster Care System: Recognizing
Children's Voices, 27 FAM. L.Q. 395, 398-99 (1993).
73. Id.
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for enforcement. 74 Although the legislature's efforts to incorporate child
development theories and permanency planning concepts into the AACWA
were laudable, they simply had no chance for success of survival in the
resource poor trenches of the child public welfare system.75
In an effort to address many of the identified deficiencies in the nation's
foster care system, former President Clinton signed the Adoption and Safe
Families Act ("ASFA") into law on November 19, 1997.76 The ASFA has
two primary objectives: "to prevent children from being returned to unsafe
homes and [to] diminish the "foster care drift" by finding safe, loving, and
permanent homes for children who cannot be reunited with their families. 77
Again, foster care legislation clashes with systemic realities as the ASFA
failed to address the most frequently identified problems which plague every
foster care system: insufficient funding for services;78 lack of training for
social workers, supervisors, attorneys, and judges; overwhelming case-
loads;79 foster and adoptive parent recruitment; and funding for post-
adoption services.8 The ASFA's nonsensical financial system of reimburse-
ment between federal and state government continues to reward states for82leaving children in foster care, thus undermining state incentives. In the
end, the legislative scheme of the ASFA is essentially the same as the
AACWA-state court enforcement through the review of individual cases,
combined with rather lax periodic file audits conducted by the federal
Department of Health and Human Services. 83 Historically, the system ofenforcement has produced unimpressive results.
74. Barbara L. Atwell, "A Lost Generation:" The Battle for Private Enforcement of
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 60 U. CiN. L. REv. 593, 596 (1992);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(b) (1994).
75. Herring, supra note 55, at 333.
76. Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as
amended in various sections of Title 42 of the United States Code).
77. 126 CONG. REc. 12012, at 2017.
78. See generally Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2001).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Gendell, supra note 20, at 31.
82. Gordon, supra note 42, at 639 (detailing the inconsistent logic behind the ASFA
that would jeopardize state funding for services if in fact states were more effective in reduc-
ing foster care populations).
83. Herring, supra note 55, at 340.
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V. DEFINING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
The term "child sexual abuse" can be employed to conceptualize a
variety of sexually oriented behaviors involving a minor child. Stereotypical
notions of child sexual abuse portray children being victimized exclusively
at the hands of adult perpetrators.8 A growing body of literature pertaining
to child sexual abuse indicates that principal actors in many abusive inci-
dents are sexually aggressive minor children with sexual behavior prob-
lems. 5 It is important to note that research of this subject is still in its
infancy stages and must be considered preliminary. 6  However, the fact
remains that we have only recently begun to conceptualize child sexual
abuse as a phenomenon occurring within the context of child sexual behav-
ioral problems.
8 7
Given this relatively new perspective, existing definitions of child sexual
abuse need to be examined and retooled to fit our expanding knowledge and
comprehension of the subject. The American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry defines child sexual abuse as "sexual behavior between
a child and an adult or between two children when one of them is significantly
older or uses coercion .... CAPTA defines sexual abuse as "the employ-
ment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of any child to
engage in or assist any other person to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct
or simulation of such conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction
of such conduct .. .. 89 Another authority defines sexual abuse in terms of
84. Id.
85. See generally Earl F. Martin & Marsha Kline Pruett, The Juvenile Sex Offender
and the Juvenile Justice System, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 279, 286-87 (1998).
86. SUE RIGHTHARD & CARLANN WELCH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILES WHO
HAVE SEXUA.LLY OFFENDED 19-21 (2001) (explaining that many of the conclusions reached
are based upon clinical observations and empirical data, and that longitudinal studies must be
conducted to confirm the findings).
87. See generally id. (detailing an up-to-date review of the literature and discussing
the pragmatics of professional work with juveniles who have committed sex offenses).
88. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect,
Guidelines for Evaluation of Sexual Abuse of Children, 87 PEDIATRICS 254 (1991). The
perpetrator and the victim may be of the same sex or the opposite sex. Id. The sexual
behaviors include touching breasts, buttocks, and genitals, whether the victim is dressed or
undressed; exhibitionism; felatio; cunnilingus; and penetration of the vagina or anus with
sexual organs or with objects. Id. It is important to consider developmental factors in
assessing whether sexual behaviors between two children are abusive or normative.
89. CAPTA, supra note 49. The Act defines child maltreatment as "[tihe physical
and mental injury, sexual abuse, neglected treatment or maltreatment of a child under age 18
by a person who is responsible for the child's welfare .... " Under this limited definition,
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physical contact and noncontact. 90 Criminal statutes often characterize sexual
abuse in terms of acts that are per se sexual abuse and others that qualify as
abuse based on the actor's intent.91 Florida law has endeavored to define
juvenile sexual abuse as "any sexual behavior which occurs without consent,
without equality or as a result of coercion."
'g
only a parent, legal guardian or caregiver could be a perpetrator of child abuse or neglect. See
also Diana J. English, The Extent and Consequences of Child Maltreatment, in 8 THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN 1, PROTECTING CHLDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 39 (Richard E. Bechrman,
M.D. ed., 1998).
90. David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child Sexual
Abuse, Vol. 4, No. 2, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, SExUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN, 31 (Richard E.
Berchrman 1994).
91. ROBERT D. GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CASES AND MATERIALS 176
(West Group 1999).
Acts that are per se or presumed to be sexual include the (1) insertion of a pe-
nis into another's vagina, mouth or anus, or (2) the insertion of some other
object (including oral contact) into a vagina or anus, other than a privileged
insertion for medical or child care purposes (such as an enema) ... Other acts
that are sexual, by virtue of the actor's intent to satisfy his desires or arouse
desire in another, include: fondling of private areas (through touching of skin
or through clothing), including the genital or anal region, thighs, or breasts of
the desired person (or inducing the desired person to do the same to the actor
or another); other sexualized touching including frottage (rubbing of actor's
genitals, often through clothing, against another); kissing or french kissing;
nontouching acts such as voyeurism and exhibitionism (including mastur-
bation in the presence of a child); explicitly sexualized speech.
Id.
92. Section 39.07(7) of the Florida Statues provides:
Alleged juvenile sexual offender means (a) a child 12 years of age or younger
who is alleged to have committed a violation of chapter 794, chapter 796,
chapter 800, s. 827.071 or s. 847.0133; (b) [a] child who is alleged to have
committed any violation of law or delinquent act involving juvenile sexual
abuse. 'Juvenile sexual abuse' means any sexual behavior which occurs
without consent, without equality, or as a result of coercion. For purposes of
this paragraph, the following definitions apply: 1) 'Coercion' means the ex-
ploitation of authority or the use of bribes, threats of force, or intimidation to
gain cooperation or compliance; 2) 'Equality' means two participants
operating with the same level of power in a relationship, neither being
controlled nor coerced by the other; 3) 'Consent' means an agreement,
including all of the following: a. [u]nderstanding what is proposed based on
age, maturity, developmental level, functioning, and experience; b.
[kinowledge of societal standards for what is being proposed; c. [a]wareness
of potential consequences and alternatives; d. [a]ssumption that agreement or
disagreement will be accepted equally; e. [v]oluntary decision; f. [m]ental
competence.
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As indicated, these definitions are clearly relevant in the context of
adult sexual abuse of minor children. They incorporate concepts, such as
knowledge, informed consent, intent, capacity, and purpose. However, they
are less helpful in assisting with the identification, classification, and charac-
terization of sexual conduct occurring between developmentally young
children with limited cognitive abilities. Whether conduct involving a young
sexually aggressive child with sexual behavioral problems may be equated to
child sexual abuse is a difficult question of law and one not easily answer-
able by behavioral scientists.93 Such incidents of sexual conduct involving
similarly situated minor children blur the parameters of normative or accept-
able behaviors on the continuum of child sexual development. 94 Therapists
often differentiate deviant child sexual behaviors from exploratory child
sexual play based on the dimension of power.95 The disparity of power,
control, and authority are often identified as factors consistent with child
sexual abuse and not exploratory behavior.
96
Imprecise and inconsistent definitions of child sexual abuse make uniform
reporting of these incidents difficult. It is suggested that a highly normed
measure, such as the CSBI-3, 97 be employed to distinguish the extent to which
children engage in developmentally expected and unexpected sexual
behaviors. 98 A standardized inventory may be more accurate and consistent in
detecting incidents of child sexual abuse.9 The magnitude of child sexual
abuse incidents must be recognized in order to fashion appropriate
preventive measures.
93. Martin, supra note 85, at 292 (explaining the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV") indicates clinical judgment must be used to take into account
both the maturity of the victim and the age difference between the parties when assessing the
appropriateness of sexualized contact between one adolescent and the other).
94. Id. at 290 (explaining that a concise and yet inclusive behavioral science defini-
tion of juvenile sex offending has proven to be elusive).
95. Ralph Underwager & Hollida Wakefield, Antisexuality and Child Sexual Abuse,
available at www.tc.umn.edu/-under006/Library/Antisexuality.html (referencing Logg, C.
Trend of Younger Sexual Offenders on Increase, BELLINGHAM HERALD, July 11, 1990, at A 1).
96. Martin, supra note 85, at 291 n.104.
97. Friedrich, Child Sexual Behavior Inventory, The Clinical Use of the Child Sexual
Behavior Inventory: Frequently Asked Questions. [hereinafter CSBI]. The APSAC Advisor,
8. 1-20, measures frequency that children six to twelve years of age have engaged in a variety
of sexual behaviors over six month period as indicated by their parents.
98. William D. Pithers & Allison Gray, The Science of Sex Offenders: Risk Assess-
ment, Treatment, and Prevention, 4 PSYCH., PUB. POL'Y & L. 200, 205 (1998).
99. CSBI, supra note 97.
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If prosecutors, mental health professionals, and society in general portray
adults accused of child sexual abuse as abnormal and perverse monsters,'0
what label(s) shall we adopt for children whose sexual behavioral problems
stem from their own past sexual victimization? Some suggest that
criminalization of childhood sexual behavior promulgates terms such as "child
perpetrator" and "very young sexual offender."'01 No one disputes that when a
child has been sexually abused by the intentional act of a parent or through
negligent supervision of the parent, the child has truly been victimized. But
what happens if that child victim then sexually assaults another child? Does
the original label of victim now change to that of perpetrator? If so, does this
represent a fundamental shift in the paradigm of child sexual victimization?
VI. CHILD SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
The highly publicized "Battered Child Syndrome' 1 2 drew significant
attention to the issue of child maltreatment in the late 60s and early 70s.10 3 In
addition to comprehensive child protection initiatives launched by the
federal government, significant state resources have been devoted to the
detection and prosecution of child abuse offences.1' 4 Incident rates of child
sexual abuse appear to have increased over time although it is unclear if this
increase is attributable to more stringent reporting requirements, data collec-
tion, or simply an increase in the actual number of incidents. 1°5 There has
also been a significant increase in the number of prosecution-friendly
statutes that have appeared on the child maltreatment landscape during the
100. Underwager, supra note 95. The authors take the position that our current sexual
abuse system promotes an antisexual view of human sexuality. This view is seen in the
negative depiction of sex in sexual prevention programs and the criminalization of child
sexual behavior.
101. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 91, at 196.
102. C.H. KEMP ETAL., The Battered Child Syndrome, 18 JAMA 1, 17-24 (1995).
103. Tomison, supra note 41.
104. Roger J.R. Levesque, Prosecuting Sex Crimes Against Children: Time for
"Outrageous" Proposals?, 19 L. & PSYCH. REv. 59, 60 (1995). There has been an explosive
growth in the research and commentary on the plight of sexually abused children, which has
resulted in vast legal reforms providing them with needed protection and treatment. These
reforms have manifested through legislative and evidentiary considerations designed to
enhance prosecution efforts. Id. at 60-79.
105. Sana Loue, Legal and Epidemiological Aspects of Child Maltreatment, 19 J.
LEGAL MED. 471, 475 (1998) (citing to results from studies which reflect a significant statisti-
cal increase in reports of child sexual abuse; it should also be noted that a system-wide failure
to collect reliable data regarding incidents of child sexual abuse in foster care interfere with
efforts to assess the scope of this problem).
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past two decades. 106 In contrast, very little consideration has been given to
the post-litigation life of child maltreatment victims in general, and specifi-
cally, child sexual abuse victims, placed in foster care systems ill-equipped
to respond to their particularized needs.
10 7
Until recently, society has paid little attention to the issue of child sexual
abuse as it pertains to incidents occurring exclusively between minor
children. 108 It was not until the late 1980s that children with sexual behavior
problems were even recognized as a clinical population having unique
needs.'09 The fact that children and adolescents commit acts of sexual abuse is
a relatively recent discovery.10 It is now estimated that nearly 40% of all child
sexual abuse is performed by youth less than twenty years old, with six to
twelve-year-old children being the source of thirteen to 18% of all
substantiated incidents of child sexual maltreatment."'
One study found the rate of "substantiated" cases of sexual abuse in foster
care to be more than four times higher than the rate in the general
population." 2 In group homes, the rate jumped to twenty-eight times higher
than in the general population." 3 In a study of 127 children with sexual
behavior problems, 84% had been sexually abused," 4 48% had been physically
abused, 33% had been emotionally abused, 18% had been neglected, and more
than 56% of the children had experienced multiple forms of maltreatment.'5
106. See generally JOHN E. B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHIID ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES, Vol. 1, (2d ed. 1992) (containing a comprehensive treatise on significant cases and
decisional law generated from criminal and civil litigation of child and abuse neglect).
107. Id.; see generally Levesque, supra note 104, at 61 (detailing the trend of crimi-
nalization and prosecution for sex crimes against children and the concomitant effect of
diverting focus, attention, and financial resources). This fundamental shift in priorities has
adversely affected the search for other models of child sexual maltreatment, prevention, and
control. There have been few general and genuine policy reforms aimed at helping children
deal with victimization. Id. at 60-79.
108. Sander N. Rothchild, Beyond Incarceration: Juvenile Sex Offender Treatment
Programs Offer Youths a Second Chance, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 719, 720 n.7; see also KATHRYN
CASEY, WHEN CHILDREN RAPE, LADIES HOME J., June 1995, at 112.
109. Pithers, supra note 98.
110. Tomison, supra note 41.
111. Pithers, supra note 98, at 200.
112. NCCPR supra note 40 (citing MARY I. BENEDICT & SUSAN ZURAvN, FACTORS
ASSOCIATED WITH CHILD MALTREATMENT BY FAMILY FOSTER CARE PROVIDERS, John Hopkins
University School of Hygiene and Public Health, 28, 30 (1992)).
113. Id.
114. Pithers, supra note 98, at 208.
115. Id.
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Sexual acting out by foster children poses serious problems for the
foster care administrators, caseworkers, placement custodians, and other
children in the home.1 6 Not only do children with sexual behavior problems
present a threat of harm to themselves, they also present a threat of harm to
others.1 17 The following factors may substantially impact the likelihood of
child sexual victimization in foster care setting.
A. Investigating Complaints of Child Sexual Abuse in the Foster Care
System
CAPTA required states to develop child protection policies and pro-
cedures to receive and investigate reports of child maltreatment and neglect.
Although states have adopted investigative priorities, many jurisdictions
failed to adopt any meaningful investigative response to allegations of child
sexual abuse emanating from children placed in the state's own foster care
system.118 Nationwide, the overall number of reports for child maltreatment
has increased by 41% since 1988.19 The actual amount of abuse in foster
care is likely to be far higher than reported figures indicate, as agencies have
an inherent incentive not to investigate such reports. For child welfare
agencies to investigate their licensed foster care agents means they would be,
in effect, investigating themselves.121 Given the agencies' lawful discretion
to physically move children placed in their temporary legal and physical
custody from one placement to another, many complaints of foster children
116. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERVS., OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND
FAMILY SERVS., A STUDY OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AMONG FosTER CARE CHILDREN IN FLORIDA,
(1991) [hereinafter STUDY OFSEXUALASSAULT IN FLA.].
117. Pithers, supra note 98.
118. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3; Mushlin, supra note 35.
119. Id.
120. Mushlin, supra note 35 at 206 (indicating that rates of child abuse in foster care
may be higher than anyone imagines). One study found that one foster care agency neglected
to report 63% of suspected child maltreatment, although state law required such reports. Id. at
207 (citing D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, Foster Children in Jackson County, Missouri: A
Statistical Analysis of Files Maintained by the Division Of Family Services, 83-84 (1982)
(unpublished report)). Another study indicated that although seventy-five cases of abuse,
neglect, or sexual abuse were reported from one area, "virtually no reports had been docu-
mented" by the official child abuse reporting system. Id. at 206-07 (citing Gil, Institutional
Abuse of Children in Out-of-Home Care, 3 CHILD & YOUTH SERVS. 7, 8 (1981)).
121. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3 (stating that DCF officials would not report
allegations to the abuse agency registry for investigation by the department and often failed to
inform the court of allegations of abuse in foster care placements).
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have escaped judicial scrutiny.12 2 In Florida this meant that DCF agents
could change a child's placement when allegations of abuse arose instead of
investigating the allegations or bringing the matter to the court's attention.
1 23
Child welfare officials appear to have been tacitly involved in what
amounts to a "conspiracy of silence ' 4 similar to that of public school
officials who have failed or refused to address child sexual abuse in their
districts. 25 This institutional failure encompasses mistakes made as result of
negligent supervision, 126 while others are attributed to an intentional course
of conduct to conceal the true dimensions of the problem. 27 On both ac-
counts, DCF has demonstrated a tremendous capacity to tolerate child sexual
abuse incidents in the state foster care population.
Agency discretion to selectively accept and investigate allegations of
abuse has particularly harmed children in foster care. 128 Investigative poli-
cies that do not incorporate appropriate responses to allegations of child
sexual abuse in foster care are irresponsible and perpetuate the problem.12
Equally unacceptable are administrative policies that refer sexual abuse
allegations of foster children to law enforcement officials as a singular
response to the allegations. 3  This is especially true when vulnerable chil-
dren remain in harmful placement regardless of prosecutorial merits of their
allegations.
The investigative techniques employed by the agency can also compro-
mise the integrity of sexual abuse allegations. Child sexual abuse encompasses
complex familial and psychological dynamics that often require training and
122. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39 (2000) (indicating that children placed in legal care and
custody of the department are wards of the state, but DCF has an obligation to place those
children). However, no state ordinance requires DCF to report to the court when foster care
placements are made or changed, which seems to indicate that DCF has the authority to place
children in care and monitor placements without court intervention.
123. The task of licensing is delegated to DCF, the child placing agency; licensing of
DCF agents is under the exclusive control of DCF.
124. William W. Watkinson, Jr., Shades of DeShaney: Official Liability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for Sexual Abuse in the Public Schools, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1237, 1240
(1995) (noting that school officials operating under a "conspiracy of silence" within the
institution attempt to ignore or conceal the problem of child sexual abuse in their institutions).
125. Id.
126. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3.
127. See id. at 15 (indicating that DCF may have intentionally concealed information
from the court); see also Kestin, infra note 136.
128. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3, at 51. The report noted that the district needs to
follow its legislative mandate-safety of the child is its overriding concern.
129. id. at 16.
130. Id. at 11.
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expertise to recognize."' Although many jurisdictions rely on evaluations
from a sexual abuse assessment center or a multidisciplinary team132 in cases
of suspected sexual abuse, the child protective investigator must have the
requisite skill to recognize the warning signs due to the secretive nature of the
abuse. Investigating reports of abuse which occur in an institutional setting
also require specialized training, as these allegations frequently involve chil-
dren having multiple behavior problems that may interfere with their ability to
communicate accurate information in a reliable fashion.1 33 Foster parents, as
well as other service contractors, may have financial, and potentially, penal
interests that influence their decision to report incidents of abuse or otherwise
cooperate with investigative efforts. 13
4
B. Incomplete and Inappropriate Records
Children in foster care present a challenging array of behavioral,
psychological, educational, medical, and psychiatric problems.1 35 The range of
mental health needs for foster children is so varied, that multiple children
placed in a single home can frustrate and exasperate even the best foster
parents. 136  Although foster children suffer disproportionately from serious
emotional, medical, and psychological disabilities, they generally receive
woefully inadequate care and often no therapeutic intervention at all.137
Accurate mental health records identifying children known to present a risk of
131. ANN M. HARALAMBm, Ciuw SExUAL ABUSE IN CrvIL CASES 47 (ABA 1999).
132. DONAID C. BROSS Er AL, FOUNDATIONS OF CHILD ADVOCACY (1997). Multidisci-
plinary teams are designed to bring together experts from various disciplines to diagnose and
treat child abuse out of recognition that abuse itself is a complex social problem that may have
many underlying causation factors. id.
133. Sally Kestin, Volatile Environment Sometimes Leads to Abuse Investigations Lack
Depth, Children's Input: Throwaway Kids, SUN-SENTINEL (Broward), Nov. 11, 1999, at 6A.
134. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3. Civil Liability, criminal liability, licensing, and
foster care placements are affected by the treatment the child receives. Id.; Mandelbaum,
supra note 26, at 15.
135. Mandelbaum, supra note 26, at 17 (citing Robert Pear, Many States Fail to Meet
Mandates on Child Welfare, N.Y. TIES, Mar. 17, 1996, at Al ("91.5% of children were
found to have at least one abnormality in at least one body system and more than half of the
children's health problems warranted the need for referrals for medical services")).
136. Sally Kestin, System Pulls Kids From Bad to Worse: Abuse Neglect, Apathy-
The Failure of Foster Care, SUN-SENTNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Oct. 29, 1998, at IA.
137. K. Edward Green, Mental Health Care for Children: Before and During State
Custody, 13 CAMIBELL L REv. 1, 9 (citing Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case
for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children From Abuse & Neglect, HARv C.R.-C.L.
REV. 199, 209 (1988)).
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harm to themselves or others, especially from their own sexual behavioral
problems, could serve as a catalyst for protecting the entire foster care
population. 138 Formulating placement decisions with inaccurate information
can be as disastrous as failing to communicate this critical background
information to the foster parent. With inadequate background information,
recognizing foster children with sexual behavioral problems may be difficult as
they engage in developmentally expected sexual exploration in addition to
more unexpected and intrusive acts.
Detailed information on every child in the foster care system was a
prerequisite for comprehensive case planning which was to serve as the
cornerstone of AACWS.141 In support of this goal, state foster care agencies
were required to develop comprehensive record keeping systems to track
children entering foster care.142 Agencies were obliged to review the academic
and health records of the child and to keep those records current to enhance the
foster parent's ability to meet the child's needs. 143 Agencies found themselves
overwhelmed with paperwork requirements. Caseworkers, already over-
worked and underpaid, had to prioritize immediate case demands over book-
keeping responsibilities. 145
These missing records would also enlighten and assist the court at judicial
review hearings, 146 which are designed to ensure agency accountability and
reunification efforts.147 For many states, literal compliance with AACWS
unfortunately denigrated into the perfunctory task of filling out cookie-cutter
forms while paying only lip service to the spirit and intent of the act. These
138. Id.
139. Kestin, supra note 139.
140. Pithers, supra note 98, at 204.
141. Atwell, supra note 74, at 620 (stating that the case plan must provide specific
information and provide for ensuring every child in foster care receives "proper care" which is
defined to include both the physical and emotional well-being of the child); see also Garrison,
supra note 12.
142. Guggenheim, supra note 45. A federal law requiring better statewide record
keeping for children in foster care makes it easier than ever before to learn a great deal about
children that enter foster care. Id.
143. Atwell, supra note 74.
144. Id.
145. Gordon, supra note 42. The AACWS tripled the number of issues lawyers and
judges must deal with in juvenile proceedings. For example, the expansion of these hearings
requires social workers to document far more about children thereby devoting less time to
other priorities. Id.
146. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 675(l)(B) (1992).
147. Id.
148. CAPTA, supra note 49; see also Herring, supra note 55, at 335.
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standard forms and procedures did little to facilitate the conveyance of
information to the court. Agencies come to enjoy what is essentially an exclu-
sive license to control information disseminated to the court. This means
critical information regarding foster care developments may bypass judicial
scrutiny when the agency intentionally or negligently, failed to communicate
that information to the court.
149
C. Caseload Responsibilities
Child protection workers carry caseloads often much higher than recom-
mended, making the expectation of quality performance often unrealistic.
150
Caseloads have grown beyond the worker's ability to provide minimal care to
their constituents.151 Although the National Child-Welfare League recom-
mends only fifteen cases per foster care worker,152 many systems are so over-
burdened that caseworkers are required to handle caseloads of forty or more
cases. 15  The Supreme Court of Florida has consistently stated, "reasonable
workloads are essential to the proper functioning of dependency courts in
performing multiple important reviews and hearings required of them by law
and necessary for the best interests of children." 54 However, caseworkers
must often prepare time consuming reports documenting six months worth of
case developments for each review hearing even though these proceedings are
apportioned fifteen minutes or less.
155
Caseworkers have become easy targets for venting system frustrations
and often recognize the indefensible position in which their agency has placed
149. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3, at 15.
150. Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children
and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 79, 119 (1997).
151. Levesque, supra note 2, at 10.
152. NCCPR, supra note 40; Mandelbaum, supra note 26.
153. Gordon, supra note 42, at 679 ("[slocial workers and their supervisors regularly
handle more cases than recommended by licensing organizations: in some jurisdictions, more
than four times more"); see also Gendell, supra note 20, at 34.
154. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 108 (Fla. 2000) (holding no due process violation
existed where a child adjudicated dependent and placed in the legal custody of the state
protection agency, was involuntarily hospitalized in a locked mental health facility for six
weeks, without prior evidentiary hearing on placement). Id. at 109.
155. Gendell, supra note 20, at 34 (citing Melissa D. Protzek, A Voice for the Chil-
dren: Court Appointed Special Advocates are Trying to Make a Difference One Case at a
Time in the Lives of Children in the Juvenile Justice System, 22 PA. LAWYER 26, 26 (2000).
Juvenile court judges in urban areas have about fifteen minutes to decide the fate of abused
and neglected children and often do so without being informed of all the facts. Id.
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them.156 They do not have sufficient time to work closely with individual
families even though their cases obviously present difficult and complex issues
that are not quickly ameliorated. 157 Agencies that do not or cannot attract
qualified employees may simply shift the burden onto the current case-
workers. The resulting lack of staff and time causes some caseworkers to
simply fabricate case details they have not otherwise been able to confirm.
Clearly, some problems facing the child welfare system are budgetary and
financial in nature, while others stem from a lack of "credibility and
accountability., 158  No child welfare agency should tolerate policies for
caseworkers that intentionally provide erroneous information to the court,
fabricate reasons for shoddy work, or create false documents instead of
completing assignments.
59
D. Therapeutic Indications
By definition, children placed in foster care have already experienced
some type of maltreatment or neglect by those charged with their care.16o
These children enter the system psychologically and emotionally vulnerable.
16 1
It is estimated that approximately 30% of all children in foster care have severe
emotional, behavioral, or developmental problems-physical health problems
are also common. 62 The prevalence of such disorders in this population
complicates the task of identifying children that have undiagnosed sexual
behavioral problems. Child victims of sexual abuse commonly experience a
variety of negative impacts from the victimization, such as "delayed recall,
negative self-image and body image, eating disorders, running away and
delinquency, anxiety and depressive disorders, participation in high risk sexual
behaviors, feelings of helplessness and self-blame, difficulty with relationship
and with sexuality, and underdeveloped spirituality.' '163 One authority on child
sexual abuse suggests that only two symptoms are consistently found more
frequently in sexually abused children than non-abused children: post-
156. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3.
157. Mushlin, supra note 35.
158. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3, at 10.
159. Id. at 50 (holding "[t]he Department must emphasize to its employees that
classification of records or false reports to the courts is not only intolerable but illegal").
160. Id.
161. Green, supra note 137, at 5; see also Mushlin, supra note 35, at 204.
162. Green, supra note 137, at 5.
163. Loue, supra note 105, at 480-81.
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traumatic stress disorder and developmentally unexpected sexual behaviors. 64
It is also suggested that the etiologically significant factor in the emergence of
abusive sexuality is exposure to trauma, not a unique associate of sexual
victimization. 65 This factor expands the potential threat of sexual abuse far
beyond those children that may presumptively be suspected as having sexual
behavioral problems due to a history of prior sexual victimization. Research
data also convincingly establishes that deviant sexual interests can have an
onset early in development, underscoring the need for early intervention.
66
Once children that have sexually offend, or are at risk of being sexually
offending, have been identified, comprehensive assessment is required to
facilitate treatment and intervention strategies. 67
Placement of children with extended family members often falls to
provide the child with emotional and psychological support necessary to foster
therapeutic intervention. Research has demonstrated that support for the
child is especially critical in facilitating symptomatic improvement in very
young children, who are particularly dependent on parents for physical and
emotional needs. 169 Not surprisingly, kinship placements often form the most
reliable form of placement altematives.' 7 Although many mental health
experts believe that removal of a sexually abused child from a nonoffending
164. Pithers, supra note 98, at 206.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 201. The study showed that more than half of adult offenders (53.6%)
report becoming interested in at least one deviant sexual interest before age eighteen. Id.
167. RIGHTHARD, supra note 86, at 27. Due to the heterogeneous nature of juveniles
that have offended, comprehensive assessment should include assessment of each juvenile's
needs, such as psychological, social, cognitive, and medical, family relationships, risk factors,
and risk management possibilities. Id.
168. Levesque, supra note 2, at 26.
169. Judith A. Cohen & Anthony P. Mannarino, Factors that Mediate Treatment
Outcome of Sexually Abused Preschool Children: Six- and 12-month Follow-up, 37 J. AM.
ACAD. CHID & ADoLEscENT PsYcH. 44 (1998). Children living in short-term foster home
placements were not included in this study which hypothesized that two particular factors:
"parental emotional distress regarding the abuse and lack of parental support of the child,
would predict poorer child outcomes at both follow-up points." Id. The findings demonstrate
the importance of appropriate parental support on the short-term function of sexually abused
children. Id. The study highlights the importance of parental reaction to the abuse and
including parents in the treatment of young sexually abused children. In particular, the study
reveals the importance of focusing on these issues during parental therapy. Id.; see also E.
DEBUNGER Er AI-, SExuALLY ABUSED CHILDREN SUFFERING POSTrRAUMATIC STRESS
SYMPTOMS: INrTAL TREATMENT OUTcoME FINDINGS; CHILD MALTREATMENT 1:310-321
(1996).
170. Edith Fein & Anthony N. Maluccio, Permanency Planning: Another Remedy in
Danger?, 66 Soc. SERV. REV. 335, 336 (1992).
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parent may be counter productive to the therapeutic interests of the child,
safety concerns will prevail.'
7 1
E. Inappropriate Placements
Foster care placement decisions should be given the highest degree of
care-since the state is substituting its decision for that of the parent. 72 There
is strong evidence to suggest that inappropriate foster care placements, which
mimic the child's abusive home environment, only serve to further damage the
child and increase the likelihood of serious emotional and psychological
harm.173 Children suffer additional victimization and often irreparable harm
when child welfare agencies have failed to establish appropriate pre-
placement criterion for foster care placements or otherwise fail to accurately
evaluate the individual dynamics of each child's placement. 74 Placements
in overcrowded and inadequate foster homes fail to provide for children's
basic needs. 75 Beyond this, some governmental officials have consciously
abdicated their obligation to provide remedial protection for foster children
even where they have specific knowledge of threatened or actual harm to
such children. 176
171. Cohen, supra note 169.
172. T.M. v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (D.C. Wyo. 2000). The professional
judgement standard was appropriate to determine liability for placement decision of child
welfare workers who placed children with sexually abusive foster parent. Id. at 1195.
173. Pithers, supra note 98, at 209.
174. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.
175. Mandelbaum, supra note 26, at 175 (explaining that children in foster care fail to
have their mental, emotional, and physical health needs met).
176. See, e.g., LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. 959, 996-97 (D.D.C. 1991). In a class action
brought by children in foster care, the court held:
The facts in this case established beyond any doubt that defendants have
failed to protect these plaintiffs from harm-whether physical, psychological,
or emotional-by failing to place plaintiffs appropriately, failing to prepare
case plans, failing to monitor placements, and failing to ensure permanent
homes, among other things... [Klnowledge of these problems and refusal to
take action confirm that the problems are not isolated, but amount to "a per-
sistent pervasive practice... decisions made by officials within the DHS
have not been the result of the exercise of professional judgement .... These
failures are not the result of choosing among several professionally acceptable
alternatives. The failures are the result of making no choices at all.
Id. at 995.
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Foster children desperately need stability, security, and consistent nurtur-
ing.177 Multiple placements cause emotional bonds to break as children learn
to develop shallow roots in relationships with others, which may interfere with
normal and healthy attachments. 178 "Imagine as an adult, you go through a
courtship, a marriage and a divorce-now imagine you do that thirteen times in
a year-that's what is happening to these [foster] children. 1 79  Placement
options may be so limited for teenage children that foster care workers permit
them to sleep in their own work offices or even motel rooms. 18° Overcrowded
placement and the concomitant lack of privacy may lead to fewer inhibitions
and increase the likelihood of sexual assault among the foster children.8'8
Placing vulnerable young children with older children that may have sexual
behavioral problems while failing to provide necessary support and super-
vision can be a terribly unwise decision.' 82  There are countless examples
where foster children have been abused by the very person sanctioned to
177. Robinson, supra note 72, at 409.
178. Id. (citing Kenneth Jost, Foster Care Crisis, CQ Researcher, 706-07 (1991)).
179. Sally Kestin, Foster Care System Exposes Children to Abuse & Neglect, SUN-
SntWrENL (Ft. Lauderdale), Oct. 25, 1998, at 1A.
180. Shana Gruskin, Agencies Look for a Place for Troubled Teens to Call Home,
SuN-SENTINE (Ft. Lauderdale), Feb. 28, 2000, at 1A (detailing the shortage of foster homes
for older teens and the unattractive placement options that face DCF).
181. Tomison, supra note 41 (citing David Finkelhor, Child Sexual Abuse: New
Theory and Research, THE FRME Prmss, N.Y. (1984)).
Overcrowding was but one risk factor that may increase the risk of sexual of-
fending based on Finkelhor's four part model for on child victimization by an
adult, not victimization by a child. Finkelhor suggest four essential factors
must exist for CSA to occur: (1) A potential offender must have some moti-
vation to sexually abuse a child. The potential offender must feel some form
of emotional congruence with the child, sexual arousal with the child must be
a potential source of gratification, and alternative sources of gratification
must be unavailable or less satisfying; (2) Any internal inhibitions against act-
ing on the motivation to engage in sexual assault must be overcome.; (3) Any
external impediments to acting on the impulse to abuse must be overcome.
Inadequate care or supervision by a parent or guardian can provide an oppor-
tunity for an offender to act; (4) Avoidance or resistance by the child must be
overcome. This may involve enticing an emotionally deprived child into ac-
cepting inappropriate attention, or over coercion to achieve domination of the
relatively powerless child.
Id.
182. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3; Kestin, supra note 136 (detailing how DCF
placed an eight year old child in a foster home with eight or nine older children that had
mental handicaps. The child was sexually assaulted as often as twice a day by teenagers in the
home). The Court had previously found the placement inappropriate for this child and unsafe.
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provide foster care placement. 183 Some sug est that privatized services or even
institutional care would be a better solution. No substantial body of research
supports the conclusion that privatization of child welfare services will
dramatically improve the delivery or quality of those services.18 5 It has been
suggested that private agencies, which work directly with families, are in a
better position to inform courts of the needs and welfare of children. However,
there is no data to suggest that they have been any more or less effective than
the state agencies in protecting children in foster care.
186
Constitutional limitations imposed by the separation of powers doc-
trine, 187 prohibit courts from micromanaging child welfare agency affairs. 88
Courts may establish placement criterion for a specific child being placed in
foster care but they are generally prohibited from selecting the actual place-
ment,18 9 which may effectively tie the court's hands in regards to its important
placement decisions. The child welfare agency is charged with monitoring and
supervising their licensed agents; others have little ability to police agency
183. See generally Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 792 (11th Cir. 1987); K.H. v.
Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 1990) (girl sexually abused while in foster placement).
184. The Florida Legislature currently requires DCF to contract out all placement
services to private providers. FLA. STAT. § 39.01 (2000).
185. See generally Margaret Gibleman, Theory Practice and Experience in the
Purchase of Services, in The Privatization for Human Services: Policy and Practice Issues,
Vol. II, 1-46 (1998) (explaining the nature of services being subcontracted, and noting that
public administration or business management may be more relevant).
186. Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in Public
Family Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L.
REv. 1397 (1999).
187. See generally Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of
Children, 61 U. C. L. REv. 1317 (1994) (discussing competing interests in custody disputes
and how those interests are impacted by separation of powers issues).
188. Id.
189. K.A.B. v. Hyson, 483 So. 2d 898, 899 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986). A court
which adjudicates a child to be dependent and places the child with Department of HRS (now
known as DCF) does not have authority to direct precisely where child is to be placed. Id. "It
is crystal clear that it is within the discretion of the agency to decide where to keep a child
who is in its custody." Id. It is not within the province of the court to manage the affairs of
another branch of government. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.521(1)(b)(3) (2000), (providing
that "[the court shall] [r]equire placement of the child either under the protective supervision
of an authorized agent of the department in the home of a relative of the child or another adult
approved by the court, or in the custody of the department").
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practices. 190 Even when there is an objection to an agency placement decision,
there may be little recourse until the child is harmed.' 91
F. Delinquency
Foster care youth are at greater risk than non-foster care youth for
involvement in the juvenile justice system. 1  One study of foster children
placed in a group home found that twenty-seven of twenty-eight teenagers had
been arrested at least once, and that almost half had been arrested as a result of
an incident in placement.193  When foster care children are charged with
violations of a criminal statute, they tend to be incarcerated for longer periods
of time and tend to receive stiffer punishments than their non-foster care
counterparts. 194 Expenditures for treatment of children with sexual behavioral
problems remain minuscule compared with funds dedicated to investigating,
prosecuting, and incarcerating adult sex offenders. 95 Almost half of all child
sexual abuse is committed by youth less than eighteen years old, yet our social,• • 196
political, and legal focus remains incarceration. Failure to promptly and
effectively respond to children with sexual behavior problems only results in
far greater costs of criminal prosecution and subsequent incarceration in either
juvenile or adult facilities. 197
There are rising concerns that the affect of portraying adult sexual
offenders as abnormal and perverse monsters' 98 will adversely impact
therapeutic interventions for children with sexual behavioral problems-many
of whom were also previous sexual assault victims. Criminal justice
190. Lupu, supra note 187, at 1371 (explaining the paradox of power separation
models in child protection legislation that adversely impact the protection goals).
191. Kestin, supra note 133 (reporting that an eight year old child was sexually
molested in foster care over the judge's objection to DCF's placement decision).
192. Molly Armstrong, The Importance of Bridging the Gap Between Child Welfare
and Juvenile Justice for Arrested Foster Youth, at 55 (PLI Crim. Order No.: 00-0016 (2000)
(explaining the relationship between child maltreatment and disposition to the juvenile justice
system)).
193. Id. (citing results of a study on foster children and the juvenile justice system
conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice).
194. Id.
195. Pithers, supra note 98, at 201. But see Rothchild, supra note 108, at 736 (citing
WILLAM L. MARSHALL Er AL., HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 6 (1990) (noting that some
behavioral scientists consider juvenile sex offenders to be untreatable because extensive
studies on adult sex offenders indicate a high rate of recidivism)).
196. Pithers, supra note 98, at 203.
197. Id.
198. Underwager, supra note 95.
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intervention does not offer promising solutions to children with sexual
behavior problems.
G. The Child's Voice
The child's voice frequently disappears into the abyss of the child welfare
system once the child is placed in foster care. Pursuant to CAPTA, children
are entitled to representation by a guardian ad litem ("GAL") when they are
subject to child protection proceedings. 199 Congress subsequently amended the
statute to expand child representation by permitting the court-appointed advo-
cate to be an attorney. 2W The child's advocate is charged with the respon-
sibility, "to obtain first hand, a clear understanding of the situation and needs
of the child and to make recommendation to the court concerning the best
interests of the child."20' It has long been recognized that independent repre-
sentation for dependent children is necessary to protect their interests and
rights. Every state has enacted legislation providing for child representation in
protection proceedings, yet many states fail to meet this obligation. 202
In practice, the child welfare agenda is often inconsistent with the child's
best interest; this creates a conflict between agency responsibility and the
child's rights.2 °3 A primary manifestation of this conflict occurs when foster
children are harmed in care, leaving the agency to defend failed placement and
or case decisions for political, administrative, and economic reasons. Because
children enjoy no federal constitutional rights to programs for protection from
abuse and exploitation, and no rights to basic nutrition, income supports,
shelter, and healthcareY' they are at a distinct disadvantage in prevailing
against agency bureaucracy. Inconsistent representation in child protection
proceedings serves to reinforce the disenfranchisement of foster children, and
limits the court's ability to accurately determine what is in a child's best
199. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix) (2000); Mangold, supra note 186, at 1441
(tracing the history of private service providers and their historical significance in protection
proceedings).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix).
201. Id. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix)(I), (II).
202. Mandelbaum, supra note 26, at 22-23 (describing system shortcomings such as
inadequate resources and support for representation).
203. Id.
204. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children's Rights:
Incorporating Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. I
(1999) (describing theories in support of and against the extension and/or creation of constitu-
tional rights for children).
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interest.2m  Without the voice of a court appointed advocate that has know-
ledge of the child's past and present circumstances, history proves that the vast
majority of all foster children will remain in status quo.2°6 An independent
voice for the child can direct the court's attention to: inappropriate place-
ments, therapy concerns, visitation rights, educational needs, and physical or
sexual abuse allegations stemming from a placement-all of which impact the
welfare of thechild but may be filtered through agency discretion .
207
II Training to Recognize Child Sexual Abuse in Foster Care
Child sexual abuse research has consistently concluded that sexual abuse
is extensively undisclosed and underreported .20 Children often fail to report
incidents of sexual abuse because they fear disclosure will bring consequences
even worse than being victimized again.209 The length, duration, and severity
of the abuse can affect disclosure of the abuse.21° Some child victims of
sexual abuse may not exhibit the effects of the abuse until adolescence or
adulthood, when they become involved in intimate relationships. 2" Sexual
abuse investigations often rely largely on history and nonexclusive behavioral
or emotional symptoms due to the lack of physical injuries.212
205. Mandelbaum, supra note 26, at 52 (arguing why the court cannot adequately
protect the child's best interest in protection proceedings); see also Homer, supra note 34
(noting studies showing that judicial reviews and dispositional hearings are not conducted on
time in many states and the thoroughness of these reviews are questionable).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Nancy Faulkner, Pandora's Box: The Secrecy of Child Sexual Abuse Sexual
Counseling Digest, available at http://www.prevent-abuse-now.com/pandora.htm; see also C.
Bagely, Development of an Adolescent Stress Scale for Use of School Counselors, SCH.
PSYCH. INT'L 13, 31-49 (1992).
209. Faulkner, supra note 208; see also MYERS, supra note 107, at 304 (explaining that
many victims of child sexual abuse never disclose their abuse, of those that do, delayed
reporting is common).
210. MYERS, supra note 106, at 304.
211. English, supra note 89, at 48 (describing a variety of emotional,-psychological
and behavioral responses observed in child victims of child sexual abuse). Symptomology of
abuse may surface immediately for some children yet be delayed in others) (citing BRIERE &
ELLIOT, IMMEDIATE AND LONG TERM IMPACTS OF CHILD SExUAL ABUSE, THE FUTURE OF
CHMLDREN 2:54-.69 (1994)).
212. HARALAMBIE, supra note 131 (describing a variety of acts that constitute sexual
abuse, such as fondling, oral-genital contact, kissing, rubbing, and touching).
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Florida's DCF has historically rejected agency responsibility to investi-
gate child sexual abuse allegations from within the state foster care system.21 3
Florida has not, until recently,2 4 required reporting of a "child-on-child"
sexual or physical abuse in foster care where the care provider was not at
fault.215 Foster care workers often lack training techniques utilized to detect
sexual abuse.216 With no reporting or investigative obligations, there would be
no need to train caseworkers on appropriate protocols to investigate these
incidents.
A significant percentage of the foster care population displays
symptomatic behaviors resulting from various forms of abuse and neglect.
217
Without knowing the extent of abuse or neglect attributed to each child in care,
it is difficult to predict or detect children that may have sexual behavioral
218problems. Child sexual offenders constitute a markedly heterogeneous
group. 9 Between 1980 and 1995 juvenile arrest rates for children less than
twelve years old escalated 125% for sex offenses (excluding rape) and 190%
for forcible rape, while there was only a 24% increase for general crimes
during this same period of time.220 This increase underscores the need to
provide foster care workers with appropriate training.
Given the lack of systemic protections, foster children appear to be
particularly vulnerable to sexual abuse.22 1  In the absence of a permanent
kinship for foster children, the traditional incest taboo does not operate.22
Children residing with non-genetic parents appear to be at greater risk of
sexual exploitation. 22 Caseworkers must be better trained to recognize warn-
213. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3; see also NCCPR, supra note 40.
214. FLA. STAT. § 39.307 (2000).
215. Howard M. Talenfeld, Prepared Statement, at 2 (Dec. 9, 1998) (on file with
author); see also Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. Office of Children Youth and Family
Servs., A Study of Sexual Assault Among Foster Children in Florida (Feb. 1991); D.A.O. v.
Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 561 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
sexual intercourse between a thirteen-year-old boy and his five-year-old niece did not consti-
tute child abuse pursuant to section 415.503(12) of the Florida Statutes).
216. Foster Care vs. Family Preservation: The Track Record on Safety, available at
http:www.nccpr.orglnewissues/index.html.
217. See generally English, supra note 89, at 48.
218. Id.
219. Tomison, supra note 41.
220. Pithers, supra note 98, at 206.
221. Mushlin, supra note 35, at 204.
222. Id. at 205.
223. Small Children by Stepfathers v. Genetic Fathers, 15 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY
207-17 (1994).
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ing signs and employ specific strategies to ensure the safety of all children in
foster care from the known danger of child sexual abuse.
VII. FLORIDA'S SYSTEMATIC FAILURE: WARD V. KEARNEY
Considering the abundance of dreadful foster care systems across the
nation, there is probably no place where it is worse to be a foster child than in
Florida.224 The Secretary of Florida's Department of Children and Families
Kathleen Kearney,225 has likened the problems of her agency to those of the
Titanic.226 In 1998, a grand jury convened in Broward County to consider
evidence regarding Florida's foster care system and specifically the system
within Broward County.227 The report found serious deficiencies with DCF's
handling of services to abused and neglected children and found particular
danger associated with the foster care system.m "[T]he problems facing the
Department are extensive and so systemic that the children in the custody of or
under the protection of the Department are in peril." 229  The report also
indicated that Broward County's foster care system was on the brink of
catastrophe and would collapse if serious intervention was not initiated.230
One child welfare expert described the situation in Broward County as
"dangerously out of control.... These are the worst conditions I am aware of
in a child welfare system . ,,"3
In addition to physical, emotional, and mental abuse, foster children in
Broward County also suffered sexual victimization: an eight-year-old child
224. National Coalition for Child Protection Reform, Shadow on the Sunshine State,
available at http://www.nccpr.org. [hereinafter Sunshine State Report].
225. Kathleen Kearney was appointed as the Secretary of the Department of Children
and Families by Governor Jeb Bush. Prior to her appointment as Secretary, Kathleen Kearney
was a Broward County Circuit Court Judge in the Seventeen Judicial Circuit of Florida. Judge
Kearney spent approximately ten years in the state's juvenile dependency division immedi-
ately prior to her appointment as Secretary. Judge Kearney was a vocal critic of Florida's
Department of Children Services. She remains a staunch child advocate.
226. Douglas C. Lyons, New Track Needed for this Swamped Boat, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Nov. 6, 1999, at 15A.
227. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3, at 1.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3, at 48 (finding "[t]here is agreement from
Dependency Court Judges, District employees and other persons familiar with the child
welfare system that the problems facing the Department and District Ten are so extensive and
so pervasive that they threaten to collapse the entire system and that serious intervention is
imperative."). Id.
231. Sunshine State Report, supra note 224.
2001]
126
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
forced to commit sex acts in foster placement;2 32 an eleven-year-old girl lured
away by another foster child and then gang-raped by several men;233 a sexually
aggressive teenager placed in a foster home with three younger children-
subsequently charged with sexually abusing one of the younger children, a
four-year-old girl;234 foster parents gave a child a whistle to blow if older
235
children in the foster home tried to sexually molest him. Additionally, a
court-appointed lawyer swore that he was made personally aware of fifty
instances of "child-on-child sexual abuse" involving more than 100 foster
children in Broward County alone. 6 During this same period of time, DCF
official records indicate only seven complaints because the child abuse registry
would not accept reports of such sexual abuse.2 37 Prior to October 1, 1998,
Broward DCF did not investigate sexual abuse allegations the department
considered to be crimes committed by children upon children in foster care.
Those complaints were dubbed "child-on-child" and were regarded by the
238
agency as exclusively within the jurisdiction of the police.
A class action lawsuit was filed in October 1998, on behalf of children
who had been sexually molested and severely abused while in foster care.239
The evidence in that case demonstrated that DCF caseworkers repeatedly left
children in dangerous homes, falsified department records, and mislead
judges.2 ° Broward caseworkers were often responsible for fifty to seventy
232. Sally Kestin, Caseworker Has "Lied to the Court;" Sex Abuse prompts Judge to
Order Contempt Inquiry, SUN-SENT LNE (Ft. Lauderdale), Oct. 24, 1998, at IA. The judge
ordered the State Attorney to initiate proceedings that could result in criminal contempt for
lying to the court. The case worker that placed the teen in the home then pleaded with the
family not to tell the judge.
233. Talenfeld, supra note 215.
234. Kestin, supra note 232.
235. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3, at 22.
236. Affidavit of David S. Bazerman, Esq., Ward. v. Kearney, No. 98-7137, at 4 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 16, 1998).
237. NCCPR, supra note 40.
238. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3, at 11.
239. Suit was filed by the Youth Law Center, a nonprofit child advocacy group based
in San Francisco, California. Professor Michael Dale and Howard Talenfeld were the lead
attorneys representing the plaintiffs. Professor Michael Dale is a tenured professor of law at
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
Attorney Talenfeld is a partner in the law firm of Coladny, Fass and Talenfeld.
240. Compl. at 1, Ward v. Feaver (S.D. Fla. 1998) (No. 98-7137) [hereinafter Ward
Complaint]; see also Grand Jury Report, supra note 3; see generally Sally Kestin, Children's
Safety Net Collapsing; Grand Jury Finds Cash-Strapped System Fails Kids Again and Again,
SUN-SENTNL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 11, 1998, at IA.
672 [Vol. 25:641
127
: Nova Law Review 25, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Arcaro
cases each, over four times the recommended caseload. 24 It also became
apparent that, "[a]ccountability, integrity and efficiency" were so lacking from
DCF foster care operations that child safety devolved into a secondary issue242
During a six-month period of time immediately prior to the settlement an-
nounced in Ward v. Kearney,24 3 more than thirty foster children had been sex-
ually assaulted by other foster children.24 DCF could not account for more
than eighty children who either ran away from foster care or were simply
missing--that number was seventy-seven during 1999.4 5
Florida has a long track record of failing to provide adequate services to
children in state care. While the safety and quality of Florida's foster care
system continued to decline during the 1990s,24 other states were developing
comprehensive plans to revamp their child protection proceedings and foster
care services.m Although Florida was also working on its own foster care
241. Ward Complaint, supra note 240.
242. Dep't of Children & Families, Inspector General Report No. 99-0053 (2000); see
also Susan Gruskin, Report Blasts DCF Workers Staff Ignored Court Order to Interview
Kids-Children Placed in Dangerous Home, SUN-SNINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Feb. 18, 2000,
at 3B.-
243. Id.
244. Settlement was announced indicating that the case would be resolved by consent
decree.
245. Shana Gruskin, Broward Foster Care Troubles Settled? Agency Lawsuit May Be
Put to Rest Today, SuN-S TInEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Feb. 15,2000, at IA.
246. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3, at 55.
The administration is unfortunately reflective of the nearly complete indiffer-
ence with which child welfare is regarded by the general public as well as our
elected leaders. It is an outrage that for at least 17 years the needs of our
children, which are so desperate and so obvious, have been largely ignored.
Id.; see also Sunshine State Report, supra note 224. "The problems [that plague DCF] are the
result of poor policies, poor administration and what amounts to a form of government-
sanctioned child neglect in Florida: the repeated failure of a succession of governors and
legislatures to adequately fund DCF or its predecessor, the Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services." Id.
247. See generally Grand Jury Report, supra note 3.
248. Aletha R. Stewart Jones & Kathleen R. Brault, Improving Foster Care in Mary-
land, 33 MD. B.J. 52 (2000). In 1993, Congress appropriated $35 million dollars over a four
year period for states to explore and develop more efficient handling of foster care cases by
the courts. Id. Jones and Brault provide extensive information compiled from Maryland's
Foster Care Court Improvement Project. A three-part approach was adopted to improve
juvenile court handling of foster care cases. "[F]irst, a comprehensive assessment of the rules,
standards, and criteria imposed under state law effecting abused and neglected children;
second, the development of recommendations for implementing change based upon the
assessment; third, the implementation of recommended procedures and practices to improve
the performance ofjuvenile court system." Id. at 53.
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court improvement plan ("DCIP"),2A9 many critics continued to point the blame
directly at the Florida Legislature for woefully under-funding the child welfare
system.
As early as February 1991, Florida Legislature directed Florida DCF
officials to investigate child sexual victimization in the state's foster care
system.2 50 The results were published in a study which indicated that approxi-
mately nine and a half percent of the foster care population were "of con-
1 252
cern" for exhibiting sexual behaviors. The actual number of delinquency
referrals represented only twenty-five percent of the actual number of sexual
assaults perpetrated by children in foster care; when all child welfare programs
were considered, the number of delinquency referrals for sexual battery almost
doubled.253  Further, approximately ninety-eight percent of foster care
counselors indicated that specialized placements for children that had
[The approach yielded] thirty-seven recommendations to improve the per-
formance of the juvenile court in [child-in-need-of assistance cases], [termi-
nation of parental rights], and adoption cases [and can be] categorized as fol-
lows: I) uniformity of terminology and reconstructing of information and data
collection procedures; 2) training for members of the judiciary assigned to
handle [child-in-need-of-assistance] and related cases; 3) statutory revisions;
and, 4) standards for counsel representing parties in a child-in-need-of ser-
vices proceeding.
id.
249. This plan is called the Dependency Court Improvement Project.
250. The Florida Legislature ordered DCF (then recognized as HRS) to investigate
child-on-child sexual abuse, however, the concept of child sexual victimization was not used
by DCF in the report.
251. Jones, supra note 248, at 53. No definition of the terminology "of concern" was
utilized in that report to explain the concept. However, it seems clear from a review of the
report that the agency had sufficient notice that certain children did in fact display sexualized
behaviors of sufficient nature to come to the attention of agency operatives.
252. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERVS. OFFICE OF CHILDREN, Youtm AND FAMILY
SERVS., A Study of Sexual Assault Among Foster Care Children in Florida (Feb. 1991)
[hereinafter Dep't of HRS Study]. The report indicates the following: approximately 1168
children in foster care had engaged in sexual behavior that was of concern to the foster care
counselor; foster care counselors identified 200 children who had sexually assaulted another
child within the previous 12 months; 147 placement disruptions occurred as a result of foster
children sexually assaulting foster children; serious deficits in service provisions to sexual
offenders and victims exist; training currently available to foster care staff and foster parents
does not adequately address this population. Id. at 1. Notwithstanding the inability of the
department to adequately answer questions regarding the scope and severity of the problem,
the department described the problem as "a small number of cases of sexual assault among
foster children." Id.
253. Id. at 7.
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committed sexual offenses were not available in their district.25 4  DCF
interpreted data as an indication that child-on-child 55 sexual abuse only
represented "a small number of cases.
'256
In 1995, a report prepared by DCF indicated that Broward County had the
highest population of foster children known to have been sexually abused-
41%.257 At the same time, it was known that 15% of this population consisted
of children that had reported involvement in an incident of sexual assault on
another child. 8 The high rate of sexual abuse reported in foster care, 67%
greater than the state sample population, was consistent with the high rate of
children known to be sexually abused in foster homes that were determined
unsafe.259 The Broward County rate of "unsafe" foster homes was 67% greater
than the sample group. y2
There remains a critical lack of foster care homes in Broward County. 21
In 1986 the situation was described by a previous grand jury as "desperate,"
and if anything, it has only become worse.2 2 Other counties in Florida have
also experienced a dramatic shortage of foster home placements as the number
of children coming into care continues to surpass available resources.
263
In June 2000, a statewide class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of foster
children alleging they had suffered sexual, physical, and emotional abuse in
addition to languishing for years in the states foster care system.264 After a
four-week investigation of the allegations, the court appointed advocate 5 filed
254. Id. at 9.
255. See Dep't of HRS Study, supra note 252. "Child-on-child sexual abuse" was not
defined in the 1991 report but it apparently references incidents or behaviors that involve
more than one child. See id. at 1.
256. Id.
257. RESEARCH STUDY, DIST. TEN, BROWARD Crry, 177 CHIDREN AND FAmmS
RECENG TARGED CASE MANAGmMNT SERVICES (Oct. 11, 1995) [hereinafter District Ten
Research Study] (noting that "areas of Broward County scored significantly higher than the
entire group'). Id. 6.
258. Id. 4.
259. Id.
260. Id. 13.
261. Grand Jury Report, supra note 3, at 17.
262. Id.
263. Mike Schneider, Agency Issues Rare Plea for More Foster Parents, SUN-
SEnNl. (Ft. Lauderdale), June 3, 1999, at 6B.
264. Preliminary Report of Guardian Ad Litem, Foster Children v. Bush, No. 00-2116
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 15,2000).
265. Douglas Halsey, an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida, is an environ-
mental attorney, with the law firm of White & Case, LLP in Miami. He is also a longtime
child advocate and was appointed by U.S. District Court Judge Federico Moreno to act as a
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a preliminary report with the court which stated, "Florida's foster care system,
which is supposed to protect children, harms, often grievously, many of the
children the state takes into custody. ' '26
Statewide, child welfare services appear to be deteriorating. Recent
DCF records indicate that the number of children abused in foster care have
more than doubled, as children in foster care continue to be abused at
alarming rates. 67  This bad news was delivered almost two years after
268lawmakers in Florida doubled the DCF child protection budget.
VIii. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Children in foster care have primarily relied upon the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment or other federal statutes as a basis for asserting
protection claims in federal court.269 Those cases have sought monetary dam-
ages on behalf of individual children and frequently seek immediate injunctive
relief from placement conditions on behalf of all children in state care.270 The
litigation success of foster children has largely been dictated by their place-
ment status271 or the identifiable harm suffered, 27 and the scope of the duty
that is imposed upon states by federal legislation.27 3 Mere negligence has been
insufficient to establish liability for constitutional tort claims. However, a
cause of action will lie where officials are deliberately indifferent to injuries
guardian ad litem or independent court representative for the twenty-two children plaintiffs
suing DCF for harm suffered while in the state foster care system. See also Shana Gruskin,
Advocate Boosts Foster Care Suit Judge to Hear Plea for Class Action Status, Which Would
Encompass State, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 24, 2001, at lB.
266. See id.
267. Miller, supra note 1.
268. Shana Gruskin, Panel Hears DCF Chief Defend Her Agency, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), March 7, 2001, at 5B.
269. Michele Miller, Note, Revisiting Poor Joshua: State-Created Danger Theory in
the Foster Care Context, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 243, 243 (2000); see also SUSAN GLUCK
MEZEY, CHILDREN IN COURT: PUBLIC POLICYMAKING AND FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS 109-
110 (1996); Homer, supra note 33 , at 203.
270. See Homer, supra note 33, at 217-27; see also Ward Complaint, supra note 240.
271. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
272. DALE ET AL, supra note 52, 1 2.03[2][a]. A special relationship is created when
the state takes the affirmative act of placing a child in foster care and so restrains the child's
liberty to render the child dependent upon the state to provide for the child's basic needs. By
virtue of this special relationship, the state has an affirmative duty to provide the child with
protection. Id.
273. Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
274. Watkinson, supra note 124, at 1245.
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children suffer in care when they know of the abuse and fail to take action to
address the problem.
275
Placement status has been a critical factor in determining state obligations
276to abused and neglected children. In DeShaney v. Winnebego County
Department of Social Services,2 77 the Supreme Court adopted a bright line test
to determine liability based upon custodial distinctions and the corresponding
state obligations to children in state custody.278 The Court held that the
Winnebego County Department of Social Services did not have a constitu-
tional obligation under the Due Process Clause to protect Joshua DeShaney,
from the abuse of his father 79 where the state did not create the danger but was
otherwise aware of it.280 The Court opined "[i]t is the state's affirmative act of
restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf... which is the
'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause,
not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by
other means."281 By declining to protect abused children not in "custody," the
Court departed from its previous due process methodology and treatment of
special relationships.2 2 However, the Court did not resolve the question of
liability for harm suffered by children in foster care.2
3
275. Id. at 1246.
276. See generally DALE ET AL., supra note 51, 2.03[2][a].
277. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
278. Id. at 200.
279. Id. at 195. The DeShaney Court interpreted the Constitution as a means to protect
the people from the state, not to ensure that the state protect the people from each other. The
Court held that "[ ]nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State
to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion of private actors. The
Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guaranty of certain
minimal levels of safety and security." Id.
280. Id. at 203.
281. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. The dissenting opinion relies on Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), to stand for the
proposition of state created danger, when, for example, the state cuts off private sources of aid
and then refuses aid itself, it cannot wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction.
See generally, Robert Oren Eades, Note, Snake Pits, Lion's Dens and Section 1983: When
Does Inaction Equal Action?-DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 781, 794-821 (1989) (discussing special relationship
doctrine and applauding the result in DeShaney).
282. Laura Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Proc-
ess: DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659, 664 (1990). Professor Oren criticizes the
Court's due process analysis as applied to the facts in DeShaney and details the Court's
development of the implications for a constitutional right to protection based on a custodial or
special relationship flowing from a statutory scheme based on: Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
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Under limited circumstances, the state may have an affirmative obligation
to protect an individual from harm.2 4 When a "special relationship" 5 exists
between the state agency and the individual, the state has an affirmative duty to
protect that individual. A "special relationship" is frequently limited to
situations where the state has taken physical custody of the person287 by the
affirmative exercise of state power to so restrain an individual's liberty that it
(1982). In Estelle, the Court held that a state's failure to act when prison officials were
consciously indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs could violate the inmate's Eighth
Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97.
Inmates deprived of their liberty also lost their ability to care for themselves and must rely on
prison authorities who have an obligation to care for them. Id. at 104-105. In Martinez, the
Court held parole board officials were not liable when a parolee tortured and killed a fifteen
year old victim even after it was recommended the parolee not be released from imprisonment.
Martinez, 444 U.S. at 284-85. The Court held the Fourteenth Amendment only protected the
victim from deprivation by the state and not a private actor. Id. The Court when on to
suggest, in dictum that, the holding was based on the facts presented as the victimization was
too remote a consequence to trigger civil rights liability. id. In Youngberg, the Court held
that a mentally retarded person involuntarily committed to state confinement had a constitu-
tional right (rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment) to be free from harm inflicted by himself or
from others. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. Liability for a civil rights violation by the state
could follow when decisions for the inmates care are "a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgement, practice, or standards" as to demonstrate that the person responsible
did not actually base the decision on such a judgement. Id. at 323.
283. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. The court noted that:
Had the State... removed Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster
home operated by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently analogous
to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to
protect children in foster homes from mistreatment at the hands of their foster
parents.... We express no view on the validity of this analogy, however, as
it is not before us in the present case.
Id.
284. Id. at 198.
285. Special relationships are created when the state is aware of a danger to a victim
and indicates a willingness to protect that victim. Special relationships are commonly found
where the state has created threat of harm to an individual through intervention of a nongov-
ernmental actor. The court must find a "special relationship" in this situation in order to
sustain a section 1983 action, for there is, in general, no constitutional duty imposed on state
officials to protect members of the public at large from crime. Wright v. City of Ozark, 715
F.2d 1513, 1515 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding that "the due process clause.., does not protect a
member of the public at large. . . , at least in the absence of a special relationship between the
victim and the criminal or between the victim and the state"); see also Martinez, 444 U.S. at
284-85.
286. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
287. Id. at 199.
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renders him unable to care for himself.288 "The affirmative duty to protect
arises not from the state's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from
its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has
imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf."289
Along the same lines, when a child is placed in foster care,29° a special
relationship between the state and the child arises29' as state power has
removed the child from the child's normal source of protection thereby
creating the affirmative duty of care.29 "A child generally depends on his
parents to guard against the dangers of his surroundings .... By removing the
child from his home, even when the child's best interest lie in such action, the
state thereby obligates itself to shoulder the burden of protecting the child from
foreseeable trauma."293  When a child is placed in foster care, the child
becomes dependent upon the state, through the foster family, to meet the
child's basic needs.294 Placement in foster care does in fact implicate state
custody for the purpose of due process rights and protections. 295 Accordingly,
children in foster care that have suffered sexual victimization in violation of
their civil rights may assert a viable cause of action.296
288. Id. at 200.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 199; see, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S at 324 (explaining that involuntarily
committed mental patients have constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to reasonably safe conditions of confinement,
and freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints and minimally adequate services); Estelle,
429 U.S. at 97 (explaining that incarcerated prisoners must be protected, and that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain prohibited by the Eight Amendment).
291. Doe v. Taylor, 975 F.2d 137, 146 (5th Cir. 1992).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See generally D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1369
(3d Cir. 1992).
295. Beth A. Diebel, Mark G. V. Sabol: Substantive Due Process Rights, A Possibility
for Foster Care Children in New York, 64 ALB. L. REV. 823, 837 (2000) (explaining that
litigation is often used for claimed violations of substantive due process rights in child welfare
cases); see also Brendan P. Kearse, Abused Again: Competing Constitutional Standards for
the State's Duty to Protect Foster Children, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 385, 391 (1996).
296. A sexual assault can be a constitutional injury described as a violation of the
substantive due process right to bodily integrity or privacy, and courts of appeal have recog-
nized that the right may be violated by sexual fondling and touching or other egregious sexual
contact. See Haberthur v. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Doe
v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that a student was
deprived of liberty interest under the substantive due process when she was sexually molested
by a teacher and that she had a right to be free from sexual abuse and violations of bodily
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Foster children have the right to sue for constitutional violations that
occur when they are removed from their parents' care and placed by the state
in an alternative custodial placement.2 97 Those claims are commonly asserted
under section 1983 against agencies or state welfare officials acting under
color of state law where the plaintiff is deprived "of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the constitution and law" of the United States.298
Section 1983 claims may be asserted for rights created by the Constitution or
federal statutes unless the statute does not create enforceable rights or
privileges within the meaning of section 1983, or the statute itself forecloses
299
enforcement. There is no constitutional right of governmental protection
when a private citizen intrudes upon the liberty of another citizen, therefore,
public officials cannot be held liable under section 1983300 for their inactions
when failing to protect children, absent a special relationship or state created301
danger exception. The Due Process Clause was designed as a limitation on
302the state's power to act, not a guarantee of safety.
Foster care has been described as an entitlement program, as such, the
Supreme Court foreclosed a right of private of enforcement under the
AACWA.30 3 The Court ruled in Suter v. Artist,304 that the reasonable efforts
clause of the AACWA neither created rights for children to enforce nor created
an implied private right of action.3°5 Absent a private right of enforcement, the
integrity); see Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499, 508 (8th Cir. 1987); Sisters Awarded
Millions Foster Care System Contributed to their Repeated Abuse, Jury Concludes, SUN-
SENTrNqL (Ft. Lauderdale), Oct. 24, 1999, at 1B (discussing a recent 4.4 billion dollar Florida
jury award to two sisters for injuries they received while in foster care for repeated incidents
of rape, which left one of the sisters with syphilis at the age of nine).
297. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11 th Cir. 1987).
298. Atwell, supra note 74, at 611 (noting that an essential element of any Section
1983 claim is that conduct alleged constitutional violation must occur while the actor is acting
under the color of law).
299. Id. at 611-12.
300. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (7th
Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
301. Watkinson, supra note 125, at 1249.
302. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
303. Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347, 364 (1992) (holding that children in foster care or
otherwise under state supervision have no private right of enforcement of federally mandated
services under the Child Welfare Act-the only right to enforcement would belong to the
Department of Health and Human Services via the Child Welfare Act).
304. Id.
305. Id. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act did not create a private right
of enforcement. Congress must confer enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities unambigu-
ously when it intends to impose conditions on grant of federal moneys before rights, privi-
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Supreme Court has indicated that states may still be liable for harm when a
child is "in custody" of a state agency.30 6  Thus, states may have a bare
minimum obligation to protect a child from at least physical harm while placed
in foster care.
The failure to effectuate meaningful foster care reform lead to "Child
Welfare Reform Litigation" as a primary tool in the effort to protect foster
children around the country.30 8 Doe v. New York City Department of Social
Services,30 9 was the first case to award damages based on a right to safety
claim asserted in a foster care context.310 There are at least twenty-one states,
or regions therein, and the District of Columbia, currently embroiled in class
action litigation because of their inability to protect children from abuse while
in their foster care system 1' These cases are often filed in federal court and
seek injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and monetary damages for violations
of constitutional rights arising from the operation of a state or local welfare
system.312 Since damage awards draw from limited resources and have little
impact on systemic change,313 individual damage claims may be more
appropriately reserved for plaintiffs to file separate suits.31 4
leges, and immunities may be enforceable under section 1983. Both section 1983 and section
671(a)(15) impose only a rather generalized duty under the "reasonable efforts" clause to be
enforced by the Secretary of DHHS, not private individuals. Id. at 1370. But cf. Robinson,
supra note 72 (arguing the efficacy of the act notwithstanding the lack of a private right of
enforcement).
306. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199.
307. See generally Doe v. Taylor, 975 F.2d 137, 146 (5th Cir. 1992). In Taylor, the
court held that a rudimentary duty of safety was owed to children in care. Id.
308. Homer, supra note 33 (discussing Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (conceptualizing "child welfare reform litigation" as a mechanism to improve condi-
tions facing children in public institutions through litigation). Id. Homer notes that prior to a
1976 class action brought by foster children in New York seeking injunctive, declaratory, and
damages relief, this form of litigation was virtually nonexistent. Id.
309. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981).
310. Although the Second Circuit in Doe v. N.Y. City Department of Social Sevices did
award damages based on the right to safety claim, the court did not identify the source of the
constitutional right nor did it address the application of such a right in a foster care context.
The court did differentiate the nature of the foster care claim from those of prison inmates. Id.
311. Talenfeld, supra note 215, at II.
312. DALE Er AL., supra note 51, 2.03[2][a]; see also Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 185
F.R.D. 157-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The court approved the parties' settlement which called for
monitoring and reform of the New York City Foster Care system. Id. In so doing, the court
noted that it does not preclude individuals from seeking equitable relief for individual circum-
stances or from pursuing individual claims against the state for damages. Id.
313. Homer, supra note 33, at 217-19 (explaining that damages as a form of relief for
systemic deficiencies in state foster care systems are problematic for three essential reasons:
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A common resolution to Child Welfare Reform Litigation often employs
the use of a consent decree incorporating some type of plan to ameliorate state
harm to children in care.315 Such decrees characteristically encompass
comprehensive systemic relief and have required state child welfare officials to
alter foster care programs dramatically.31  Consent decrees have become a
popular and relatively effective mechanism to address systemic failure for a
317variety of reasons. First, they often provide far-reaching mandates which
require child welfare agencies to immediately employ corrective measures for
the amelioration of systemic failures. 318 Consent decrees also devote funds to
improve foster care programs, which benefit all children and which may serve
to enhance quality and performance of the child welfare system.319 And they
bring together various system operatives in the development of new collabora-
tive relationships to collectively address system failures. This tool attracts
judicial, public, and legislative attention on the plight of foster children and to
the child welfare reform agenda.320 Consent decrees are no panacea for
systemic overhaul, but they may be one of the few palatable remedies available
to foster children. There are at least twenty-seven states and many more
localities presently ordered by a court to improve child welfare services.
IX. CONCLUSION
Despite more than ten years of welfare reform litigation, foster care
systems across the nation continue to experience miserable failures when it
comes to protecting foster children from all forms of abuse and neglect in
as a policy matter, their capacity to reform recalcitrant child welfare genic is questionable;
qualified immunity protects many officials from constitutional challenges; and the foreclosure
of a private right to enforce federal child welfare statutes may obviate claims even where
immunity doctrines do not apply).
314. See Ward Complaint, supra note 240.
315. Homer, supra note 33, at 323.
316. Id.; see also Taylor, 818 F.2d 791. The Taylor settlement included: prohibition
of corporal punishment by foster parents; exploration of relative placement alternatives;
screening of potential foster parents; monthly face-to-face child visitation by foster care
workers; response to complaints of abuse within 48 hours; and exchange of information
between foster child and parent. Id.
317. Homer, supra note 33 (suggesting injunctive relief may hold more promise to
reform foster care policies and practice in comparison to damage awards which may provide
little incentive for change to recalcitrant child welfare agencies).
318. Id. at 12.
319. Id.
320. Mushlin, supra note 35, at 250.
321. Gelles, supra note 37 at 109.
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foster placements. Foster children remain particularly vulnerable to sexual
abuse in care. Recent attention focusing on children with sexual behavioral
problems has clearly demonstrated that these children have specialized needs
and present particularized concerns when they are placed in the general foster
care population. State agencies must develop comprehensive policies and
practices to identify and respond to children with sexual behavioral problems.
Critical foster care placement decisions must be scrutinized by agency officials
to ensure that child victims of sexual abuse and children with sexual behavior-
al problems are provided with adequate therapeutic intervention. Agencies
must recognize quality that therapeutic intervention is necessary not only to
address the suffering of individual children, but also to attempt to reduce the
overall incidents of sexual abuse in care.
Children in foster care have a limited arsenal of legal protections. The
federal government, bureaucratic foster care agencies, and state legislators
have clearly demonstrated a collective failure to effectively protect children
in state care from harm. Incompetent caseworkers, agency administrators,
and legislators indifferent to the sexual victimization of foster care children
have only served to perpetuate the victimization on a massive scale. Florida,
and in particular Broward County, has experienced an unprecedented rise in
the number of sexual assaults that occur among children in the foster care
population and has demonstrated abysmal failure in dealing with the prob-
lem. There must be system accountability for every child in care. Judicial
intervention may be the only way to address foster care systems which refuse
to protect children in their care.
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Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce
"Guaranteed Results: Investing in the Front End of Life"
November 1, 2000
David Lawrence
For more than a month now, I have worried about what to say, what
tack to take this noontime. In these past two years of a new life and career, I
have spoken to literally thousands of people. No audience means more to
me than this one. For I have become convinced that unless the business and
civic community can become energized and involved in this matter of
"school readiness" for all our children, then we will make no enduring dif-
ference in thousands upon thousands of lives. That will be a tragedy for
these children, and it will be a tragedy for all of us.
My mission is straight talk on a matter fundamental to our community
being a good place for the future-a good place for our children, a good
place for all of us.
Like you, I choose to live in Greater Miami. Like you, I love who we
are and what we can become. But if we are to be honest with one another,
we also must acknowledge that for all the progress we have made, we also
live in a place that is undereducated, underemployed, and, in many ways,
growing poorer. It is worth your knowing, for example, that just over eight-
een percent of our population twenty-five years and older has at least a four-
year college education; the national average is above twenty-five percent.
That is not where we need to be.
School "readiness" is not about children learning to read by age three.
It is about children growing-socially, emotionally, physically, and intellec-
tually-so that they are ready and eager to learn by the time they reach first
grade. It is about the blending of education and health and nurturing in the
earliest years. We know from the science of "readiness" that these first
several years of life are crucial in a way that most in our community do not
yet realize.
Listen to this quotation from a book called Ghosts from the Nursery, by
Robin Karr-Morse and Meredith Wiley:
While she is still wet from the womb, as she breathes her first
breath, cries her first cry, feels her first gusts of cool air, her brain
is building itself at a rate never to be repeated. She already knows
the sound of her mother's voice and turns to it. She gazes at her
mother's face with great concentration. Synapses in her tiny brain
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are sprouting in response to each sensation. The most powerful
computer in the world has been waiting for these moments of light,
and smell, and touch, and sound, and taste-the carpenters of the
human brain.... She is fully equipped... to learn, to connect ....
Every system is poised to take in information-for the first and
perhaps the most incisive impressions of a lifetime.
In behalf of that baby and each of the 31,000 babies who will be born in
our community this year, I have come to know that an integrated, compre-
hensive approach-covering health and education and nurturing for all
children between birth and age five-is our best hope for lasting progress.
We must do much better than the present hodgepodge of programs-good
programs invariably led by good people, but so often disconnected from
other good people, other good programs.
Our mission must embrace all children, which is not the way the pre-
sent "system" works. Instead, well intended, good-hearted people target one
deeply disadvantaged neighborhood or another, and then devote extra re-
sources, which, because those resources are disbursed in such a non-holistic
way, so often add up to precious little progress for children. Meantime, the
rest of the community sees how we target our resources and reasons: "[o]h, I
see, it is about those children." But "readiness" is not and should not be just
about those children; rather, "readiness" should be about, and for, everyone's
child.
Listen to this letter that I received just recently from Monica Serra, who
lives on Carlyle Avenue on Miami Beach:
I am a single mother with two children. My older son is seven
years old and in the second grade. My younger son ... will turn
four on January fifth. I wanted my youngest son to start pre-
kindergarten. At Biscayne Elementary I got the application to a
program called Head Start. This program is for children three to
five years old. I went to the interview, and I was denied. They told
me I made too much money. I'm really upset.... My annual in-
come is $23,500.
Ladies and gentlemen, Mrs. Serra might not fit the federal definition of
poverty, but $23,500 and two children leaves her a great distance from
middle-class existence. Here, then, is a working parent-like so many
others-who wants to do right by her children, and the so-called "system"
has no room for her children. They lose. So do we all.
I am neither utopian dreamer nor socialistic revolutionary. If your
family, or my own, can afford to pay for basic and quality services, then we
[Vol. 25:685
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should. But if a family cannot, then it is in the community's interest, our
interest, to make available those basic and quality services.
Mrs. Serra's children need all the quality early care and education that
your children and my own need: love and nurturing; all their shots; excellent
nutrition; the fullest opportunity to be safe; stimulating pre-K experiences;
child care that engages the mind, not the "warehousing" that most children
receive. One startling statistic: of the 1357 licensed child-care centers in
Miami-Dade County, just fifty-five are nationally accredited, meaning at
those you can have assurances of a stimulating environment for your child.
You and I cannot afford to do anything less than provide high-quality
early childhood care and education to all children who need it. We cannot
afford to do anything less than provide first-rate health care for all children.
How can we live with ourselves when literally tens of thousands of children
between birth and age five in our county go to the emergency room for basic
medical care because they have no health insurance and no family pediatri-
cian? How can we afford to do anything less than commit to every child and
every parent that we are prepared to devote the resources, in public and
private partnership, that will give every child the chance to be truly ready for
school and for life?
How tragic that up to thirty percent of the children in first grade in our
community are significantly behind, and so many will never catch up. But
you might say to me: "[c]hildren at this age have young and fertile minds.
They will quickly catch up." How very wrong you would be. I give you a
most compelling figure from an American Reading Association study of two
years ago: if one hundred children come out of the first grade not really
being able to read, then eighty-eight of them will really not know how to
read after the fourth grade either. Surely that is a wakeup call for readiness
for all children.
How do I convince you that "readiness" is our mutual mission? How
do I convince you that this must be done?
Do I make the case with tough facts, tough figures, a mind-blowing
dose of reality?
The twenty-nine percent of our fourth graders who did miserably on
Florida's writing assessment test. Our math scores that fall way short of the
national median. The forty percent of our ninth graders who do not com-
plete high school. The 35,000 children in our community who need mental
health services, which most do not get. The 2498 low birthweight babies
born here last year. The 1497 babies born to twelve to seventeen-year-olds.
The violent teen crimes up more than thirty five percent in the past five
years. The 17,457 reported incidents of fighting last year in Miami-Dade
20011
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schools. The 498 incidents of weapons possession in those schools. The
18,647 cases of domestic violence last year in our county.
Or do I appeal to your sense of civility and decency?
In this community of great decency and so many giving people, surely
every child is entitled to a decent beginning in life. To use the words of the
great educator John Dewey: "[w]hat the wisest and best parents want for
[their] own children, [so] must the community want for all its children." Or,
to quote the great thinker W.E.B. Du Bois: "[iln the treatment of the child
the world foreshadows its own future."
Or do I appeal to your sense of economic imperative and
business investment?
Readiness is, in fact, a matter of business investment as well as in the
self-interest of all of us. An educated community is a safer, more prosper-
ous, more optimistic community for everyone. We know from the research
that if we were ever to spend a dollar wisely up front-that is, from prenatal
to age five-we would not have to spend seven dollars at the other end on
police and prosecution and prison, and remedial education of all sorts.
Ladies and gentlemen, you and I will either pay a few dollars more up front
in children's lives, or we will pay many more more dollars when they get
older. A more educated, contributing citizenry literally depends on children
coming to first grade eager and able to learn. The greatest gift we could
give our schools, Roger Cuevas would confirm, is more children ready for
success in the first grade and, hence, in life.
Ladies and gentlemen, I have been to first grade classrooms in Miami-
Dade County where teachers tell me that more than half of their students are
severely, distinctly behind. How could a prudent community permit this?
How could a wise community ignore this? If we want our children and
grandchildren to be able to choose this community for their lives, their work,
their prosperity, their futures, then we are going to need to care about every-
one's child.
There are, to be sure, companies here that see "readiness" as a business
imperative-Ryder, Baptist Health Systems, Royal Caribbean, Mt. Sinai,
Bank of America, First Union, the University of Miami and the Assurant
Group, among others. Companies that understand that parents not worried
unduly about their children are more productive. Companies that understand
the lessons of the New Economy-that is, a company culture of caring about
children is not only right, but also smart business. Business people fre-
quently complain about the quality of graduates-most of these business
people simply not realizing that the path to hiring the most capable, most
688 [Vol. 25:685
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qualified employees begins with a child's earliest years. You in business
know more than anyone of the power of investment. Remember, then, that
these beginning years of life furnish the optimum window for investment.
Toward that investment there is now underway in our community a
crucial undertaking in behalf of children and families. It was preceded by a
generous and continuing commitment and investment from four citizens of
this community-Dr. Jane and Jerry Katcher and Jan and Dan Lewis-that
launched The Early Childhood Initiative Foundation. Work toward "readi-
ness" for all children here began twenty-two months ago with months of
community forums and strategic planning and the full support and leadership
of Mayor Alex Penelas. Thirteen months ago, 4500 people participated in
the Mayor's Children's Summit on Miami Beach, where we launched four
major task forces: 1) Early Development and Education; 2) Child Health
and Well Being; 3) Parent and Family Skills, Services and Information; and
4) Prevention and Intervention of Violence, Abuse and Neglect. This year
we are embarked on three major projects: 1) the building of an "inventory"
so we know who is served, who is not, and what the gaps in service are in
Miami-Dade; 2) a survey of 2000 plus parents here on attitudes and needs,
with results to be revealed next month; and 3) a major, at least three-year-
long campaign for public awareness on this topic, a broadcast print and
website approach. That campaign, to be launched next year (and co-branded
by United Way/Success by Six and The Early Childhood Initiative Founda-
tion), will first target parents and caregivers who will be able to call-in
English, Spanish or Creole-any hour of the day or night for information
that ranges from "my child has been crying for hours; what should I do?" to
"how do I find really good child care that I can afford?"
The work of this early childhood initiative is closely connected with the
work of the Miami-Dade School Readiness Coalition, one of fifty-seven such
coalitions in our state. That coalition of twenty-five members-more than a
third from the business community and the private sector-includes six
Chamber representatives. One of those is Bud Park, among the coalition's
best, most giving members. Another stalwart is the coalition president,
Chuck Hood, who left a successful career in shopping center management to
toil full-time in the vineyards of "readiness." Know that I am heartened by
the Chamber's involvement. The movement for readiness must be a public-
private venture, with some of the most visible leaders coming from business.
People both open and tough-minded. People with a long-term passion and
compassion in behalf of "readiness" for all children.
We need your commitment and your leadership to move toward a
genuinely holistic readiness plan covering the 158,000 children between
birth and age five in our community. That means we must work toward these
five goals, and more:
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1) High quality, nationally accredited child care available for all
children. High quality child care, ample research informs us,
makes a big difference in whether children grow up to be suc-
cessful adults.
2) A quality "medical home" for every child pre-natal to age five
-not the emergency-room-as-basic-medical-care that thou-
sands of children receive in our community. Every child
should be entitled to first-rate health care.
3) Progress toward availability of a quality pre-K experience-
though not mandatory-for every four-year-old. This would
incorporate public and private approaches, including Head
Start and high quality child care options for parents.
4) "Home visiting" availability-using trained professionals or
paraprofessionals-for all children from prenatal through the
first two or three years of life. Important research going back
two decades shows this approach leads to more successful
children, more successful adults, and greater spacing between
babies-three powerful and proven outcomes. We could
make that happen here.
5) Parent skill building that recognizes the necessity of parents
and families being fully involved in "readiness." A child's
first teacher-the parent-needs to be the child's best
teacher.
Ladies and gentlemen, could we not be wise enough to come together to
"own" a portrait of what we would want for every child? Is this not a matter
of wise investment in their future and our own? Is it not basic American
fairness that every child have a real chance to succeed?
What I seek from you today is your eagerness to build a "movement"
that embraces all children. I want you to educate yourselves on the critical
nature of these earliest years for children. I want you to think about how
your company-through quality child care, through your benefits programs
and in other ways--can do even more to make a difference in the lives of
your employees and their offspring. I want you to see how you might get
involved in these task forces-led by Carole Abbott, Wil Blechman, Ophelia
Brown-Lawson, Marisel Elias-Miranda, Deise Granado-Villar, Sara Herald,
Obdulio Piedra, and Peter Roulhac.
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I believe that a community with the strength and compassion to over-
come the terror of Hurricane Andrew could build a community where no
one's child is left behind. Indeed, you and I should insist on that.
Should we fail to do so, I remind you of the words of the great psychia-
trist Karl Menninger: "[w]hat we do to children," said Dr. Menninger, "they
will do to society."
Ladies and gentlemen, the choice for our children is ours. When we do
right by our children, all of our children, we will do right by ourselves.
Thank you.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article argues that private individuals may sue government agen-
cies and employees for failing to enforce child support statutes. Failure to
enforce child support orders is a systemic problem which directly affects
countless children, including foster care children, who depend upon the
money promised in child support enforcement orders for their existence. The
ramifications of this failure to pay spread beyond the boundaries of the
* For their helpful suggestions, I would like to thank Bill Fraser (West Palm Beach)
and Carolyn Salisbury (University of Miami Youth Law Clinic), children's advocates. I
would also like to thank Kathryn Gainey, law student at Harvard Law for her research and
other assistance.
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individual family unit, however, as custodial parents and children are forced
to depend upon public assistance as a substitute rather than as what could
potentially be a substitute.
This article does not purport to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the
national child support enforcement policy. Rather, it focuses specifically
upon the Florida support enforcement system, juxtaposed with examples
elicited from other support enforcement schemes. Through a survey of
primary sources, including federal and state statutes, Florida case law, and
selected case law from other jurisdictions, this article intends to argue that
state enforcement agencies and private agencies may be held responsible for
their mismanagement of child support enforcement. It applies the primary
source material two similar cases: children in the foster care system and
children who reside with a custodial parent. It also analyzes private causes
of action against government agencies and government employees, and
argues that individuals should have a private cause of action for failing to
collect child support enforcement.
Part II describes the extent of the support enforcement problem in
Florida, which suggests that this problem is endemic to our society as a
whole. Part II also describes the complex federal and state statutory scheme
governing child support in an effort to highlight the separation of powers
between federal and state government. This statutory analysis reveals addi-
tional reasons why private citizen suits are necessary, including lack of legal
representation of the child's interests in current support enforcement suits.
Part IlI examines federal law as a potential source of liability, and
argues that the application of section 1983 of title 42 of the United States
Code ("section 1983"), which provides individuals with the ability to file
private citizen lawsuits for violation of either constitutional or statutory
rights, has resulted in varying outcomes.' Part I examines the predominant
standards announced in decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the
Eleventh Circuit that are used to determine whether section 1983 is satisfied.
The common law does not clearly establish whether one of the tests prevails,
but instead illustrates the usage of several tests. This analysis of case prece-
1. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The statute provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, ex-
cept that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
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dent is designed to elicit factors that the courts commonly consider in decid-
ing liability under section 1983 so as to apply these factors to the case of
children and child support payments.
Part IV argues that government agencies may be held liable under
section 1983 through violations of the Social Security Act, despite the wel-
fare reforms which took place in 1996. Children may not recover through
section 1983 for violations of substantive due process because the courts
have not been willing to grant a property right to children in promised, but
uncollected, child support payments. Despite welfare reforms which elimi-
nated entitlement programs, a viable due process argument remains for foster
care children. The right of non-foster children to recover under section 1983
was limited by the welfare reform law, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA"), because such chil-
dren can no longer claim that a due process violation arises from property
rights to an entitlement when the State of Florida has explicitly established a
welfare system that is not an entitlement. After the welfare reforms, section
1983 can be invoked for violations of due process only in those states where
the welfare benefit remains an entitlement.
Part IV examines federal statutory liability by considering the provi-
sions of the Social Security Act.2 In order to receive block grants from the
federal government, state governments must "substantially comply" with the
statutory provisions regulating collection of child support payments.3 How-
ever, the criterion of standard compliance is only seventy-five percent, but
serves as an incentive and condones state action which fails to collect and
distribute a fourth of the child support orders.4 In Blessing v. Freestone the
Supreme Court held that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act did not bestow
a private cause of action upon custodial mothers under section 1983 for a
state's failure to operate its system in substantial compliance, but it left open
the possibility that "some provisions of Title IV-D give rise to individual
2. Social Security Act, Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. § 651 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The
statute provides as follows:
For the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by non-custodial
parents to their children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom such
children are living, locating noncustodial parents, establishing paternity, ob-
taining child and spousal support, and assuring that assistance in obtaining
support will be available... to all children (whether or not eligible for assis-
tance under... [AFDC]) for whom such assistance is requested, there is
hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sym sufficient to
carry out the purposes of this part.
Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(8) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
4. 45 C.F.R § 305.20 (1995); 42 U.S.C. § 609(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
5. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
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rights."6 For example, Blessing does not preempt the possibility of a private
recovery in instances of failures to distribute pass-through payments and
failures to comply with gap-filling provisions.7 If a state fails to distribute
the predetermined portions of child support payments after collection, then it
8violates the rights of children who live with their custodial parents. Such a
private right of action is necessary so children may seek enforcement of the
child support orders to which they are entitled. Part IV argues that the courts
would sustain a private action beyond summary judgment if that action is
brought for child support that the state is obligated to distribute to children
upon collection.
Part V examines sovereign immunity and the State of Florida to deter-
mine what factors are necessary for the state to be held liable.
Part VI applies the concept of sovereign immunity, and argues that the
State of Florida is liable under sovereign immunity for violation of statutory
provisions in collecting and distributing child support amounts on behalf of
children.
II. UNREPRESENTED INTERESTS IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
Child welfare, family responsibility, and decreased welfare rolls-each is
an asserted policy interest of the state in establishing and enforcing child
support orders. 9 In creating child support policies, states must balance the
interests of family autonomy and fiscal economy with concern for the child's
standard of living; as a result, "fiscal interest" or "self-supporting families"
dominate child support policy.10 An issue emerges from this interest balanc-
ing as to how to construct the optimal procedure for child support enforce-
ment that would protect the rights of the children without unduly burdening
the fiscal resources of the state. This article asserts that private citizen suits
against the public and private agencies are one additional means which
empower custodial parents and children to protect their own interests while
encouraging states to abide by the statutory provisions to which the legisla-
tures have agreed. The purpose of Part I is to assess the current federal and
Florida state procedures in child support enforcement in an effort to frame
the importance of private citizen suits.
6. Id. at 345.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 345-46.
9. JYL J. JOSEPHSON, GENDER, FAMILIES, AND STATE CHILD SUPPORT PoLIcY IN THE
UNrTED STATES 148 (1997).
f 10. Id. at 149.
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A. Federal Statutes as a Skeleton for Child Support Enforcement Programs
Federal statutes provide the skeletal framework within which states
formulate child support enforcement programs. Federal child support en-
forcement began with the-enactment of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act,
the Child Support Enforcement Amendments ("CSEA") of 1984, and the
Family Support Act ("FSA") of 1988.11 The Social Security Act requires
each state to establish a Title IV-D child support enforcement agency, which
serves both recipients and nonrecipients of welfare benefits.1 2 Furthermore,
the Office of Child Support Enforcement ("OCSE") is responsible for "moni-
toring and assisting" the Title IV-D state agencies. 13 The CSEA mandated
that each state establish formulas for calculating child support orders, but the
courts were not bound to invoke them and the amount calculated from the
formulas was not treated as "presumptively correct."' 14 However, the FSA,
enacted four years later, established a rebuttable presumption that the amount
calculated by the formulas is correct unless it is demonstrated to be "unjust or
inappropriate in a particular case" through a written record. 5 The cumula-
tive effect of these three federal statutes was to structure states' child support
enforcement activities and to render legitimacy to the calculation of child
support awards.
Additional provisions offered further definition to states in formulating
child support enforcement programs, including provisions that ensured state
accountability. The PRWORA included a state mandate that each state
11. NANCY S. ERICKSON, CHILD SUPPORT MANUAL FOR ATrORNEYS AND ADvOcATEs 6
(1992). Title IV-D was enacted in 1974. Id.
12. Id. at7.
13. Id.
14. Id. at9.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1994). The statute provides as follows:
(1) The guidelines established pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made avail-
able to all judges and other officials who have the power to determine child
support awards within such State.
(2) There shall be a rebuttable presumption, in any judicial or administrative
proceeding for the award of child support, that the amount of the award which
would result from the application of such guidelines is the correct amount of
child support to be awarded. A written finding or specific finding on the re-
cord that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in
a particular case, as determined under criteria established by the State, shall
be sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case.
Id. Florida has adopted an "income sharing" model in which the income of both
custodial and noncustodial parents is augmented to calculate the child support
contribution. ERIcKsON, supra note 11, at 192-93. The guidelines are set forth in
section 61.30 of the Florida Statutes.
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conduct an annual report pertaining to its child support enforcement program
and submit a copy to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services. 16 This represented a shift in policy to "focus on data reliability and
to assess performance outcomes instead of determining compliance with
process steps., 17 While the federal government subscribes to results-oriented
child support legislation, state governments retain authority to execute the
federal requirements through individual child support programs.'8 Federal
statutes provide the boundaries within which, and the limits according to
which, state governments must formulate and enact child support enforce-
ment programs.
Federal legislation also includes an indomitable incentive for states in
the formulation of child support enforcement provisions. The federal statutes
include a system of penalties to be imposed upon state governments for their
failure to establish child support enforcement programs. 19 For example,
under Title IV-D, states forfeit block grants for Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families ("TANF') if they fail to achieve certain paternity percent-
ages, if they submit "incomplete or unreliable" statistical information, or if
they fail to "substantially comply," unless the violation is corrected within
the following year and the statistical information submitted for the following
year is not "incomplete or unreliable."20 The fiscal penalties imposed upon
16. State Self-Assessment Review and Report, 65 Fed. Reg. 7772-01 (Dec. 12, 2000)
[hereinafter State Self-Assessment Review and Report] (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. Pt. 308).
17. Id. at 7774.
18. Id. The federal government's suggested role was described as assisting the states
in conducting and evaluating their self-assessment reviews, supervising the enactment of state
self-assessment, referring states to the optimal procedures of the other states, and considering
the potential success of possible self-assessment actions. See id. at "Federal Role."
19. See id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(8) (1994 & Supp. 1998). The statute provides as follows:
(i)(I) [If] the State program failed to achieve the paternity establishment per-
centages... or to meet other performance measures that may be established
by the Secretary;
(II) on the basis of the results of an audit or audits conducted.., that the
State data submitted... is incomplete or unreliable; or
(III) on the basis of the results of an audit or audits conducted.. . that a State
failed to substantially comply with 1 or more of the requirements of part D;
and
(ii) that, with respect to the succeeding fiscal year-
(I) the State failed to take sufficient corrective action to achieve the appropri-
ate performance levels or compliance as described in subparagraph (A)(i); or
(II) the data submitted by the state pursuant.., is incomplete or unreliable;
the amounts otherwise payable to the State. . . shall be reduced by the per-
centage specified in subparagraph (B).
Id. (emphasis added).
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the states vary from one to five percent according to the number of consecu-
tive years in which the state procedure fails to conform with federal child
support enforcement regulations.21  The federal statute wields a sword
against states as a compelling incentive for the enactment of child support
enforcement provisions that satisfy federal requirements. Indeed, a Florida
statute specifically acknowledged that noncompliance with PRWORA could
lead to severe economic tragedy, which "poses a direct and immediate threat
to the health, safety, and welfare of the children and citizens of the state and
constitutes an emergency." 22
Given the potential for federal penalties, the states have little alternative
but to satisfy the federal statutes to the letter when creating child support
enforcement schemes. In fact, some agencies have recognized the current
statutory scheme as overly burdensome. For example, the National Child
Support Enforcement Association passed a resolution that urged Congress to
"simplify the distribution of child support to provide additional support to
families attempting to reach self-sufficiency and to provide relief for states
and families from the burdensome complexity of the PRWORA distribution
rules" given the welfare reforms in the 1990s.'
Each state formulates its own child support enforcement program
through which intrastate child support orders can be enforced by a variety of
means, including garnishing wages, seizing tax refunds, or placing the obli-
gor in jail.24 However, approximately one third of child support enforcement
cases are interstate cases, in which the non-custodial parent resides in a
different state than the custodial parent and child.2 Jyl Josephson describes
interstate child support cases as more complex: while he suggests that the
child support enforcement system be uniform across the country adminis-
21. § 609 (a)(8)(B). The statute provides as follows:
The reductions required under subparagraph (A) shall be-
(i) not less than 1 nor more than 2 percent;
(ii) not less than 2 nor more than 3 percent, if the finding is the 2nd consecu-
tive finding made pursuant to subparagraph (A); or
(iii) not less than 3 nor more than 5 percent, if the finding is the 3rd or a sub-
sequent consecutive such finding.
Id.
22. FLA. STAT. § 61.1826(1)(e) (2000); see also § 61.1826(1)(d) (providing that
"[n]oncomplance with federal law could result in a substantial loss of federal funds for the
state's child support enforcement program and the temporary assistance for needy families
welfare block grant").
23. Nat'l Child Support Enforcement Ass'n, Resolution on Child Support Distribution
Reform, available at http:lwww.ncsea.orglresolutionslres-dist.PDF (last visited Feb. 10,
2001).
24. JOSEPHSON, supra note 9, at 148.
25. Id.
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tered by a federal agency, such as the Internal Revenue Service, rather than
each state conducting its own support enforcement program, he recognizes
that this change is most likely not feasible. 6 The Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act ("URESA") was designed to enforce interstate
child support obligations.27 However, the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act ("UIFSA") was enacted in 1998 to replace URESA. 28 Unlike URESA,
which lacked uniformity among the states, UIFSA was designed to provide
"uniform rules, procedures, and forms for interstate cases." 29 Congress also
passed the Child Support Recovery Act in 1992 in an effort to address the
enforcement problems that arise in interstate cases.30 Policy efforts regarding
interstate child support cases are designed to increase collection percentages
by integrating state procedures. However, interstate child support enforce-
ment continues to challenge the statutory scheme.
B. Florida's Legislative Response
In response to federal legislation, the State of Florida granted the au-
thority to adopt and administer child support enforcement provisions to the
Department of Revenue ("DOR"), and custodial parents who have a child
support order that is more than thirty days past due may solicit the DOR to
collect the overdue support payment.31  Under Florida law, child support
26. Id. at 153. Josephson describes "administrative upheaval" as the reason why child
support enforcement could not be conducted on a federal rather than a state level; this would
most likely include systemic costs in combining the various provisions from each of the fifty
states into a uniform federal standard. See id.
27. ERICKsON, supra note 11, at 306.
28. 64 Fed. Reg. 8382, 8383 (1999).
29. ERICKsON, supra note 11, at 306.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The Act establishes penalties for an
individual who:
(1) willfully fails to pay a support obligation with respect to a child who re-
sides in another State, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period
longer than 1 year, or is greater than $ 5,000;
(2) travels in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to evade a sup-
port obligation, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period longer
than 1 year, or is greater than $ 5,000; or
(3) willfully fails to pay a support obligation with respect to a child who re-
sides in another State, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period
longer than 2 years, or is greater than $ 10,000.
Id.
31. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2000). The statute provides that "[tihe Department of
Revenue shall have the authority to adopt rules to implement the child support enforcement
provisions of this section." § 61.13(1)(b)(4); see also State of Florida Department of Revenue,
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orders made after January 1, 1985, or made before January 1, 1985, but
subsequently modified shall "direct that the payments of child support be
made... through the depository in the county where the court is located. 32
The depository is the default method according to which child support
awards are paid. Parties may avoid the depository per the statute, but only
upon their mutual agreement and only if it is in the "best interest of the
child., 33 The Public Information Office of the Florida Office of Child Sup-
port Enforcement indicated that the information with respect to whether the
majority of orders uses the depository's exact members was not readily
available. 4 Florida statutes also direct "each depository to perform duties
with respect to the operation and maintenance of a State Disbursement Unit
and the non-Title IV-D component of the State Case Registry., 35 The state
defines the relationship between the DOR and the depository as a cooperative
agreement that permits access to the State Disbursement Unit and non-Title
IV-D provisions of the State Case Registry, which "complies with all state
and federal requirements. ' 36 In Title IV-D cases, the rights of the obligee
regarding the depository are conveyed to the government agency.37
The clerks of court are charged with collecting, enforcing, and distribut-
ing child support payments. 38 In furtherance of this duty, the clerks created a
statewide system that permits automated processing of child support pay-
ments.39  Specifically, the Florida legislature noted that only a contract
between the DOR and the Florida Association of Court Clerks would ensure
state compliance sufficient to avoid a federal financial penalty.
40
The actual application of Florida procedure to the child support en-
forcement system may be sufficient to avoid federal penalties, but it is not
adequate for collecting child support. In fact, one DOR Quarterly Report
indicates that $45 million more in child support was collected than distrib-
Child Support Services, at http:llsun6.dms.state.fl.usldor/childsupportlenforcement.html (last
visited March 31, 2001).
32. § 61.13(1)(d)1.
33. § 61.13(1)(d)3.
34. April 2, 2001 telephone conversation with OCSE Public Information Officer Dave
Bums.
35. § 61.1826(1).
36. § 61.1826(2). The depositories also must enter into a "written agreement" with
the Florida Association of Court Clerks and the Department of Revenue. Id.
37. § 61.13(1)(d)5.
38. See § 61.1826(1)(a).
39. § 61.1826(1)(g) (recognizing the establishment of the Clerk of Court Child
Support Enforcement Collection System).
40. See § 61.1826(1), (3), (4) (recognizing the importance of the clerk's involvement
and directing the Department of Revenue [hereinafter DOR] to contract with the Florida
Association of Court Clerks).
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uted to the children for the quarter covered, even though Florida law speci-
fies that collected support ought to remain in the depository for only two
days.4 In addition to child support money that is not collected, the child
support enforcement program in Florida exhibits a fundamental problem in
distributing the money collected, as evidenced by the DOR holding sizeable
amounts that should have been distributed. In the current system, the inter-
ests of the State of Florida are satisfied because the child support enforce-
ment program avoids federal penalty. However, the result is an ineffective,
inequitable, and unjust system. Children, whether they reside with their
custodial parents or in foster homes, do not receive the support to which they
are entitled. The system, although the result of complex statutory interaction
and interest balancing between family autonomy and state fiscal interest, fails
in its primary goal: to provide financial support to children. This systemic
failure in Florida warrants the extension of private citizen suits against public
and private entities to ensure that the child support orders are enforced and
distributed correctly.
In addition to the failure to distribute child support awards, another
systemic feature provides support for private citizen suits. Under the current
statutory scheme, the DOR specifies that an attorney-client relationship does
not exist between the attorneys which it hires to enforce child support orders
and the custodial parent; rather, the client is the DOR itself. 42 The DOR has
the authority to collect child support orders, and it may impose remedies
upon noncustodial parents, including seizing IRS tax refunds, freezing and
seizing bank accounts, income deduction, liens on real and personal property,
liens on workers' compensation and unemployment compensation, and by
suspending professional licenses and drivers licenses. Thus, the attorney
who is hired to seek child support enforcement is an advocate for the state
and not for the interests of the custodial parent. Nancy Erickson notes that
because the attorney is representing the interests of the state, the attorney will
not represent the interests of the custodial parent (or the child when they are
in conflict with or do not coincide with those of the state. Furthermore,
Erickson cites the following examples of the conflict between the interests of
the state and those of custodial parents: when a state seeks child support
from the noncustodial parent even if the custodial parent does not desire it, or
41. October 1999 report submitted by Florida Department of Revenue office of Child
Support Enforcement to federal OCSE in HHS.
42. State of Florida Department of Revenue, supra note 31.
43. Id. Other remedies include: suspending Florida driver, professional, and hunting
licenses; issuing interstate arrest warrants; reporting nonpayment of child support to credit
bureaus and garnishing wages; denying passport applications or causing passports to be
suspended (if the unpaid obligation is $5,000 or more). FLA. STAT. §§ 409.2551, .2598
(2000).
44. ERICKSON, supra note 11, at 128.
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when a state supports custody for the father in an effort to eliminate the
mother and child from public assistance.45
If Erickson's assertion is correct, there is a systemic interest in permit-
ting custodial parents their own representation. This systemic feature pro-
vides a compelling argument that custodial parents must retain a corollary
right to sue to protect their individual interests. If a custodial parent is not
allowed to sue for support enforcement under Title IV-D, the result would be
the disenfranchisement of an entire segment of custodial parents and their
children. Congress would not intend, and the courts would not allow, this
result. Indeed, a custodial parent may sue a noncustodial parent even after
and even though their right to receive child support was assigned under Title
IV-D.4 Erickson reports that it is essential for a custodial parent to retain the
private right to sue the noncustodial parent because the interests of states do
not necessarily coincide with those of the custodial parent.47 The question
that this article pursues extends the justification stemming from lack of
representation of custodial parents against noncustodial parents to the issue
of whether one has a right to sue private and public agencies who are respon-
sible for child support enforcement. As privatization of public agency
enforcement increases through application of section 409.25575 of the
Florida Statutes, this remedy can be even more important to ensuring timely
distribution of child support collected to the child's custodian.48
Part II described the federal legislation in child support enforcement that
resulted in state enforcement programs by virtue of the threat of severe
penalties. The child support enforcement system in Florida is no exception.
Part II also explored the failure of the current Florida statutory scheme to
fully distribute money owed to children and to represent the interests of
children in enforcing support orders. A private cause of action against public
or private agencies in charge of collecting and distributing child support
funds is necessary to correct these systemic failures.
III. FEDERAL LAW AS A SOURCE OF LIABILITY
Federal law offers a possible source for private action against agencies
that fail to enforce child support orders or that fail to distribute child support
funds collected, which are necessary to the livelihood of foster children and
children who live with their custodial parents. If an individual is acting as an
agent of the state, then that individual may be sued for a violation of section
45. Id. at 127-28.
46. See id. at 129.
47. Id. If the custodial parent is able to collect the child support money, the potential
for attaining freedom from public assistance increases. Id.
48. § 409.25575.
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1983. 49 Section 1983 allows citizens to sue those who act "under the color of
any statute ... of any State" for a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. 50 Section 1983 provides
two possible foundations on which a suit for noncompliance with a child
support order can be based: a private action must arise from a violation of
either constitutional or statutory rights. Part III will apply the provisions of
section 1983 to constitutional violations of procedural and substantive due
process in addition to statutory violations of Titles IV-D and TV-E of the
Social Security Act.
The common law is less than clear as to when individuals have a private
right of action under section 1983. If the statute providing the rights alleg-
edly being denied contains an express prohibition against the bringing of an
independent action pursuant to section 1983, or if the statute includes reme-
dial measures that were sufficient to demonstrate congressional intent to
exclude such a remedy, then no private right of action will likely be allowed
to go forward pursuant to section 1983. For example, the enforcement
mechanisms of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the administra-
tive mechanism from the Education of the Handicapped Act both demon-
strated that Congress intended to preempt the private action remedy estab-
lished in section 1983.52 Furthermore, if a state alleges that the statute either
expressly prohibits or provides sufficient mechanisms such that section 1983
becomes unnecessary, then the state has the burden of proof in establishing
that a private cause of action does not arise.
53
The United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit courts have
predominantly applied combinations of the criteria announced in Wright v.
49. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). An implied cause of action was no longer
necessary to private enforcement under section 1983, and the four-part inquiry was simplified
because section 1983 allows for recovery for a violation of rights under a federal statute. See
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 525-26 (1990). The court mentions one
common requirement that remained between both implied causes of action and section 1983:
the statutory language "must confer identifiable enforceable rights." Id. at 526. It is important
to remember that the Eleventh Amendment precludes actions for any relief directly against the
state itself, and also precludes damage actions against state government employees and agents
in their state representative capacity. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment does
not, however, preclude damage actions against state personnel in their individual capacity, nor
does the Eleventh Amendment preclude actions for declaratory or equitable relief against state
personnel in their representative capacities. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
51. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423
(1987).
52. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521 (describing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981)); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012
(1984)).
53. Wilder, 479 U.S. at 521.
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City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority54 and Wilder v. Vir-
ginia Hospital Association.55 The standards applied in Wright and Wilder,
although formulated differently, encompass similar criteria. In Wright, the
Court applied section 1983, holding that the regulations gave low income
tenants an enforceable right to a reasonable utility allowance and that the
regulations were fully authorized by the statute.56 The Court noted that the
Brooke Amendment evinced a mandatory right and a clear intent to benefit
the tenants. 57 In Wilder, the Court considered whether the legislature in-
tended to benefit the tenants in the utility and rental rates, and articulated the
prevailing test used to determine whether a private cause of action arises
under section 1983: 1) the statutory or constitutional provision must be
"intended to benefit the putative plaintiff;" 2) the obligation upon govern-
ment must be mandatory; and 3) the plaintiffs interest must not be "'too
vague and amorphous' such that it is 'beyond the competence of the judiciary
to enforce.' 58
Although the criteria enunciated in Wilder provides a useful test, Golden
State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles formulates the section 1983 test along
different lines. The Court in Golden State described the question of a private
cause of action under section 1983 in terms of two criteria: 1) violation of a
federal right; and 2) Congress "'specifically foreclosed a remedy under
[section] 1983."'" 9 In determining whether a violation of a federal right
occurred, Golden State cited Wright as precedent and considered issues such
as whether the provision created binding obligations upon the state, whether
the plaintiff's interest was too vaue to be enforceable, and whether the
provision benefited the plaintiff. However, in addition to the criteria
applied from Wright, the Court also considered whether Congress intended to
preempt a private action under section 1983. In response, Golden State cited
54. Id. at 418 (finding a private cause of action under section 1983 against the public
housing authority for violating the rent ceiling of the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act
and the regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development).
55. 496 U.S. at 498 (holding that the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act includes
a private cause of action for health care providers to seek reimbursement of costs from state
officials).
56. Wright, 479 U.S. at 420.
57. Id. at 430.
58. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509.
59. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)
(quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1005 n.9). Golden State held that the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution does not create a right to private enforcement under section 1983 because it
"secures federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state
law." Id. at 107 (quoting from Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613
(1979)).
60. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106.
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precedent where the provision included ample enforcement procedures, and
where a suit by plaintiff "'would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully
tailored scheme., 6 Thus, the Golden State Court conducted an analysis
similar to that developed in both Wright and Wilder.
However, Suter v. Artist M.62 appeared to retreat from the standard
enunciated in Wilder in failing to apply Wilder to decide whether a private
cause of action exists under section 1983.63 It was not sufficient that the
provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act were manda-
tory; this fact alone did not give rise to section 1983 liability.64 The Supreme
Court in Suter found it significant that the provisions of the Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act did not include a formula or percentage by
which to quantify "reasonable efforts," and the Court interpreted the legisla-
tive intent as intending to exclude recovery under section 1983 if rights
instilling such a cause of action were omitted from the statutory language. 65
The Court distinguished Suter from Wilder in that the statute in Wilder
specified that the "reasonable utilities" costs were limited and rent costs were
limited to thirty percent of the recipient's income; Wilder gave rise to a cause
of action under section 1983, while Suter did not.66 In holding that section
1983 did not supply a private cause of action, Suter conducted a "careful
examination of the language.., in the context of the entire act," which led to
the conclusion that the "'reasonable efforts' language does not unambigu-
,,67ously confer an enforceable right upon the Act's beneficiaries.
Unlike Wilder and Wright, the Court in. Suter adopted a standard of
intense statutory scrutiny to determine whether a right suitable for section
1983 enforcement arises. The dissent in Suter described the majority opin-
ion's holding not only as "plainly inconsistent" with Wilder, but also con-
spicuously lacking the application of the common law principles to deter-
mine section 1983 liability.6 8 However, the majority did not explicitly
61. Id. at 107 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012).
62. 503 U.S. 347,357 (1992).
63. Id. (holding that children beneficiaries of the Adoption Assistance in Child
Welfare Act did not have a section 1983 cause of action against the Illinois agency responsible
for exerting "reasonable efforts" to administer the placement of foster care children because
such language was too vague to be enforceable).
64. Id. at 358.
65. See id. at 360.
66. Id. at 361-62.
67. Suter, 503 U.S. at 363.
68. Id. at 365 (providing a thorough summary of principles for finding a private right
of action under Section 1983). The dissent stated: "I cannot acquiesce in this unexplained
disregard for established law." Id.
[Vol. 25:693
159
: Nova Law Review 25, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Gievers
overrule Wilder's three-part analysis, thus leaving it unclear which analysis
should or will be conducted.69
In the more recent Blessing decision, the Court indicated that the analy-
sis from Wright and Wilder remains good law as shown when the court
applied a three-part test to determine whether a private cause of action exists
under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.70 The Blessing Court reversed
the lower court's order recognizing a cause of action for failure of the Ari-
zona child support system to meet the federally mandated "substantial com-
pliance" requirement of the federal statute, commenting that neither the
plaintiffs nor the lower court had engaged in the proper analysis of the
specific rights infringed upon. The Court also found, however, that the child
support statutory scheme was not comprehensive enough to preclude section
1983 liability and found there was no express preclusion.71 The Court went
on to suggest amendment of the complaint to include a request for relief
connected to plead failure to distribute the support payments due, which it
implied would be action pursuant to section 1983.72
Other decisions reveal that the Eleventh Circuit and related district
courts also treat the test formulated in Wilder favorably. For example, in
Doe v. Chiles,73 the issue was whether the failure of the Florida Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services to furnish Medicaid within the rea-
sonably prompt time mandated by the Medicaid Act74 constituted a valid
basis for the lower court's providing of injunctive relief pursuant to section
1983.75 The circuit court distinguished Suter, analyzed Wilder and Wright,
and held that the plaintiffs had a federal right to reasonably prompt Medicaid71
assistance and found the right properly enforceable under section 1983. In
Mallo v. Public Health Trust of Dade County,77 the court used the two-part
test to determine whether a private right of action exists under section 1983,
69. See Ashish Prasad, Comment, Rights Without Remedies: Section 1983 Enforce-
ment of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 197, 206 (1993), for a
thorough discussion and comparison of standards enunciated in both the Wilder and Suter
decisions. It should also be noted that Congress amended the statute after the ruling in Suter,
with the statute-related notes and legislative history suggesting congressional desire to
effectively overrule Suter.
70. Blessing v. Firestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997).
71. Id. at 338-39.
72. Id. at 345-46.
73. 136 F.3d 709 (1lth Cir. 1998).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(8) (1994).
75. Chiles, 136 F.3d at 714. The complaint alleged the time being taken exceeded
four years. Id.
76. Id. at 709.
77. 88 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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and the Wilder framework is encompassed within this test.78 The burden of
the first step falls upon the defendants, who must demonstrate that Congress
either explicitly or implicitly intended to "foreclose such private enforce-
ment. '79 The court held that the defendants failed to meet the burden that
Congress intended to preclude recovery private action in conjunction with
the Medicaid Act.80 The burden of the second step falls upon the plaintiffs,
who must demonstrate that their federal rights were violated.8' As part of the
second step, the court incorporated the Wilder three-part test "to determine
whether statutory provisions implicitly create [a] federal right., 82 Thus, the
three-part test from Wilder remains in good standing in the Eleventh Circuit.
Part III analyzed the development of common law standards for deter-
mining whether a private cause of action arises under section 1983, arguing
that, although there is not one definitive standard, the prevailing law repre-
sents a combination and relationship of factors developed from cases such as
Wilder and Golden State. Part IV will apply the tests to argue that federal
law-violations of the constitutional guarantee to due process and violations of
the Social Security Act-gives rise to a private cause of action of both custo-
dial parents and foster children.
II. VIOLATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL OR A STATUTORY RIGHT
A. Constitutional Right
Child support orders implicate issues raised by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The CSEA mandates that states establish "expedited proc-
esses" in instances of Title IV-D child support enforcement. 83 Accordingly,
states must protect the due process rights of the parties in such expedited
processes, and custodial parents are entitled to notice and to an opportunity to
be heard.84 However, this exception does not provide an avenue for liability
under section 1983 because the problem of failure to enforce does not trigger
the due process requirement of the expedited processes. Rather, this article
examines the issue of whether a state or a private agency acting under the
78. Id. at 1379.
79. Id. at 1380 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 423).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Mallo, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
83. ERICKSON, supra note 11, at 355.
84. 45 C.F.R 303.101(c)(2) (2000). The regulation provides as follows: "[u]nder
expedited processes... the due process rights of the parties involved must be protected." Id.
Section 303.101(c)(1) of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations specifically governs the
issue of paternity determination. Id.
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color of state authority may be held liable for mishandling or failing to
collect child support.
When injunctive relief is sought, rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires the Court to consider the following four factors: 1) the
substantial likelihood that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; 2) the substan-
tial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the temporary restrain-
ing order is not issued; 3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm a tempo-
rary restraining order may cause the defendants; and 4) the grant of a tempo-
rary restraining order will not disserve the public interest. As to the four
factors, "'no particular quantum of proof is required as to each of the four
criteria."' 8 6 The four factors, which also govern the grant of preliminary
injunctive relief, favor the issuance of a temporary restraining order in this
case. Likelihood of success on the merits is not to be equated with success
87on the merits.
As to children in foster care, the government cannot condition receipt of
a benefit, such as remaining in foster care, on the relinquishment of a consti-
tutional right.
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even
though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any
number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the gov-
ernment may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-
especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government
could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms
would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to "produce a result which [it] could not command di-
85. E.g., Levi-Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (1lth Cir.
1995).
86. Laboratorios Roldan v. Tex Int'l, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1555, 1565 (S:D. Fla. 1995)
(quoting Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 925 (S.D. Fla. 1981)).
87. Paul Y. v. Singletary, 979 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (citing Univ. of
Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981)); Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1190 (N.D.
I1. 1990) (citing Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386-87 (7th Cir.
1984)) (holding in an action against the Illinois' state child welfare agency for inadequate
caseworkers and other services the party requesting a preliminary injunction must show as a
threshold matter, that they have "some likelihood of succeeding on the merits" in the sense
that their "'chances are better than negligible"').
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rectly." [citation omitted] Such interference with constitutional
rights is impermissible.
8
"At a minimum, 'due process requires that government officials refrain
from acting in an irrational, arbitrary or capricious manner.'" 8 9 "The absence
of standards governing the withdrawal or modification of services permits
arbitrary decisionmaking" in violation of due process.90 This is equally true
if the government agency imposes standards that are different from those
established by written policies or regulations.91
It hardly need be said that the existence of an absolute and uncon-
trolled discretion in an agency of government vested with the ad-
ministration of a vast program, such as public housing, would be
an intolerable invitation to abuse. [citation omitted] For this rea-
son alone due process requires that selections among applicants be
made in accordance with "ascertainable standards," [citation omit-
ted] .... 92
Administering a government program "using unwritten standards leads to
rule by decree and not by law. '93
The property and liberty interests that are protected by procedural due
process are creatures of state law, including statutes, regulations, and deci-
sional law interpreting state common law or the federal constitution.94 The
touchstone for a property interest is that it creates "a legitimate claim of
entitlement" to a benefit.95 "[R]ules and understandings, promulgated and
fostered by state officials ... may justify [a] legitimate claim of entitlement"
to the benefit.
96
88. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 72 (1990) (alteration in original)
(quoting Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)); see also, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv.,
Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150
(5th Cir. 1961) ("[t]he State cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the
renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process").
89. Pressley Ridge Schools, Inc. v. Stottlemyer, 947 F. Supp. 929, 940 (S.D. W. Va.
1996) (quoting Pollnow v. Glennon, 757 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1985)).
90. Mayer v. Wing, 922 F. Supp. 902, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
91. Pressley Ridge, 947 F. Supp. at 940-41.
92. Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968).
93. U.S. Dep't of Justice, DEA v. Burke, 968 F. Supp. 672, 681 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
94. E.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
95. Id. at 577.
96. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. at 602; see also Brown v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue,
881 F.2d 1018, 1027 (11th Cir. 1989) (fact that rules provide for a hearing to challenge
dismissal weighs in favor of finding a protected interest); Shahawy v. Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529
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The recipient has a property interest in a benefit if the government
cannot terminate it except for good cause, and the existence of procedures to
challenge the termination is evidence of the state's recognition that the
interest is protected.97 A protected interest is created if state law restricts the
government's discretion in extending or terminating benefits.
98
When state law creates an entitlement to a benefit, the next issue is what
process is due. In Mathews v. Eldridge,99 the Court articulated the three
factors that must be considered in determining the sufficiency of the process
that is afforded:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of ad-
ditional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail. 0
When the nature of the benefit is such that its termination deprives the former
recipient of the "means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and
medical care," only a pre-termination hearing will suffice.'" Foster care is
unquestionably such a benefit.
Foster children have a protected interest in remaining in foster care past
their eighteenth birthday. The analysis of Plaintiffs' property right begins
with the statute that establishes the availability of foster care for youngsters
over eighteen years of age. Section 409.145(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes
provides:
The department is authorized to continue to provide the services of
the children's foster care program to individuals 18 to 21 years of
age who are enrolled in high school, in a program leading to a high
school equivalency diploma as defined in s. 229.814, or in a full-
(11 th Cir. 1989) (finding of protected interest supported by specific standards and procedures
to be applied when considering discharge or suspension).
97. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978).
98. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,271 (1970); Occean v. Keamey, 123 F. Supp. 2d
618, 623 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (right to remain in foster care past eighteenth birthday); Marisol A.
v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (wide variety of child welfare services);
Sockwell v. Mahoney, 431 F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (D. Conn. 1976); Brian A. v. Sundquist, No.
3:00-0443,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18771 at *12 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 26,2000).
99. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
100. Id. at 335.
101. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,264 (1970).
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time career education program, and to continue to provide services
of the children's foster care program to individuals 18 to 23 years
of age who are enrolled full-time in a postsecondary educational
institution granting a degree, a certificate, or an applied technology
diploma, if the following requirements are met:
1. The individual was committed to the legal custody of the de-
partment for placement in foster care as a dependent child;
2. All other resources have been thoroughly explored, and it can
be clearly established that there are no alternative sources for
placement; and
3. A written service agreement which specifies responsibilities and
expectations for all parties involved has been signed by a represen-
tative of the department, the individual, and the foster parent or li-
censed child-caring agency providing the placement resources.
10 2
Section 409.145(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes provides that "[s]ervices shall
be terminated upon completion of or withdrawal or permanent expulsion
from high school" or other enumerated educational program.
10 3
Section 409.145(3) may give DCAF the discretion whether to create a
program of providing foster care services beyond a child's eighteenth birth-
day, but once the program is in place, DCAF's discretion is restricted con-
cerning which youngsters will be entitled to continue to receive the bene-
fits. 0 4 The program is limited to youngsters who attend one of the enumer-
ated educational or vocational programs, who were in foster care prior to
reaching eighteen years of age, and for whom no other placement resource
has been identified despite a thorough search. 10 5 DCAF cannot extend foster
care benefits to a youngster who does not meet these requirements and,
obversely, cannot deny the benefits to a child who meets the listed criteria.
102. FLA. STAT. § 409.145(3)(a) (2000).
103. § 409.145(3)(b).
104. See § 409.145(3).
105. A DCAF document that clearly is specifically intended for foster youth who have
turned eighteen years of age, states as follows:
You are 18! You made it! Now what? Many teens, staff and foster parents
have asked what happens to a teen in foster care when he or she turns 18.
You have several options: ... You may choose to remain in foster care to
complete your education. You may remain in a foster home, group place-
ment, or Supervised Practice Living through the Independent Living Program.
... To remain in foster care after 18, you must be attending a full time educa-
tional program. This could be high school, A G.E.D. Program, technical
school or college .... Once you are 18 if you do not attend school full-time,
you are no longer eligible to be in foster care.
Id. There are no other eligibility requirements cited in this document.
[Vol. 25:693
165
: Nova Law Review 25, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Gievers
"Once the Department begins to provide services [under section
409.145(3)(a)], its obligation is not voluntary. Subsection 409.145(3)(b)
mandates that the services continue so long as the individual complies with
the statutory requirements.
10 6
Section 409.145(3)(b) and this operating procedure recognize that an
individual can be involuntarily discharged from the program only for cause,
that is, noncompliance with the case plan or program. Under Memphis Light
and related cases, this fact establishes foster youth have a protected property
interest in remaining in foster care past their eighteenth birthday.1
0 7
Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis and analogizing to the
welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly, it is clear that a pre-termination
hearing before an impartial decision maker is essential to achieve due proc-
ess. The interest at risk for the youth being discharged is in having mini-
mally adequate food, shelter, and clothing. In the words of Goldberg, such
children will face "brutal need" upon discharge. Indeed, their need will be at
least as great as that faced by an adult welfare recipient who is not dis-
abled.10 8 Consequently, like welfare recipients, children must be allowed to
retain the benefit by remaining in foster care-pending review of DCAF's
discharge decision.
Disputes concerning whether the foster youth was, in fact, out of com-
pliance with the program or the case plan and, implicitly, whether the case
plan was appropriate to the young adult's individual needs, involve intensely
fact-sensitive issues which require an opportunity for an oral presentation
before an impartial fact finder in an environment that is suited to the foster
youth's abilities. Finally, the government has a very substantial interest in
retaining youth in foster care until they are able to live independently. Not
only will there be long term financial benefits from reduced welfare rolls and
these individuals' contributions to the state's economy, defendants, as these
youngsters' custodian, also have an interest in seeing former foster children
succeed in life.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that "[a] showing of irreparable harm is
'the sine qua non of injunctive relef." The Fourth Circuit decision in L.J.
v. Massinga"0 is illustrative of the test for irreparable injury in the foster care
setting. Foster children in the custody of the Baltimore City Department of
Social Services brought an action against state and city officials for their part
106. Melody v. Dep't of H.R.S., 696 So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(Pariente, J., concurring).
107. Occean, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
108. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261.
109. N.E. Fla. Chapter of the Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,
896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (1lth Cir. 1990).
110. 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988).
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in administering Maryland's foster care program."' Plaintiffs alleged that as
a result of the Defendants' "maladministration of the program, they were
victims of physical and sexual abuse as well as medical neglect" and "sought
broad interim and permanent injunctive relief to redress the deficiencies in
the administration of the program and money damages."'"12 The district court
in Massinga found that there was a likelihood of irreparable harm to the
Plaintiffs if the interim relief was not granted." 3
The irreparable harm that foster youth face if terminated from foster
care without the opportunity to complete their education and develop neces-
sary job and independent living skills is borne out by the well-documented
outcomes of many youth discharged from foster care upon reaching age
eighteen. Because foster youth are not adequately prepared to survive on
their own at eighteen, the foster care system has created a whole new cate-
gory of homeless. Indeed, nationwide studies have shown that twenty to
forty percent of our country's homeless population consists of former foster
youth." 4 In fact, a 1991 National Association of Social Workers study found
that more than one fifth of teens at homeless shelters arrive directly from
foster care nationwide."15
In addition to comprising a large segment of our homeless population,
foster youth are disproportionately represented on public assistance rolls, in
state mental hospitals, and in state prisons." 6 These youth are more likely to
end up in prison or on welfare, and they often turn to drugs or prostitution." 7
111. /d.at 119.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 120.
114. See J.C. Barden, After Release From Foster Care, Many Turn to Lives on the
Streets, N.Y. TYIMEs, Jan. 6, 1991, at Al.
115. See Study by the Nat'l Ass'n of Social Workers, A Summary of Findings from a
National Survey of Programs for Runaway and Homeless Youth and Programs for Older
Youth in Foster Care (1991) (on file with the Nat'l Ass'n of Social Workers).
116. See Somini Sengupta, Youth Leaving Foster Care with Few Skills or Resources,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2000, at Al; Barbara Vobejda, At 18, It's Sink or Swim; For Ex-Foster
Children, Transition is Difficult, WASH. POST, July 21, 1998, at Al; Sonia Nazario, Sex,
Drugs, and No Place to Go, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1993, at Al; see also Diana J. English,
Sophia Kouidou-Giles & Martin Plocke, Readiness for Independence: A Study of Youth in
Foster Care, 16 Children and Youth Services Review, 147, 157 (1994) (indicating the skills
that youth lack by the time they emancipate from state foster care seriously impact their
successful transition to adulthood).
117. See U.S. House Rep. Nancy Johnson, Bill Before House Tomorrow, Congressional
Press Releases, June 24, 1999 (LEXIS, News Library, Press Release); The Foster-Care Trap,
N.Y. YORK POST, May 16, 1999, at 56; Michael Kelley, Not That Easy to be Free; Life Can
Sting at 18, on Your Own After Foster Care, The Commercial Appeal, May 4, 1999, at Cl;
Senator Kit Bond, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Finance Subcommittee of Health Care,
October 13, 1999 (LEXIS, News Library, Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony).
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Further, a recent study on former foster youth conducted by the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin found that "by 12-18 months past discharge, 37 percent of
the young adults had not yet completed high school, [and that only] nine
percent had entered college."' 8 Additionally, "one-quarter to one-third of
the youths reported a perceived lack of preparedness in several skill areas
[including managing money, living on own and parenting]." ' 19 Moreover, it
has been found that only fifty percent of post-foster care youths are em-
ployed twelve to eighteen months after leaving the foster care system.n2
It was because of findings such as these that Congress originally created
the federal Independent Living Initiative to ensure that all foster youth
sixteen years old and older would receive independent living services and
skills training in order to prevent these children from ending up homeless, on
welfare, or in jail.121
Most recently, in enacting the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999,
Congress found:
Congress has received extensive information that adolescents leav-
ing foster care have significant difficulty making a successful tran-
sition to adulthood; this information shows that children aging out
of foster care show high rates of homelessness, non-marital child-
bearing, poverty, and delinquent or criminal behavior; they are also
frequently the target of crime and physical assaults.
The Nation's State and local governments, with financial support
from the Federal Government, should offer an extensive program
of education, training, employment, and financial support for
young adults leaving foster care, with participation in such pro-
gram beginning several years before high school graduation and
118. Mark E. Courtney and Irving Piliavin, Foster Youth Transitions to Adulthood:
Outcomes 12 to 18 Months After Leaving Out-of-Home Care, at 2 (July 1998 (Revised Aug.
1998)).
119. See id.
120. See David Reyes, Something Lost in Transition for Foster Care Teens; Report
Cites Need for Young Adults Leaving System to Have Financial or Emotional Support to Help
Prevent Homelessness, Pregnancy and Joblessness, L.A. TImEs, Feb. 10, 2000, at BI; Scott
McCown, Foster Children Get a Fighting Chance, AusTN AM.-STAr MAN, Dec. 20, 1999, at
A17.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 677 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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continuing, as needed, until the young adults emancipated from
foster care establish independence or reach 21 years of age.
122
Society is best served by enabling youth who are committed to the
foster care system as dependent children and who have not completed their
education to remain in foster care after age eighteen in order to complete
their education and make a successful transition to adulthood. It is unques-
tionable that the public interest is best served by a well-run, humane, and
effectively administered foster care system, which will preserve the lives,
health, and safety of foster youth. Without such a system, the harm to the
public interest is substantial and tragic, with increased numbers of older
foster care children suffering neglect of the most damaging nature and the
costs to the youth, as well as the costs to our communities, continuing for a
lifetime.
Numerous studies conducted throughout the nation and numerous
legislative hearings leading up to the enactment of the Foster Care Independ-
ence Act of 1999 have come to the same conclusion, as has, most recently,
President Bush who stated:
The personal and emotional costs are especially high for young
people who leave foster care at age eighteen without having been
adopted. Research indicates that these young people experience
alarming rates of homelessness, early pregnancy, mental illness,
122. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, 106 Pub. L. No. 106-169, § 101, 113 Stat
1823 (1999). Through the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Congress doubled the
annual federal funding from $70 million to $140 million to enable states to serve foster youth
through the age of twenty-one. See id. The legislation provides for expanded training and
educational opportunities, access to health care, housing assistance, counseling and other
services for teenagers and young adults in foster care to help them make a successful transition
to adulthood. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 677 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). As noted by Rep.
Mark Foley (Fla.) in the House debate on this bill,
Last year Florida had 3,103 youths who were eligible for independent living
programs. Although some of these kids have foster parents who stick with
them and are willing to help, including giving them money out of their own
pockets, many have been shuffled around so much that they do not have any-
one to turn to.
These foster children have barely been able to be kids, and suddenly they are
forced to become instant adults. It is no wonder that many of them end up on
the streets or on welfare, or as teenaged parents.
145 CONG. Rnc. H4962 (daily ed. June 25, 1999) (statement of Sen. Foley) This new law has
had a significant impact on Florida's Independent Living budget for older foster youth, raising
it from $900,000 to $6.1 million. See Shana Gruskin, State to Help Foster Kids Master Adult
Life, SuN-SmTN,_L (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan 2, 2000, at lB.
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unemployment, and drug abuse in the first years after they leave
the system.123
Florida courts have held that Florida law does not permit the retention
of circuit court juvenile jurisdiction over a person after the age of eighteen
when she continues to receive services from the Department of Children and
Family Services.'2 Hence, if Leslie F. is improperly deprived of her right to
continued foster care benefits, she has no other means to seek any legal
remedy in the Florida state courts to make her whole.
B. Social Security Act
Agencies established under Title IV-D "must pursue enforcement" of
child support enforcement rights because families must "assign their support
rights to the state.'12 Just as the Supreme Court held in Wright that HUD
has "authority to audit, enforce annual contributions contracts, and cut off
federal funds [b]ut these generalized powers are insufficient to indicate a
congressional intention to foreclose [section] 1983 remedies,' 26 so too
should the Court hold that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act permits
private enforcement through section 1983.
Pursuant to the CSEA, state agencies must collect child support "in
order to reimburse the federal and state governments for the costs of main-
taining children in the federal IV-E foster care program., 127 Specifically, the
Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance
provides that, where appropriate, all steps will be taken, including
cooperative efforts with the State agencies administering the pro-
gram funded under part A and plan approved under part D, to se-
cure an assignment to the State of any rights to support on behalf
123. A Blueprint for New Beginnings: A Responsible Budget for America's Priorities,
EXEC. Doc. No. 041-001-00560-9, at 76 (2001) available at http:llwww.whitehouse.govl
news/usbudgetlblueprintlblueprint.pdf. To help this class of youth, President Bush has
proposed that the new federal budget "provide $60 million through the Foster Care Independ-
ence Program specifically for education and training vouchers to youth who 'age out' of foster
care." Id.
124. L.Y. v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 696 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997); see also N.L. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 770 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
125. ERICKSON, supra note 11, at 10-11.
126. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
127. ERICKSON, supra note 11, at 379.
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of each child receiving foster care maintenance payments under
this part. 21
Erickson describes policy concerns that arise under assignment and
children in foster care that do not arise under assignment and AFDC: the
assignment should be made only if it is appropriate and should be postponed
because of the propensity for economic instability of the former custodial
parent. 129 If the child returns home, then the support should be sent directly
to the custodial parent, provided that they are not welfare recipients.130 In
this instance, the issue of right of action of foster care children merges with
that of children who reside with their custodial parent.
V. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE STATE OF FLORIDA
A. In General
As was demonstrated previously, the Eleventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution protects the State of Florida and its representatives
from federal law based damage actions and protects the state itself [though
not representatives] from suits seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.",
The state's liability is different under state law, and the significance of the
differences varies depending on whether the suit is one sounding in tort or
contract. The analysis begins with Florida's Constitution, which reflects a
presumption of pre-existing state immunity from suit. It reads: "SECTION
13. Suits against the state. Provision may be made by general law for bring-
ing suit against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originat-
ing.911
32
The 1973 Legislature officially passed a partial waiver of sovereign
immunity in tort cases, with various preconditions required and limitations
on damages recoverable. 33 In pertinent part, the current statute provides as
follows:
(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the
state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives
128. 42 U.S.C. § 671(17) (1994).
129. ERICKSON, supra note 11, at 379-80 (citing Carol Golubuck, Cash Assistance to
Families: An Essential Component of Reasonable Efforts to Prevent and Eliminate Foster
Care Placement of Their Children, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1393, 1399 (April 1986)).
130. Id. at 381.
131. See also FLA. STAT. § 768.28(17) (2000).
132. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13.
133. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-313, § 1.
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sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent
specified in this act. Actions at law against the state or any of its
agencies or subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money
damages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury
or loss of property, personal injury, or death caused by the negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency or
subdivision while acting within the scope of the employee's office
or employment under circumstances in which the state or such
agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant, in accordance with the general laws of this state, may be
prosecuted subject to the limitations specified in this act. Any such
action may be brought in the county where the property in litiga-
tion is located or, if the affected agency or subdivision has an of-
fice in such county for the transaction of its customary business,
where the cause of action accrued.'3
(5) The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for
tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances, but liability shall not include
punitive damages or interest for the period before judgment. Nei-
ther the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to pay
a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of
$100,000 or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which,
when totaled with all other claims or judgments paid by the state or
its agencies or subdivisions arising out of the same incident or oc-
currence, exceeds the sum of $200,000. However, a judgment or
judgments may be claimed and rendered in excess of these
amounts and may be settled and paid pursuant to this act up to
$100,000 or $200,000, as the case may be; and that portion of the
judgment that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Legis-
lature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of
the Legislature.... 135
(9)(a) No officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its
subdivisions shall be held personally liable in tort or named as a
party defendant in any action for any injury or damage suffered as
134. § 768.28(1).
135. Id. § 768.28(5). For each separate incident of negligence that causes or contrib-
utes to damage, the statutory caps can be stacked. See, e.g., Pierce v. Town of Hastings, 509
So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her
or his employment or function, unless such officer, employee, or
agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or
property. The exclusive remedy for injury or damage suffered as a
result of an act, event, or omission of an officer, employee, or
agent of the state or any of its subdivisions or constitutional offi-
cers shall be by action against the governmental entity, or the head
of such entity in her or his official capacity, or the constitutional
officer of which the officer, employee, or agent is an employee,
unless such act or omission was committed in bad faith or with ma-
licious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disre-
gard of human rights, safety, or property. The state or its subdivi-
sions shall not be liable in tort for the acts or omissions of an offi-
cer, employee, or agent committed while acting outside the course
and scope of her or his employment or committed in bad faith or
with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and will-
ful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.
36
B. Liability in Tort Cases
The sovereign immunity waiver statute applies to all government enti-
ties, although municipalities were historically treated differently and could be
held liable where a special duty to the injured person existed, even though
another government entity may have been immune. 137 The 1973 adoption of
the statute has effectively eliminated the different treatment of municipali-
ties. 138 The Florida waiver statute essentially imposes liability on govern-
ment entities when their negligent conduct is the type of conduct which
would result in a private citizen being liable for damages caused by the same
type of negligent conduct. 139 In analyzing the types of conduct for which
waiver of immunity exists and those governmental non-private types of acts
for which immunity continues without waiver, the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted the following four-part test:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily in-
volve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective?
136. § 768.28(9)(a).
137. Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
138. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
139. § 768.28(1).
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(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the re-
alization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objec-
tive as opposed to one which would not change the course or
direction of the policy, program, or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of ba-
sic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of
the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or
make the challenged act, omission, or decision? 140
As a further litmus test, the court also adopted the analysis of Johnson v.
State1'4 to differentiate between planning and operational levels of decision
making, with the waiver of tort immunity applying solely to nongovern-
mental, discretionary, operational level negligence.142
It is important to note that the statute can also have an effect on the
liability of government employees and agents in their representative and
individual capacities. The statute precludes personal liability suits against
individuals in their individual capacity for any act "within the scope" of their
employment or agency "unless such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad
faith'or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful
disregard of human rights, safety, or property.143
Thus, individual liability remains for acts "not within the scope" and for
egregious acts meeting the bad faith, malicious purpose, or willful disregard
threshold.'" A clerk of court officer whose duties expressly include the
proper indexing of documents relating to real property can be sued in tort for
damages caused by negligence in recording a title document; no immunity
precluded the suit or the liability. 45 There can clearly be individual govern-
ment employee liability for acts outside the scope of employment;" 46 the
140. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1019 (citing Evangelical United Brethen
Church v. State, 407 P.2d 440,445 (1965)).
141. 447 P.2d 352, 360 (1968).
142. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1022.
143. § 768.28(9)(a).
144. Id. By statute, for non-egregious, covered acts "within the scope" the only proper
defendant is the government entity itself. See id.
145. First American Title Ins. v. Dixon, 603 So. 2d 562, 566 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
146. § 768.28(9); O.A.G. 80-57 (1980); see White v. Crandon, 156 So. 303 (1934)
(member of county commission board will be held personally liable for money voted and paid
out without authority of law where the payment is equivalent to misappropriation of public
funds).
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determination of whether a particular wrongful act is within the scope of
employment or not is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact. 147
As one contemplates potential theories of action against a state a ency,
it should be noted that the immunity stated relates to "liabilities," 1§8 and
actions against a government body for injunctive or other equitable relief are
not necessarily precluded by sovereign immunity under state or federal
law.' 49
Although the legislature has not enacted any law waiving sovereign
immunity in contract actions, Florida's courts recognize the inequity that
would be present if the state could violate its contractual obligations with
impunity, and have allowed actions to go forward against the state. In Pan-
Am Tobacco v. Department of Corrections,15° the Supreme Court of Florida
unequivocally held, in answering a question certified by the district court to
be of the utmost importance, that sovereign immunity cannot be properly
raised by government as a defense to an action for breach of an express,
written contract.' 5 ' In so doing, the court relied upon the general powers of
state agencies to enter into contracts and reasoned that because such contracts
would be valid only if mutually enforceable the legislature obviously in-
tended for state agencies to be amenable to suits for breaches of said express
contracts. 52 In Champagne-Webber v. Fort Lauderdale,153 the court held
that an action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith inherent in the
express contract would also lie.' 54 Similarly, governmental liability for
prejudgment interest has been allowed, despite an absence of any statute
expressly waiving immunity for same. 55 A cause of action may also be
147. Alvarez v. Cotarelo, 626 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
148. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13.
149. E.g., Seminole Co. v. Mertz, 415 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(injunction requiring county to prevent the flow of surface water onto lower-lying property;
sovereign immunity not applicable); Mallo, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (injunction requiring
reimbursement of excess funds demanded and received by county).
150. 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984).
151. Id. at 5.
152. Id.
153. 519 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
154. Id. at 698. In Champagne-Webber, the contractor relied on the city's representa-
tion that the soil on which construction would occur was all sand, and made its bid according-
ly. Id. at 696-97. The rock discovered under the sand during construction increased the work
to be done and the cost. Id. at 697. The Champagne-Webber court's rationale was expressly
approved by the Supreme Court of Florida. County of Brevard v. Miorelli Engineering, Inc.,
703 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 1997).
155. See generally Broward County v. Finlayson, 555 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1990) (from
date of demand); Florida Livestock Bd v. Gladdens, 86 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1956); Public Health
Trust of Dade v. State, 629 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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stated against an individual employee personally in an action for breach of a
contractual duty of a gratuitous bailee. 
R 6
VI. APPLICATION OF FLORIDA LAW TO CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT VIOLATIONS
There are two situations in which it is likely that liability for violating
the child support enforcement laws will easily be found. First, when the
noncustodial parent is known, but no action is taken to obtain a support
order, the state violates its nondiscretionary ministerial obligation under
federal and Florida law. Suite would therefore be proper to compel the
official to obtain the support order.
If the child is in foster care in the state's custody as a dependent child
pursuant to section 39 of the Florida Statutes, there is an absolute duty to
provide all basic services up to age twenty-one under federal law' 57 and the
extended assistance provided under state law up to age twenty-three for
foster youth who continue to pursue their educations.'58 An action for
injunctive relief on behalf of an in-school foster youth would be appropriate
here as well, to compel the state to comply with its nondiscretionary duties.
In the case of non-foster children for whom the state receives money,
but fails to distribute funds to the custodial parent for the benefit of the child,
available remedies under the authorities cited above would appear to include
actions for damages under tort or contract law against the state itself or the
official whose nonfeasance or misfeasance delayed or prevented the distribu-
tion, as well as equitable remedies such as a suit for mandamus or other
injunctive relief.
VII. CONCLUSION
Under federal and Florida law, legal action is appropriate to enforce the
state's obligations to collect and distribute for the direct benefit of children
the child support which the noncustodial parent has been ordered to pay.
Such a suit can be brought against the agency head responsible for enforce-
ment of the obligations pertaining to a non-foster child, and against the
responsible official of the Department of Children and Families in the case of
foster children.
156. See generally Palm Court Corp. v. Smith, 137 So. 234 (1931).
157. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, supra note 122.
158. See generally id.
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The remarks and suggestions made by foster care graduates con-
tained a recurrent theme-the importance of consultation with the
young people themselves. They felt like pawns-subject to the
many powers of others. They felt disregarded, that it did not matter
what they wanted or had to say, because too often they were never
asked. Whether it was a decision about a foster home, about
* Director and Associate Director, respectively, University of Miami School of
Law, Children & Youth Law Clinic, and counsel for petitioner in M. W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d
90 (Fla. 2000).
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changes in placement, about visiting arrangements with kin, or
about their goals in life, they felt they should have been heard.'
I. INTRODUCTION: THE STORY OF MICHAEL AND HIS
STRUGGLE TO BE HEARD
"Michael" is a teenage foster child who was committed by the Florida
Department of Children & Families ("DCF') to a psychiatric institution after
a five-minute hearing at which he was not present, in which he had no
opportunity to participate, and at which no evidence was presented. The
commitment order signed by the juvenile court judge required Michael to be
transported under armed police escort to the institution. While at this institu-
tion, Michael was forcibly administered psychotropic drugs, placed in four-
point leather restraints, and punished by being placed in seclusion, prohib-
ited from speaking to other patients, or telephoning his family.
Michael was one of nine children born in Miami to a poor, single
mother. At the age of six, Michael and his siblings were removed from his
mother's custody and placed in foster care due to allegations of abuse and
neglect. During his many years in state custody, Michael was placed by
DCF in several different settings, including foster homes, group homes,
hospitals, and his mother's home. While in foster care, he sometimes ran to
his mother's home.
During his long period in foster care, Michael was also hospitalized on
several occasions for crisis stabilization and evaluations. Two doctors who
evaluated Michael during one of these hospital stays disagreed as to the type
of placement that was appropriate for him. One, a psychiatrist, recom-
mended "'a residential placement emphasizing self-responsibility, self-
identity, and independent living skills .... ,,,2 Another, a psychologist,
recommended that a foster placement in which the foster mother would be
most "'accessible and available"' to this adolescent child would be most
therapeutic. 3 Michael's court-appointed attorney asked the court to appoint
another psychologist to perform an independent examination. The indepen-
dent psychologist recommended that Michael be given "individual therapY ,
psychotropic medications, and that he be placed in therapeutic foster care. '
Later, his case was reviewed by a DCF multi-disciplinary case review
committee charged under Florida law with determining children's eligibility
1. TRUDY FESTINGER, No ONE EVER ASKED Us: A POSTSCRIPT TO FOSTER CARE 296
(1983).
2. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
3. Id. at 93.
4. Id. at 94.
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for residential treatment.5 The committee considered another assessment,
one prepared by a psychologist hired by DCF. This assessment opined that
Michael "'did not appear to be at risk for suicidal attempts or self-injurious
behaviors but he is at risk for running away and the dangers associated with
this.' 6 The psychologist, however, recommended Michael's placement in a
"'supportive, but locked residential environment wherein [Michael] will be
able to develop relationships with others and can participate in family ther-
apy .... ,, Without interviewing Michael, or hearing from Michael's court-
appointed lawyer, the committee adopted this psychologist's recommenda-
tion.
8
DCF then appeared in court and asked Michael's presiding juvenile
court judge to order than he be placed in a locked residential environment.9
Michael's attorney asked the judge, prior to ordering this placement, to
allow an evidentiary hearing under the Baker Act i to take place in order to
sort out the conflicting evidence and allow Michael to present evidence that
residential placement was not necessary." The dependency judge refused to
conduct such a hearing, found that a locked residential placement was
"appropriate," and set an evidentiary hearing six weeks later, over the pro-
tests of Michael's attorney.'
2
While in the locked program, Michael was interviewed by a newspaper
reporter. The reporter described him in the following manner:
Michael has been confined to Lock Towns for more than a year. He
turned 16 inside the pink walls and behind locked metal doors. He
is not allowed out, except to go to court or see a doctor. When he
does leave, Lock Towns' staff puts his legs in shackles to prevent
him from running away .... He is on several powerful drugs, and
he says he has been mistreated and harshly punished. "It feels like
I'm in jail," Michael said. To an untrained eye, Michael does not
appear to be disturbed. He answers questions thoughtfully though
with few words. He likes the Dallas Cowboys and Denver Broncos
and has a teen-ager's awkward shyness. As he sits in his case-
5. See FLA. ADMiN. CODEANN. r. 65E-10.018 (2001).
6. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 94.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at95.
10. FLA. STAT. § 394.451-.4789 (2000). The Act is also known as The Florida
Mental Health Act. See § 394.467.
11. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 95.
12. Id.
2001]
179
: Nova Law Review 25, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Nova Law Review
worker's office, he fidgets with her computer. He downs two orange
sodas and a large bag of potato chips.
13
Michael's story is not an isolated, or even unusual, one. In No One
Ever Asked Us: A Postscript to Foster Care,14 the author reported on an
extensive study on the views of former foster care youth. 15 One of the most
"unsettling and confusing" aspects of a foster child's is the experience of
moving from one foster home to another, or from a foster home to a psychi-
atric hospital, or from a foster home to a temporary shelter.16 The youths
surveyed in the study had no opportunity to be heard before such changes in
placement occurred . Foster children felt bounced around like a "ping-pong
ball," to use their words.1 8 "'There has to be a greater understanding that
one is moving people, not furniture' and 'Children are not objects ... like
merchandise' were common refrains."' 9 No change in placement is more
traumatic to a foster child than the removal from a foster home and an
alternative commitment to a locked psychiatric institution.
The commitment of foster children to long-term, locked psychiatric
institutions is a matter of great importance affecting the privacy and liberty
rights of many foster children in the state's custody. This article will ad-
dress the right of a foster child to procedural due process prior to commit-
ment to a psychiatric institution. First, the article will provide an overview
of the Supreme Court of Florida's holding in M. W. v. Davis20 and the context
of the decision. Second, the article will review the relevant Florida statutes
that govern the psychiatric commitment of a foster child in state custody.
Third, the article will address the foster child's right to privacy under the
Florida Constitution when the state seeks to commit the child to a psychiatric
institution. Fourth, the article will discuss what procedural safeguards
should be set forth in the new rule of court that resulted from the M. W.
decision. Finally, the article will review the therapeutic jurisprudence con-
siderations that were implicated by the M.W. decision, which support greater
13. Sally Kestin, At 16, He's Behind Locked Doors, State as Parent Denies Rights to
Foster Kids, SuN-SFNTnB- (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 7, 1999, at A25.
14. FESTINGER, supra note 1.
15. Id. at 275.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at281.
19. Id. at 275. "Placement in foster care undermines the children's interpersonal
trust, sense of mastery, and control over events within the environment." Wendy Glockner
Kates, et al., Whose Child Is This? Assessment and Treatment of Children in Foster Care, 61
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 584, 585 (Oct. 1991).
20. 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
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procedural due process for children in state custody who face psychiatric
commitment.
I. M.W. V. DAVIS
A. Procedural History of the Litigation
The M. W. decision was the culmination of a two-year battle waged on
behalf of Michael, a seventeen-year-old who spent ten years in the foster
care system. Michael experienced multiple placements during that time after
which he was ordered into the residential treatment program at Lock Towns
Adolescent Care Program, a locked psychiatric facility on the grounds of
South Florida State Hospital,2 1 after a five-minute hearing in the juvenile
court.
Michael and his counsel, members of the University of Miami Children
& Youth Law Clinic,22 appeared at the hearing, but were denied the opportu-
nity to present evidence that he did not meet the criteria under the Baker Act
to be involuntarily placed in such a restrictive setting.23 The trial court set
an evidentiary hearing more than six weeks after his placement.24 Shortly
after his placement in Lock Towns, the Clinic filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the Fourth District Court of Appeal, arguing that the commitment
was illegal because the trial court failed to provide a pre-placement adversar-
ial hearing with findings by clear and convincing evidence that involuntary
commitment was required and that no less restrictive treatment alternative
was available.2 The district court initially agreed, and granted the writ,
holding that Michael's commitment by DCF violated his rights to an adver-
sarial hearing under sections 39.407(4) and 394.467 of the Florida Stat-
utes.2
On DCF's motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc and certification, the
district court withdrew its earlier opinion and denied the child's petition for
habeas corpus relief, holding that no further hearing on Michael's commit-
27
ment was required. The court of appeal denied further rehearing requested
21. Id. at 95 n.12.
22. Counsel was appointed by the dependency court as an attorney ad litem. Id. at 92
n.3.
23. Id. at 95.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. M.W. v. Davis, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2419 (4th Dist. Ct. App., Oct. 27, 1998),
withdrawn on reh'g, 722 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
27. M.W., 722 So. 2d at 969.
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by Michael, but certified to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of great
public importance the following question:
IS A HEARING WHICH COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF SECTIONS 39.407(4) AND 394.467(1), FLORIDA
STATUTES, NECESSARY WHEN A COURT ORDERS THAT A
CHILD BE PLACED IN A RESIDENTIAL FACILITY FOR
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT, WHERE THE CHILD HAS
BEEN COMMITTED TO THE LEGAL CUSTODY OF THE DE-
PARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES AND
THE DEPARTMENT IS SEEKING RESIDENTIAL TREAT-
MENT?
28
The Supreme Court of Florida held that neither the statutory framework
in chapter 39, nor the United States Constitution, requires an evidentiary
hearing that complies with section 394.467(1), before the juvenile court
orders a child in the legal custody of DCF to be placed in a residential
facility for mental health treatment. 29 However, the court stated that "[a]n
order approving the placement of a fifteen-year-old dependent child in a
locked residential facility against the wishes of that child deprives that child
of liberty and requires clear-cut procedures to be followed by the depend-
ency court judge. ' 30 The court directed the Juvenile Court Rules Committee
to develop a rule that above all that affords the child "a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard" before the court orders the child's placement against his
will in a psychiatric institution.31
The court instructed the Juvenile Court Rules Committee to prepare a
proposed rule that will set forth the procedures to be followed by the de-
pendency court that " ive[s] due regard to both the rights of the child and the
child's best interests."
28. M.W. v. Davis, 729 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999). The certified
question prompted the filing of several amicus briefs in the Supreme Court of Florida in the
case of M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 91 (Ha. 2000), including one filed jointly by the ACLU
Foundation of Florida, the Children First Project at Nova Southeastern University Shepard
Broad Law Center, the Advocacy Center for Persons With Disabilities, the National Associa-
tion of Counsel for Children, and others by the Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County's
Juvenile Advocacy Project and the Guardian Ad Litem Program for the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit, reflecting the importance of this litigation to children's, civil rights, and disability
rights advocates throughout the state and nation.
29. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 92.
30. Id. at 107.
31. Id. at 109.
32. Id.
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B. M.W. in Context: Residential Treatment of "Troublesome" Youth
The M. W. litigation was brought against a backdrop of growing skepti-
cism about the effectiveness, necessity, and cost benefit value of residential
treatment of emotionally disturbed or behaviorally disordered children and
adolescents in state care. In recent years, advocates for children and mental
patients have voiced and documented their concerns about the overuse and
misuse of private mental hospitals to institutionalize "trouble-some youth"
diagnosed with relatively mild adolescent disorders such as "conduct disor-
der," "oppositional defiant disorder," and "adolescent adjustment reac-
tion. 33 Many of these youths "do not appear to suffer from anything more
serious than normal developmental changes" associated with adolescence.34
According to Ira M. Schwartz, Dean of the School of Social Work at the
University of Pennsylvania, who has criticized the mental hospitalization of
"oppositional" adolescents, "[t]hese names sound as though they have
diagnostic precision.., but they don't."35  In fact, they include a wide
variety of typical teenage behaviors: running away, aggression, opposition
to parental values and rules, engaging in excessive sexual activity, or serious
antisocial behavior.3 6
Increasingly, in recent years, child welfare, juvenile justice, and mental
health policy experts have come to regard residential treatment as an ineffec-
tive, unnecessary, and expensive solution to these problems, which can
usually be treated through less restrictive, community-based interven-tions
such as therapeutic foster care and family builder programs.37 In Florida,
33. See, e.g., Lois A. Weithom, Note, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth:
An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 773, 788-91 (1988) (noting
that "fewer than one-third of juveniles admitted for in-patient psychiatric treatment were
diagnosed with severe or acute disorders such as psychotic, serious depressive, or organic
disorders as necessary for such admissions").
34. Id. at 789.
35. Nina Darnton, Committed Youth: Why Are So Many Teens Being Locked Up in
Private Mental Hospitals?, NEWSWEEK, July 31, 1989, at 66, 68; see also IRA M. SCHWARTZ,
Rethinking the Best Interests of the Child, in JUSTICE FOR JUVENILEs 131-48 (Lexington
Books 1989) (characterizing unnecessary hospitalization as "being abused at better prices").
36. Darnton, supra note 35, at 68.
37. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL'S
CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN'S MENTAL HFALTH (2001), available at http://www.surgeongeneral
gov/cmh/childreport.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001) (noting the positive evidence favoring
home and community based care for severely emotionally disturbed children in contrast to
traditional forms of institutional care which can have deleterious consequences); see also U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvICES, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL
(1999), available at http:llwww.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter3/sec7.html
(last visited Sept. 8, 2001) (recommending alternatives to institutionalization for the mentally
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this skepticism was fueled by revelations over the years that many children
locked up in long-term treatment facilities are often mistreated, overmedi-
cated, abused, and held longer than therapeutically warranted. Newspapers
throughout Florida for the past decade have published chilling accounts of
children being asphyxiated by "basket hold" physical restraints administered
by staff in psychiatric hospitals to de-escalate aggressive behavior, children
with mild emotional disturbances shackled and overmedicated in facilities
for the acutely disturbed, and children confined in psychiatric wards months
and years after being discharged because DCF has nowhere else to put
them. 8
Nationally, a review of data from several states has indicated that at
least forty percent of children and youth committed to psychiatric institu-
tions are inappropriately placed. 39 Also, studies of the psychiatric commit-
ill, including outpatient treatment, community-based interventions, therapeutic foster and
group home care, and family support programs); GARY B. MELTON, ET AL., No PLACE TO Go:
THE CIvIL COMMITMENT OF MINORS (1998) (recommending that states support family-based
alternatives to inpatient hospitalization of minors, including respite care, as a means of
preserving families and ensuring alternatives to inpatient psychiatric treatment); FLA. COMM'N
ON MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, REPORT OF CHILDREN'S WORKGROUP (2000),
available at http://cmhsa.fmhi.usf.edu/finalreport/children.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2001)
(noting that the shortage of therapeutic foster placements for children with mental health
problems creates a situation where adolescents remain unnecessarily in residential placements
because of the absence of appropriate placements in less restrictive programs); NAT'L COMM'N
ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AGENDA FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES (1991)
(observing that traditional psychotherapy is often unavailable to children in low-income
families, and that even if it is available, it is typically isolated from other health, education,
and social services that these children and their families need).
38. See, e.g., Steve Patterson, Troubled Kids Left in Center Too Long, FLA. TIMES-
UNION, Mar. 12, 2000, at Al; William Cooper, Jr., Alternative to "Basket Hold" Restraint
Demanded State's Limited Options Leave Children in Limbo, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 6,
1998, at 1C; William Cooper, Jr., Mentally Ill Teen's Homicide Haunts Her Father, Workers
Who Restrained Her Placed on Leave, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 26, 1998, at 1B; Candy
Hatcher, Meet Samantha: Her Only Family is the State, PALM BEACH POST, June 12, 1994, at
IA; Karen Samples & Donna Pazdera, Crisis Center to Adjust Plan Keeps Unruly Teens Out
of Unit, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Feb. 8, 1993, at 5B; Mary Brooks, Drug-Treatment
Program is in Trouble with State Again, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 11, 1991 at D3; Carol
Gentry, Child's Death Spurs Inquiry, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 4, 1991, at lB.
39. Weithorn, supra note 33, at 784 n.72 (quoting J. KNrzER, UNCLAIMED CHILDREN:
THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY TO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN NEED OF MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES 46 (1982) (reviewing agency reports from several states)). "'Inappropriate-
ness' was judged on the basis of factors such as whether the children could have been served
as outpatients or in day treatment, and whether the severity of the children's diagnoses
warranted inpatient treatment." Id. Indeed, "'at least 40% of children and youth in state
hospitals could have been treated in less restrictive settings, by the states' own admission."'
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ment of adolescents have shown that "[flewer than one-third of those chil-
dren admitted for inpatient mental health treatment were diagnosed as having
severe or acute mental disorders of the type typically associated with such
admissions (such as psychotic, serious depressive, or organic disorders). '"
Disturbingly, "the rising rates of psychiatric admission of children and
adolescents reflect an increasing use of hospitalization to manage a popula-
tion for whom such intervention is typically inappropriate: 'troublesome'
youth who do not suffer from severe mental disorders.'
Many of the "troublesome" youth who are committed to psychiatric
institutions are children who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected and
placed in state foster care. Indeed:
[A] very large proportion of children in mental hospitals and other
residential treatment facilities are wards of the state .... The GAO
[General Accounting Office] found that half of the youths institu-
tionalized in 'health' facilities in the three states it examined (Flor-
ida, New Jersey, and Wisconsin) were referred by welfare authori-
ties. [citing Residential care: Patterns of child placement in three
states (report No. GAO/PEMD-85-2)] .... Once children are
placed in state custody, a new set of problems emerge. Social ser-
vice placements often are far from children's families and there-
fore, promote an institutional climate. Children find themselves
amid a slow bureaucracy in which they are stuck in restrictive set-
tings for long periods of time without effective recourse.42
Children who are committed to psychiatric institutions remain there
indefinitely. In fact, once hospitalized, juvenile psychiatric 4patients remain
in the institution approximately twice as long as do adults. Additionally,
foster children who are in state custody remain institutionalized longer than
children who are in their parents' custody."4 Indeed, as the United States
Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he absence of an adult who cares deeply for a
child has little effect on the reliability of the initial admission decision, but it
may have some effect on how long a child will remain in the hospital....
MELTON, supra note 37, at 37 (emphasis in original) (citing J. KNrrzER, UNCLAIMED
CHILDREN: THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC REsPONsmrrY To CHILDREN AND ADoLEscENTS IN NnaD
OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES (1982)).
40. Weithorn, supra note 33, at 788.
41. Id. at 773-74.
42. MELTON, supra note 37, at 15-16 (citations omitted).
43. Weithom, supra note 33, at 789.
44. MELTON, supra note 37, at 16.
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For a child without natural parents, we must acknowledge the risk of being
'lost in the shuffle."'
45
Sound policy reasons should prevent a state child welfare agency from
being equated with a parent for the purpose of institutionalizing a child.
"'The importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and
to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the
intimacy of daily association.... "46 A natural parent who makes treatment
decisions is emotionally bonded with the child, observes the child on a
regular basis, and knows the child's history. By contrast, as a foster child
navigates the child's journey through state custody, the child interacts with a
long series of state agents-social workers, shelter staff, foster parents, etc.
Unlike a parent, a state agency granted temporary legal custody of a child
does not form an emotional attachment with a child and does not achieve
"the intimacy of daily association.
'A7
In recent years, literally hundreds of foster children in Florida placed in
residential treatment centers by the state have been "lost in the shuffle.
4
45. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 619 (1979) (holding that the child's Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests are not violated when a parent or the state commits a child to a
psychiatric facility without a formal due process hearing, but requiring independent review of
the child's condition after commitment to the facility as a necessary check against possible
arbitrariness in the initial admission decision).
46. In re E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 973 (1995) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
844 (1977)).
47. As Gary B. Melton and his collaborators, in their examination of the legal
framework and policy relating to the commitment of minors to residential treatment, observe:
Mhe notion of identical interests between foster child and state guardian is non-
sensical. With the turnover in state social workers, large caseloads, and, most im-
portantly, lack of family ties, the contention that guardians can and will protect the
interests of their wards in the same manner as watchful parents defies common
sense .... Also, because state social workers are part of the very bureaucracy that
is responsible for the administration or regulation of residential treatment facilities,
they may have little discretion in monitoring the welfare of their wards placed
within them .... At a minimum, state social workers are apt to have the appear-
ance of a conflict of interest. Therefore, rejection of the myth of 'voluntary'
placement of children is especially important when the admitting 'parent' is the
state guardian.
MELTON, supra note 37, at 157-58.
48. According to DCF, approximately 800 children were admitted to residential
treatment centers or therapeutic group homes during fiscal year 1997-1998 for the purpose of
receiving treatment for emotional disturbance. SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC
IMPACT STATEENT, CS/SB 682 (2000). The agency also reported that during fiscal year
1998-1999, there were 411 residential placements of children and 877 other placements in
therapeutic group homes funded through the DCF children's mental health budget. Id.
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The South Florida Sun-Sentinel in a series of articles examining Florida's
practice of warehousing these children in private residential treatment
programs reported:
In Florida, some children have been sent to locked
treatment centers simply because the state has no place else to put
them .... Once confined, some children have spent years in treat-
ment centers because of the state's perennial lack of foster homes.
The average length of stay in a treatment centers statewide is nine
months. But in some parts of the state, it is much higher: sixteen
months in Gainesville for instance, and two years in Tampa.
49
Erroneous placement in a residential treatment facility can have an
extremely harmful and traumatic impact on a child:
A recent review of psychological research concluded that
certain degrees of freedom of movement, association, and commu-
nication are critical to the psychological well-being of children and
adolescents. Mental hospitalization may entail substantial periods
of isolation, particularly in the case of recalcitrant children and
adolescents, and may be characterized by involuntary admini-
stration of heavy doses of psychotropic medication (that is, medica-
tion used to alter psychological functioning), invasions of privacy,
and social pressure to conform behavior to certain norms....
Certain aspects of mental hospitalization can be extremely
frightening for some children. Children who are not seriously emo-
tionally disturbed may be greatly upset by exposure to children
who are. In addition to the possible assault on one's psychological
well-being, an involuntary hospitalization may be harmful to one's
physical health....'50
Moreover, children erroneously committed to mental hospitals often experi-
ence behavioral deterioration because "[t]he psychiatric hospital can also be
a place to learn some previously unconsidered behaviors, such as suicide
attempts." 51
49. Sally Kestin, No Place Else to Go Florida Has Never Measured the Effectiveness
of Treatment Centers for Troubled Children, SuN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 8, 1999, at
IA.
50. Weithom, supra note 33, at 797 (footnotes omitted) (citing MELTON, ET AL., No
PLACETO GO: THE CIVILCOMMrIMENT OF MINORS (1998)).
5 1. Gerald P. Koocher, M.D., Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Child-
ren's Rights, 16 NOVA L. REv. 711,723 (1992). Moreover, "[tihe stigma of a history of [psy-
chiatric] institutional placement also is well-known. The effects on youth who are on the
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Furthermore, many children are abused in psychiatric institutions. The
abusive treatment to which Florida's foster children have often been sub-
jected in psychiatric facilities throughout this state has long been docu-
52
mented. One instance of children being abused in psychiatric institutions
was brought to light by Broward County Court Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren
and substantiated by the DCF Inspector General.53
In March of 1999, during a visit to the Brown Schools of Florida, a
thirty-bed residential facility for emotionally disturbed children in Sunrise,
Florida, Judge Lerner-Wren witnessed a staff member twisting the arm of a
fourteen-year-old pregnant patient in the program.54 Alarmed by what she
had witnessed and by other accounts of abuses and overmedication of chil-
dren in the program, Judge Lerner-Wren scheduled hearings for all children
at the Brown Schools under her jurisdiction, citing "'significant safety
concerns"' about their treatment. 55 The heightened judicial scrutiny of the
children in the facility, and resulting media coverage, prompted the Secretary
of DCF, Kathleen Kearney, to send in teams of experts from Tallahassee
program offices to investigate allegations of improper restraint in the facil-
ity.
DCF's Inspector General launched a separate investigation of the
program. Its August 1999 report found that the majority of the children could
be treated on an outpatient basis in less restrictive, non-residential settings,
with quality case management, wrap-around treatment and support.57 Over
half of the children in the program had been improperly admitted. At least
one quarter did not have a diagnosed major mental illness. The report was
verge of applying for jobs, seeking insurance, and so forth may be especially pernicious."
MELTON, supra note 37, at 47 (citations omitted).
52. See generally newspaper articles, supra note 38.
53. See Shana Gruskin, State: Restraints Overused on Youths, Brown Schools
Monitoring Flawed, SuN-SENTNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 17, 1999, at 4B.
54. See Sally Kestin, State Team to Review Youth Center Restraints, Brown Schools
Monitoring Flawed, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Mar. 25, 1999, at 1A.
55. Id.
56. Id. Concerns about the injuries and even deaths suffered by children in psychiat-
ric hospitals because of the excessive use of force by hospital staff while physically restraining
them are by no means confined to Florida. See, e.g., Blint & Poitras, Boy, 11, Crushed
During Restraint: Aides at Psychiatric Facility Put on Leave During Probe, HARTFORD
COuRANT, Mar. 24, 1998, at Al.
57. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, INTERNAL AuDrr, MANAGEmENT REVIEW OF
TmE BROWN SCHOOLS OF FLORIDA, INC. (covering July 1, 1998 through April 1, 1999) (finding
violations of DCF administrative protocols for the placement of emotionally disturbed
children in residential treatment; no multi-disciplinary eligibility assessments for many
children admitted to the facility; improper uses of chemical and physical restraints; and
incomplete abuse and neglect incident reports); see also Gruskin, supra note 53, at 4B.
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especially critical of the "serious shortage of this level non-residential inten-
sive, individualized mental health treatment" programs for DCF children in
Broward 8
The lack of available placements for emotionally disturbed children in
Broward County, and the "abusive practice" of housing these children at
"assessment centers," without providing them necessary mental health treat-
ment or medical services, was the subject of a separate round of news arti-
cles in Broward and court hearings before Judge Lerner-Wren
5 9
C. Sun-Sentinel Series: "Throwaway Kids"
The most disturbing revelations about conditions in children's psychiat-
ric facilities in Florida came to light in November of 1999, when the South
Florida Sun-Sentinel published a seventeen-part investigative series on the
state's practice of locking up children in costly psychiatric institutions where
many did not belong, where many languished months and years after com-
pleting treatment, and where care and treatment provided to children con-
fined in these institutions was often of dubious value.0 The series graphi-
cally documented the treatment (or maltreatment) provided to the more than
500 children "too troubled for foster care... grow[ing] up in institutions,"
costing taxpayers up to $109,500 a year per child, often subjected to physical
and sexual abuse, overmedication, and the imprl er use of physical re-
straints, resulting in serious injuries and even death.
The series reported the children were sent to these residential treatment
centers which operate with lax or no oversight or regulation from govern-
ment agencies such as DCF and the Agency for Health Care Administra-
58. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 57, at 4.
59. See Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. I.C., 742 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (affirming juvenile court order for in camera production of records of emotionally
disturbed children housed at DCF "assessment center" pending their placement by DCF in
appropriate therapeutic settings); see also Shana Gruskin, Judges' Role in DCF Clarified:
Appeals Court Ruling Pleases Both Sides, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 2 1999, at
lB. The chronic shortages of suitable therapeutic placements for children in the legal custody
of the Department of Children and Families has been the subject of a long-pending statewide
class action lawsuit against state officials in Florida. Third Amended Complaint for Declara-
tory and Injunctive Relief, M.E. v. Bush, No. 90-1008-Civ-Moore (S.D. Fla. 1997).
60. See Sally Kestin, Throwaway Kids, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 6-9,
1999, available at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/specials/throwawaykids.
61. See Sally Kestin, Too Troubled for Foster Care, Kids Grow Up in Institutions,
SuN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 6, 1999, at IA.
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62tion. It cited reports by the state showing that at least one quarter of the
children placed in these programs did not belong there, but were confined in
these facilities because the state had nowhere else to place them.63 It chroni-
cled cases of parents relinquishing custody of children to the foster care
system in order to access needed, but costly, mental health treatment, and
then unable to reclaim custody of their children from that very system after
becoming frustrated with the abuses suffered by their children in that resi-
dential care.64 The effectiveness of treatment, utilizing rigid and often
punitive behavior modification techniques and other controls, also was
called into question. 65  Additionally, the series reported that numerous
children had been subjected to overuse of physical restraints, seclusion,
illegal communication restrictions, and overmedication with psychotropic
drugs, and that many of the children had also been victims of emotional,66physical, and sexual abuse while locked up in the institutions. Children
were placed in the care of poorly trained, poorly educated staff who some-
times abused them. 67 The articles disclosed at least fifty-five cases of chil-
dren abused or neglected by staff in these institutions over the preceding
68three years.
Finally, spurred by the revelations in the Sun-Sentinel series, DCF
responded to the serious concerns of these children and sent teams of inspec-
tors to eight treatment centers. 69 DCF terminated its $1.4 million annual
62. Sally Kestin, Children's Centers Lack Oversight, Treatment Facilities Operate
with Few Regulations and with Little Monitoring by State or Federal Governments, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 9, 1999 at IA.
63. Kestin, supra note 49.
64. Sally Kestin, Parents Helpless After State Assumes Custody, StN-SENTIN.L (Ft.
Lauderdale), Nov. 6, 1999, at 1A. This predicament has challenged parents of mentally ill
children across the nation. For at least the past two decades, parents in many states, including
Florida, have been confronted with the dilemma of giving up custody of children to the child
welfare or juvenile justice system in order to obtain publicly funded treatment for their
children's mental health problems. See generally BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH
LAw, RELINQUISHING CUSTODY: THE TRAGIC RESULT OF FAILURE TO MEET CHILDREN'S
MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS (Mar. 2000).
65. Sally Kestin, Treatment's Results Hard to Gauge Lacking Standards, the State is
Unable to Judge the Effectiveness of Children's Therapy in Psychiatric Centers, SUN-
SE24TIEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 8, 1999, at 19A; Sally Kestin, The Rules Are Strict, the
Punishment Swift and Stiff, Experts Disagree on Whether Some Centers' Rigid Structure
Benefits Children or Hurts Them, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 8, 1999, at 19A.
66. Sally Kestin, Environment Sometimes Leads to Abuse Investigations Lack Depth,
Children's Input, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 9, 1999, at 6A.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Sally Kestin, State Goes After Youth Centers Crackdown Aimed at Halting Abuse,
Neglect, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 18, 2000, at 13A.
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contract with Lock Towns, which housed Matthew for almost two years.
7°
The agency found that staff used excessive force in restraining children and
the staff gave powerful medications to control their behavior but did not
monitor these children for side effects.71 DCF also found Lock Towns did
not provide youths with individual therapy and unlicensed, unqualified
workers were conducting most group therapy sessions.72 According to the
chief of mental health services for DCF in Miami-Dade County, "[w]hat
stopped me in my tracks was there was no therapist on staff [at Lock Towns]
since February.... These are some of our sickest kids. That is just unac-
ceptable.
,73
D. The New Legislation
In response to the Sun-Sentinel Throwaway Kids series' revelations
about the many abuses of children in residential treatment centers, Democrat
Senator Howard Forman, of Pembroke Pines, co-sponsored legislation in the
2000 session.74 The legislation is designed to provide greater legal protec-
tion for children inappropriately admitted to or held in psychiatric facili-
ties. 7
5
Addressing the Sun-Sentinel's concerns about lax regulation of residen-
tial programs by state agencies, the new legislation requires children's resi-
dential treatment centers to be licensed and regulated by the Agency for
Health Care Administration ("AHCA"). 76 The legislation also directs DCF,
in consultation with AHCA, to issue rules governing residential treatment
centers for children and adolescents which specify licensure standards for a
number of the problems identified in the series."7 These include: admission,
length of stay, program and staffing, discharge and discharge planning, treat-
ment planning, seclusion, restraints, time-outs, rights of patients under
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The children in the Lock Towns program were moved to different facilities
throughout South Florida. Id. Fourteen were transferred to a facility on the grounds of South
Florida State Hospital, operated by Citrus Health Network, in a building described by the DCF
mental health chief as "much nicer." Id.
74. CS/SB 682 (Fla. 2000); HB 2347 (Fla. 2000).
75. Sally Kestin, Bill Would Add Legal Protection for Kids, SUN-SETINEi. (Ft.
Lauderdale), Nov. 29, 1999, at lB.
76. FLA. STAT. § 394.4785 (2000).
77. § 394.875(10).
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section 394.459 of the Florida Statutes, use of psychotropic medications,
and standards for the operation of such centers.78
The bill also amended portions of chapters 39 and 394 by requiring
guardians ad litem to represent children and to have a suitability examination
and assessment conducted by a "qualified evaluator" appointed by the
Agency for Health Care Administration before being placed in residential
treatment centers.79
The legislation, which took effect October 1, 2000, provides procedural
safeguards for children, after their placement in the facilities by DCF, to
ensure they are not institutionalized for lengthy periods of time without
judicial oversight. It requires DCF to notify the court and the child's guard-
ian, "[i]mmediately upon placing a child in a residential treatment program,"
that the child has been placed in a facility. 80 The residential treatment
program must report monthly to DCF and the guardian on the child's pro-
gress and DCF must submit monthly status reports to the juvenile court.81
The legislation further provides a court hearing shall take place no later than
three months after the child's placement in the program, that includes a
clinical review by a qualified evaluator addressing the need for continued
residential placement. Further, judicial reviews must be conducted every
78. Id. Proposed rule 65E-9 of the Florida Administrative Code Annotated, govern-
ing licensure of children's residential treatment centers, was published in 27 Fla. Adin.
Weekly 8 (Feb. 23, 2001), but advocates have criticized the limited public notice and com-
ment opportunities afforded by DCF, in violation of section 120.54(2)(c) of the Florida
Statutes. Letter from Brent R. Taylor, Policy Director, Advocacy Center for Persons with
Disabilities, to Jim Poindexter, Operations and Management Consultant, Department of
Children and Families (Feb. 26, 2001).
79. See FLA. STAT. § 39.407(5), (5)(c) (2000). "Suitability for residential treatment"
means that the qualified evaluator has found that: 1) the child appears to have an emotional
disturbance serious enough to require residential treatment and is reasonably likely to benefit
from treatment; 2) the child has been provided a clinically appropriate explanation of the
nature and purpose of treatment; and 3) all less restrictive modalities of treatment have been
considered, and a less restrictive alternative offering comparable benefits to the child is
unavailable. § 39.407(5)(a)3.
These standards, which allocate to the "qualified evaluator" the principal role in
determining a child's suitability for placement in a residential setting, appear to be derived
from Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979). In Parham, the Court noted that the ques-
tions of whether to have a child institutionalized for mental health care "are essentially medi-
cal in character," that provision of a "neutral [non-judicial] factfinder" adequately protects
against erroneous admission, and that judicial review does not heighten the reliability and
validity of the psychiatric diagnosis. Id. at 607.
80. FLA. STAT. § 39.407(5)(d) (2000).
81. § 39.407(5)(f)-(g).
82. § 39.4 07(5)(g)(2).
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ninety days after the initial three-month review by the juvenile court.8 3
Additionally, the court may order the child be placed in a less restrictive
setting any time the court determines the child is not "suitable" for continued
residential placement .8
The legislation is notably silent on whether pre-commitment adversarial
hearings are required, although the statute permits DCF to involuntarily
examine or place the child in a residential treatment setting pursuant to
section 394.463 or section 394.467 of the Baker Act.85 The statute, while
mandating the appointment of a guardian ad litem, is also silent on whether
appointed legal counsel for the child is required. 86 The pre-commitment
hearing procedures and the requirements of appointed counsel are the sub-
jects of a proposed rule of Juvenile Procedure, which the Supreme Court of
87Florida is currently considering in the aftermath of the M. W. decision.
III. THE FLORIDA STATUTES
The statutes at issue in M.W. v. Davis were sections 39.407(4) and
394.467 of the 1998 Florida Statutes. At the time of Michael's commitment
to the locked program, section 39.407(4) provided that, "if it is necessary to
83. § 39.407(5)(h).
84. § 39.407(5)(g)(4).
85. § 39.407(5). The legislation's focus on the post-commitment procedures concern-
ing a child's suitability for residential placement, rather than pre-commitment procedures, was
due in part to the legislature's awareness that the pre-commitment procedures were the subject
of the M.W. case, then pending before the Supreme Court of Florida. See SENATE STAFF,
supra note 48. Ironically, the supreme court's decision in M.W. issued on May 4, 2000, the
day before the Senate vote on SB 682, noted that "legislation is pending that would explicitly
set forth certain procedures to be used before a child who has been adjudicated dependant may
be placed in a residential psychiatric facility. The amendment of section 39.407 would be an
important step in specifying what steps are required to be taken before a child may be placed
in residential treatment." M.W., 756 So. 2d at 107 n.34 (citations omitted). This stand-off
between the legislature and the judiciary inevitably forced the original purpose of the law,
namely to establish court hearings before the child's placement in order to avoid an erroneous
commitment to a residential facility, to fall into the cracks.
86. Cf. FA. STAT. § 39.4085(20) (2000) (establishing as a goal for children in shelter
and foster care that "a guardian ad litem [should be] appointed to represent, within reason,
their best interests and, where appropriate, an attorney ad litem [should be] appointed to
represent their legal interests").
87. See In re Amendment to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Case No. SCOO-2044,
Placement of Child in Residential Mental Health Treatment Facility (noting that when
originally filed, SB 682 required a court hearing before placement of a child in a residential
treatment facility; but this provision was "affirmatively removed" by the legislature and
replaced with the "extensive process" of evaluations, reports and reviews, due process
safeguards similar to those in Parham).
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place the child in a residential facility for such [mental health] services, the
procedures and criteria established in s. 394.467 or chapter 393 shall be
used. . .. "88 This statute cross-referenced section 394.467, commonly
known as the "Baker Act," which provides that before a person may be
involuntarily placed for psychiatric treatment, there must be a finding by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the person is mentally ill, cannot care
for himself, or is likely to "inflict bodily harm," and that a less restrictive
setting cannot provide the necessary treatment for the patient.8 9
Prior to M.W., several Florida district courts of appeal had unanimously
ruled a court could not commit a child in state custody through delinquency
proceedings to a psychiatric institution without following the Baker Act's
procedures. 90 In addition, in a case where the child's parent appeared to
oppose the child's commitment, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal
had ruled that the child could not be committed unless the requirements of
the Baker Act were met.9'
Moreover, in L.W., the Fourth District held that the court could not
order a dependent child in the DCF's legal custody to be placed in a thera-
88. FLA. STAT. § 39.407(4) (2000).
89. Chapter 394 also specifically references the involuntary placement provisions of
section 394.467 of the Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 394.490-.4985 ("Comprehensive
Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services" ). Section 394.492(6) of the Florida Statutes
defines a child or adolescent who has a serious emotional disturbance or mental illness as
including a child or adolescent who meets the criteria for involuntary placement under section
394.467(1). See also FLA. STAT. § 394.492(5) (defining "'a child or adolescent who has an
emotional disturbance"' as not including "a child or adolescent who meets the criteria for
involuntary placement under s. 394.467(1)").
90. See Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. A.E., 667 So. 2d 429, 429 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1996) (directing that proceedings to commit a child to a mental health facility be
commenced under FLA. STAT. §§ 39.046, 394.467, and 393.11), T.L. v. State, 670 So. 2d 172,
174 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "chapter 39 specifically cross-references
chapter 394 in providing that if it is necessary to place a child in a residential facility for
mental health services, the procedures and criteria established in chapter 394 shall be used");
Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. State, 655 So. 2d 227, 228 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(declaring that it was error for the trial court to order the child committed to an interim long-
term residential mental health placement without following the procedures of the Baker Act);
see also State ex rel Smith v. Brummer, 426 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1982) (indicating that while the
Public Defender's Office was authorized to represent a child in a chapter 394 involuntary
commitment proceeding, the Public Defender's Office could not file a class action on behalf
of all children similarly situated).
91. In re L.A., 530 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing the trial
court's commitment of a child to a mental health hospital because the involuntary commitment
criteria of section 394.467(l)(a)2.a. and 394.467(l)(b) were not met).
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peutic facility without following the provisions in the Baker Act.92 Ironi-
cally, in L.W., it was DCF that objected to the order of placement and ap-
pealed the court's order, arguing that the Baker Act involuntary placement
procedures apply to children in both shelter and foster care.93 DCF objected
to the court order not on the basis of any articulated interest in the child's
well-being or needs, but on the basis of a "lack of financial funding."
94
In Michael's case, a lack of resources, namely a sufficient array of
therapeutic foster homes, was the guiding reason that DCF placed him in a
locked psychiatric facility.95 Unlike L.W., in M.W., the Fourth District was
presented with a case where DCF placed a foster child in a psychiatric
facility, but it was the child who objected. The Fourth District ruled that this
was a "voluntary" placement that did not require the Baker Act, since the
child was in the Department's legal custody and the Department placed him.
In reviewing the Fourth District's decision in M.W., the Supreme Court
of Florida did not hold that Michael's commitment was a "voluntary" place-
ment. Instead, the court ruled that since section 39.407(4) of the Florida
Statutes referenced children in the "physical custody" of DCF, it did not
apply to children in DCF's legal custody.96 Thus, the Supreme Court of
Florida rejected the Fourth District's holdings in both LW. and M.W. that the
statute applied to children in both the agency's physical and legal custody.
During the pendency of the M. W. litigation, the legislature replaced the term
"physical custody" in section 39.407(4) with the phrase "out-of-home
care., 97 Michael argued this amendment clarified the provision applied to
all children who are in out of home care, including those children who are in
the legal custody of DCF. However, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected
this argument and ruled this statute did not apply to foster children in DCF
legal custody.98
As noted above, during the 2000 session the legislature further amended
section 39.407 of the Florida Statutes to require a "suitability examination
and assessment" conducted by a "qualified evaluator" for any child that DCF
92. In re L.W., 615 So. 2d 834, 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing and
remanding the trial court's commitment of a dependent child to residential treatment because
the court failed to follow the provisions of sections 39.407(4) and 394.467(1)).
93. Id. at 836.
94. Id.
95. DCF, in its briefs to the Supreme Court of Florida in M.W., acknowledged that its
decision to institutionalize a child in a psychiatric facility involves not only "a best interest of
the child calculus" but also "budgetary and availability constraints," an especially disturbing
position to take in view of the needs of children for a continuum of care irrespective of the
budgetary constraints.
96. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 109 (2000).
97. See H.B. 2347 (Fla. 2000).
98. Id. at 109.
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seeks to place in a residential facility, in addition to other procedures.
Although the court held that neither the statutory framework nor the Four-
teenth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the child's com-
mitment, in directing the Juvenile Court Rules Committee to develop proce-
dures for commitment that afford the child a "meaningful opportunity to be
heard," the Committee had to consider both the Supreme Court of Florida's
ruling in M.W. v. Davis and the recent amendment to section 39.407 of the
2000 Florida Statutes. Additionally, the priVacy interests of the child, under
the Florida Constitution is a consideration in the promulgation of the proce-
dural rule, if the child is to have a truly "meaningful opportunity to be heard"
prior to the loss of his liberty.9
IV. A MINOR' S RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
In M.W., the Supreme Court of Florida declined to address a child's
right to privacy under the Florida Constitution, but such a right should be
taken into account by the court in adopting a rule of court that governs a
foster child's commitment to a residential facility. Florida's citizens chose
in 1980 to include an explicit right to privacy in the state constitution guar-
anteeing that "every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
government intrusion into his private life."' 0° As the Supreme Court of
Florida has stated, minors are "persons" in the eyes of the law, and
"[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults .... possess constitutional rights."
10
'
In In re T. W., the Supreme Court of Florida first established that minors
have the right to privacy under the Florida Constitution and that this privacy• 102
right extends to medical procedures. Additionally, the court has extended
the right to choose or reject medical treatment, under the Constitution's
guarantee of a right to privacy, to incompetent or incapacitated persons,
99. Id.
100. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. "'Privacy' has been used interchangeably with the
common understanding of the notion of 'liberty,' and both imply a fundamental right of self-
determination subject only to the state's compelling and overriding interest." In re Guardian-
ship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9-10 (Fla. 1990).
101. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
102. Id. (holding that the right to privacy under the Florida Constitution encompasses a
minor's right to consent to an abortion without first obtaining parental consent or court
authorization); see also Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994) (indicating that a minor's
privacy right extends to other medical and surgical procedures besides abortion, and to the
"conduct of others," including the state).
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because "the right of privacy would be an empty right were it not to extend
to competent and incompetent persons alike.
' 1t 3
In T.W., the court ruled that the child's right to privacy included her
own decision as to whether to terminate her pregnancy.104 Thus, the minor
obtained the right to make the decision about whether to have a medical
procedure that affects her body. 105 Michael and other foster youth have not
sought the decision-making autonomy that the Supreme Court of Florida
accorded to T.W. under the Florida Constitution's privacy clause. Indeed,
foster children like Michael do not seek to make the decision as to whether
they will be committed to a psychiatric institution. Rather, these children
seek meaningful due process before their privacy is invaded by institution-
alization at locked psychiatric facilities where their bodies are forcibly and
involuntarily subjected to four-point restraints, seclusion, and psychotropic
medications.
In Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering,10 6 the Supreme Court
of Florida first established the appropriate test to be applied when the right
to privacy is implicated:
The right to privacy is a fundamental right which we believe de-
mands the compelling state interest standard. This test shifts the
burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy. The
burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged regulation
serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through
the use of the least intrusive means.
10 7
In reviewing the state's intrusion on a minor's fundamental right to privacy,
the supreme court applied the Winfield test.108 With regard to the first prong
of the test, the court reiterated that the burden is on the state to prove that it
has a compelling, not merely significant, state interest before the state can
impinge on a minor's privacy right:
We agree that the state's interests in protecting minors and
in preserving family unity are worthy objectives. Unlike the fed-
103. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12 & n.9 (defining "incompetent"
and "incapacitated" persons, to whom the right of privacy extends, as "those individuals
unable to make medical decisions on their own behalf' and holding that the constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment is not lost or diminished by virtue of mental incapacity or
incompetence); see also J.F.K. Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
104. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1189.
105. Id.
106. Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
107. Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
108. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193.
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eral Constitution, however, which allows intrusion based on a "sig-
nificant" state interest, the Florida Constitution requires a "compel-
ling" state interest in all cases where the right to privacy is impli-
cated.1
0 9
The court acknowledged that, where minors are concerned, the State
has worthy interests in protection of the immature minor and in preservation
of the family unit. However, the court specifically held that "neither of these
interests is sufficiently compelling under Florida law to override Florida's
privacy amendment."1 0 In the context of psychiatric treatment, although the
state similarly has an interest in protecting foster children because they are
minors, the Supreme Court of Florida has already established the state's
interest in protecting minors is not sufficiently compelling to override the
minor's constitutional right to privacy.
Even if the state had a compelling interest that outweighed the minor's
privacy right, it cannot commit a minor in its custody to a long-term, locked
psychiatric institution without providing the minor due process, because the
state must accomplish its objective through use of the least intrusive means,
which is the second prong of the Winfield test."' In reviewing the state's
intrusion on a minor's right to privacy, and the means of furthering the
state's interest, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that "[a]ny inquiry
under this prong must consider procedural safeguards relative to the intru-
sion."
' 112
In the M. W. litigation, DCF contended that it could commit a minor in
its custody to a long-term, locked psychiatric institution, subject only to the
judicial review provisions of chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes."3 However,
109. Id. at 1195 (quoting Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547 ). The court in T.W. noted that
an unemancipated minor could give consent to any medical procedure pertaining to her
pregnancy or care for her unborn child, pursuant to section 743.065 of the Florida Statutes,
regardless of its intrusiveness or potential danger. Id. However, the same unemancipated
minor was prohibited from giving consent for an abortion under the challenged 1988 statute,
section 390.001(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes. Id.
110. In re T.W., 551So. 2dat 1194.
111. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
112. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1195-96; see also Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d
1099, 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that when the right of privacy is involved,
"the means to carry out such a compelling state interest must be narrowly tailored in the least
intrusive manner possible to safeguard the rights of the individual").
113. FLA. STAT. § 39.701 (2000). The court has continuing jurisdiction to periodically
review the status of the dependent child, including the progress being made to place the child
for adoption, the status of independent living services being provided to an adolescent child,
the financial support given to the child by the child's natural parents, and the compliance of
the parties with their tasks in the case plan, among other items. Id.; see also In re L.W., 615
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these provisions are not sufficient to authorize the child's commitment to a
psychiatric institution against the child's will, as they do not mandate notice
to the child, an opportunity for the child to be heard, or the appointment of
counsel if the child contests his commitment. Indeed, as the supreme court
noted:
Considering the statutory framework of Chapter 39 and the ongo-
ing judicial review once a child is adjudicated dependent, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the Legislature would require different
procedures to apply when the Department takes the extraordinary
step of requesting the court to order residential mental health
treatment for a child who is not yet in its temporary legal custody
versus a child who has been adjudicated dependent and placed in
the Department's legal custody.
1 14
Thus, these provisions are constitutionally inadequate to withstand the test
established by the Supreme Court of Florida when the fundamental rights
implicated here are at stake because they contain no procedural safe-
guards."
5
In formulating a procedural rule that provides a dependent child a
"meaningful opportunity to be heard" prior to commitment, the court must
provide safeguards that, at a minimum, assure the child notice, the appoint-
ment of counsel, a pre-placement hearing, the opportunity to be present at
the hearing, and to present and rebut evidence.
In the M.W. decision, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that one of
the purposes of chapter 39 is "[t]o provide judicial and other procedures to
assure due process through which children... are assured fair hearings by
a... respected court... and enforcement of their constitutional and other
legal rights ... .,,16 The court observed that although there are abundant
procedures concerning other aspects of treatment and care for children in the
dependency system, no statute or rule specifically set forth procedures that
DCF and the court must follow to place a child in a residential facility for
mental health treatment. 7 The court noted:
So. 2d 834 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (purpose of judicial review is to assure that the state
is making reasonable efforts to promote adoptive placement or return the child to the family
unit).
114. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 105 (Fla. 2000).
115. See Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 544.
116. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 106 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)() (2000)).
117. Id. at 106.
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[N]either Chapter 39 nor our own procedural rules adequately ad-
dress whether an attorney for the child should be appointed before
a commitment to a residential facility takes place, what type of
hearing is required, what standard of proof should apply and
whether the child should have the right to put on evidence before
the court orders a placement in a residential psychiatric facility. "
8
Moreover, because the amendment to section 39.407 is insufficient to
ensure what type of hearing is required, what standard of proof should apply
and whether the child should have the right to put on evidence before the
court orders a placement in a residential treatment facility, it is especially
critical that the rule adopted by the court afford children with safeguards that
protect the privacy interests under the Florida Constitution.
V. THE RULE OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE
Although the court in M. W. did not reach the constitutional question
under Florida's right to privacy clause, it did hold that there must be proce-
dural safeguards that give the child a meaningful opportunity to be heard. It
urged the Juvenile Court Rules Committee to consider a proposed rule
submitted by the Guardian ad Litem program amicus, to look at rules in
other jurisdictions and in particular the New Jersey procedural rules address-
ing this issue." 9 In essence, then, in formulating an appropriate procedural
118. Id. at 106-07 (internal footnotes omitted).
119. While New Jersey was the one state identified by the court, it should be noted that
several other states' supreme courts have already considered the constitutional rights of
minors facing psychiatric commitment and have granted minors due process protections,
greater than those afforded to minors under the Fourteenth Amendment, consistent with their
state constitutions. See, e.g., Washington ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hosp., 918 P.2d 497
(Wash. 1996) (granting a fifteen-year-old mentally ill minor's petition for writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the involuntary incarceration of the minor in a mental hospital
against her will violated Washington state law and the minor's constitutional right to liberty);
In re N.N., 679 A.2d 1174 (N.J. 1996) (holding that even though the state has an interest in
ensuring the mental .health of its children, that interest is not sufficiently compelling to justify
infringement upon a child's due process and liberty rights and ruling that a minor who is in
need of intensive institutional psychiatric therapy may not be committed without a finding
based on clear and convincing evidence that the minor without such care is a danger to others
or self); In re P.F. v. Walsh, 648 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982) (holding that a minor has a substan-
tial and protectable liberty interest in being free from the physical restraints attendant to
commitment in a psychiatric hospital); In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286 (Cal. 1977) (holding
that no interest of the state sufficiently outweighs the liberty interest of a mature minor (over
age 14) to independently exercise his right to due process in a comnitment to a mental
hospital).
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rule, the Supreme Court of Florida is considering the "procedural safeguards
relative to the intrusion."1
There are four main procedural safeguards at issue: 1) the right to
notice and to be heard; 2) the right to an attorney; 3) the right to a pre-
placement court hearing; and 4) the right to present evidence and to have a
burden of proof met.
The Juvenile Court Rules Committee drafted proposed Rule 8.350,
Placement of Child Into Residential Treatment Center After Adjudication of
Dependency, attempting to give consideration both to the court's directives
in M.W. v. Davis and the recent amendments to section 39.407 of the Florida
Statutes. 21 The proposed rule, approved by a vote of 18-7-0 (and by the
Florida Bar Board of Governors, 8-3) unfortunately failed to mandate coun-
sel, require a pre-placement hearing, define the standard of proof or spell
out what evidence, if any, the child could present at the hearing.122 It also
failed to consider amending rule 8.140(c), governing case plan modification,
as directed by the court. 123
The Committee's proposed rule required notification to the parties of
the child's placement in a residential treatment center, including the written
findings of the qualified evaluator, within seventy-two hours of placement;
the appointment of a guardian ad litem and/or represention by counsel; the
submission of a report by the guardian within fourteen days of placement,
including a recommendation regarding placement and a statement of the
child's wishes; discretionary appointment of counsel by the court upon
notification of the child's placement; the setting of a "status hearing" requir-
ing the presence of the guardian and/or attorney (but not the child) within
five working days after placement; and a directive to the guardian and/or
attorney to attempt to ascertain whether the child consents to placement.'1
4
The rule additionally set out procedures for an initial placement review, to
be set upon motion of any party or if the guardian's report indicates the child
objects to placement within the time requested by the moving party or within
fourteen days of the filing of the motion or the GAL report.
120. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1195-96. In formulating juvenile court rules, the
Supreme Court of Florida has stated, "[w]e have the authority to establish proper procedures
for juvenile proceedings to implement constitutional rights." R.J.A. v. Foster, 603 So. 2d
1167, 1171 (Fla. 1992) (holding that juvenile rule of procedure regarding a time period took
precedence over the legislative enactment).
121. The full text of the proposed rule is available at http://www.flcourts.org/sctl
sctdocs/proposed.html (last visited May 30, 2001).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Under the proposed rule, the placement hearing considers the follow-
ing: based on an independent assessment of the child, the recommendation
by DCF that residential treatment is in the child's best interest and that it is
the least restrictive alternative available; the GAL's recommendation; the
recommendation of the multidisciplinary case review committee, if any;
written findings of the evaluation and suitability assessment prepared by a
qualified evaluator.'2 Any party can present evidence concerning "suitabil-
ity of placement" at this hearing. The court is required to order DCF to
place the child in a less restrictive setting best suited to the child's needs if
the court determines that the child is not suitable for continued placement.12 7
Finally, the proposed rule, tracking recently enacted section 39.407(5)
of the Florida Statutes, requires an initial review hearing within three
months of admission, and continuing review hearing every three months
thereafter, until the child is placed in a less restrictive setting. The child
must be present at all hearings except the initial five day status hearing.1
21
The two issues that generated the most discussion in both the plenary
Committee and a Dependency Subcommittee were whether a pre-placement
court hearing was required and whether the appointment of counsel should
be mandated for every dependent child recommended for placement in a
residential facility.129 The disagreement over the appointment of counsel in
turn prompted a sharply worded Minority Report, which resulted from close
and conflicting votes on a draft of the proposed rule that read as follows:
"Upon notification that a child has been placed into a residential treatment
center, the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the child."'
30
The proposed rule also prompted the filing of eight separate comments
critical of various aspects of the rule. The comments were filed by Univer-
126. Proposed Rule 8.350, available at http://www.flcourts.org/sct/sctdocs/proposed
.html (last visited May 30, 2001).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Amendment to FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.100(a), 26 Fla. L. Weekly S171 (Fla. Mar.
15, 2001). The minority argued that a "'meaningful opportunity to be heard is the hallmark of
procedural due process," which requires fairness to the litigant, and that for a child to have a
meaningful opportunity to be heard in a commitment proceeding, the child must be repre-
sented by counsel. The minority stressed that the child as a separate party through his case
must be given the opportunity, through his lawyer, to subpoena witnesses, present testimony
and evidence, cross examine witnesses and present argument. The report also noted the irony
and inconsistency of mandating the appointment of counsel for the lay guardian, while
depriving the child himself of legal representation in this proceeding. Id. See also Dep't of
Children & Family Servs. v. I.C., 742 So. 2d 401, 406 (Fla. 1999) (stating that "the child, the
alleged object of everyone's concern, has no voice and no capacity to reach the court in many
cases").
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sity of Miami Children & Youth Law Clinic; University of Miami Law
Professor Susan Stefan and the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law; the
Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities; the Florida Public Defender
Association; the Florida Bar Public Interest Law Section; the Children First
Project at Nova Southeastern University; University of Miami Law Professor
Bruce Winick and Broward County Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren; and attorney
Karen Gievers, representing the Children's Advocacy Foundation, Inc. All
of the comments argued that the rule should, at a minimum, provide for
notice, counsel, and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before children
can be involuntarily placed by DCF in residential treatment centers. 3
The essential elements that the rule should contain, in order to comport
with the privacy interests of the child at stake in this type of proceeding, and
to afford the child a meaningful opportunity to be heard, are the following.
A. The Right to Notice and to be Heard
In M.W., the Supreme Court of Florida held that the foster child facing
commitment to a psychiatric institution must be provided "a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.', 132  The court recognized the importance of
"whether a child believes that he or she is being listened to and that his or
her opinion is respected and counts."' 33 Indeed, former foster children were
extremely troubled that they were not heard when critical decisions were
being made about their lives. A recurrent theme in their comments was the
importance of consulting with children and allowing them to share in, and
contribute to, decisions that need to be made.
134
The fundamental principles of due process require notice and the
opportunity to be heard, but a child in foster care is typically provided
neither. Chapter 39 provides for judicial review hearings at six month inter-
vals for children in foster care.135 With the recent statutory amendments,
chapter 39 now provides for judicial review hearings at three month intervals
for foster children placed in residential treatment centers. 136 However,
chapter 39 does not include the child among those who must be noticed for a
131. See generally therapeutic jurisprudence arguments of Winick/Lemer-Wren and
Stefan/Bazelon, as well as the high points of the other six comments.
132. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 109 (2000).
133. Id. at 108.
134. FESTINGER, supra note 1, at 281. "Some felt left, and others felt left out: 'They
always had conferences and you weren't in on it and they don't tell you what they discussed
about you ... then they write a report and you don't know what they've said.' Some felt that
general statements such as 'it's in your best interest' makes you feel like a client, not a
person." Id.
135. FLA. STAT. § 39.701(1)(a) (2000).
136. § 39.407(5)(h).
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judicial review hearing, and it does not provide the child with the right to be
heard at a judicial review hearing.1 37
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide that a child is a party
to his dependency case, 13 and therefore the child is entitled to receive the
same notice as any other party.139 The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
further entitle the child to be heard at court hearings. 4 However in reality,
most children are not provided with notice of their hearings and are not
heard by the court.
For example, statistics compiled in the District XI (Miami-Dade
County) Florida Foster Care Review's Annual Data Summary Reports de-
monstrate that there is a near absence of children's participation in their
foster care review hearings. In a recent year, out of 1214 cases reviewed
with children over the age of ten, involving a total of 1766 children, only 234
children participated in the review hearings of their cases.14
On a daily basis in Florida, judicial review hearings take place in
dependency court, and every party is heard from, except the most important
party-the child. In addition, routinely only one party is present for foster
care review hearings and therefore only one party is heard from-the De-
partment of Children & Families. Without hearing from the child or from
anyone other than DCF, the court cannot know if it is being provided with
inaccurate or incomplete information, as frequently occurs.
The experiences of various clients of the Children & Youth Law Clinic
illustrate the need for the court to hear from them and to listen to them.
42
One client of the Clinic, upon reaching the age of majority, read her court
file and discovered various reports and evaluations submitted to the court
unbeknownst to her which contained inaccurate and prejudicial information.
This information had resulted in her commitment to a locked psychiatric
facility where she was subsequently abused. She described how she was
taken to the facility by her DCF worker and a police officer, without being
able to talk to a judge. It was not until she saw her court file and looked at
137. See § 39.701(5)(a)-(f) (notice must be provided to such persons as the social
service agency charged with the supervision, custody or guardianship of the child, the foster
parents or legal custodian, the parents, the guardian ad litem, among others but not the child).
138. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.210.
139. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.225(c); 8.235(a).
140. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.100(a).
141. DIsTRIcT XI FLORIDA FOSTER CARE REviEw's ANNUAL DATA SUMMARY REPORTS
(1997-98). Additionally, out of 1681 total reviews heard, children only had an assigned
guardian ad litem in 348 cases. Id.
142. See generally Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in Accordance with the
Law: The Failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 1
(1999) (discussing the importance of listening to the real foster care experts, the children
severed by the system).
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the numerous court orders in the file that she realized there had been regular
court hearings and reviews of her case from which she had been systemati-
cally excluded. Unfortunately, this foster youth's experience is typical of
the experiences of children in foster care who are committed to psychiatric
facilities.
Numerous foster youth have described to the attorneys and interns in
the Clinic & Youth Law Clinic their experiences and feelings when they
have been locked up in psychiatric institutions, subjected to seclusion, four
point restraints, the forced administration of potent psychotropic medica-
tions, and limitations imposed on family contact and visitation, without ever
having been heard by the juvenile court. Even if a foster child is not noticed
or heard in foster care review proceedings on a regular basis, as the child
should, the child must be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard in a
proceeding involving the child's commitment to a locked psychiatric facility
where the child's liberty and privacy rights are at stake. No foster care
hearing regarding the child's psychiatric commitment should proceed with-
out providing the child notice and the opportunity to be heard directly by the
court.
The juvenile court in a delinquency proceeding in all certainty would
not proceed to adjudicate the child and thereby deprive him of liberty,
without first ascertaining that the child was provided notice and the opportu-
nity to be heard directly by the court. In M.W., the Supreme Court of Florida
stated: "[i]ronically, our rules provide more procedural protections in this
situation for children in the custody of the state because they are delinquent
than for those children who are in the custody of the state because they have
been adjudicated dependent through no fault of their own."' 43 A foster child
facing commitment to a psychiatric institution is entitled to the same notice
and opportunity to be heard as a delinquent child who faces the same com-
mitment.
In fact, in rejecting a proposal that juvenile detention hearings in delin-
quency proceedings be conducted through audiovisual devices rather than
the children's personal appearance in court, the Supreme Court of Florida
stated:
Florida's oft-repeated pledge that 'our children come first' cannot
ring hollow in-of all places--our halls of justice. Not simply al-
lowing, but mandating that children attend detention hearings con-
ducted through an audio-visual device steers us towards a sterile
environment of T.V. chamber justice, and away from a system
where children are aptly treated as society's most precious re-
source. It is time that we understand that these youths are indi-
143. See M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 108 n.36 (2000).
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viduals and require sufficient resources if we are to expect a
brighter tomorrow.... Personalized attention and plans are neces-
sary to properly address the multiple and complex problems facing
today's children.144
A foster child has as much of a right to be heard directly by the juvenile
court at a foster care hearing as does a delinquent child at a delinquency
hearing.
Further, a foster child facing commitment to a locked psychiatric insti-
tution through a dependency proceeding suffers the same loss of liberty and
privacy as a child facing the same psychiatric commitment in a delinquency
proceeding. In Michael's case, he could not understand why children placed
in the same locked psychiatric facility as he was placed had received a full
hearing before the juvenile court prior to being committed to the facility,
while he did not. Michael could understand that children do not have the
same rights as adults, and therefore he did not receive the procedural due
process given to the adults committed to South Florida State Hospital in the
mental wards that were yards away from him. However, he could not under-
stand why another child in state custody placed in a bed next to him, in the
same locked facility, had received so much greater procedural due process
from the juvenile court prior to being committed than he received.
B. The Right to Counsel
In addition to notice and the opportunity to be heard, a foster youth
must be provided with an attorney if the youth seeks to contest his or her
commitment. In T.W., the Supreme Court of Florida held that "[iln proceed-
ings wherein a minor can be wholly deprived of authority to exercise her
fundamental right to privacy, counsel is required under our state constitu-
tion." 145 Indeed:
A minor, completely untrained in the law, needs legal advice to
help her understand how to prepare her case, what papers to file,
and how to appeal if necessary. Requiring an indigent minor to
handle her case all alone is to risk deterring many minors from pur-
suing their rights because they are unable to understand how to
144. Amendment to FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.100(a), 25 Fla. L. Weekly S516 (Fla. Mar. 15,
2001) (internal citation omitted).
145. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989).
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navigate the complicated court system on their own or because they
are too intimidated by the seeming complexity to try.'"
The Supreme Court of Florida has required the State to be represented
by counsel in all dependency proceedings, including judicial review proceed-
ings. 47 In In re D.B., the supreme court held that counsel for the parent is
mandatory in dependency proceedings where the parent-child relationship is
in danger of being severed, but counsel for the child is discretionary. ' In
proceedings involving an infringement of the parent-child relationship, the
parent's attorney can adequately protect both the parent's and the child's
mutual constitutional right to family integrity. Thus, separate counsel for the
child is not necessary to protect the child's right to family integrity. How-
ever, in a dependency proceeding involving the child's commitment to a
psychiatric institution, it is the child's constitutional rights to liberty and
privacy that are at stake and there is no other counsel to protect this right.
Even if a minor is not ordinarily entitled to an attorney in dependency pro-
ceedings, the minor must be provided with counsel in a proceeding involving
his commitment to a long-term, locked psychiatric institution, as this pro-
ceeding would wholly deprive him of his ability to exercise his fundamental149
right to privacy under the Florida Constitution. Therefore, under these
circumstances counsel for the child is mandatory.
Finally, contrary to the Majority in its attempt to justify a rule that
mandated guardians but not counsel for children in these proceedings, an
appointed guardian is no substitute for legal counsel. As correctly noted by
the Minority Report, an attorney provides the child with important and
irreplaceable protection of a child's constitutional interests that a guardian
cannot provide:
146. Id. (quoting Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n v. Pearson, 716 F.2d
1127,1138 (7th Cir. 1983)).
147. Florida Bar Re: Advisory Opinion HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 So. 2d 909
(Fla. 1989).
148. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980).
149. Not only is the child a party to his or her dependency case under chapter 39 and
the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, but the child is a "patient" and as such is protected
by the safeguards enumerated in chapter 394. Under section 394.875(10) of the Florida
Statutes, children placed in residential treatment centers are accorded the rights of patients set
forth in section 394.459. See § 394.875(10) (2000) Indeed, when placed in residential
treatment, "[c]hildren's tights, as specified in Section 394.459, F.S., for patients, shall be
safeguarded. Children shall be informed of their legal and civil rights, including the right to
legal counsel and all other requirements of due process. Receipt of such information shall be
documented by parent or guardian, and the child's signature." FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.
65E-10.021 (2001).
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The minority believes that this advocacy cannot be provided by the
guardian ad litem or the guardian ad litem's attorney, as set forth in
subdivision (a)(3) of the proposed rule. See § 39.820(1). Fla. Stat.
(1998). The American Bar Association's Standards of Practice for
Lawyers who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases (ap-
proved by the ABA House of Delegates, February 5, 1996), pro-
vide that a child's attorney is charged with providing "legal ser-
vices for a child" and "owes the same duties of undivided loyalty,
confidentiality, and competent representation to the child as is due
an adult client." In contrast, a lawyer who is appointed as a guard-
ian ad litem is "appointed to protect the child's interests without
being bound by the child's expressed preferences." Thus only an
attorney for the child can properly advocate for the child and pro-
vide him or her with a "meaningful opportunity to be heard."'
50
C. The Right to a Pre-Placement Court Hearing
Procedural due process under the United States Constitution guarantees
that the states shall give every person "fair notice" and "a real opportunity to
be heard" in a "meaningful manner" and at "a meaningful time."'1 1 In M. W.,
the Supreme Court of Florida stated: "we cannot eschew the necessity for a
hearing before a dependent child is placed in residential treatment against his
wishes simply because other statutorily mandated hearings are already
required or because it would otherwise burden our dependency courts."'
The Juvenile Court Rules Committee was under the belief that it could not
mandate a pre-placement hearing for a child facing commitment to a long-
term residential treatment facility because the recent amendment to chapter
39 did not require such a hearing. However, the Supreme Court of Florida
can require that the child be provided a pre-placement court hearing.
153
150. See Minority Report; see also Jan C. Costello, Representing Children in Mental
Disability Proceedings, 1 CENTER FOR CHILDREN & TIm CTs. J. 101 (1999) (recommending
that lawyers for children in civil commitment proceedings pursue the client's legal interests
and avoid functioning as a guardian ad litem or therapist, and observing that "[b]y skillful and
zealous representation they must seek to empower the child client").
151. Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1991)
(citation omitted).
152. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 109 (2000) (emphasis added).
153. In the M. W. decision, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that legislation was then
pending that would clearly set forth the procedures to be used before a dependent child may
be placed in a residential psychiatric facility. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 107 n.34. However, the
enacted legislation is silent as to a pre-placement hearing procedure, which makes the neces-
sity for such a proceeding through the Juvenile Court Rules even more critical.
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In addition to the child's rights under the Florida Constitution, the
circuit court has both the constitutional authority*54 and the inherent power
to protect children, which cannot be restricted by statute. The doctrine of
inherent judicial power is necessary for the court to protect its independence
and integrity and to make its lawful actions effective.155 As the Supreme
Court of Florida has stated, "[tihe invocation of the doctrine is most compel-
ling when the judicial function at issue is the safeguarding of fundamental
rights."156 The court stressed that "where the fundamental rights of indi-
viduals are concerned, the judiciary may not abdicate its responsibility and
defer to legislative or administrative arrangements.'
'57
The court's protection of children and their fundamental rights is
perhaps the court's most important inherent power. This inherent power,
which stems from the duty of chancery courts to protect the interests of
minors, is well-established. a8 Indeed:
Independent of statute or rule a court of chancery has inherent ju-
risdiction and right to control and protect infants... [Courts] must
exert the utmost vigilance to see that the rights of so protected a
class as that of infants are not infringed on or destroyed. The court
itself is, in legal contemplation, the infant's guardian.1
59
Although the court is the infant's guardian:
Courts lack the physical ability to efficiently carry out custodial
functions at all stages of dependency proceedings .... In recogni-
tion of this fact the legislature gave the courts the prerogative to di-
vest themselves of the actual physical care of children alleged or
adjudicated to be dependent while still maintaining the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the courts. All powers not expressly di-
vested by the court are retained by it. 
160
154. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
155. See, e.g., Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978).
156. Id. at 137.
157. Id.
158. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Hollis, 439 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1983). "'Chancery is the supreme guardian, and has the superintendent jurisdiction of all the
infants in the kingdom."' Id. at 949 (citing Cooper v. Cooper, 194 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (internal quotations omitted)).
159. Id. at 949 (citing Brown v. Ripley, 119 So. 2d 712, 717 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1960)).
160. Div. of Children & Family Servs. v. Florida, 319 So. 2d 72, 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
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"Indeed, it is not conceded that under our Constitution, vesting as it does the
circuit courts with equity jurisdiction, this Rower could, under our Constitu-
tion as it stands, be taken away by statute."
The Supreme Court of Florida holds that "[a] statute which attempts to
restrict the inherent powers will be broadly interpreted as laying down
reasonable guidelines within which the power operates rather than as a sole
or actual source of the power.' ', 62 Additionally, where the supreme court
promulgates rules relating to the practice and procedure of the courts and a
statute provides a contrary practice or procedure, the statute is unconstitu-
tional to the extent of the conflict.
63
In developing the new rule of court, as noted previously, the Committee
did not respond to the court's directive to consider existing rule 8.410(c) that
governs court approval of amendments to the child's case plan, but this is
integral to the proposed rule. The dependency court adopts a case plan for
each child in foster care, in which it orders the "type of placement," and
"type of home or institution" where the child is to be placed and specifies the
placement that is in the "least restrictive and most family-like setting avail-
able ... in as close proximity as possible to the child's home."'' This is not
just a requirement of state statutory law,165 and the existing juvenile rules of
court, 166 but is also a requirement of federal law. 16 7 Moreover, this is part of
the circuit court's constitutional and inherent power to protect children.
Once the court adopts the case plan, it becomes an order of the court. A
statute cannot authorize DCF to unilaterally change the conditions of the
child's placement, in contravention of the court's existing order. Michael's
own case provides a stark example, as his court-ordered case plan placed
him in a foster home, with the goal of reunification and regular family
therapy with his mother. In contravention of the court-ordered case plan,
DCF instead placed him in a locked psychiatric institution in another county
161. Cooper, 194 So. 2d at 281.
162. Rose, 361 So. 2d at 139 n.14; see, e.g., Smith v. Miller, 387 P.2d 738 (1963);
State v. Webb, 21 N.E.2d 421 (1939); Bass v. County of Saline, 106 N.W.2d 860 (1960).
163. Haven Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1991).
164. Although the court cannot name the specific foster home or facility where the
child is to be placed, it is well-established that the court can name the type of placement. See,
e.g., In re L.W., 615 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); In re F.B., 319 So. 2d 77 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975); see also Henry & Rilla White Found., Inc. v. Migdal, 720 So. 2d
568, 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (indicating that "the department and the court have
overlapping and concurrent power over matters relating to dependency and delinquency
proceedings").
165. FLA. STAT. § 39.601 (2000).
166. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.410, Form 8.967.
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 675-679a (2000).
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far away from his mother. This required a court-ordered amendment to the
168
case plan, after notice and an evidentiary hearing.
A psychiatric institution where the child is subject to restrictive and
potentially hazardous treatment modalities is a drastically different type of
placement than a foster home. When the child's court-ordered case plan
requires placement in a foster home, DCF may move the child from foster
home to foster home without prior court approval. However, a change in the
type of placement from foster home to psychiatric institution requires an
amendment to the child's case plan, following notice and an evidentiary
hearing. 169 The court's constitutional authority to protect children mandates
a court hearing prior to the child's placement being changed to a locked
psychiatric institution.' 70
Moreover, when a child is involuntarily committed to a psychiatric
institution where the child is subject to physical and chemical restraint, as
well as a documented risk of serious mental and physical injury and even
death, the child's right to privacy under the Florida Constitution is clearly
implicated. A residential treatment center for children and adolescents
168. In the child's case plan, the court orders the "type of placement," and "type of
home or institution" where the child is to be placed, and the child cannot be placed in contra-
vention of a valid, existing court order. FLA. STAT. § 39.601 (2000). Additionally, while the
amendment to section 39.407 of the Florida Statutes is silent on the necessity for a pre-
placement hearing, chapter 39 continues to mandate that DCF, as temporary legal custodian,
can only provide a child with ordinary psychiatric and psychological treatment, unless the
court orders otherwise. § 39.01(70).
169. Where the child requires short-term hospitalization or treatment in a crisis
facility, then there is no need for the court to conduct a pre-placement hearing. However,
when the type of the child's long-term placement is changed from a foster home to a psychiat-
ric institution in contravention of the court-ordered case plan, then a pre-placement hearing is
required. Moreover, viewed from both the child's perspective and from the child's best
interests, the child should not be subjected to the intrusiveness and harmful effects of this type
of placement, nor should the child be bounced around like a "ping-pong ball," being sent to a
residential treatment center in a different county, only to be discharged by the court days or
weeks later.
170. Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Florida noted in M.W., providing pre-
placement hearings for children facing long-term commitment to residential centers should not
be eschewed just because it would be burdensome to the dependency courts. M.W., 756 So.
2d at 109. In fact, the courts would not be unduly burdened by having to conduct such
hearings, as the number of foster care children in residential psychiatric settings represents a
relatively small percentage of the total population. For example, in Miami-Dade County the
number of foster care children placed in long-term psychiatric residential treatment facilities in
1999-2000 totaled only 94, representing only three percent of the children in foster care in the
county. FosTER CARE REVIEW, INC., ANNUAL REcAPrrUATION REPORT (July 1999-July
2000).
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utilizes "a variety of treatment modalities in a more restrictive setting,"'171
including the use of psychotropic drugs, restraints, and seclusion. 172 Under
these circumstances, the "procedural safeguards relative to the intrusion'
7
should include a pre-placement court hearing.
D. The Right to Present Evidence and the Burden of Proof Required
In developing the rule, the court must also consider the question of the
evidentiary standard to be met. In M.W., the Fourth District ruled that
because the juvenile court has an "ongoing relationship" with a dependent
minor, the presentation of evidence is not necessary in court reviews involv-
ing the child's commitment to a psychiatric institution.1 74 In the ideal sys-
tem, a juvenile court judge does have an ongoing relationship with a child.
In reality, though, just as the dependent child often has a constant turnover
of social workers, so too does the child often have a number of juvenile court
judges presiding over the case during the time the child may spend in the
state foster care system. In addition, given the extraordinary number of
cases in each juvenile judge's docket, even if there is one consistent judge
presiding, it is difficult for a judge to recollect every child in his or her
docket. As demonstrated in Michael's case, even though there had been
several hearings before the court, the court stated at the start of the hearing
in which the child was committed: "I don't remember this child, so tell me a
little about the case.' 175 No judge can possibly remember the details of the
hundreds of cases in his or her docket. Without a meaningful hearing, the
court cannot know if it is being provided with erroneous or incomplete
information, as M.W. maintains occurred in his case, and has the potential to
occur in every case where a minor is being institutionalized by the state. In a
proceeding involving the child's commitment to a psychiatric institution, a
perfunctory hearing before the juvenile court does not provide the child with
171. FLA. STAT. § 394.67(22) (2000).
172. See § 394.875(10); FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 65-10.021(8) (discussing proce-
dures for use on children of mechanical restraints, canvas jackets, and cuffs and requiring
additional justification for other hazardous procedures or modalities that place the child at
physical risk or which are potentially painful); see also Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 216
(Fla. 1992) (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("we tend to forget exactly
what civil commitment means: [t]he person is taken out of society, deprived of liberty... and
involuntarily subjected to examination and treatment. There is very little difference between
this procedure and incarceration for crime"); Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla.
1987) (equating a psychiatric institution to a jail because of the facilities for enforced con-
finement).
173. In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1195-96 (Fla. 1989).
174. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 104 (Fla. 2000).
175. Record at 29, M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
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any meaningful protection. A child must be provided the opportunity to
present and rebut evidence in a proceeding where the child's liberty and
privacy is at stake.
Moreover, when constitutionally protected rights are being impinged
upon by the state, the state has a burden of proof, which can be no less than
clear and convincing evidence. 176 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Florida "has
consistently held that the constitution requires substantial burdens of proof
where state action may deprive individuals of basic rights."'177 In non-
criminal contexts, the court has held that constitutionally protected individ-
ual rights may not be impinged with a showing of less than clear and con-
vincing evidence.17 9 Chapter 39 does not provide any evidentiary standard
for the court to follow in judicial review proceedings, nor does it provide for
the rules of evidence to be followed at the hearing. Even if the rules of
evidence are not followed during judicial review hearings regarding the
child's general status, the rules of evidence must be followed in proceedings
involving the minor's commitment to a long-term, locked psychiatric institu-
tion, as the minor's constitutional rights are at stake.
As the supreme court has made clear, "[t]he seriousness of the depriva-
tion of liberty and the consequences which follow in adjudication of mental
illness make imperative strict adherence to the rules of evidence generally
applicable to other proceedings in which an individual's liberty is in jeop-
ardy."1 79 This is necessary because of the uncertainty and risk of erroneous
psychiatric diagnosis may result in inappropriate commitment to a mental
institution.1
80
Additionally, in the context of psychiatric commitment, the Supreme
Court of Florida has required the trial court, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, to "eliminate the possibility of successful treatment through some less
restrictive alternative. As one commentator has noted:
The doctrine of the least restrictive alternative found in mental health
law has its roots in basic constitutional doctrine. A state-imposed bur-
176. See generally Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957, 967 (Fla.
1991).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481,489 (Fla. 1977).
180. See In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286 (Cal. 1977) (holding that neither the state nor
the parent has an interest in committing a child to a state mental hospital if the child is not in
need of treatment and if commitment is based on erroneous information and evaluation); see
also In re Michael E., 538 P.2d 231 (Cal. 1975) (establishing criteria for admission of minors
who are wards of the state where the state seeks to commit the minors to psychiatric institu-
tions).
181. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 490.
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den on a 'fundamental' right, such as certain liberty [or privacy] rights,
is constitutional only if the burden is necessary to further a compelling
government interest. Thus, if the government's interest can be pro-
moted by a means that imposes a lesser burden on the right, the more
burdensome means is constitutionally impermissible.1
82
VI. PARHAM V. J.R. AND THE NEW SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
In ruling that a dependent child must be provided a meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard prior to commitment to a residential facility, the court
rejected the arguments that Florida law and the U.S. Constitution afford the
child this right. The lynchpin of its decision in M. W., and the directive to the
Juvenile Court Rules Committee was its observation that:
While the child's best interests may in fact be paramount in
the eyes, minds and hearts of every participant in the dependency
proceeding, it is important that our procedures in dependency cases
ensure that each child is treated with the dignity to which every
participant in a dependency proceedings should be entitled. It is
true that the dependency court, a citizen review panel, the Depart-
ment and multiple psychiatrists and psychologists were involved in
M.W.'s case and all were concerned with his best interests. How-
ever, of paramount concern is the question of whether M.W. per-
ceived that anyone had his best interests at heart when he was
placed against his wishes in a locked psychiatric facility without
the opportunity to be heard.
Indeed the issue presented by this case extends beyond the
legal question of what process is due; rather, this case also presents
the question of whether the child believes that he or she is being
listened to and that his or her opinion is respected and counts. 13
Over twenty years ago, in 1979, the United States Supreme Court
decided Parham v. J.R., in which the Court ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution does not bar parents or the
182. Weithom, supra note 33, at 787 n.85. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
183. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So.2d 90, 107-08 (Fla. 2000); see MELTON, supra note 37, at
146-47 (stating that children obtain psychological benefit from procedural protections prior to
being placed in psychiatric treatment facilities).
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state from committing children "voluntarily" to a mental hospital. 1 4 In its
ruling, the Court relied upon an amicus brief submitted by the American
Psychiatric Association and the social science research prevalent at the
time.1as Two decades later, the social science research now stands inappo-
site. In Parham, Justice Burger stated that "[m]ost children, even in adoles-
cence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many
decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment."1 6 However,
this dicta by the Supreme Court is one of a number of outmoded "assump-
tions" that the Court relied upon in its ruling.
Indeed, the social science research now indicates that "at least in their
reasoning about treatment decisions, adolescents are indistinguishable from
adults."1 7 In a leading research study, clinical psychologists:
[P]resented hypothetical dilemmas about medical and psychological
treatment decisions to nine, fourteen, eighteen, and twenty-one-year
olds. The responses of the fourteen-year olds could not be differentiated
from those of the adult groups, according to any of the major standards
of competency: evidence of choice; reasonable outcome or choice; rea-
sonable decision making process; understanding the facts.
188
This empirical evidence indicates that:
[t]here seems to be ample basis for reversal of current presump-
tions in favor of a view of adolescents as autonomous persons pos-
sessed of independent interests regarding liberty and privacy. Ac-
184. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). In filing his petition for habeas, Michael
did not seek his release from L ock Towns under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, because he knew that such relief would be precluded by the Supreme
Court's ruling in Parham. Michael predicated his relief entirely on the Florida Statutes and
the Florida Constitution, consistent with the Supreme Court's discussion in Parham referenc-
ing the state's ability to provide more expansive rights for children than allowed by the
Fourteenth Amendment and the need to provide greater judicial protection for wards of the
state.
185. Id. at 606.
186. Id. at 603.
187. Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial Notice of Social
Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633, 649 (1983-84) (citations omitted).
188. Gary B. Melton, Toward Personhood for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as
Values on Public Policy, 38 AM. PsYCHOL 99 (Jan. 1983); see also Susan D. Hawkins, Note,
Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment
Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075 (1996) (arguing that minors should be accorded due
process in contested medical treatment cases to protect their rights to informed consent, bodily
integrity, self-determination, and privacy).
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cordingly, psychologists should actively involve minors in decision
making about treatment and research, and policy-makers should
begin their analyses of issues involving adolescents with respect for
their autonomy and privacy.
189
In fact, both the American Psychiatric Association and the American
Psychological Association now strongly support due process for adolescent
minors facing psychiatric institutionalization, particularly when the minor is
a ward of the state. Both associations have drafted or voted to endorse
model commitment statutes or approved guidelines for minors facing com-
mitment to psychiatric facilities that provide the youth substantial due
process prior to commitment.'19
In 1981, two years after Parham, the American Psychiatric Association
approved a set of guidelines for the psychiatric hospitalization of minors.
The guidelines, prepared by the Association's Task Force on the Commit-
ment of Minors, guarantee children over the age of sixteen the right to
contest an involuntary admission to a psychiatric facility, the right to an
involuntary commitment hearing, and the right to counsel at the involuntary
commitment hearing. 191 At the involuntary commitment hearing, the child
through his appointed counsel has the right to cross examine witnesses
favoring commitment and the right to present testimony and evidence in
opposition to commitment and/or in favor of less structured alteratives.1
2
In addition to these protections, the party seeking to commit the child
against his will has the burden of showing the court by clear and convincing
evidence that: a) the child has a mental disorder; b) the child is in need of
treatment or care available at the institution to which involuntary commit-
ment is sought; and c) no less structured means are likely to be as effective
in providing such treatment or care. If the court, after hearing the evidence
presented, commits the child to a psychiatric program, the duration of the
initial commitment cannot exceed forty-five days, with the next commitment
for ninety days, and subsequent commitments of six months.
More recently, the American Psychological Association's Division of
Child, Youth, and Family Services endorsed guidelines that provide similar
due process to youth facing psychiatric commitment.19 3 Both the guidelines
by the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric
189. Melton, supra note 188, at 99.
190. See generally Amer. Psychiatric Ass'n & Amer. Psycho. Ass'n Children's Model
Mental Health Code.
191. See generally http://www.psych.org/index.cfm.
192. Id.
193. See generally Guidelines for Psychological Evaluations in Child Protection
Matters, available at http://www.apa.org/practice/childprotection.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2001).
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Association apply even where the parent is seeking the youth's commit-
ment.1
94
VII. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Commendably, the Supreme Court of Florida was able to see Michael's
perspective and understand how he felt when he was committed to a psychi-
atric institution without the opportunity to be heard by the court. 95 Providing
a minor due process in the context of mental health commitment enhances
therapeutic and psychological benefits for the minor. A number of research
studies have found that providing adversarial proceedings produces positive
psychological benefits for children. Empirical research indicates that "hav-
ing some control over the process (a form of control inherent in a truly
adversarial system) is likely to enhance a child's sense of perceived jus-
tice.., and perhaps decrease resistance to treatment if it ultimately is or-
dered." 196
Indeed, significant clinical evidence exists showing a greater likelihood
of the treatment succeeding when adolescents participate in the decision to
begin treatment.197 Contemporary research on civil commitment hearings
conducted by social psychologists and therapeutic, jurisprudence scholars
strongly favors procedures that "increase patients perceptions of fairness,
participation, and dignity, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will
accept the outcome of the hearing, will view that outcome as being in their
best interests, and will participate in the treatment process in ways that will
bring about better treatment results."' 98
A research study found considerable benefits resulting from allowing
adolescents to have judicial hearings prior to their commitment if they
objected to hospitalization. 99 The researchers reported hospital staff be-
lieved that giving adolescents a hearing if they objected to hospitalization
was "helpful to children" for the following reasons:
194. See generally http:lwww.psych.orglindex.cfm; http://www.apa.org.
195. See M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
196. See MELTON, supra note 37, at 139-41.
197. See Rochelle T. Bastien & Howard S. Adelman, Noncompulsory .Versus Legally
Mandated Placement, Perceived Choice, and Response to Treatment Among Adolescents, 52
J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL, 171, 177 (1984).
198. Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing,
10 J. CoNTEmp. LEGAL IssUEs 37, 60 (1999).
199. Alan Meisel & L.H. Roth, The Child's Right to Object to Hospitalization: Some
Empirical Data, 4 J. OF PSYCHIATRY & L., 377-92 (1976).
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1. The procedure gave the child the opportunity to tell how he
felt. He had the opportunity to express his objection.
2. The procedure crystallized the issue of the need for treatment.
It made the child (and the family) confront the issue of
whether or not the child really needed or wanted to be hospi-
talized.
3. It made the child feel that he had been treated fairly; if he ob-
jected, he would have an impartial hearing.
4. The procedure afforded the child some measure of control
over his own destiny.
5. This procedure was a step in the patient's involvement in
planning for his own care.
6. The judge could only release the child if he did not need to be
hospitalized.mo
As one commentator noted: "[p]rocedural due process does not immunize
persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; it simply insists on a
degree of fairness and humanity.... To that degree the capacity of children
has nothing to do with their right to be treated fairly, decently, and humanely
by their government. They are entitled to such treatment not because they are
competent but because they are persons.2 1 Indeed, "the 'competency' of the
claimant bears little or no relationship to the issue of entitlement, primarily
where the liberties involved are aimed not at maximizing free choice but at
civilizing the process and instruments of state compulsion.",
202
Vin. CONCLUSION
The Children & Youth Law Clinic's perspective as counsel for foster
youth has given it a unique ability to see these proceedings from the eyes of
the child. Many clients have expressed feeling "like pieces of furniture"
when placed in psychiatric facilities without being seen or heard by the
court. They have described feeling "shut up" and "shut out" when deprived
200. Id. at 384-85; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (observing that that the
appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short the
essentials of due process-may be a more impressive and therapeutic attitude so far as the
juvenile is concerned).
201. See Leon Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status as Suspect Classification?,
29 STAN. L. RV. 627, 642 (1977).
202. Id.
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of the chance to speak to the judge to contest their placement or to correct
inaccurate information in the court record. Thus, it is important to view the
issue through the eyes of the child who faces commitment.
As one former foster youth has written: "[f]oster care begins with the
terror of suddenly losing family, friends, toys, clothes, siblings, relatives,
neighborhood, and home. A child faces strange surroundings, strange people
the indignity of a medical strip search, and questions that aren't nice.
''2°
When a foster child is placed in a residential psychiatric facility, the child
experiences the same feelings of loss, indignity, and dislocation. It is there-
fore essential that foster children be provided with meaningful due process
procedures and protection by the juvenile court prior to, as well as during,
their placement in psychiatric facilities.
Indeed:
The decisions in foster care often involve many, and sometimes con-
flicting, interests. The viewpoints of the children are, therefore, not
sufficient alone but need to be seen as a necessary part of the consid-
erations that determine the recommendations that are made. Such a
practice can be beneficial in the long run since it is almost axiomatic
that those who participate in making decisions are more concerned
about making things work out .... Surely a field that stresses the self-
determination of clients needs to take steps to avoid drowning out the
voices of children.
204
Ultimately, it is hoped that the Supreme Court of Florida's willingness
to consider the feelings and perceptions of Michael and the psychological
benefits of affording the child a hearing, and most important, Michael's
valiant struggle to have his voice heard, will inform the court's consideration
of a rule of procedure that provides dependent children a truly meaningful
opportunity to be heard by affording them the right to notice, counsel, a pre-
placement hearing, and the right to present and rebut evidence of the need
for commitment in a psychiatric facility before the state can commit them to
these facilities.
203. Jessica Watson Crosby, Why Foster Care Can Never Be Reformed, FosTER CARE
YOUTH UNirrED, 32 (May/June 1997).
204. Festinger, supra note 1, at 296-97.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida has a long and ignominious history of failing to provide protec-
tion and safety to children in its child welfare system. Years of investiga-
tions, newspaper articles, and lawsuits demonstrate the pervasiveness of the
problem and the degree to which children are unprotected.' Large numbers
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law Center. The author thanks
Sheena Benjamin-Wise, Amy Bloom, Mark Earles, Garrett Franzen, Tracey McPharlin, Joan
Morrison, and Elizabeth Shaw who assisted in the preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. I.C., 742 So. 2d. 401 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999); White Found., Inc., v. Migdal, 720 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1998); Jane H. Shaeffer, Representation of Children in Dependency Actions: The Child's
Unfulfilled and Illusory Right, 66 FLA. BAR J., 64 (1992); Christina A. Zawisza, Child Welfare
Managed Care in Florida: Will It Be Innovation or Abdication? 25 NOVA L. REv. 619 (2001);
RICHARD WEXLER, NAT'L COALITION FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, THE LENGTHENING SHADow:
How FLORIDA'S CONTINUING FosTER CARE PANIc ENDANGERS CHILDREN (lst ed. Feb. 2001);
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of children are subject to abuse and neglect.2 Children often come into state
care who should not be there, and then they remain for extended and unrea-
sonable periods of time.3 Decision-making as to whether children should be
given the opportunity to be adopted, placed in long-term care, including
independent living, or sent home, are often delayed for inordinately long
periods of time.4  Neither a coherent system for deciding which children
should enter state care exists, nor do procedures that provide guidelines for
what to do with the children once they enter the Florida child welfare system
and come before the court. The lack of an efficient system of placement and
supervision is exacerbated by the fact that the conditions into which children
are placed are fundamentally unsafe. The irony is self-evident. During this
entire process of removal from a home claimed to be unsafe and placed into
a foster home or congregate care facility that may be even more unsafe, very
few of Florida's children receive any independent legal representation.
6
Fred Grimm, Foster Care System Doomed to Failure, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 11, 2001, at 1BR;
Carol Marbin Miller, Consultant Says Foster Care in County as Bad as Any in U.S., MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 5, 2001, at 3B; Richard Wexler, Claims of Checks, Balances farfrom Reality at
Child Agency, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000; Curtis Krueger, So Many Children, ST.
PETERSBURG TIms, Mar. 8, 2000, at ID; DCF Now Has to Deliver, SUN-SENTNEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), February 21, 2000, at 26A; Shana Gruskin, Report Blasts DCF Workers Staff
Ignored Court Order to Interview Kids Children Placed in Dangerous Home, SUN-SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale) Feb. 18, 2000, at 3B; OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADM'R, ASSESSMENT OF
THE DEP'T OF CHILDREN AND FAmIs FED. COMPLIANCE REVIEW (2001) [hereinafter OFFICE
OF THE STATE COURTS]; 1998 BROWARD COUNTY GRAND JURY INTERIM REP. [hereinafter
INTERIM REPORT].
2. The data is complex. In 1998 the legislature determined that "[t]he incidence of
known child abuse, abandonment and neglect has increased rapidly over the past [five] years."
FLA. STAT. § 39.001(6) (2000). Interestingly, a recent national study of child abuse crimes
indicates that child sexual abuse has diminished. Lisa Jones & David Finkelhor, The Decline
in Child Service Abuse Cases, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (Jan. 2001).
3. Id.
4. See FLA. STAT. § 39.621-.624 (2000) setting forth options. The Circuit Court
jurisdiction over the child ends when the child reaches 18. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(2) (2000);
Randi Mandelbaum, Revisiting the Question of Whether Young Children in Child Protection
Proceedings Should be Represented by Lawyers, 32 LoY. U. C. L.J. 1 (2000).
5. See discussion infra Part II. Conditions in child welfare systems in other states
are also dramatically inadequate. See Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in Accor-
dance with the Law: The Failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1, 8 (1999) (finding that in 1995, 22 states and the District of Columbia were under
court supervision for problems in care of foster children); National Center for Youth Law,
Foster Care Reform Litigation, Docket 2000.
6. See discussion infra Part II.
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For at least the past forty years, the major focus of the American re-
sponse to child welfare problems has been the use of juvenile or family court
to decide issues concerning removal of abused and neglected children from
their homes, placement and care in the child welfare system, and then either
returning them home or looking toward termination of parental rights and
adoption.7 Given the system primarily involves the use of courts, and Flor-
ida's history of failing to protect children in the system from harm, children
in Florida's dependency proceedings need maximum assistance to safeguard
them. Of course, endemic problems in providing a workable and protective
child welfare system is not limited to Florida. Problems exist nationwide.
8
The National Center for Youth Law reported in its Foster Care Reform
Litigation Docket 2000 that major litigation directed to foster care over the
past ten years has been brought in at least thirty-two states.9 There have
been a plethora of books and articles addressing the American child welfare
system, both in popular ° and scholarly" literature. Particularly prophetic is
the description of the system by Professor Martin Guggenheim. Speaking
with specific reference to the Adoption Assistance and Reform Act of 1980,
Professor Guggenheim said:
7. Douglas Besharov, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney
1999).
8. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); DALE Er AL, REPRESENTING THE
CHILD CLIENT (2000); Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in Two
States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995) [hereinafter Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends]; H.
Lila Hubert, Comment: In the Child's Best Interests: The Role of the Guardian Ad Litem in
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531, 538 n.38 (1994)
(referring to the crisis in the early 1990s); Mandelbaum, supra note 4. The problems are just
as great in the Juvenile Justice System. See generally Michael J. Dale, Lawsuits and Public
Policy: The Role of Litigation in Correcting Conditions in Juvenile Detention Centers, 32
U.S.F. L. REV. 675 (1998); PATRICIA PURrI2 & MARY ANN SCALI, Beyond the Walls: Improv-
ing Conditions of Confinement for Youth in Custody, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N (1998).
9. NAT'LCR. FOR YotH LAW, FOSTER CARERiORM LITIGATION DOCKET (2000).
10. See, e.g., NINA BERNSTEIN, THE LOST CHILDREN OF WILDER (2001); JoHN CUTNER
& JILL WOLFSON, SOMEBODY ELSE'S CHILDREN: THE COURTS, THE KIDS, AND THE STRUGGLE TO
SAVE AMERICA'S TROUBLED FAMILIES (1996); JENNIFER TOTH, ORPHANS OF THE LrVING:
STORIES OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE (1997); Elizabeth Gleick, The Children's
Crusade, TIME MAO., June 3, 1996.
11. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLOT, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
FOSTER DRIFr, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (Beacon Press 1999); BAZELON CENTER FOR
MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MAEING CHILD WELFARE WORK How THE R.C. LAwsurr FORGED
NEw PARTNERSHIPS TO PROTECT CHILDREN AND FAMtLmS (1998); JEAN KOH PETERS,
REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL
DIMENSIONS (1997).
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When foster care is overused, when policymakers do not take into
account the circumstances under which children are separated from
their families, when the proposals to terminate parental rights of
children in foster care are the only features of a comprehensive fos-
ter care reform that are assiduously enforced, one must ask whether
the termination provisions are appropriate. Justice Fortas' well-
worn commentary on the realities of the juvenile justice system in
the 1960s is fully appropriate in this context; under the Adoption
Assistance and Reform Act of 1980, children appear to receive "the
worst of both worlds." They are placed in foster care too easily,
without sufficient safeguards ensuring that they remain with their
families whenever they could be safely kept at home. Then, once
they enter foster care, the rules authorizing termination of parental
rights-which were enacted based on the premise that foster care
would be a last resort-are fully enforced.
There have also been articles specifically addressing the problems in
Florida.13  The child's innate vulnerability, combined with defects in the
dependency system and external threats of harm, brew a dangerous concoc-
tion that can irreparably harm Florida's youth.14  Once a child acquires
dependency status 5 in Florida, jurisdiction over the child vests in both the
judicial and executive branches.' 6 Although parental involvement in these
12. Guggenheim, The Effect of Recent Trends, supra note 8, at 140.
13. See, e.g., Timothy Arcaro, Florida's Foster Care System Fails Its Children, 25
NOVA L. REV. 641 (2001); Hubert, supra note 8; Renee Goldberg & Nancy Palmer, Guardian
Ad Litem Programs: Where Have They Gone and Where Are They Going, 69 FLA. B.J. 83
(1995); Carolyn S. Salisbury, The Legality of Denying State Foster Care to Illegal Alien
Children: Are Abused and Abandoned Children the First Casualties in Ameiica's War on
Immigration?, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 633 (1996); Shaeffer, supra note 1, at 64.
14. See White Found, Inc. v. Migdal, 720 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Bruce A. Boyer, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child Welfare Agen-
cies: The Uneasy Relationship Between Institutional Co-Parents, 54 MD. L. REV. 377 (1995).
15. Under Florida law abuse and neglect cases are referred to as dependency proceed-
ings. See FLA. STAT. § 39 (2000). Section 39 contains two separate procedures dealing first
with dependency proceedings and second with termination of parental rights proceedings. See
§§ 39.501-.510, .521-.522, .801-.817. Other jurisdictions use other terms for dependency
proceedings, such as abuse and neglect proceedings. See Besharov, supra note 7, § 241
(McKinney 1999). Other commentators have referred to the combination of dependency and
termination proceedings as "child protection proceedings." See Mandelbaum, supra note 4, at
90 n.2. For simplicity purposes, this article refers to both dependency and termination
proceedings in Florida generically as dependency proceedings.
16. § 39.501-.510,.521-.522, .801-.817.
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matters can be significant, in many situations the courts and child welfare
agencies are the primary decision makers in the determination of what is in
the best interests of the child, which also makes conflicts of interest more
common. 17 Even when there is no conflict, the court and the agencies are
often unable to protect the children.
By statute in Florida, parents are now entitled to counsel at all stages of
the dependency and termination of parental rights proceeding.' For the past
decade, the Department of Children and Family Services ("Department"),
Florida's child welfare agency, has been required to appear through counsel
in dependency proceedings pursuant to an order of the Supreme Court of
Florida. 19 On the other hand; children have no lawyer in dependency pro-
ceedings in Florida either by constitutional right or by statute. Rather, the
only form of representation they receive is on an ad hoc basis through a
volunteer guardian ad litem system, and very little representation by attor-
neys.2' Children have received representation in some form across the
country for the past twenty-five years, 22 sometimes by a lawyer and other
times through a guardian ad litem program, which was first instituted in
1974 through the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.23 The
problem in Florida, unlike other jurisdictions whose systems are discussed
later in this article, is that the child has no entitlement to a lawyer and often
does not even obtain the services of a volunteer guardian ad litem. The child
needs an attorney, and the legislature should provide for one.
This article first describes the nature of the problem in terms of both
inadequacies in the child welfare system and the failure of the current ap-
proach to protect children in Florida's courts. The article then analyzes the
source of authority to protect children in dependency procedures, focusing
on federal statutes and Florida state law. It then briefly surveys the variety
of approaches to protecting children in child protection proceedings across
the country. Finally, it proposes that independent representation of depend-
ent children by a lawyer is a crucial factor in facilitating a rapid and safe
outcome for children in abuse and neglect proceedings. It asserts that the
17. See Boyer, supra note 14, at 383.
18. § 39.013(1); R.M. v. Dep't of Children. & Family Servs., 770 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
19. § 39.402(8)(c)1., .807(2), .822; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215, 8.305(b)(7)(A),
8.510(a)(2)(c); Supreme Court of Fla., Amended Administrative Order, In re Guardian Ad
Litem Program Standards of Operation, Preamble (1995).
20. See chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes and discussion infra pp. 782-84.
21. § 39.402(8)(c)1., .807(2)(a), .822.
22. Martin Guggenheim, Counseling Counsel for Children, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1488,
1488 (1999) [hereinafter Guggenheim, Counseling Counsel].
23. 42 U.S.C. § 5105-5107 (1994).
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appointment of a guardian ad litem is an appropriate and worthwhile ap-
proach to protecting children. However, despite the presence of the guardian
ad litem, appointment of counsel, both as a general proposition and specifi-
cally because of Florida's historic failure to protect its children in the de-
pendency system, is essential to protecting children in the state's child
welfare system.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Although Florida statutory law recognizes the need for and appears to
require that all children receive representation through a guardian ad litem
during dependency proceedings,24 many children involved in abuse and
neglect proceedings are not provided with representation of any kind. The
urgent need for consistent and competent representation of children in
dependency proceedings is demonstrated first by state reporting statistics,
which show that 30,065 of the state's children were found to be victims of
substantiated maltreatment during 1998,2 and that state court proceedings
were undertaken for 14,980 of these victims.2 Parents were by far the most
common perpetrators, contributing to 18,429 of 23,790, or seventy-seven
percent, maltreatment cases. 27 Close to 800 perpetrators were either foster
parents, residential faculty staff, or child day care providers. The fact that
fifty-four child deaths in Florida were attributed to maltreatment2 9 evidences
the need for a voice to zealously advocate the child's interests in these
proceedings. The trial and appellate courts have publicly expressed this
concern for children in foster care.30
Second, there is substantial evidence that Florida's system is in a state
of crisis. Indeed, both Governor Bush and the Secretary of the Department
reported as much in a federal court hearing in January 1999.31 The very
24. § 39.402(8)(c)1., .807(2)(a), .822(1).
25. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY DATA COMPONENT SURVEY
1998 § 4.1 & COMMENT (1998) [hereinafter SUMMARY DATA COMPONENT SURVEY].
26. Id. § 4.8.
27. Id § 6.1.
28. Id. § 6.1
29. Id. § 5.1.
30. See discussion infra pp. 781-86.
31. I am here to tell you that this administration is committed to transform-
ing our child welfare system across the board, not just foster care, but from
the beginning to the very end to place children that abused and neglected to a
much higher priority that has been in the past.
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serious operational problems that create issues of dangerous conditions for
children are compounded by Florida's planned dramatic revamping of its
system. State legislation requires plans for privatizing the state's child
welfare system, except for child protected intake and investigation, by
2003.2
Two recent federal court class action lawsuits in Florida, one in Bro-
ward County in which the governor and secretary appeared and one state-
wide,33 have highlighted the problems in foster care in the state. 4 A third
federal lawsuit, a decade old, raising issues about the mental and health
The legislature is a partner in this, and I intend to use the resources and
the bully pulpit and the power that the executive branch has to make that
partnership work.
We have a temporary problem that we are going to solve, we are going
to work on. A lot of the problems that exist, sadly we don't even have a base-
line numbers to measure - how we measure progress.
We are so far behind. It is such a tragedy to see how the mismanage-
ment combined with the lack of resources has developed this situation ....
Gov. Jeb Bush, Transcript Motion for Preliminary Injunction Before the Honorable Federico
A. Moreno, United States District Judge, 18-19, Jan. 11, 1999.
Sir, no one is more cognizant than I of the situation in Broward County.
When I see the style of this case, I see the real names of the children and the
real faces of the children and what has occurred to those children.
So, I am aware of the crisis that truly faces Broward County and the en-
tire state.
I have found that the department is, in fact, in a state of crisis.
Secretary Kearney, pp. 20-21, Transcript Motion for Preliminary Injunction Before the
Honorable Federico A. Moreno, United States District Judge, January 11, 1999. Very recently,
Department of Children and Families Secretary Kearney has said that the system has gotten
much better. "I have witnessed tremendous improvement made possible by unprecedented
funding increases championed by Governor Jeb Bush and the legislature." Kathleen Keamey,
Keeping Children in Loving Homes, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 16,2001, at 5L.
32. Lisa Snell, Child-Welfare Reform and the Role of Privitzation, POLICY STUDY No.
271, REASON PUB. POL'Y INST. (2000); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey
of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L. REV. 91 (2001). For a detailed discussion of this topic, see
Zawisza, supra note 1.
33. See Order Approving Settlement Agreement, Ward v. Kearney, No. 98-7137-CIV-
MORENO (S.D. Fla.) (settlement approved May 31, 2000) (court jurisdiction ended on Nov.
30, 2001); Foster Children Bonnie L. v. Bush, Case No. 00-2116-Civ-Moreno (S.D. Fla.) (A
recent opinion by the trial court on December 4, 2001, granted defendant state officials'
motion to dismiss the major claims in the case on Younger v. Harris abstention grounds).
34. Foster care is defined as "care provided a child in a foster family or boarding
home, group home, agency boarding home, child care institution, or any combination thereof."
§ 39.01(29).
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needs of dependent children, was recently settled.35 The Broward County,
Florida Grand Jury Interim Report of Spring 1998 also substantiates this
problem. The Report expressed deep concerns that children in the District's
foster care system are exposed to continuous danger while under the De-
partment's care, stating:
It is the opinion of your Grand Jury that the problems facing the
Department are extensive and so systemic that the children in the
custody of or under the protection of the Department are in peril.
We also found that the problems in the child welfare system extend
beyond the Department into the courts as well. 36
While acknowledging that the Department is equipped with some
dedicated personnel, the investigation portrays deplorable conduct from the
Department's staff, ranging from poor handling of files, misrepresentations
to the court, and even criminal behavior from persons associated with the
Department.37 Children are placed with persons who have been the subject
of previous allegations of abuse and in homes that are overcrowded and
poorly supervised. 38 As this article is being written, another grand jury
investigation of the foster care system is on-going in Broward County.39 The
Supreme Court of Florida has recognized that the dependency courts are
overburdened, and that acceptable case loads are central to the appropriate
functioning of the dependency court.4 It has said, "[a]s a result of the
backlog inherent in termination cases, many children are left in legal limbo
as their custody status is argued in the courts.",41 The intermediate appellate
courts have also recognized the problems in the system. Recently, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal, in a case involving allegations of conditions
problems in a DCF assignment center, recognized the need for representation
of the child.4 2 Commenting on the horrendous number of abused and aban-
35. See Settlement Agreement, M.E. v. Bush, Case No. 90-1008-Civ-KEHOE (S.D.
Fla.) (settlement approved May 31, 2001).
36. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
37. id. at 37-39; see also Carol Marbin Miller, Child Welfare Law in Fixing Blame,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 8, 2001.
38. Id. at 22-23.
39. Telephone call from Assistant State Attorney John Countryman (Feb. 10, 2001)
(requesting that the author testify before the grand jury investigating foster care in District 10).
40. See M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 108 (Fla. 2000).
41. J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 768 So. 2d 1060, 1065 (Fla.
2000).
42. See Dep't of Children. & Family Servs. v. I.C., 742 So. 2d. 401, 406 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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doned children, and the difficult caseloads of both the case workers and the
courts in juvenile proceedings, the court said:
What would help considerably is if each child could have a guard-
ian ad litem or attorney ad litem who could be in contact with the
child on a more regular basis and serve as the child's advocate.
Parents are represented in these proceedings, but the child, the al-
leged object of everyone's concern, has no voice and no capacity to
reach the court in many cases. We commend the bar volunteer pro-
jects such as Lawyers for the Children of America, for their repre-
sentation of dependent children.
43
Regretfully, as this article demonstrates, the guardian ad litem program
is unable to fully protect children for several reasons. First, in Florida, it is a
voluntary system with the result that in many instances there is no guardian
ad litem available to represent the child. Second, the state appellate courts,
although expressing a recognition of the need for a guardian ad litem, have
held that there is no absolute right to a guardian ad litem despite the fact that
chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes appears to be absolute on its face," and
despite the existence of the federal statute that requires appointment of a
guardian ad litem. 45 Third, the Florida dependency and termination statutes
establish a complex set of procedures, which are quite time consuming and
require a lawyer's intervention to move the proceeding on behalf of the
child.46 Unfortunately, the Florida Statutes and Rules of Juvenile Procedure
43. Id. at 406.
44. In termination of parental rights cases, the statute is clearly absolute. FLA. STAT.
§ 39.807(2)(a) (2000). In dependency cases, section 39.822 is absolute, stating that "[a]
guardian ad litem shall be appointed by the court at the earliest possible time to represent the
child in any child abuse, abandonment, or neglect Judicial proceeding... ." (emphasis
added). Section 39.402(8)(c)(1) provides that at the shelter hearing the court shall "[a]ppoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the best interest of the child, unless the court finds that such
representation is unnecessary." These two provisions ought not to be read as contradictory.
Section 39.402 should be read solely as a limitation at the shelter housing stage. See Letter
from Secretary Kathleen A. Kearney, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, to Congressman E.
Clay Shaw, Jr., (July 7, 2000).
45. CAPTA, 42 U.S.C. § 5101-5107; 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g); Letter from Carlis V.
Williams, Southeast Regional Hub Director, Administration for Children & Families, U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Services, to Florida D.C.F. Secretary Kearney (Oct. 16, 2000).
46. See Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D. Fla. 1977). The need for counsel
was recently rendered more urgent by the federal district court's opinion in Foster Children
Bonnie L v. Bush. The court dismissed the central claims in a statewide class action challeng-
ing conditions in foster care in Florida in part on grounds that there was an adequate state
Dale
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specifically prohibit legal representation by the lay guardian ad litem. In
light of these problems and the Florida courts' inconsistent but nonetheless
deeply held concern about lack of guardians ad litem and the resulting
adverse effect on children, it is appropriate to review the federal and state
statutory sources of guardian ad litem representation of children in depend-
ency proceedings, as well as Florida's compliance with the federal and state
laws pertaining to guardians ad litem, to understand the shortcomings.
III. FEDERAL STATUTES APPLICABLE TO DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
Over the past twenty-five years, the federal government has recognized
the severe problems in the nation's child welfare system by enacting three
major funding statutes that create complimentary requirements and incen-
tives to improve state practices in child welfare proceedings. Florida re-
ceives money under these laws and is obligated to be in compliance with
enumerated statutory duties.
The first and most significant federal statute for the purpose of this
article, is the Childhood Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974
("CAPTA"). 47  This law profoundly influenced the nation's approach to
representation of children in dependency proceedings. 48 This statute re-
quires guardian ad litem representation in dependency proceedings, creating
a great need for legal services and its funding.49 CAPTA is a federal funding
statute providing incentives to states for improving the operation of their
child protective services. 50 The Act requires the states to submit plans to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, indicating to which child welfare51
programs the states will apply their federal funds. Under the statute, states
must implement procedures that require the appointment of guardians ad
litem in all dependency cases. 52 In every case involving an abused or ne-
glected child resulting in a judicial proceeding, the state must provide the
child with a guardian ad litem to represent them, in order to receive federal
forum in which the children could obtain relief. The federal court abstained in light of "the
ongoing jurisdiction and ability of plaintiffs to raise constitutional claims in dependency
court." Foster Children Bonnie L. v. Bush, Case No. 00-2116-CIV-MORENO, at 24 (Dec. 4,
2001). The federal court never discussed who would raise these claims or how they would do
it.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 5101-5119 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
48. For discussion of the Act, see JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN
CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 28 (1997); Mandel-
baum, supra note 4.
49. PETERS, supra note 48, at 28; see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
51. § 5106a(c).
52. § 5106a(b)(6).
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funds.53 CAPTA states that the guardian ad litem may be an attorney or a
court appointed specialist.54 The guardian ad litem must "obtain first-hand, a
clear understanding of the situation and needs of the child" and "make
recommendations to the court concerning the best interests of the child."55
Florida receives funding under CAPTA and must provide guardians ad litem
in dependency cases. Unfortunately, as the discussion in section IV.B of
this article shows, children are not regularly represented by a guardian ad
litem in dependency proceedings in Florida. To the contrary, guardians ad
litem who are volunteers are appointed in less than fifty percent of the cases.
The Florida courts have done nothing to enforce the right to a guardian ad
litem, which is mandatory under CAPTA.
CAPTA also requires states to provide reports to the United States
Department of Health and Human and Services, which include, among other
items, "the number of children for whom individuals were appointed by the
court to represent the best interests of such children and the averae number
of out of court contacts between such individuals and children." Despite
this federal requirement, Florida's Department of Children and Family
Services has not provided this information to the Secretary. 58 The Depart-
ment's explanation in its report to the Secretary for the 1998 reporting year
is that the information is "not available" at this time, and that this data will
be made available with the implementation of a new statewide information
system in the year 2003.59 Recently, the Department of Health and Human
Services asked Florida's Department of Children and Family Services to
develop a corrective action plan, looking at the case of appointment of
guardians ad litem.60 The state's failure to fully staff the guardian ad litem
does not appear to be a recent development.61 Unfortunately, in Florida, the
only means to ensure appointment of guardians ad litem pursuant to CAPTA
is through action taken by the federal agency. There appears to be no in-
53. § 5106(c).
54. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(iv)(I)-(II) (1994).
55. Id.
56. FLA. STAT. § 39.822 (2000). In 1999-2000, the State of Florida received ap-
proximately $1,000,000 in CAPTA funds.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(d)(12) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
58. See SUMMARY DATA COMPONENT SURvEy, supra note 25, § 4.9-.10.
59. Id.
60. See Letter from Carlis V. Williams, supra note 45.
61. See Daniella Levine, To Assert Children's Legal Rights or Promote Children's
Needs: How to Attain Both Goals, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2023, 2032 (1996) (reporting that
only half of children alleged to be abused or neglected receive GAL representation.); Shaeffer,
supra note 1, at 64 (citing to state statistics showing that during fiscal year 1990-91, 40% of
new dependency cases went unrepresented.).
Dale
230
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
stance yet where a state lost funding as a result of a Department of Health
and Human Resources finding of non-compliance with CAPTA. Litigation
by private parties to enforce CAPTA is problematic at best. While there is
no reported opinion directly on point, where parties litigated to enforce the
CAPTA provisions regarding the provision that there be a guardian ad litem
in each dependency case, a body of case law does suggest that the courts
interpreted other provisions of the Act's requirements leniently, based upon
an analysis that the provisions are vague and do not mandate very particular-
ized procedures or protective steps to be taken.
62
The second major federal statute is the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act ("AACWA"), 63 which was enacted in 1980 in response to
criticisms of the system during the 1970s.64 The Act provides for incentives
to the states to improve their foster care system by funding placements,
protective services, and family preservation and reunification services. The
state must submit a plan in this regard. The purpose of the plan was to
establish standards for the foster care system including those aimed at reduc-
66tion in the use of foster care. AACWA also encourages increased state
court involvement by requiring the state courts to perform two functions.
The courts must encourage and monitor families in need of services in
addition to protecting the welfare of the child. 67 The Act provides that
courts shall ensure that child welfare agencies have made reasonable efforts
to provide services to the family that may eliminate the need for termination
68
of parental rights. Courts review the progress the welfare agencies make
toward the permanent placement of the child and must implement procedural
protections for parents involved in these proceedings.6 9 Efforts to enforce
the AACWA through a private right of action have uniformly failed. The
United States Supreme Court rejected the approach in Suter v. Artist M70 in
1990.71 Subsequent cases here fared no better,72 with the result that the
62. See Fein v. D.C., 93 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182
(6th Cir. 1995); Blondis v. Thompson, 967 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Wis. 1997).
63. Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Cams, Improving the Court Process for Alaska's
Children in Need of Aid, 14 ALAsKA L. REV. 1 (1997).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b) (1994 & Supp. 1999). For an overview of the Act, see
Guggenheim, supra note 8; Alice C. Shotten, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and
Neglect Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W.L. REv. 223 (1990).
65. § 622(a).
66. § 625(a)(1).
67. § 622 (b)
68. Di Pietro, supra note 63, at 4-5.
69. Id. at5.
70. 503 U.S. 347 (1990).
71. Id.
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major remedy for violation of the Act is through federal governmental
agency enforcement. The lack of an enforceable means to protect children
under AACWA is particularly unfortunate due to the unintended result of the
Act. Research suggests that while it is the child's parents who have their
parental rights terminated, the child experiences the negative effects consid-
ering that many children are not subsequently adopted. It should be noted
that the Congress did amend the AACWA after Suter to allow some limited
form of a private right of action.74 Unfortunately, the limited reinstitution of
the private right of action does not affect the right to enforce guardian ad
litem provisions in the CAPTA law.
Congress recently passed a third act, the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 199715 ("ASFA"), to address concerns about the effectiveness of
AACWA. ASFA allows for greater discretion regarding the definition of
statutorily required reasonable efforts of state based services and is more
flexible in allowing states to remove children from dangerous homes.
76
ASFA also attempts to speed up the dispositional stage and increase adop-
tions in certain situations involving extreme circumstances. 77  Unfortun-
ately, ASFA does not provide a process by which the federal government
evaluates the judicial determination requirement so as to guarantee that
reasonable efforts have been made by state agencies in performing their
duties under this statute.
72. See, e.g., Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep't of Human & Rehab. Servs., 959 F. 2d 883
(10th Cir. 1992); E.F. v. Scafadi, 851 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Miss 1994); Eric L. v. Bird, 848 F.
Supp. 303 (D.N.H. 1994).
73. Margaret Beyer and Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents: Their
Effect on Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 FAM. L.Q. 233 (1986); Gug-
genheim, supra note 8.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-10 (1994), Effect of failure to carry out State plan, provides:
In an action brought to enforce a provision of this chapter, such provision is
not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of this
chapter requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State
plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for deter-
mining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan requirements
other than by overturning any such grounds implied in Suter v. Artist M., 112
S. Ct. 1360 (1992), but not applied in prior Supreme Court decision respect-
ing such enforceability: Provided, however, that this section is not intended
to alter the holding in Suter v. Artist M, that 671(a)(15) of this title is not en-
forceable in a private right of action.
75. 42 U.S.C § 761 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
76. Shawn L. Raymond, Where are the Reasonable Efforts to Enforce the Reasonable
Efforts Requirement?: Monitoring State Compliance Under the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980,77 TEx. L. REv. 1235, 1237-38 (1999).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 673 (2000).
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Thus, each of the three federal statutes contains extremely important
protections for the child. However, because none of the laws provides the
child the ability to obtain affirmative relief to enforce rights through a
private right of action in the courts, leaving only administrative remedies
through the federal agencies that fund the states, the need to enforce the
conceptual provisions of the laws in individual cases in the juvenile court
becomes much more significant. Specifically, the lack of a private right of
action under the federal statutes to enforce the right to a guardian ad litem as
well as other protections means that a lawyer representing a child in the
dependency proceeding becomes more important. However, as the following
section demonstrates, there is no right to legal representation for a child in
Florida, and the statutory and juvenile court rule provisions governing
guardian ad litem representation are ill-defined and imprecise.
IV. DEPENDENCY REPRESENTATION IN FLORIDA
A. Federal and Florida Case Law Governing the Right to Counsel
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the question of
whether a child has a right to counsel and, if indigent, counsel free of charge
in a dependency or termination of parental rights proceeding. The Court
held, in In re Gault,78 that a child does have a right to counsel in a juvenile
delinquency case premised on the proposition that children do have a pro-
tected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment when their freedom
is in jeopardy.79 However, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,80
the court held that parents do not have a right to counsel, as a matter of
constitutional law, in a termination of parental rights proceeding. 81 The
court did recognize that counsel should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
as a matter of fundamental fairness in termination of parental rights ("TPR")
cases.82 Despite rejecting an absolute right to counsel, the court said:
"[i]nformed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is
entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not only in the parental termi-
nation proceedings, but in dependency and neglect proceedings as well. '8 3
Nonetheless, the combination of the two cases makes it difficult to be sure
that the United States Supreme Court would ever hold that children have an
78. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
79. Id. at 42.
80. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
81. Id. at 24-32.
82. Id. at 31-32.
83. Id. at 33-34.
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absolute ight to counsel in dependency cases.8 On the one hand, there is a
clear deprivation of liberty when children are removed from their home and
placed in state care.85 On the other hand, the court has held that the loss of a
family member-in Lassiter it was the loss of a child permanentl-is not a
significant enough loss to require the right to counsel in all cases.
In the case In re D.B.,87 the Supreme Court of Florida held that children
do not have a right to counsel in dependency cases.88 The court acknowl-
edged that a "guardian ad litem must be appointed in any child abuse judicial
proceeding" 89 under Florida Statutes, but in all other instances, the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem is left to the discretion of the trial court and
should be made only when required under rule 8.3 of the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure. The interests of the child are considered "protected"
when the interests of a parent who is a party are not adverse to the child's
interests.9 ' However, children do have due process rights when the interests
of the child may be adverse to the interests of the parent,92 as is commonly
the situation in dependency proceedings. This has never been translated into
a right to counsel by either the courts or the Florida Legislature.
84. See Shaeffer, supra note 1, at 64. For a brief discussion of the history of children
rights and the Supreme Court's approach to these rights, see Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights &
Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client Relationship, 26 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 259
(1995); Michael J. Dale, Children Before the Supreme Court: In Whose Best Interests, 53
ALBANY L. REv. 513 (1989).
85. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
86. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34.
87. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
88. kL at 87; see also, Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Kahn, 639 So. 2d 689, 690
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Michael J. Dale, Role of the Lawyer in Dependency Cases,
Chap. 10 in Florida Juvenile Law and Practice, § 10.6 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Educ.
1999) Florida has not expanded the Gault holding and limits the appointment of counsel for
an indigent child to a delinquency proceeding that might result in detention. In re D.B., 385
So. 2d at 90. It is a fundamental error in Florida to both deny this right and fail to comply
with FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165. A.G. v. State, 737 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1999); see also State v. Steinhauer, 216 So. 2d 214, 218 (Fla. 1968) (holding that where a
waiver hearing does not "inexorably lead to a jail or detention home" that a juvenile is not
constitutionally required to a right to counsel).
89. InreD.B.,385So.2dat91.
90. Id.
91. Mistretta v. Mistretta, 566 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
that wife's interest in obtaining child support coincided with the best interests of the child,
thus, the child's representation was adequate).
92. Id.
93. For opinions following In re D.B, see In re Adoption of T.G.L., 606 So. 2d 730,
732 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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The Supreme Court of Florida very recently held that the appointment
of counsel is mandatory when a child objects to being placed into a residen-
tial treatment center after an adjudication of dependency. 94 The court ruling
in the form of amending the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure to provide
for counsel in this limited setting arose from the court's decision in M. W. v.
Davis.95 In that case, it held that when a court ordered a dependant child in
the temporary custody of the Department of Children to be placed into
residential treatment, an evidentiary hearing that complied with Florida's96
civil commitment statute, known as the Baker Act, was not required, but
that certain due process hearing rights did apply.97 The court sent the matter
to the Juvenile Court Rules Committee to prepare and submit proposed rules
98to cover the situation, which resulted in the order amending the juvenile
court rules. In so doing, the court explicitly said that it was not addressing
the issue of whether an attorney is constitutionally required when a child is
being committed to a residential treatment center.
While children have no statutory right to counsel, including appointed
counsel if indigent, in dependency proceedings in Florida, their parents
do. 1°° For a number of years by statute, Florida had provided that parents
were entitled to counsel only if their parental rights were to be terminated.10'
Parents were not entitled to counsel in a dependency proceeding unless, and
the Florida statutory scheme was rather odd in this respect, there was some
indication that parental rights would be terminated. This statutory ap-
proach produced a body of appellate case law in which the appeals court
judges routinely reversed trial court determinations of termination of paren-
tal rights where there had been no counsel to the parents at the dependency
stage.1 3 This problem was ultimately resolved in 1998 when the Florida
Legislature amended chapter 39 to provide for the right to counsel to parents
at all stages of dependency proceedings in addition to all stages of termina-
94. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.250 (amended on Oct. 25, 2001).
95. 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
96. Id. at 109.
97. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 25
NOVA. L. REv. 91, 105-07 (2000).
98. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 109.
99. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.250 (amended on Oct. 25, 2001).
100. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2000).
101. § 39.807.
102. See J.S.S. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 680 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1996); White v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 483 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NOVA L.
REv. 189,218-20 (1996).
103. See J.J.S., 680 So. 2d at 548; White, 483 So. 2d at 861; Dale, supra note 97.
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tion of parental rights proceedings. 1°4 The result of the legislative change
was to protect the interest of parents throughout the proceedings. That
scheme and the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure which implement it
"make elaborate provision for appointment of counsel and for procedures
concerning waiver of counsel" 1°5 by parents. Obviously, it did nothing to
protect the interest of children.
Florida's child welfare agency-the Department of Children and Fam-
ily Services (formerly known as the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services)-also appears by counsel. It must do so because of a series of
Advisory Opinions issued by the supreme court in the late 1980s responding
to the practice of then HRS nonlawyer counselors appearing in court. In the
first opinion, Florida Bar In re Advisory Opinion HRS Nonlawyer Coun-
selor, °6 the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services petitioned the
Florida Bar Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law for an
opinion. 07 The court addressed the issue of whether the preparation of
documents by lay counselors and the presentation of non-contested depend-
ency court cases by lay counselors, including the filing of the documents,
presentation of the case, request for relief, and testimony of the counselors
are the "unauthorized practice of law."'108 The Bar Standing Committee
found that HRS counselors were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
by drafting pleadings, legally binding agreements, and representing others in
court.'0 9 The court held that the types of activities required by chapter 39
and this form of representation of children constituted the practice of law. 1°
While the court agreed with the Committee that HRS counselors were
engaged in the practice of law, the court did not find that such practice was
the cause of the alleged harm or that enjoining it was the most effective
solution.", Thus, the court granted temporary authorization for HRS coun-
selors to continue their activities pending the report of court appointed ad
hoc committee.112 Most importantly, the Committee reported the problems
in allowing lay counselors or guardians ad litem to perform such legal
activities, finding that "HIRS lay counselor mistakes and delays result in
104. FLA. STAT. § 39.807 (2000). The purpose of the appointment, according to the
Supreme Court, is to "ensure that the final result is reliably correct." J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of
Children. & Family Servs., 768 So. 2d 1060, 1068 (Fla. 2000).
105. S.S. v. DCF, 764 So. 2d 718, 719 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
106. 518 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1988).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id at 1271.
110. Id. at 1272.
111. Fla. Bar In re Advisory Opinion HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 518 So. 2d at 1272.
112. Id.
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public harm, due in part to a lack of adequate training and supervision in the
proper procedures and legal ramifications of the dependency process.
'' 13
This opinion is significant because it recognizes the problems of nonlawyer
and inadequate representation of children in dependency proceedings.
In a second opinion in 1989, Florida Bar In re Advisory Opinion HRS
NQnLawyer Counselor,' 4 the court reviewed a report of the Supreme Court
Committee on HRS Nonlawyer Counselors, which found that HRS, guardi-
ans ad litem, and others are unable to process cases within the statutory time
limits for children in emergency care or foster homes." 5  The Committee
concluded that the problem of extensive delays was partially attributed to the
insufficient involvement of lawyers in the juvenile process. The Commit-
tee suggested "a greater investment of time by lawyers in the system.., to
protect the important rights of the children and families whose lives come
under the control of the system."' 7 The report further stated the Committee
had knowledge of harm suffered by children through the current practice of
allowing nonlawyer counselors to oversee dependency cases without legal
representation.'8
The Committee concluded that, as the system was presently arranged,
HRS counselors failed their clients in two ways. 19 First, their experience
and training prepared them for social work and not legal services; thus, they
were not adequately equipped to perform legal services.'12 Second, the time
spent preparing for legal services takes away from time that would be best
spent improving the case management aspect of their jobs. Due to the lack
of legal background and large case loads, the Committee found that it was
inappropriate for HRS counselors to handle dependency cases without legal
representation. 122
The supreme court held that adequate legal representation on behalf of
IRS is required at every stage of juvenile dependency hearings conducted
pursuant to part DI of chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes. 23 An attorney'spresence is required in all court proceedings and supervision in the prepara-
113. Id.
114. 547 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1989).
115. Id. at 910.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Fla. Bar In re Advisory Opinion HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 So. 2d at 910.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id. at911.
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tion of all legal documents.'2 The court extended its holding to include all
foster care proceedings, all child-in-need-of-services proceedings, and all
termination of parental rights proceedings.125 Further, it held that HRS must
end its practice of law by lay person counselors under these statutes and
ordered the Juvenile Rule Committee of the Florida Bar to draft amendments
to the present laws and submit to the court.
126
B. Florida's Statutory Scheme Governing Representation of Children
The legislature's purpose in enacting chapter 39 was "[t]o provide for
the care, safety, and protection of children in an environment that fosters
healthy social, emotional, intellectual, and physical development; to ensure
secure and safe custody; and to promote the health and well-being of all
children under the state's care."1 7 The chapter provides that the state's
judicial and other procedures must "assure due process through which
children ... and other interested parties are assured fair hearings... and the
recognition, protection, and enforcement of their constitutional and other
legal rights." 2 The dependency process comprises of a "complex body of
substantive law and evidentiary rules,' 29 as well as a "compendium of
relevant sociological, psychological, and medical data."3 The law provides
for a detailed system of taking children into custody, arraignments, 13 shelter
hearings,132 mediation, injunctions to prevent abuse,133 adjudicatory hear-
ings, 1 3 dispositional hearings,135 periodic judicial reviews,' 3 6 and appeal. 137
124. Fla. Bar In re Advisory Opinion HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 So. 2d at 911.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(a) (2000). The legislature also enacted a set of goals for
dependent children, a form of bill of rights, in 1999. The goals are virtually meaningless
because the legislature explicitly made them unenforceable. § 39.4085.
128. § 39.001(1)(1).
129. Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
130. Il There are also detailed statutory provisions governing medical, psychiatric
and psychological examinations and treatment of the child. § 39.407.
131. § 39.506.
132. § 39.401, .402(1), (2), (8)(a), (h), .01(65).
133. § 39.504.
134. § 39.507.
135. § 39.521.
136. § 39.701.
137. §§ 39.510, .815. The statute provides that any party affected by an order may
appeal. By definition this includes both the child and guardian ad litem because each is a
party in a dependency proceeding.
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It includes "[a]n independent, trained advocate, when intervention is necess-
ary and a skilled guardian or caregiver in a safe environment when alter-
native placement is necessary."' 138 The process is both complex and time
consuming. One commentator has concluded that, with delays, it is possible
that as many as sixteen court hearings may take place in a year. 3 9 Addition-
ally, the courts and other commentators have commented on the delays.140 It
is also highly subjective. 41 For these reasons-reduction in delays and
dealing with the complexity and subjectivity of the process-among others,
this article urges representation of children by counsel in dependency and
termination of parental rights cases.
Courts are required by statute to appoint guardians ad litem 4 at the
earliest possible time in child abuse, abandonment, or neglect proceedings.1
43
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Florida Statutes, and two orders
of the Supreme Court of Florida codify the operation of guardian ad litem
programs in the state.
The statutes enumerate a list of persons that can qualify as a guardian
ad litem including:
[A] certified guardian ad litem program, a duly certified volunteer,
a staff attorney, contract attorney, or certified pro bono attorney
working on behalf of a guardian ad litem or the program; staff
members of a program office; a court-appointed attorney; or a re-
sponsible adult who is appointed by the court to represent the best
interests of a child in a proceeding as provided for by law, includ-
ing, but not limited to, this chapter, who is a party to any judicial
proceeding as a representative of the child, and who serves until
discharged by the court.144
138. § 39.001(3)(h).
139. Michael T. Dolce, A Better Day for Children: A Study of Florida's Dependency
System with Legislative Recommendations, 25 NOVA L. REv 547 (2001).
140. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS, supra note 1; Ritter v. Dep't of Children
& Family Servs., 700 So. 2d 805, 805 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Fla. Bar In re Advisory
Opinion HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 So. 2d 909, 910 (Fla. 1989); In re S.B.B., 379 So.
2d 395, 398 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
141. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
142. One court has described the court's power to appoint a guardian ad litem as
"inherent." Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994). The Florida Statutes call persons who act on behalf of a drug dependent new-
born a "Guardian advocate." § 39.820(2); Amended Administrative Order, supra note 19.
143. § 39.822(1); see FLA. R. Juv. PROC. 8.170.
144. § 39.820(1).
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Parents who can afford to must reimburse the court for all or part of the cost
of the guardian ad litem.
45
Significantly, the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure and Florida
Statutes consider guardians ad litem, and sometimes the local guardian ad
litem program and the child asaarties to the action who have standing to
participate in the proceedings. This status as a party raises questions
concerning the relationship among the court, the child, and the other parties.
It has generated a substantial body of case law. 47 Guardians ad litem are
statutorily responsible to review dispositions, must be present at all impor-
tant stages of the dependency proceeding, must submit written reports to the
court, 14 may waive the child's right to confidentiality, 49 and may file
appeals on behalf of the child. 150 The report must include the wishes of the
child and the recommendations of the guardian ad litem.15 1 These laws put
the guardian in the position of a witness in the case. In the past, courts had
even gone so far as to order the guardian ad litem to make unannounced
visits to a parent's home.1 52 Recently, the Florida Legislature amended the
"statutory provision regarding the duties of the guardian ad litem, specifically
to remove the section which had given the court authority to order a guardian
ad litem. to provide such services.1 53  However, the statute continues to
provide that the guardian ad litem's duty is to "represent" the child.IM The
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure expressly forbid the practice of law by
145. § 39.822(2).
146. § 39.01(51).
147. See Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994); In re Adoption of T.G.L., 606 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Coskey, 599 So. 2d 153, 157 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992);
Brevard County v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 589 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991); Brevard County v. Lanford, 588 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Marion
County v. Johnson, 586 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Dep't of Health & Rehab.
Servs. v. Cole, 574 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 91
(Fla. 1980).
148. FLA. STAT. § 39.822(3) (2000).
149. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. A.N., 604 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
150. § 39.815(1) (2000).
151. FLA. R. Juv. PROc. 8.215(c)(1).
152. Lewis v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 670 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
153. See § 39.807(2)(b); but see Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M. (Fla. 1995)
(approving trial court order appointing legal services program in dependency case and
empowering it to act in proceedings outside the dependency proceeding which resulted in the
filing of damage action against the Department).
154. § 39.807(2)(a).
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lay guardians, 155 although the guardian ad litem is authorized to file depend-
ency petitions and petitions to terminate parental rights.156 The structure of
the guardian ad litem role is thus internally inconsistent. The guardian is
obligated at times to be confidante of the child, a witness, and an advocate.
These roles can be entirely contradictory.
At the same time, the Supreme Court of Florida Amended the Adminis-
trative Order, governing the standards of operation of the guardian ad litem
program, and Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, creates an inherent
conflict for a lawyer who acts as a guardian ad litem. The supreme court
Order and the rules provide on the one hand that the lawyer may not practice
law, which seems to suggest somehow that a lawyer who is a guardian ad
litem might practice law. 57 However, the rules also provide for the ap-
pointment of the lawyer as an "attorney ad litem" who has different respon-
sibilities. 15' The attorney ad litem represents the child. It thus becomes
unclear whether, given Florida's statutory provisions that make the guardian
ad litem a party, how the lawyer as a guardian ad litem can practice law
given his or her party status. The federal statute, CAPTA, expressly pro-
vides that a guardian ad litem may be an attorney but does not create the
conundrum found in the Florida law. i1 9 Thus a conflict results having to do
with the lawyer's professional responsibility under the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Arguably, when an attorney acts as a guardian ad litem, that
attorney is not relieved of the responsibilities provided by the Rules of
Professional Conduct.t6° Yet if the lawyer as a guardian ad litem is a party
who may testify among other things, an inherent conflict is raised.
Another prospective conflict, although one not recognized by the court,
concerns the issue of separation of powers. '"The guardian ad litem program
is administered by the Office of the State Court Administrators under the
supervision and control of the supreme court.' 6' As such, although the
155. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(c)(4)(f).
156. Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994); Lupineck v. Firth, 619 So. 2d 379, 390 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
157. FLA. R. Jtv. P. 8.215(f); Amended Administrative Order, supra note 19, at
Preamble § (c)-(e).
158. FLA. R. Jtv. P. 8.215(c).
159. 42 U.S.C.§ 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix) (Supp. IV 1999).
160. See ANN. M. HARALAMBE, THE CHILD ADvOCATE 6 (1993); Ventrell, supra note
84, at 268; David R. Katner, Coming to Praise, Not to Bury, the New ABA Standards of
Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETfUCS 103 (2000).
161. In re J.M., 579 So. 2d 820, 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Servs, v. Cole, 574 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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guardian ad litem is a separate and distinct party from DCF,162 the guardian
ad litem remains, in essence, responsible to the supreme court. The Third
District Court of Appeal dismissed this problem over a vigorous dissent by
Chief Judge Schwartz
163
Another problem is the lack of the assignment of a guardian ad litem in
many cases. In addition to being required by federal law,'6 the need for
guardians ad litem for children in dependency proceedings has been recog-
nized as necessary by dependency judges. One trial court judge "character-
ized the absence of an active guardian as fundamental and an impediment to
her ability to conclude that the grounds for termination were established by
clear and convincing evidence. ' r65 However, the appellate court in this case
held that this absence did not prevent the trial court from readjudicating
children dependent based on specific allegations of abuse.1 This opinion
represents part of a growing body of Florida case law in which the appeals
courts have inexplicably accepted the failure to either appoint or continue in
place a guardian ad litem in a dependency or termination of parental rights167 168
proceeding. In Vestal v. Vestal, the appeals court relied upon several
prior cases in the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal to hold that the
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem in a termination of parental rights case
is not fundamental error. 169 The problem with these opinions is they find an
exception in the Florida law where none exists. The statute is absolute and
mandatory on its face.170 Furthermore, the federal funding statute, CAPTA,
162. In re J.M., 579 So. 2d at 821.
163. See Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So. 2d 957, 963 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 5106(b)(2)(A)(ix) (Supp. IV 1999).
165. W.R. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 701 So. 2d 651, 652 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1997). In its Draft Report to the Senate on the Legal Needs of Children, Report No.
2002-140 (Nov. 2001), at page 18, the Committee on the Judiciary found that guardians ad
litem have provided representation in only 58% of the dependency cases to which the court
appointed a guardian ad litem and only 36% of the petitions for dependency have a guardian
ad litem assigned.
166. Id.
167. W.R. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 751 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000); Vestal v. Vestal, 731 So. 2d 828, 829 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In re E.F.,
639 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. 2d Dist, Ct. App. 1994). This issue has been raised by this author in
prior Florida Juvenile Law Survey articles. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 97, at 222-24.
168. 731 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
169. Id. (citing Fisher v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 674 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In re E.F. 639 So. 2d at 639. See also Dale, supra note 97, at 222-24
(criticizing the Fisher decision).
170. See F.A. STAT. § 39.807(2)(a) (2000).
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is also absolute, as this article demonstrates. 171 The Florida courts have
never commented upon the application of CAPTA to failure to provide or
continue in place a guardian ad litem. Courts simply conclude using "no
harm no foul" language, finding that while the statute may be mandatory on
its face, the failure to provide a guardian ad litem is not fundamental error.
Applying the same logic, if a parent did not have a lawyer in a termination of
parental rights case, which is statutorily although not constitutionally man-
dated, would the court find that there is no fundamental error, or would the
court say that the right is more significant for the parent than for the child
and thus fundamental as to the parent but not as to the child.
Although there is no statutory right to counsel for children in depend-
ency proceedings, occasionally a lawyer does represent a child in a depend-
ency or termination of parental rights proceeding. This occurs on an ad hoc,
irregular, and infrequent basis. The sources of representation are varied.
First, the court appears to have authority where necessary to appoint an
attorney ad litem to represent a child by virtue of language in the 1995
Supreme Court Administrative Order Relating to the Standards of Operation
of Guardian Ad Litem Programs.172 The only language in chapter 39 refer-
ring to attorneys ad litem is in the bills of rights for children and in refer-
ence to a pilot attorney program in Orange and Osceola Counties.' 74 Thus,
for example, a trial court does not have a duty to appoint counsel for a minor
simply because a representative from the guardian ad litem program requests
the appointment.175 The court may use its discretion to make an appoint-
ment, with "independent judgment after reviewing the need for the requested
appointment."' 76  In Davis v. Page,77 the federal Fifth Circuit Court of
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 5101-06 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
172. Amended Administrative Order, supra note 19, § (e):
(e) Role of the Pro Bono Attorney
The role of the pro bono attorney is to provide legal assistance to the
guardian ad litem when such assistance is necessary for the guardian ad litem
to effectively represent the best interest of the child. The pro bono attorney
may also provide legal support to the GAL Program under separate and spe-
cific order of appointment. [For purposes of these standards, the role of the
pro bono attorney is distinguished from that of an attorney ad litem, who is
appointed by the court and is independent of the GAL Program, to provide
legal representation to the child.]
173. § 39.013(1).
174. § 39.4086.
175. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Coskey, 599 So. 2d 153, 156 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
176. Id.
177. 714 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1984).
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Appeals held that the right to c6unsel in Florida dependency proceedings
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
178
Second, a number of the law schools in Florida, including Nova South-
eastern University, the University of Miami, the University of Florida, and
Florida State University, have clinical programs where students, as interns,
represent some children in dependency proceedings. 179 In addition, a na-
tional nonprofit organization, Lawyers for Children America, Inc., represents
children in Miami. Based upon a model introduced in Hartford, Connecticut
in 1995, Lawyers for Children America, Inc. recruits volunteer lawyers from
law firms and corporate legal departments to represent children in a multi-
disciplinary approach in the dependency court.1IS " Several legal aid programs
also represent children in dependency proceedings.181
Most recently, during the 2000 legislative session, the Florida Legisla-
ture enacted an attorney ad litem pilot program aimed at assigning lawyers to
represent certain children in out-of-home care. 18 The statute provides that
the Office of State Courts Administration establish an agency to provide
representation. 1 3 The result has been the development of a program through
Barry University School of Law in Orlando.184 The statute, in the form of a
demonstration project, is both limited in scope and unclear in approach. In
fact, it appears that the largest sums appropriated by the legislature are being
used to fund guardian ad litem programs in Orange and Osceola counties.
19
Of the $1.8 million appropriated, only $300,000 goes to lawyer representa-
tion.
181
178. Id. at 514.
179. Florida Senate Committee on the Judiciary Draft Report 2002-140, Legal Needs
of Children, at 16 (Nov. 2001).
180. Helen Stein, Esq. & Candace L. Maze, Esq., Lawyers for Children America,
Inc.-A Unique Model of Pro Bono Representation for Abused and Neglected Children,
Improving the Professional Response to Children in the Legal System, 2000 Children's Law
Manual Series, National Association of Counsel for Children.
181. Telephone Interview with David Bazerman, Legal Aid Society of Broward County
(Dec. 1, 2001); Telephone Interview with Barbara Burch, Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach
County (Mar. 28,2001).
182. FLA. STAT. § 39.4086(2) (2000).
183. Id.
184. Ninth Judicial Circuit Attorney Ad Litem Project, Barry University's Report
Presented to the Florida Bar Commission on the Legal Needs of Children (June 21, 2001);
Telephone conversations with Gerard Glynn, Director of Clinical Programs, Barry University
School of Law (Oct. 21, 2001).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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Even when attorneys represent children in abuse and neglect proceed-
ings there are questions as to who pays for their services.1 7 When a lawyer
is appointed as an attorney ad litem because of the failure of a previously
appointed guardian ad litem to perform his or her duties, the Department of
Children and Family Services is responsible for paying the attorney ad
litem's fees. 188 Further, the Department is not responsible for the operational
costs of guardian ad litem programs, programs that "it did not create and
over which it has no control."
18
The Florida Guardian Ad Litem Program, a member of National CASA,
has twenty-one programs located in the twenty judicial circuits.1 90 The
program functions in every county except Orange County where the Legal
Aid Society serves as the guardian ad litem. The Florida Guardian Ad Litem
Program operates under the auspices of the judicial branch. The mission of
the program is to recruit, train, and supervise volunteers to advocate for the
best interests of the children who are alleged to be abused, neglected, or
abandoned, and who are involved in court proceedings. 9  Each county's
program may consist of different divisions within the program structure with
coverage extending to domestic relations and other custody matters. For
example, the Broward County Guardian Ad Litem Program of the Seven-
teenth Judicial Circuit has three divisions: Dependency, Family Law, and
Criminal.192 The program literature explains that volunteers for these pro-
grams do not need to be attorneys because they are acting as advocates for
these children, not legal counsel.193 For example, criminal court guardians
ad litem are appointed when there are criminal proceedings in which a child
may be asked to testify. 194
The Legal Aid Society of the Orange County Bar Association was
founded thirty-eight years ago to help indigent individuals in the commu-
187. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Coskey, 599 So. 2d 153, 157 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); Brevard County v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 589 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Brevard County v. Lanford, 588 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
188. Marion County v. Johnson, 586 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
189. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cole, 574 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
190. OFFICE OF STATE COURT ADM'R, FIA. GUARDIAN AD LrrEM TRAINING MANUAL,
Introduction & Overview, at 7 [hereinafter FLA. GUARDIAN AD LrrEM TRAINNG MANUAL].
191. Id.
192. See generally BROWARD COUNTY GUARDIAN AD LrrEM TRAINING MANUAL.
193. FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 190, Roles & Responsi-
bilities of the Guardian Ad Litem Program, at 2.
194. Id.
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nity.195 The Orange County Guardian Ad Litem Program is not part of the
state nor a member of National CASA. This organization acts as attorneys
for abused, neglected, or abandoned children. Orange County, Florida of the
Ninth Judicial Circuit began and continues to provide pro bono attorney
guardians ad litem in its volunteer program through Legal Aid Society.
196
In summary, the appellate opinions, ad hoc independent programs, and
legislative pilot project all demonstrate that a child's representative, whether
by an attorney in addition to or as an alternative to a guardian ad litem, is
recognized as a critical participant in facilitating the child's best interests
and advocating for the child in the context of a system that is unable to
efficiently and safely care for children in its care. The following section, in
brief survey fashion, demonstrates that, while other states uniformly recog-
nize this need for children's representation in dependency proceedings, their
implementation of representation is quite diverse and eclectic with no single
approach standing out as a most accepted model.
V. A SURVEY OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Statutory frameworks providing for child representation vary through-
out the country, requiring or allowing discretionary appointment of an
attorney, a Guardian Ad Litem, or a Court Appointed Special Advocate
(CASA) volunteer. 197 No two states or local jurisdictions within a state
195. Letter from Mary Ann Morgan, President of the Legal Aid Society of the Orange
County Bar Ass'n; see also ORANGE COUNTY BAR ASS'N, INc., LEGAL Am Soc'y, INFO.
PACKEr [hereinafter ORANGE COUNTY BAR Ass'N].
196. ORANGE COUNTY BAR AsS'N, supra note 189.
197. See generally Laurie K. Adams, CASA: A Child's Voice in Court, 29 CREGHTON
L. REV. 1467 (1996); Jennifer E. Alexander, Is There a New Guardian Ad Litem Just Around
the Comer in Missouri, 54 Mo. B.J. 242 (SeptiOct.1998); Kristin G. Brewer, Utah Office of
Guardian Ad Litem, 9 UTAH B.J. 21 (May 1996); Linda D. Elrod, Responses to the Confer-
ence: An Analysis of the Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Children
in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1999 (1996); Albert E. Hartmann, Note:
Crafting an Advocate for a Child: In Support of Legislation Redefining the Role of the
Guardian Ad Litem in Michigan Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM
237 (1997); William R. Joiner, Juvenile Proceedings, Parental Rights: Provide for Appoint-
ment of Counsel or Court Appointed Special Advocate as Guardian Ad Litem for a Minor in
Deprivation Cases, 15 GA. ST. L. REv. 49 (1998); William Wesley Patton, Family Law
Corner: Who Speaks for the Child in Abuse Cases: Autonomy or Best Interests? 40 ORANGE
COUNTY LAWYER 40 (Nov. 1998); Melissa D. Protzek, A Voice for the Children: Court-
Appointed Child Advocates are Trying to Make a Difference One Case at a Time in the Lives
of Children in the Juvenile Court System, 22 PA. LAWYER 26 (Jan./Feb. 2000); Robert E.
Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, "I Know the Child is My Client, But Who am l?" 64
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share the same system for representing children in dependency proceedings,
although all have some form of representation. 198 Thus, it is difficult to
make generalizations about the different state or county models. 199 However,
it appears that all of the jurisdictions were influenced by a combination of
the Supreme Court opinion in In re Gault, the passage of CAPTA, and the
advent of the CASA movement. Although jurisdictions differ in their
choice of terminology and practices, their approaches share several common
traits. 2°1 First, in 1996, at least thirty-eight states linked the role of the child
representative to the "best interests" of the child, despite employing different
labels for this concept. 202 Second, there is no consensus as to what is meant
by the "best interests" concept. 2°3 Third, the models are greatly influenced
by budgetary concerns. 204 Essentially, there are two approaches or models,
sometimes separate and sometimes mixed. They include representation by
counsel or guardian ad litem, of which the CASA is one format or approach.
A. Guardian Ad Litem & CASA
Twenty-two states provide for a guardian ad litem,2°5 Twenty-three
FORDHAM L. REV. 1917 (1996); Christopher N. Wu, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation
of Children in Dependency Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857 (1996); Geoff Yuda, Protecting
Pennsylvania's At-Risk Children: The Role of Court-appointed Special Advocates, 22 PA.
LAWYER 30 (Jan./Feb. 2000).
198. Final Report on the Validation and Effectiveness Study of Legal Representation
Through Guardian Ad Litem (1993).
199. PETERS, supra note 48, at 26.
200. Id. at 27-28.
201. Id. at 30.
202. Id. at 30-31.
203. Id. at 32.
204. PETERS, supra note 48, at 32.
205. ALA. CODE § 12-8 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.050 (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 8-522 (2000) (special advocate); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-62, 44-20, 46b-129a
(West 2000); FLA. STAT. § 39.4086, .820-.822 (2000); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215; HAW. REV.
STAT. § 587-34 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 16-1618, 1630-1632 (2000); IOWA CODE § 232.2,
232.71C, 232.89 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 119, 29 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 260C.163(5)
(2000); MINN. R. Juv. P. 62.01; Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-121 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §
41-3-303 (2000); NEv. REV. STAT. § 432B.500-.505 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-10, -
18-1 (Michie 2000); N.M. R. CT. 10-305; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-601 to 1200 (2000); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-08 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1; Ofio REv. CODE ANN. §
2151.281 (West 2000); FRANKLIN COUNTY COMM. PLEAS. JUV. CT. R. 15, 27; S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-110 to 121 (Law. Co-op. 2000); S.D. CODrifED LAWS § 26-8A-20 (Michie 2000); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5525 (2000); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.12.175 (2000), .44.053 (2000);
WIS. STAT. § 44.235 (2000).
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states provide for a CASA,20 6 and eleven states provide for both.207 However,
in most jurisdictions, there is little difference between the duties and powers
of the guardian ad litem and CASA.208 Instead, the difference seems to be
simply that of different organizational structures and recruiting pools rather
than a true dichotomy of roles. In some jurisdictions, like Florida, a lawyer
may act as a guardian ad litem but not practice law in that capacity.
In 1976, Judge David Soukup in Seattle, Washington, began using
community volunteers trained in making decisions for abused and neglected
children to recommend to the court what they felt would be in the best
interest of the child.209 By 1977, the idea expanded and was encouraged by
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.2'0 The National
Court Appointed Special Advocate Association was formed in 1982, and in
1990, the Victim of Child Abuse Act was passed by Congress. CASA is a
211
national organization based in Seattle, Washington. This organization
participates in the training, recruiting, and management of CASA volunteers.
There are 800 local programs, 48,000 volunteers, 44 state organizations, 12212
state administered programs, and 183,000 children being served. Although
CASA volunteers go through extensive training, they do not require their
volunteers to be attorneys. The role of a CASA volunteer is not to give
legal representation for children but to investigate, report, and to recommend
206. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-401, 9-27-316 (Michie 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-
170 to 174 (Office of the Child Advocate); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.100, .500, .505, .515,
.525, .530 (Banks-Baldwin 2000); LA. REV. STAT. CHILDREN'S CODE § 424-424.3 (West
2000); MD. CODE ANN. § 3-834-834.1 (2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 419A.004, 419A.170
(2000); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6342 (2000); TEX. FAM. CODE § 264.601-.264.612 (2000)
(court appointed volunteer advocate); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-173.6-.13 (Michie 1999); W. VA.
R. CT. 3 & 52.
207. These include: Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee. See supra notes 190-200.
208. In fact, in Florida the guardian ad litem program is a member of the National
CASA Association. FLA. GUARDIAN AD LIrEm TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 190, Introduc-
tion & Overview, at 7.
209. For a detailed discussion of the CASA approach see Adams, supra note 191. See
also BROWARD COUNTY GUARDIAN AD LITEM TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 192, at 3;
Daniella Levine, To Assert Children's Legal Rights or Promote Children's Needs: How to
Attain Both Goals, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2023, 2025 (1996).
210. Id.
211. NAT'L CASA Ass'N, Strategic Plan 1995-2000, at httpll:www.casanet.org/ncasaal
nationalcasapolicies/strategi.htm (last visited Nov. 1999) [hereinafter NAT'L CASA Ass'N,
Strategic Plan].
212. NAT'L CASA Ass'N, 1999 STATE OF TBE STATES 3 [hereinafter STATE OF THE
STATES].
213. BROWARD COUNTY GUARDLAN AD LrrEM TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 192, at 3.
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to the court what would be in the best interests of the child in abuse and
214
neglect cases.
The 1998 statistics on Child Abuse, Foster Care, Adoption, and CASA
Report states that, in 1997, there were 2,943,829 children reported as abused
and neglected.215 According to the 1997 Child Welfare League of America's
Stat Book, 520,000 children were in foster care between October 1, 1997 and
March 31, 1998.21' The 1998 National CASA Association Annual Program
Survey National Totals states that 183,339 children were represented by
CASA volunteers.2 7 There are a total of 3331 United States. jurisdictions of
218
which 906 have a CASA Program. Between 206,000 and 425,000 chil-
dren in communities with CASA programs are not represented.219 This is
often due to the lack of volunteer resources or CASAs not being appointed, a
situation also present in Florida.
The Guardian Ad Litem Program is another organization, often volun-
tary in nature, that assigns individuals to specific cases to investigate, moni-
tor, and make recommendations to the court for the best interests of the child
in abuse and neglect cases. 2° State Guardian Ad Litem Programs often are
members of the National CASA Organization and recruit and train their
volunteers employing the National CASA Organization Standards. 22 Man-
datory guardian ad litem appointments have existed in the United States
since Colorado enacted the first such program in 1963. 22 The programs are
of varying formats. Some operate through a state or local office of court
administration. There are also guardian ad litem programs administered by
organizations such as a legal aid society.223  As noted earlier, Orange
214. Id.
215. 1998 Statistics on Child Abuse, Foster Care, Adoption & CASA, at 2, available at
http://www.casanet.orgtlibrary/abuse/abuse-stats98.htm (last visited Nov. 1999) [hereinafter
1998 Statistics on Child Abuse].
216. See generally State Child Welfare Agency Survey, Child Welfare League of
America (1999).
217. 1998 Statistics on Child Abuse, supra note 215.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LrEM PROGRAM, Consumer Services, available at
http:llwww.flabar.orglnew/flabarlconsumerservices/GenerallCallALaw/CAL1O68.hmAl (last visited
Nov. 1999).
221. FLA. GUARDIAN AD LrrEm TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 190, Introduction &
Overview, at 7.
222. Brian G. Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child:
The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 16, 17 n.7 (1976).
223. See FLA. GUARDIAN AD LrrEM TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 190; ORANGE
CoUrTY BAR ASS'N, supra note 195.
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County, Florida has adopted the Legal Aid Society as its Guardian Ad Litem
program structure. This program provides legal services to indigent persons
and children in dependency or abuse and neglect cases. 224 Here, guardians
ad litem assist in recommending what is in the best interests of the child as
well as advocating the legal rights of the child.
2 5
Many states have specific statutes mandating when a guardian ad litem
or CASA should be appointed.226 A guardian ad litem is a specially trained
volunteer appointed as an officer of the court to ensure that the best interests
227
of the child are protected while the child is a ward of the court. 27 In Florida,
the guardian ad litem has five basic roles. They are investigator, reporter
protector, spokesperson, and monitor of services provided to the children.iH
The guardian ad litem does not replace legal counsel or the social worker.
22 9
Guardian ad litem programs that are run under a state model often use
volunteers from the community, individuals with varying backgrounds.23
CASA, as well as Guardian Ad Litem programs, can be state organiza-
tions under the judicial branch of government, as in Florida, state organiza-
tions under the executive branch, or private nonprofit organizations with no
state funding.231 The structure can vary from state to state and county to
county. An advantage of being a state agency is that the program will receive
annual funding. A private not-for-profit organization must generate funding
through fund-raising and grants. This affects the amount of money the
program has to operate as well as the staff available for recruitment, training,
and management. 2 Some counties have community agencies that help fund
CASA and Guardian Ad Litem Programs. Colorado receives funding from
233the National CASA Association and foundations. In Colorado, all CASA
programs are private non-profit organizations or come under a non-profit
umbrella organization.234 These programs do not get state funding. In Flor-
ida, Speak Up For Children, Voices for Children Foundation, Inc., and the
224. ORANGE COUNTY BAR Ass'N, supra note 195.
225. See FLA. GuARDIAN AD LrEM TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 190, Roles &
Responsibilities of the Guardian Ad Litem, at 3 (listing the general roles of a guardian ad litem
in Florida, including the responsibilities of a guardian ad litem in Orange, County).
226. See, e.g., NAT'LCASA ASS'N, supra note 211.
227. FLORiDA GUARDIAN AD LrrEm PROGRAM, Consumer Services, supra note 220.
228. L
229. Id.
230. GA. CASA, INC., TRAINING MANUAL, What is CASA, at 3 (1999).
231. NAT'LCASA Ass'N, Strategic Plan, supra note 212.
232. Telephone Interview with Barbara Mattison of Colorado CASA (Oct. 28, 1999).
233. NAT'LCASA Ass'N., Stategic Plan, supra note 212.
234. Telephone Interview with Barbara Mattison, supra note 232.
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State of Florida provide funding to Guardian Ad Litem programs.235 Georgia
receives funding from the state, National CASA Association, foundations,
dues, and conference fees236 The Legal Aid Society of Orange County,
Florida is supported by various funding sources, including private donations,
government grants, foundations, and general public support.
237
In Georgia, CASA is the only nonprofit organization of volunteer
advocates for "deprived" children funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice &
Delinquency Prevention.238 Georgia CASA has thirty programs in forty-
three counties. 239 In 1999, approximately 3522 children were served, 24° and
over 19,000 children were in the legal custody of the state per month. 24 1 On
average, 197.6 incidents of child abuse and neglect are reported daily in
Georgia.2 2 In fiscal year 1999, the year-end report total number of cases
was 2057, with the number of children at 3522, and number of CASA volun-
teers at 1004.4 3 Georgia ranks as the fifth highest state in the nation in the
number of children who have been abused and neglected. 2
The CASA volunteer, in Georgia, is a lay individual from the commu-
nity who works with other service providers to act as an independent voice
for an abused or neglected child.24 5 These volunteers do not act as attorneys,
although they may assist attorneys who are representing the individual
parties, including children. The training consists of forty hours, which
include courtroom procedure, child advocacy techniques, neglect, physical
abuse and sexual abuse training, early childhood development, and adoles-
cent behavior.2 6 The volunteer's role is to advocate for a child from the
beginning of the case until it is resolved, attend all legal proceedings, assess
all of the facts in the case, and to make recommendations in the child's best
interests. 247 Volunteers must be twenty-one years of age. 24 The potentialvolunteer is given a personal interview, which includes a screening for
235. About Voices for Children, available at http://www.voicesgal. org/about_vfc.html
(last visited Nov. 1999).
236. NAT'L CASA AS'N, Strategic Plan, supra note 212.
237. ORANGE CoUNTY BAR ASS'N, supra note 195.
238. See GA. CASA, INC., supra note 230, History of CASA.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at CASA Facts.
242. Id.
243. GA. CASA, INC., supra note 230, at 6.
244. Id. at CASA Facts.
245 Id. at What is CASA.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. GA. CASA, INC., supra note 230, at What is CASA.
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objectivity, competence, and commitment, and a fingerprint and background
check is also conducted.249 No special or legal background is required to be
a CASA.250 After training, each volunteer is sworn in by a juvenile court
judge prior to the assignment of a first case.25 1 Each volunteer takes either
one or two cases at a time, a significantly lighter caseload than the Depart-
ment of Children and Families' caseload of thirty.
B. Counsel
Presently, twenty-four states have promulgated laws declaring that
children in dependency hearings may have some form of appointed coun-
252sel. Five states only provide for counsel with no separate provision for a
GAL or CASA.25 3 The states vary as to what is required of the attorney and
the rights of the child. For example, Nebraska requires that the guardian ad
litem be an attorney except in cases when there are special reasons why a
particular lay person would be appropriate.25 4 In Virginia, all guardians ad
litem are attorneys.
25 5
New York provides a system of counsel for children in its dependency
system.25 6 The lawyer for the child in the New York system by statute is
249. Id.
250. Id
251. Id. at CASA Facts.
252. ALA. CODE §§ 12-15-1, 26-14-11 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.050 (Michie
2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-221 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316 (2000); CAL. WELF. &
INST. § 317 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129a, -136 (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 925 (2000); HAw. REV. STAT. § 587-34 (2000). IOWA CODE § 232.89 (2000); LA.
REv. STAT. § 607 (West 2000); MD. CODE § 3-834 (2000); MICH. COMP. LAws & 712A.17d
(2000) (attorney guardian ad litem); Miss. CODE. § 43-21-121 (2000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 169-C:10 (2000) (guardian ad litem may be an attorney); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.23 (West
2000) (law guardian); N. MEx. STAT. § 32A-1-4(J) (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-08
(2000); N.D. R. CT. 8.7 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS & 26-8A-18 (Michie 2000); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-7-0, -3a-911-912 (1996 & Supp. 2000) (attorney guardian ad litem); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-266-266.1 (Michie 2000); W. VA. CODE § 49-7-2 (Michie 2000); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 14-3-211 (Michie 2000).
253. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-11 (1996); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1-103
(West 2000), 19-3-602; MD. CODt ANN. CTS. & JuD. PRoc. § 3-821, 3-834 (2000); W. VA.
CODE § 49-6-2 (Michie 2000).
254 R.R.S. NEB. CODE § 43-272(3) (2000).
255. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266 (Michie 2000).
256 Besharov, supra note 7, § 242; see also Sheri Bonstelle & Christine Schessler,
Adjourning Justice: New York State's failure to Support Assigned Counsel Violates the
Rights of Families in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings 28 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1151
(2001) (discussing lack of attorney representation for parents in abuse and neglect cases).
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known as a law guardian. 257 Perhaps the best known law guardian program
in New York, and certainly the oldest, is the Legal Aid Society of New
York.258 The Legal Aid Society helps provide legal counsel to indigent
persons within the community in a variety of settings, including criminal
defense, domestic relations, civil, and juvenile matters. 259 The Legal Aid
Society represents ninety-percent of the children who appear before the
Family Court in New York City in matters involving child abuse and neglect,
juvenile delinquency, and children alleged to be persons in need of supervi-
sion. 26 The Legal Aid Society acts as Law Guardians to more than 40,000
children and represents more than 38,000 families.261 The Legal Aid Soci-
ety's policy is to co-advise and counsel their clients and then to advocate the
clients' interests and wishes.
262
Illinois is one of the states that passed a statute that either requires or
permits the appointment of independent counsel for children in a variety of
judicial and administrative settings. 3 Thus, children who are the subjects
of proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act and the Mental Health Code
must be represented by a guardian ad litem, and that guardian ad litem is
represented by an attorney.26 The court must also appoint a guardian ad
litem in each case involving a child not of the age of majority who is the
subject of a proceeding under the state's Juvenile Court Act or Mental
Health Code.265 The guardian ad litem shall represent the minor's best
interests. 266 It is the guardian ad litem's responsibility to form the required
relationships and investigation necessary to represent the best interests of the
child.257 The Juvenile Court Act provides that no hearing on any petition or
motion filed under the Act may be commenced unless the minor who is the
257. Id.
258. Besharov, supra note 7, § 241; see Janet A Chaplan, Youth Perspectives on
Lawyers' Ethics: A Report on Seven Interviews, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1763 (1996). The
author served as an attorney in the Legal Aid Society of the City of New York Juvenile Rights
Division from 1974-78.
259. ORANGE COUNTY BAR ASS'N, supra note 195.
260. THE LEGAL AID SoCIETY, available at http://www.legal-aid.org/legal.htm (last
visited May 2001).
261. Id.
262. Besharov, supra note 7, § 241.
263 705 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 405/2-17(1), (2) (West 1999).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at (1)(b).
267. See id. at (8).
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268subject of the proceeding is represented by counsel. When the court has
appointed a guardian ad litem that is not an attorney at law, the court must
appoint an attorney at law to represent the guardian ad litem.26 1 The court is
also allowed to appoint a community volunteer, such as a court appointed
special advocate or a person from CASA.270 Usually, these individuals are
not legally trained.27'
California's approach is different. State statutes provide that in all
cases in which an abuse and neglect petition has been filed, the probation
officer or social worker who filed the petition shall serve as the guardian ad
litem to the child, unless the court in its discretion appoints another adult
guardian ad litem to represent the child's interests.272 The statute clarifies
that the guardian ad litem shall not be the attorney responsible for proving
abuse or neglect.273 Unlike mandatory appointment of guardians ad litem,
the appointment of legal counsel in California is discretionary.2 7 4 The courts
may appoint counsel for the minor when it appears to the court that "the
minor would benefit from the appointment of counsel." 275 Although Cali-
fornia enumerates the responsibilities of the child's counsel in dependency
proceedings including interests "beyond the scope of the juvenile proceed-
ing,"276 the statutes emphasize that the child's attorney is "not required to
assume the [duties] of a social worker and is not expected to provide nonle-
gal services to the child.
' 277
In the Colorado juvenile court, the attorney is formally called the
guardian ad litem.278 Colorado Revised Statutes section 19-1-103 defines the
guardian ad litem as a person appointed by a court to act in the best interests
of a person.279 The child is not a client, and it is not the job of the guardian
to parrot the request of the child. The unique role of the guardian ad litem is
280to represent the best interests of the child. Colorado recognizes that the
268. 705 ILL. COM'. STAT. 405/1-5(1); see also Diane Geraghty, Ethical Issue in the
Legal Representation of Children in Illinois: Roles, Rules & Reforms, 29 LOY. U. Cn. L.J.
289, 291 (1998).
269. Id. at (4); Geraghty, supra note 268, at 291.
270 705 ILL. COMp. STAT. 405/2-17.1.
271 Id.
272. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 326 (West 2000).
273. Id.
274. See § 317(c).
275. Id.
276 Id. §317(e).
277. Id. § 326.
278. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-103 (West 2000).
279. Id.
280. Id.
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role of the attorney representing children is different then the attorney's role
in other court proceedings. As a result, the Colorado State Bar has adopted
guardian ad litem standards. 281  The guidelines require that an attorney
participating in the Colorado guardian ad litem program is mandated to have
a minimum of ten hours of specialized training or self education.282 Inexpe-
rienced attorneys appointed as guardian ad litems must complete eight hours
of accredited training on the role of the guardian ad litem.
2 3
In most counties in Colorado, the guardian ad litem is appointed under a
contract system. 2 This is the case in most abuse and neglect cases.
Through the contract system of appointing guardian ad litems, the attorney
does not work for the government, a government agency, or institution, but
as an independent attorney. The attorneys contract directly with the state
judicial department or district court.285  The contract creates an ethical
obligation to carry out a case similar to the obligation that is created when an
attorney accepts money and creates a retainer agreement in the private bar.
However, the major difference is that the agreement is not between the client
(the partybeing represented) and the attorney, but between the court and the
attorney. This model has been criticized because it sometimes creates a
conflict of interest.287 The attorney often finds himself appearing before
judges who sign his or her contracts. Critics believe that this makes the
288
attorney obligated to the judge as well as the child. Another problem is
the rates paid to attorneys who contract with the court system tends to be
low.28 9 As a result, very few attorneys want to participate. In addition,
because the contract rates are so low, many contracting attorneys contract for
more cases than they can handle causing the same attorneys to appear in
court four to five days a week. 29  This may lead to attorneys becoming
overly familiar with the judges and other agencies involved.291 It is the duty
281. Marie Walton & Donna Schmalberger, Final Draft of Proposed GAL Standards
of Practice, 22 COLO. LAW. 1907 (1993).
282. Id. at 1910.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1909-10.
286. Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1842 (1996).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Nancy Nerras, Comment, The Non-Lawyer Guardian Ad Litem in Child Abuse
and Neglect Proceedings: The King County, Washington Experience, 58 WASH. L. REv. 853,
866 (1983).
290. Walton, supra note 281, at 1907.
291. Id.
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of the district court judges to monitor the guardian ad litem attorneys and
preside over the dependency proceeding.292 This double-duty also creates a
conflict of interest that is one of the concerns of critics of the Colorado
system.293
As this brief survey shows, there are two different approaches to the
appointment of an attorney as counsel for a child. These approaches include
the attorney for the child and a guardian ad litem who is an attorney. A
survey of national standards for a child's attorney by the American Bar
Association defines the attorney-appointed guardian ad litem in the follow-
ing way: "a lawyer appointed as 'guardian ad litem' for a child is an officer
of the court appointed to protect the child's interests without being bound by
,,295the child's expressed preferences. These standards do not apply to
nonlawyers when such persons are appointed as guardians ad litem or as
"court appointed special advocates .... The nonlawyer guardian ad litem
cannot and should not be expected to perform any legal functions on behalf
of a child. 296
VI. THE CASE FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION
There are numerous organizations, books, articles, and professional
publications that present strong public policy arguments for the use of
attorneys in all proceedings in which juveniles are before the court in de-
pendency and termination of parental rights cases.297 Foremost is the Ameri-
can Bar Association, which has introduced national standards for the repre-
sentation of children, including representation in dependency proceed-
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Sometimes referred to as attorney ad litem, as in the Supreme Court of Florida
Order, or law guardian, as in New York.
295. A.B.A., Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and
Neglect Cases (Feb. 5, 1996), available at http://www.abanet.org/child/rep-preface.html
[hereinafter A.B.A. Standards].
296. Id.; Institute of Judicial Administration/American Bar Association, Standards
Relating to Abuse and Neglect Cases (1980).
297. See, e.g., Leonard P. Edwards, A Comprehensive Approach to the Representation
of Children: The Child Advocacy Coordinating Counsel, 27 FAM. L.Q. 417 (1993). But see
Jan Pudlow, Should All Children in Court be Represented? 28 Fla. Bar News 21, at 1, 9 (Nov.
1, 2001) (quoting Ninth Judicial Circuit Judge Daniel Dawson that "[i]t's philosophically
dangerous to have attorneys for every child. I have parents' attorneys who come before me.
And because they are skilled in the law, they do things that are bad for children.")
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ings.298 The National Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) "be-
lieves that attorneys representing children and families should have a combi-
nation of knowledge, training, experience, and ability which allows them to
effectively discharge their duties to their clients." 29 NACC asserts that all
parties should be represented by counsel, including children in abuse and
neglect related proceedings.3 ° NACC is trying to encourage federal law to
mandate that independent attorneys be appointed to represent the interests of
children in such proceedings.30 1 NACC firmly believes that CASA volun-
teers are important to ensure families receive appropriate services and
assistance, but children's attorneys remain uniquely qualified to provide a
legal voice for the child. Therefore, CASA volunteers can work alongside
children's attorneys but cannot take the place of the children's legal voice. 3
On August 8, 1994, CASA summarized a Validation and Effectiveness Study
on Legal Representation through Guardian Ad Litem, which identify the role
of attorneys, guardians ad litem, and CASA.3 4 The report states that:
CASAs provides a different style of advocacy and perform many
activities that attorneys do not .... CASAs tend to avoid the legal
aspects of representation, and place greater emphasis on promoting
cooperation among the parties. CASAs and attorneys prioritize
their time differently, reflecting their areas of training and expertise
-attorneys in legal representation and courtroom activities,
CASAs in nonlegal and social service activities outside the court-
room.
Training, Accountability and Quality Control Findings ... [stated
that] [s]taff attorneys probably receive more training than CASAs;
private attorneys less. CASA training, however, covers more top-
298. See AMERICA'S CHILDREN STILL AT RISK (executive summary), AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N (2001); Linda Elrod, et al. Representing Children Standards of Practice Committee,
Proposal Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect
Cases, 29 FAM. L.Q. 375 (1995). See generally Katner, supra note 160.
299. NAT'L ASS'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN POuCY AGENDA, available at
http://www.naccchildlaw.org/policy/policy.htm (last visited Nov. 1999).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. The Validation and Effectiveness Study of Legal Representation Through Guard-
ian Ad Litem, Summary of Findings Affecting CASA, Aug. 8, 1994 at
http:llwww.casanet.org/library/guardian-ad-litenmeff.htm.
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its... [but] puts less emphasis on the child welfare system and
courts (7.8%) .... CASAs generally lacked information about im-
munity and liability issues.
The study expresses concern about CASAs' low level of courtroom
activity. CASAs have less legal experience, and place less empha-
sis on attending hearings. In contested proceedings where there is
a CASA but no lawyer, legal representation will be inadequate.
305
A general recommendation from this study is to use the CASA training,
caseloads, supervision and evaluation to model attorney Guardian Ad Litem
programs.3°6
In addition, many but not all, authors who have written on the subject
have argued in favor of counsel for children.30 7 The work of Martin Gug-
genheim,308 Jean Koh Peter, 309 and Anne Harralambe ° all support represen-
tation of children in dependency proceedings by lawyers. The core debate
among scholars involves what role the lawyer should play as legal represen-
tative of the child-advocate for the child's express wishes or the child's
best interests.3 Florida Statutes do not currently require counsel to chil-
dren in Florida's dependency system in either form, and the statutory guard-
ian ad litem mandate is not consistently followed. For reasons discussed
throughout this article, Florida should follow the lead of other states that
require legal representation of children in dependency proceedings and
incorporate the independent counselor requirement in its dependency statu-
305. Id.
306. Id
307. Mandelbaum, supra note 4, at 29-33; see also Daniella Levine, To Assert
Children's Legal Rights or Promote Children's Needs: How to Attain Both Goals, 64
FOR-AM L. Ray. 2023, 2028-33 (1996); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empower-
ment: Rethinking The Role of Lawyering in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 1655, 1680 (1996); Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Abandoning
Children to Their Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37
HARV. INT'L L.J. 449 (1996).
308. Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children in Cus-
tody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 LOY. U. CI. L.J. 299 (1998) [herein-
after Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel].
309. PETERS, supra note 48.
310. ANN M. HARRALAmBE, THE CHLD'S ATrORNEY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN CUSTODY, ADOPTION AND PROTECTION CASES (1993).
311. See generally Special Issue, Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Chil-
dren, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 4 (1996); Mandelbaum, supra note 4, at 30-31; Katner, supra
note 160.
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tory provisions subject to variation based upon the child's capacity to direct
the representation.
312
Conceptually, the appointment of counsel for all children in depend-
ency proceedings makes sense for two major reasons. First, in light of the
fact that the context in which decisions are made about children's life cir-
cumstances and services to be provided to them are made almost exclusively
in a court setting, a lawyer for the child has the unique set of skills and
authority to advocate and demonstrate the required right of the child to
receive services. In the absence of counsel for the child, none of the other
parties to the proceeding-the Department of Children and Family Services,
the guardian ad litem, the attorney representing the Department, the parent
and lawyer for the parent-is necessarily going to make motions to the court
to order the provision of services, hold the other parties accountable to prove
their assertions, and double check the collection of factual information to
prove or disprove claims or defenses. The guardian ad litem is the person
who most closely carries out these responsibilities. As the American Bar
Association has explained, the guardian ad litem is also responsible in many
jurisdictions to submit a report or testify as a back or expert witness. Such
tasks are inconsistent with the function of the lawyer.
Second, the lawyer for the child is the only individual other than the
guardian ad litem whose sole interest is protecting the child from harm. All
the other parties have conflicts and have primary interests which are self- or
inner-directed. The evidence of the Department of Children and Family
Services' failure to provide safety is amply demonstrated by the long history
and multiple reports of dangerous conditions in the child welfare system.
Parents' position is often to obtain the return of the child even where there
may be dramatic and dangerous shortcomings in the parent's ability to look
after the child. The guardian ad litem is not always present, and where one
is present, he or she is usually a volunteer, perhaps unsophisticated, and
certainly without the ability or authority to make motions to the court and
seek orders obligating the parties to comply with statutes and rules aimed at
protecting the child.
Several arguments are often made against providing lawyers for chil-
dren in dependency proceedings. The three major ones are disruption of the
dependency court proceeding, advocating inappropriate goals for the child,
and cost. The first complaint is that adding lawyers will further disrupt the
312. Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representa-
tion of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1301, 1312-14 (1996); Bruce A. Green & Bernardine
Dohrn, Foreward: Children and the Ethical Practice of Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281,
1295 (1996).
313. A.B.A. Standards, supra note 289, at pt. I, § A-2.
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dependency court proceeding. Of course, as anyone who has been in the
Florida dependency court knows, the proceedings are anything but efficient
and formal. This issue was raised before the Supreme Court of Florida in
M.W. v. Davis3 14 in which the Court was asked to determine whether the
hearing requirements under the Baker Act for Civil Commitment apply when
the child has been in the legal custody of the Department of Children and
Family Services and is in need of residential treatment.3 15 The court recog-
nized that the reality was that the system is overburdened.316 The answer lies
in part in providing enough judfes to adequately hear the statutorily man-
dated dependency proceedings.3'
With regard to the second issue, the concern is that lawyers, unlike
guardians ad litem and other representatives in the court, will seek to repre-
sent what the child wants as opposed to what the child needs with the result
that somehow the outcome of the court proceeding will be antithetical to the
best interest of the child. The argument goes something like this: the lawyer
argues for a result that will be harmful to the child and will succeed with the
result that the child will be harmed. The premise of this argument is that
lawyers are obligated by the rules of professional conduct to advocate their
client's interest as opposed to their client's best interest. Of course, this
topic has been the subject of extended discussion in the professional litera-
ture. In fact, in December of 1995 a national conference on representing
children in dependency proceedings took place at the Fordharn University
Law School dealing in major part with just this issue.3 8 It would appear that
it is rare that lawyers find themselves in positions that they represent inter-
ests of children which are opposed to what is best for children. The reality is
that because most children represented in dependency proceedings are quite
young, the issue does not arise. Although there does not appear to be clear
national data evaluating the age of children in dependency proceedings, at
least one commentator concluded that most children are under the age of
eight when the proceeding begins and a high percentage are under the age of
three.3
19
In addition, the argument that somehow lawyers will represent clients
whose wishes are antithetical to their best interests and will then somehow
cause harmful results for their children is based upon an implausible prem-
314. 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
315. Id. at 92.
316 Id. at 108.
317. See id. at 108-09.
318. See generally Green, supra note 312.
319. See Guggenheim, Counseling Counsel, supra note 22, at 1495; Guggenheim,
Reconsidering the Need for Counsel, supra note 308, at 327 n.129.
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ise. The premise is that the lawyer, by representing the child's professed
interest as opposed to the child's best interest, will somehow fool everyone
else in the courtroom, with the result that the court will enter an order that
will be antithetical to the child's best interests. This defies reality. In addi-
tion, a lawyer is rarely placed in the position of representing the child's
interests that might differ from the child's best interests.
A more important issue involves a lawyer or a guardian ad litem repre-
senting the child's best interests. As the work of Professors Peters, 320 Gug-
genheim, 321 and Randi Mendelbaum? 2 demonstrate, there is a deep concern
that by representing the child's best interest, the lawyer may be representing
positions that are based upon the lawyer's or guardian ad litem's own value
structure or biases, which may in fact not be in the child's best interest from
the vantage point of the child, the parents, and the community.323 In sum-
mary, the concern about lawyers not protecting children's best interests but
instead representing the child's professed interests is, as a practical matter,
more of a scholarly debate than a widely documented problem. This author
supports the pure advocate approach for several simple reasons: counsel has
a duty to counsel clients against unwise decisions, the courts will not be
fooled by poor judgment-based decisions, and, in the overwhelming number
of cases, the lawyer will advocate the child's best interests because they
coincide with the child's interests.3
More significantly, a consensus has grown as to how lawyers should
approach representation. According to Professor Guggenheim:
Until very recently, it may have greatly mattered what particular
views the attorney assigned to represent a child happened to pos-
sess. As this Article will indicate, however, those days appear to
be behind us as a growing consensus of scholars and practitioners
increasingly insist that personality, personal opinions, values, and
320. PETERs, supra note 48.
321. Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm For Determining the Role of Counsel for
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1399 (1996) [hereinafter Guggenheim, Paradigm]; Martin
Guggenheim, The Making of Standards for Representing Children in Custody and Visitation
Proceedings: The Reporter's Perspective, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAw. 35 (1995)
[hereinafter Guggenheim, The Making of Standards].
322. Mandelbaum, supra note 4.
323. See PETERS, supra note 48; Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 321; Guggen-
heim, The Making of Standards, supra note 321; Ventrell, supra note 84, at 269.
324. See also Katner, supra note 160 (discussing the ethical conflicts that arise when
the lawyer acts as both guardian ad litem and lawyer).
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beliefs should play as small a role as possible in carrying out the
responsibilities of representing a child in a legal proceeding.
325
Lawyers for Children America, Inc., based in Miami, has addressed the
problem in the following way:
The attorney must be able to communicate effectively her role in
the nature of the court proceedings in an age appropriate manner.
The attorney must know how to listen to the wishes of her child cli-
ent and to counsel a child about her various options. She must be
able to balance her client's express wishes with what is in the
child's best interest, and to help her client make informed deci-
sions.3
26
The third issue is one of cost. Regretfully, there is virtually no litera-
ture studying the cost of attorneys in the dependency and termination of
parental rights proceeding.327 The questions are obvious. How much will it
cost to operate an attorney program? How much does the guardian ad litem
cost the state? What benefit will attorneys produce financially by causing
children to either be made available for adoption or returned to natural
parents in faster and more efficient ways?
An additional, more technical question is how expansive should the
lawyer's role be. This question arises in the context of the dependency and
termination of parental rights proceeding and beyond. Within the depend-
ency setting, the lawyer ought to have the same range of responsibilities as
any other lawyer acting on behalf of a client including filing writs and taking
and defending appeals. Should the lawyer have the responsibility to com-
mence independent actions arising from information the lawyer obtains
during representation in the dependency proceedings, though? Two exam-
ples are damage actions2 8 and individual and class actions for declaratory
and injunctive relief.329
What, then, should the statute requiring counsel look like in Florida?
Although the guardian ad litem provision is located in a separate "Part" of
325. Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel, supra note 302, at 301; see
also Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 321, at 1399 (discussing the particular difficulties in
establishing how to represent young children).
326. Stein, supra note 180, at 2.
327. Levine, supra note 307, at 2031.
328. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. BJ.M., 656 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1995).
329. See Ward v. Kearney, No. 98-7137-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla. 2001); Foster
Children v. Bush, Case No. 00-2116-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla. 2000).
Dale
262
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
Chapter Thirty-Nine, the dependency proceeding chapter is organized
chronologically. Thus, because the dependent child should have immediate
access to a lawyer who will independently represent him, this should be
addressed where dependency proceeding begins in the Florida Statutes,
following the petition provision, at a new number, 39.5011. It preferably
should follow the current placement of the guardian ad litem provisions as
"Part X," and it should precede the guardian ad litem Part, which will be
renumbered as "Part XI." The proposed provision should read:
Appointment of attorney for abused, abandoned, or neglected
child.-
(1) An attorney shall be appointed by the court at the earliest
possible time to represent the child's legal interests in any abuse,
abandonment, or neglect judicial proceeding, whether criminal or
civil.
(2) This requirement cannot be satisfied with the appointment
of a guardian ad litem in s. 39.822.
(3) Attorneys representing children under this subsection
should not assume responsibilities that are not consistent with those
of an attorney for the child.
(4) If the court determines the child has the capacity to direct
the representation, the lawyer has the same ethical duties as he
would if he were representing an adult client as governed by the
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.330 If the child cannot direct
the representation, the lawyer must decide what position or range
of positions to present to the court.
(5) Duties and responsibilities of the child's attorney:
a. The lawyer must explain his role to the client so that
the child will be willing to communicate the information the attor-
ney will need for adequate representation.
b. In situations where a reasonable likelihood exists that
the child's interests will conflict with another child or another cli-
ent, the lawyer shall not provide joint representation.
330. See FLA. STAT. § 39.822(1) (2000).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The need for attorney representation of children in the context of
dependency proceedings is irrefutable. A dependent child may suffer irrepa-
rable harm while in the state's care, and there is a need for efficient disposal
of dependency cases so that children may quickly return to an appropriate
caregiver. Florida courts have acknowledged the inherent vulnerability
children face in its dependency system and problems within the system. The
Florida Legislature has enacted provisions requiring the appointment of
guardians ad litem to protect children in this context, but these provision are
not consistently followed throughout the state. To make matters worse,
often times, nonlawyer advocates are not capable of representing children in
a legal setting. While CASA and similar programs are effective in promot-
ing the child's best interests, the reality is that children lack adequate and
consistent representation. The dependent child's fate and safety are decided
by the court. Thus, the individual most qualified to advocate for the child
and speak to the court is one with training, skill, and experience for the
job-an attorney to represent the child in his or her legal capacity.
Dale
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I. INTRODUCTION
Have you ever felt like nobody?
Just a tiny spec of air.
When everyone's around you,
And you are just not there.'
Divorce, that once unspoken condition considered the breakup of a
family, now reflects a growing way of life for America's families. In 1998,
"19.4 million adults nationwide were divorced, representing nine point eight
percent of the population.",2 Florida is no exception to this phenomenon. In
Florida in 1990, over one million adults were registered as divorced, repre-
senting ten percent of the adult population. 3 Accompanying this increasing
divorce rate is an evolving generation of children growing up in single parent
households. According to the Current Population Survey, in 1970 only
twelve percent of children under eighteen years of age lived in single parent
households.4 This number grew to twenty three percent in 1980, to twenty
seven percent in 1990, and to thirty two percent in 1998 . Today, these
percentages equate to over twenty million American children under eighteen
years old living in one parent households.6 The changing face of America's
families and household situations creates new challenges not only for health
care professionals, school planners, and childcare providers, but also for
legislators and judicial officials. Specifically, legislators and judicial offi-
cials grapple with the problem of how to balance the feelings and desires of
the children affected by divorce with the interests of society for stable, clear
laws. Florida's courts and legislators expressly state that they place the
7
"best interests" of the children as the primary focus in divorce issues.
However, in reality, few actually consider the children's opinion when
establishing these best interests.
1. JACK CANFIELD ET AL., CHICKEN SOUP FOR THE KID'S SOUL 83 (1998) (quoting
nine year old Karen Crawford).
2. U.S. CENsuS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. PPL-100, MARITAL
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS (1998).
3. TERRY A. LUGAILA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE) available at http://www.census
.gov/population/socdemo/ms-la/tabms-stl .txt.
4. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CENSUS BRIEF, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK, (1997).
5. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM BIRTH
TO SEVENTEEN: TE LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN, 1998 (1999).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Marshall v. Reams, 14 So. 95, 96 (Fla. 1893) (holding that the benefit
and welfare of the child is the "pole star" by which courts are guided).
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Divorce impacts a child's life in a major way. From the child's per-
spective, the finality associated with custody proceedings provokes strong
feelings of duress. As the opening poem of this article suggests,9 they
watch their world collapse around them while nobody takes the time to ask
their opinions. Custody decisions determine not only with whom the child
will live, but also geographically where the child will reside, and under what
conditions the child will be raised.10 Increasingly, "the laws of this nation
recognize that children have a legitimate interest in the important decisions
affecting their lives."" Most states today, either through statutory mandate
or through common law practice, acknowledge the benefit of listening to and
including as a determinative factor, the children's preferences in custody
decisions.1
2
Florida, among the least progressive states on this issue, 13 statutorily
includes a child's preference as one of a multiplicity of suggested factors for
courts to consider in custody determinations.14  As Part IV of this article
8. Randy Frances Kandel, Just Ask the Kid! Towards a Rule of Children's Choice
in Custody Determinations, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 299, 358 (1994).
9. CANFBD Er AL, supra note 1.
10. Wallace J. Mlyniac, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to
Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873 (1996). "Judges determine where children will live, with
whom they will live, how they will live, and what will be done to, by, or for them." Id.
11. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Children's Preference in Adjudicated Custody Decisions,
22 GA. L. REv. 1035, 1039-40 (1988).
12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. See discussion infra Part III.
14. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2000). The statute states:
(3) For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary residence, the best in-
terests of the child shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the welfare and
interests of the child, including, but not limited to:
(a) The parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent and con-
tinuing contact with the nonresidential parent.
(b) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the
parents and the child.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized
and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care,
and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory envi-
ronment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed cus-
todial home.
(f) The moral fitness of the parents.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parents.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child;
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shows, the broad spectrum of interpretation given to this statute by Florida's
courts and judges has created a chaotic environment for divorce litigation.15
Is this chaos in the best interests of the children?
Many of Florida's cities and towns have developed plans to attract
younger residents. 16 These plans are working.17 The residents of Florida are
getting younger.'1 Younger residents desire modem approaches to their
legal problems. As this article will show, requiring courts to consider chil-
dren's preferences in custody determinations will move Florida back into a
leadership position, making the state more attractive to a younger popula-
tion. Part II of the article explores the national trend, specifically identifying
four categories of legal approaches taken by the fifty-one jurisdictions
around the nation. Part III describes Florida's current legislation; and Part
IV explores the multiplicity of interpretations Florida's courts have given to
this legislation. Part V rounds out the analysis by evaluating judges' re-
sponses to children's expressions of preference. Taken together, the article
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to
express a preference;
(j) The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encour-
age a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the
child and the other parent;
(k) Evidence that any party has knowingly provided false information
to the court regarding a domestic violence proceeding pursuant to
s. 741.30;
(1) Evidence of domestic violence or child abuse;
(in) Any other fact considered by the court to be relevant.
Id.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.
16. See, e.g., Sallie James, Shaping Their Images: Cities in Central and North
Broward are Trying to Strike Balances as They Deal with Growth, Development, and Gener-
ally Younger Demographics, SuN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 8, 1997, at 33 (discussing
changing demographics "as young families move into neighborhoods once limited to sen-
iors"); Madelaine Gonzalez, Posner's Proposal on Condos Stirs Fear: Hallandale is Hoping
To Lure Younger People, SUN-SENTlNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Oct. 22, 1996, at 1B (discussing
city commissioner's goal of attracting a younger population to Hallandale).
17. See Robert Sargent Jr., The Villages is Quietly Growing More Youthful; Despite
What You See in Ads, The Community is Home to More and More People Who Aren't Ready
for Retirement Yet, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIBUNE, Aug. 19, 1998, Lake Sentinel at I (noting
that "[m]ore and more residents 30 to 40 years olds are buying or inheriting homes"); see also
David K. Rogers, St. Petersburg Wears Younger Face, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 2, 1995,
at 3B (discussing the affects of the "influx of young families and vacationers of all ages");
Terry Sheridan, Deerfield Cove Area Attracting Younger Buyers, BROwARD DAILY Bus. REV.,
Sept. 24, 1997, at A2 (noting the trend since 1994 towards younger buyers).
18. Id.
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clearly justifies the assertion that Florida should adopt legislation mandating
consideration of children's preferences in child custody decisions.
II. THE NATIONAL TREND
The growing trend around the nation is acquiescence to children's
wishes in custody determinations.'9 Each year, an increasing number of
states adopt legislation requiring courts to consider children's preferences.
20
In 1977, there were sixteen states in which the affected children's preference
was manator21was a mandatoy consideration. This number grew to thirty-two jurisdic-
tions in 1998. Today, thirty-four jurisdictions statutorily mandate that
courts consider children's preferences in custody determinations.23 Amongthese thirty-four jurisdictions, twelve consider the child's preference as the
19. Kathleen Nemecheck, Note, Child Preference in Custody Decisions: Where We
Have Been, Where We Are Now, Where We Should Go, 83 IOWA L. REV. 437,445 (1998).
20. Id. at 443 (noting that states began to seriously consider statutory guarantees after
the passage of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in 1970).
21. Id. at 445. Among the sixteen states were: California, Connecticut, Georgia,
Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, and Texas. Id. at 444 n.60, 61.
22. Id. at 445. These jurisdictions included: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Colorado,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
23. These states include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See ALASKA. STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 2000); ARiz.
Rv. STAT. § 25-403(A)(2) (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(a) (West 2000); COLD. REv.
STAT. § 14-10-124 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-57 (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §722
(2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(5)(A) (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1(a)(3) (2000); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 571-46(3) (2000); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (Michie 2000); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/602(a)(2) (West 2000); IND. CODE § 31-14-13-2 (2000); IOWA CODE § 598.41(3)(f) (2000);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2)(B) (Banks-Baldwin
2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.19-A, § 1653 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 9-
103 (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.23(3)(i) (2000); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (2000); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
212(1)(B) (2000); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364 (2)(b) (2000); NEv. REv. STAT. § 125.480(4)(a)
(2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 2000); N.M. STAT ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 2000); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(i) (2000); 23 PA. CODE § 5303(a)(1) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-7-1515 (Law. Co-op. 2000); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.008 (Vernon 2000); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-6-106 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE §
26.09.187(3)(vi) (2000); Wis. STAT. § 767.24 (2000).
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key and controlling determining factor.24 Another twenty-two states statuto-
rily mandate courts consider the child's preference along with other factors
when making custody determinations. Of the seventeen remaining states,
seven have permissive statutes suggesting that courts consider a child's
preference in such determinations. Florida is among these seven states
with permissive legislation. 27 Only ten states make no mention of children's
preferences in custody determinations in their statutes.28 In most states in
these last two categories having no statutory mandate, however, courts are
still giving weight to the wishes of the children.29 The remainder of this
section will explore in more detail each of these described legislative groups.
24. These states include: California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas. See
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042 (a) (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-57 (2000); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-9-1(a)(3) (2000); HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-46(3) (2000); MD. CODE ANN. FAm. LAW § 9-
103 (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (2000); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364 (2)(b) (2000);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.480(4)(a) (2000); N.M. STAT ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 2000); 23 PA.
CODE § 5303(a)(1) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1515 (Law. Co-op. 2000); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.008 (Vernon 2000).
25. These jurisdictions include: Alaska, Arizona. Colorado, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin. See ALASKA. STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403(A)(2)
(2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (2000); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-911(5)(A) (2000); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (Michie 2000); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/602(a)(2) (West 2000); IND. CODE § 31-14-13-2 (2000); IOWA CODE § 598.41(3)(f)
(2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2)(B) (Banks-
Baldwin 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653 (West 2000); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.23(3)(i) (2000); MNN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375 (2000);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(B) (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 2000); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(i) (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106 (2000); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-124.3 (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(vi) (2000); Wis. STAT. § 767.24
(2000).
26. These states include: Florida, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and Utah. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(i) (2000); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134 (West
1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (VI) (2000); OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(B)(1)
(West 2000); OKLA. STAT. Tit. 43, § 113 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45 (Michie
2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(1) (2000).
27. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(i) (2000).
28. These states include: Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, Vermont, and Wyoming. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-152
(2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (2000);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (2000); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 2000); OR. REv.
STAT. § 107.137 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2000); VA. CODE § 48-10-4 (2000); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (2000).
29. See discussion infra Part III.
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A. Mandatory Statutes Granting Controlling Weight to Child's Preference
The most progressive preference statutes are those granting controlling
weight to the children's preference. 30 These statutes require the courts to
solicit a child's preference before making a custody determination. 31 Further,
these statutes require that the child's preference control the court's deci-
sion.32 Twelve states currently grant controlling weight to a child's prefer-
ence in custody determinations. The most liberal of these, Pennsylvania,
with no additional conditions, requires the court to consider the preference
of the child in making an order for custody or partial custody.34 Similarly,
the majority of the other states in this category mandate the courts' consid-
eration of the child's preference subject to the additional condition of the
child's ability to reason intelligently. Some courts interpret the child's
ability to reason intelligently, strictly as an age restriction. Others evaluate
the individual child's reasoning ability. Still others evaluate the reasonable-
ness of the individual child's expressed wishes.
In Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Texas, the child's
preference is a controlling factor if that child has reached a specified age. 6
For example, the Mississippi Code states:
Provided, however, that if the court shall find that both parties are fit
and proper persons to have custody of the children, and that either
30. Nemecheck, supra note 19, at 446.
31. Id. at 445 n.68.
32. Id. at 446.
33. See supra note 24.
34. 23 PA. CODE § 5303(a)(1) (2000). "In making an order for custody or partial
custody, the court shall consider the preference of the child as well as any other factor which
legitimately impacts the child's physical, intellectual and emotional well-being." Id.
35. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042 (a) (West 2000). "If a child is of sufficient age and
capacity to reason as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, the court shall consider
and give due weight to the wishes of the child in making an order granting or modifying
custody." Id. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-57 (2000) ("giving consideration to the
wishes of the child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent prefer-
ence."); HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-46(3) (2000). "If a child is of sufficient age and capacity to
reason, so as to form an intelligent preference, the child's wishes as to custody shall be
considered and be given due weight by the court." Id. See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364 (2)
(2000). "Mhe court shall consider... (b) [t]he desires and wishes of the minor child if of an
age of comprehension regardless of chronological age." Id. See also NEV. REy. STAT. §
125.480(4) (2000). "The court shall consider... (a) [t]he wishes of the child if the child is of
sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to his custody." Id.
36. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1(a)(3) (2000); MD. CODE ANN. § 9-103 (2000); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (2000); N.M. STAT ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 2000); Tax. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.008 (West 2000).
2001]
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party is able to adequately provide for the care and maintenance of
the children, and that it would be to the best interest and welfare of
the children, then any such child who shall have reached his twelfth
birthday shall have the privilege of choosing the parent with whom
he shall live.
37
Similarly, the Georgia code provides that at the age of fourteen, the
child has the right to select with whom he or she desires to live. 38 Georgia
code mandates that the child's selection is always controlling unless the
parent selected is deemed not fit to have custody.39 In New Mexico, the
court must consider the desires of a minor who is fourteen years of age or
older.4° In Texas, a child of ten years of age or older has the right to choose• • 41
his/her guardian subject to court approval. In Maryland, a child who is
sixteen years or older has the right to file a petition to change custody. 2
The remaining five states in this category look to the child's maturity
and reasoning ability rather than age in deciding whether or not to give,p - 43
weight to the child's preference. In California, Connecticut, Hawaii, and
Nevada, if the child is shown to have the capacity to form an intelligent
preference as to where to live, the court must consider the child's wishes.4
In Nebraska, the final state in this category, the child's wishes must only
appear to be reasonable to require the court's granting weight.45
37. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (2000) (emphasis added).
38. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1(a)(3) (2000). "In all cases in which the child has
reached the age of fourteen years, the child shall have the right to select the parent with whom
he or she desires to live." (emphasis added) Id.
39. Id.
40. N.M. STAT ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 2000). "If the minor is fourteen years of age or
older, the court shall consider the desires of the minor as to with whom he wishes to live
before awarding custody of such minor." (emphasis added) Id.
41. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.008 (Vernon 2000). "If the child is twelve years of
age or older, the child may, by writing filed with the court, choose the managing conservator,
subject to the approval of the court." (emphasis added) Id. Texas reduced the age from
twelve years to ten years of age in the 2000 legislative session.
42. MD. CODE ANN. § 9-103 (2000). "A child who is sixteen years old... may file a
petition to change custody." (emphasis added) Id.
43. These states include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Nevada. See
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(a) (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-57 (2000); HAW. REv.
STAT. § 571-46(3) (2000); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364(2)(b) (2000); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125.480(4) (2000).
44. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042 (a) (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-57 (2000);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(3) (1999); NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.480(4) (2000).
45. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364(2) (2000). "The court shall consider .... The desires
and wishes of the minor child if of an age of comprehension regardless of chronological age,
when such desires and wishes are based on sound reasoning." Id.
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B. Statutes Mandating Consideration
The second most progressive preference statutes mandate that the courts
consider the child's preference in custody determinations. 46 Although these
statutes require that the court hear the child's preference, the judge retains
nearly complete discretion as to its interpretation and utilization in the
custody determination. 7 Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia
require their courts to consider the child's preference as one of several
factors in a custody determination.4 Among these twenty-two jurisdictions,
ten require their courts to consider the wishes of the child as to his or her
custodian irrespective of other characteristics of the child such as age,
maturity or intelligence. 9
Two of the remaining twelve states, Tennessee and Indiana, take the
child's age into account in determining the weight to be accorded to the
child's preference.50 In Indiana, the court is required to consider the wishes
of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child
is at least fourteen years of age.5 In Tennessee, the court is required to
consider the preference of any child twelve years of age or older; while still
acknowledgin that the court may consider the preference of younger chil-dren as well. z
The remaining ten states in this category require courts to consider the
preference of the child when the child is of sufficient age and capacity to
form an intelligent decision.53 Recognizing that children mature at different
46. Nemecheck, supra note 19, at 452.
47. Id. at 454.
48. See supra note 25.
49. These jurisdictions include: Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, and Wisconsin. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 25-
403(A)(2) (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(5)(A)
(1999); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (2000); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(a)(2) (West 2000); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (2000); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2)(B) (2000); Mo. R v. STAT.
§ 452.375 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(B) (2000); Wis. STAT. § 767.24 (2000).
50. See IND. CODE § 31-14-13-2(2), (3) (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106 (2000).
51. IND. CODE § 31-14-13-2(2), (3). "In determining the child's best interests...
[t]he court shall consider ... (3) [t]he wishes of the child, with more consideration given to
the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age." (emphasis added) Id.
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106. "The court shall consider... (7) [t]he reasonable
preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or older. The court may hear the preference
of a younger child upon request." (emphasis added) Id.
53. These states include: Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Virginia, and Washington. See ALASKA. STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie
2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (2000); IOWA CODE §598.41(3)(f) (2000); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit.19-A, § 1653 (West 2000); MICH. COM. LAws § 722.23(3)(i) (2000); MiNN.
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ages, these states give the courts the discretion to evaluate the child's matur-
ity and ability to intelligently state a preference.
5 4
C. Purely Discretionary Statutes
Unlike the mandatory language discussed for the previous two catego-
ries, several states use purely discretionary language in their preference
statutes.55 These statutes suggest but do not require courts look to the child
for a preference. 6 Seven states give the court discretion as to whether or not
to consider a child's preference in a custody determination. 7 The wording
of these statutes use language such as "the court may consider" as exempli-
fied in the South Dakota code:
In awarding the custody of a child the court shall be guided by con-
sideration of what appears to be for the best interest of the child in
respect to the child's temporal and mental and moral welfare. If
the child is of a sufficient age to form an intelligent preference, the
court may consider that preference in determining the question.
58
The trend in jurisdictions with purely discretionary statutes is for courts
to give the child's preference due consideration.5 9 For example, in Nazworth
v. Nazworth6° an Oklahoma appellate court held that a thirteen year old boy's
request to live with his father was recuired to be considered in determining
whether to change the boy's custody. 1 In Connelly v. Connelly a Louisi-
ana appellate court held that the child's preference is an appropriate factor to
STAT. § 518.17 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-
06.2(1)(i) (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 26.09.187(3)(vi) (2000):
54. Id.
55. Nemecheck, supra note 19, at 457.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 26.
58. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-4-45 (Michie 2000).
59. See Nazworth v. Nazworth, 931 P.2d 86, 88 (Okla. 4th Div. Ct. App. 1996); see
also Connelly v. Connelly, 644 So. 2d 789 (La. 1st Cir. Ct. App. 1994); Hutchison v. Hutchi-
son, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982).
60. 931 P.2d 86, 88 (Okla. 4th Div. Ct. App. 1996).
61. Id. at 88. The court opinioned that "where the preference is explained by the
child and good reasons for the preference are disclosed, the preference and supporting reasons
will justify a change of custody." Id. (citing Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Wyo.
1985)).
62. 644 So. 2d 789, 789 (La. 1st Cir. Ct. App. 1994).
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consider in determining custody of the child.63 Similarly, in Hutchison v.
Hutchinson " the Supreme Court of Utah held that in making a custody
determination, the trial court may consider the preference of the child as one
of the factors.65 These courts all appear to be saying "listen to the children,
it's their lives that will be most affected."
D. No Statutory Reference
The remaining ten states make no mention in their statutes of a child's
preference in custody determinations.6 However, even with no statutory
guidelines, many of these states' courts give due consideration to the child's
67 68preference. For example, in Kenney v. Hickey, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island held that although the expressed preference of a minor child is
not conclusive, such preference is competent and highly probative evi-
dence.69  Similarly, in Wilcox-Elliott v. Wilcox, 7° the Supreme Court of
Wyoming held that a child's unequivocal preference to live with a'particular
71 7parent must be considered. . In Hinkle v. Hinkle, 2 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina gave considerable weight to the wishes of a child of suffi-
cient age to exercise discretion in choosing a custodian.73 The child reaches
the age of discretion when he or she "is of an age and capacity to form an
intelligent or rational view on the matter."74 Further, in Bak v. Bak,75 a
63. Id. at 795. The appellate court opinioned that great deference must be given to
the trier of fact's findings; and therefor found no error in the lower court's findings that the
child's testimony concerning his desire to remain with his mother was not credible. Il at 796.
64. 649 P.2d 38, 38 (Utah 1994).
65. Id. at 41.
66. See discussion supra note 28.
67. See Kenney v. Hickey, 486 A.2d 1079, 1083 (R.I. 1985) (noting that "it has been
our policy to afford a child's preference considerable weight"); see also Wilcox-Elliott v.
Wilcox, 924 P.2d 419, 421 (Wyo. 1996) (noting that "[a] child's unequivocal preference to
live with a particular parent is a factor which must be considered"); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 146
S.E.2d 73, 79 (N.C. 1966) (noting that "[t]he wishes of a child of sufficient age to exercise
discretion in choosing a custodian is entitled to considerable weight"); Bak v. Bak, 511
N.E.2d 625, 631 (Mass. App Ct. 1987) (noting that the preference of a child is a factor to be
considered).
68. 486 A.2d at 1079 (R.I. 1985).
69. id. at 1084. The court also opinioned that "the weight to be given to the prefer-
ence of the child is a matter within the sound discretion of the court." Id.
70. 924 P. 2d 419 (Wyo. 1996).
71. Id. at 421.
72. 146 S.E.2d 73 (N.C. 1966).
73. Id. at 79. The court opinioned that when the contest is between the parents, the
child's preference is not controlling. Id.
74. Id.
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Massachusetts appellate court held that the preference of a child is a factor
. . .. . 76
to be considered in making child custody determinations. These holdings
exemplify the proposition that absent express legislation, the lawmakers of
this nation still believe in the importance of consideration of a child's pref-
erence in custody decisions.
HII. FLORIDA LEGISLATION
Florida's custody statute gives the court sole discretion on whether or
not to consider a child's preference in making a custody determination.f
Section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes provides guidelines for custody and
support of children, visitation rights, and the power of the court in making
related orders.78 Specifically, section three provides "[flor purposes of
shared parental responsibility and primary residence, the best interests of the
child shall include an evaluation of all factors affecting the welfare and
interests.,79 Although the statute does suggest factors that may affect the
child's welfare and interests,s° subsection three leaves the consideration of
any and all of the factors completely to the discretion of the court.8' This
discretion includes the child's preference factor.
8 2
In contrast to Florida's custody statute, a number of other Florida
statutes do mandate the consideration of the child's preference when deter-
83
mining the child's best interests. The subjects of these statutes range from
84 .85grandparental visitation rights to child-in-need of service cases to termi-
75. 511 N.E.2d 625 (Mass. App Ct. 1987).
76. Id. at 631. The appellate court also gave consideration to the report of one of the
family's service officers as to the child's wishes. Id.
77. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2000).
78. Id.
79. § 61.13(3).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. "The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference." § 61.13(3)(i).
83. See FLA. STAT. § 752.01(2) (2000). "In determining the best interest of the minor
child, the court shall consider ... (c) [tlhe preference of the child if the child if the child is
determined to be of sufficient maturity to express a preference." Id.; see also FLA. STAT. §
984.20(3)(a)(9) (2000) (stating "[tihe predisposition study shall cover... (9) [t]he reasonable
preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understand-
ing, and experience to express a preference"); FLA. STAT. § 39.810 (2000) (stating "[iln a
hearing on a petition for termination of parental rights, the court shall consider... (10) [tlhe
reasonable preferences and wishes of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient
intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference")
84. § 752.01.
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nation of parental rights.86 For example, in a petition for termination of
parental rights, the court is required to consider the reasonable preference
and wishes of the child, if the court determines that the child is capable of
expressing such a preference. 87 Similarly, in actions for grandparent visita-
tion, the court is required to consider the preference of the child if the child
is mature enough to express a preference. 8  In disposition hearings to
determine custody of a child in need of service, 9 the court is required to
consider the reasonable preference of the child.90 These statutes, all cover-
ing topics relating to the child's residence and visitation, represent a legisla-
tive intent to listen to the preference of the children.
Recent bills introduced in both the Florida Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives further exemplify legislative intent to give weight to children's
wishes in various custody decisions. Examples include Florida Senate Bill
117691 and House Bill 447.92 These companion bills provided instruction for
judges in domestic violence cases.93 Specifically, these bills provided for the
prohibition of court awarded visitation rights to a parent who has been
convicted of a capital felony or a first-degree felony that involved domestic
violence.94 The bills provided that this prohibition on visitation could be
overridden by an agreement to the visitation by a child over sixteen years of
age.95 In other words, when the child stated a preference for visitation, this
preference controlled the court's decision. The numerous bills introduced
into the Florida Senate and House of Representatives historically every year
containing similar language, further demonstrate that many Florida legisla-
tors acknowledge the need to modify the Florida custody statute. It is just a
matter of time before the assertion of this article, that children's preferences
should be considered in Florida custody decisions, will be added to Florida's
custody statute.
85. § 984.20.
86. § 39.810.
87. Id.
88. § 752.01(2)(c).
89. § 984.20. The statute regulates the procedure for determining custody of a child
who has been removed from his or her residence and taken into custody of the court for
reasons such as domestic violence. Id.
90. Id.
91. S. 1176, 1999 Leg., 104th Sess. (Fla. 1999) (dying in committee on fiscal policy
for unrelated reasons).
92. H.R. 447, Leg., 101st Sess. (Fla. 1999) (dying in committee on criminal justice
appropriations for unrelated reasons).
93. S. 1176 at 1; H.R. 447 at 1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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IV. FLORIDA COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW
A. Supreme Court of Florida
The highest court in Florida is the Supreme Court.96 The Supreme
Court of Florida has the power to determine the interpretation of the state's
legislation for uniformity within the state's lower courts.97 At its discretion,
the Supreme Court of Florida reviews decisions of lower courts that ex-
pressly validate a state statute, construe a provision of the state or federal
constitution, affect a class of constitutional or state officers, or directly
conflict with a decision of another Florida court on the same question of
law.98 The Supreme Court of Florida also reviews certain categories of
judgments, decisions, and questions of law certified to it by the district
courts of appeal and federal appellate courts. The Supreme Court of Florida
has the constitutional authority to issue a number of writs including an
extraordinary writ.
99
The Supreme Court of Florida led the nation in giving children the
opportunity to express their custodial preferences.'0 ° In 1887, in the un-
precedented case of Williams v. Williams,'0' the Supreme Court of Florida
allowed three girls to remain with their father when they had all expressed a
preference to do so, the father was able to give them a comfortable home and
support, while the mother had no other means but alimony for support.'0 2 A
few years later, in Marshall v. Reams, 1 3 the court established what was later
to become a national standard for giving a child the right to express his/her
preference when the child has reached the age of intelligent discretion.'0 In
Marshall, the child, Edward Reams, was over sixteen years old and desired
to remain in the care of his uncle, F.F. Marshall, where he had resided since
96. FLA.'S COURT SYSTEM, at http://www.flcourts.org/courts/supct/system2.html (last
visited Aug. 11, 1999).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. "An extraordinary writ is an order commanding a person or entity to perform or to
refrain from performing a particular act. They are by nature extraordinary and for that reason
are not available as an alternative to the usual trial and appeal. Both by their historical
development and by current judicial decisions, the writs are made available only in a narrow
class of exceptional cases." Id.
100. Nemecheck, supra note 19, at 442.
101. 2 So. 768 (Fla. 1887).
102. Id. at 773. The evidence in this case included letters from the teenage daughters
expressing strong preference to living with the father. Id. at 770.
103. 14 So. 95 (Fla. 1893).
104. Nemecheck, supra note 19, at 443.
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his mother's death. 0 5 Henry6Reams, Edward's father petitioned for custody
of his out of wedlock son. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the
lower court decision and allowed Edward to remain with his uncle. 07 The
court in its precedent setting opinion held: "[wihere the child has reached
the age of discretion it will often be allowed to make its own choice, al-
though the person chosen is not one whom the court would voluntarily
appoint.'
0 8
Thereafter, throughout the next century, the Supreme Court of Florida
continued to advocate the consideration of children's preference in custody
cases.'0 9 Even when the preferences of the minor children were split, the
court is willing to split up the children to meet these preferences.-'1 For
example, in Epperson v. Epperson,"' the three sons aged sixteen, twelve,
and eight expressed a preference to live with their father, whereas the eight-
een year old daughter wanted to remain with the mother.1 2 The court de-
clared that when boys of sixteen and twelve years of age express a decided
preference to remain with one parent, this preference should be accorded due
weight and allowed the sons to reside with the father and the daughter to
reside with the mother.'
The Supreme Court of Florida also recognized the psychological affect
of a refusal to consider a child's preference." 4  For example, in Eddy v.
Staufer"5 the court held that a fifteen year old -boy is at an age where he
should have the ability to exercise reasonable discretion.' 6  The court
opined: "[i]ndeed, the course of his life may be affected adversely by a
105. Marshall, 14 So. at 95.
106. 1&.
107. Id. at 97.
108. Id. at 96 (quoting CHURCH, HABEus CoRPus § 447).
109. See Eddy v. Staufer, 37 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1948) (holding that the desires of a
fifteen year old boy should be given great weight); see also Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So. 2d
367 (Fla. 1958). The Epperson court held that when "normal and intelligent boys of the ages
of 16 and 12 express a decided preference for the companionship of one parent over the other,
we think their preference should be accorded due weight in settling the matter of custody." Id.
at 370. See also Gregory v. Gregory, 313 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1975). The court affirmed the trial
judge's conclusion that "(wie always listen to children of that age expressing views." Id. at
738.
110. See Epperson, 101 So. 2d at 368.
111. 101 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1958).
112. Id. at369.
113. Id. at 370. The court noted that "[tihe preference of the children is not absolutely
controlling but it should be given considerable weight as between parents of relatively equal
fitness." Id.
114. See Eddy, 37 So. 2d at 418.
115. 37 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1948).
116. Id. at418.
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refusal of the Florida courts to consider his unquestioned preference."' 17
Continuing along those lines, in Gregory v. Gregory,118 the Supreme Court
of Florida disagreed with the district court's statement that the courts are not
bound by a child's views because children sometimes don't know what is
best for themselves. 19 In its opinion, the court pointed to the quality of the
relationship between the father and son in this case for deciding what is the
best for the son. 2°
Despite the historical expression supportive of children's preference
over the first two-thirds of the past century, the Supreme Court of Florida
has been silent on the subject in the past two decades, choosing to leave such
decisions to the lower district courts of appeals.12 1 This silence has had the
detrimental affect of creating chaos in Florida's court system. With no
strong direction from the highest court in the state, a diverse spectrum of
interpretation of the law by the district courts has resulted.
22
B. Florida's District Courts of Appeal: Divided Interpretations
In general, the Supreme Court of Florida does not hear the bulk of trial
court decisions in Florida that are appealed. 123 Instead, they are reviewed by
the District Courts of Appeal.124 Prior to 1957, when the District Courts of
Appeals were established in Florida, all appeals were heard solely by the
Supreme Court of Florida. 25 The Florida Constitution now provides that the
Legislature divide the State into appellate court districts with a District
Court of Appeal serving each district.'2 Currently, there are five such
117. Id.
118. 313So.2dat735.
119. Id. at 738. The son candidly expressed his preference to be with his father and
stated that if he would rather go to ajuvenile home then live with his mother. Id.
120. Id. The court held that:
The pole star of the cases before us is based upon the simplest element of
all-the united relationship of the father and son and the quality it possesses
in this instance for the bet welfare of the son. Unfortunately, good parental
association has no single word in our language, however, sub judice the fa-
ther and son have achieved it.
Id.
121. Research for this article failed to discover any Supreme Court of Florida opinions,
in the past decade, expressing a stance with regard to child preference in custody decisions.
122. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.I., 5.
123. FLA.'s COURT SYSTEM, supra note 96.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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districts headquartered in Tallahassee, Lakeland, Miami, West Palm Beach,
and Daytona Beach.127
The jurisdiction of the District Courts of Appeal extends to appeals
from final judgments and orders of trial courts either not directly appealable
to the Supreme Court of Florida or not taken from a county court to a circuit
court, and to the review of certain non-final orders.1
2
The District Courts of Appeals have also been granted constitutional
authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, manda-
mus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, as well as all other writs necessary to
the complete exercise of their jurisdiction. 29
As a general rule, decisions of the District Courts of Appeal represent
the final appellate review of litigated cases. 30 A person who is displeased
with a district court's express decision may ask for review in the Supreme
Court of Florida or in the United States Supreme Court, but neither tribunal
is required to accept the case for further review; the overwhelming number
of requests are in fact denied.1
3
'
In past history, all five of the district courts gave credence to a child's
preference in child custody modification proceedings. 32  Further, they
tended to uphold lower courts rulings.133 Over the past two decades, how-
ever, the courts have divided. Some Districts Courts reversing modifications
granted by the lower courts and surprisingly giving little weight to the
expressed preferences of the children involved, others giving some consid-
eration, while still others remaining dedicated to listening to the preferences
of the children. 134
127. Id.
128. FLA.'s COuRT SYSTEm, supra note 96.
129. Id.
130. d
131. Id.
132. See Martin v. Martin, 215 So. 2d 80, 82 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (allowing
the children to remain with their father based on their admitted preference to do so); see also
Udell v. Udell, 151 So. 2d 863, 864 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (holding that ajudge should
give weight to the expressed desires of a child); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 264 So. 2d 49, 52
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that the expressed desire of a child is entitled to
weight).
133. See Burley v. Burley, 438 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that a minor child's preference shall be given "such weight as the trial court deter-
mines appropriate"); see also Udell, 151 So. 2d at 864 (noting that the trial judge is in a more
advantageous position than an appellate court to determine the problems in each divorce case).
134. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.I., 5.
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1. First District Court of Appeal of Florida: No Weight Given
The First District Court of Appeal of Florida gives very little weight to
the expressed preferences of children in child custody cases. 135 Further, in
custody modification cases, this court advocates leaving the children wher-
ever the original decree had placed custody. 6 The First District requires the
non-custodial parent, who seeks modification of an earlier custody award, to
first prove a substantial change of circumstances and secondly prove that the
welfare of the child would be promoted by the changed custody.
137
The First District requires that the non-custodial parent seeking to
modify a prior award of custody carry an extraordinary burden.38 In Holmes
v. Green139 both children'40 expressed a strong desire to have their primary
residence changed; 14' and the trial court had found that the welfare of the
children would best be served by the transfer of their primary residence to
their father.' 42 However, the First District Court of Appeal held that the
evidence presented was insufficient 143 and the trial court abused its discre-
tion when it changed the primary residence of the two girls. 14
135. See Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So. 2d 1034, 1036 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that even if the children had all "evinced a clear and definite desire to live with their
father and not with their mother, that preference would not alone be dispositive of the issue
whether their best interests would be served by ordering a change in custody"); see also
Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719, 726 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that allowing
minor children to pick and choose the parent with whom they will reside is not in the best
interest of the child.); see also Holmes v. Green, 649 So. 2d 302, 305 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (citing Elkins v. Vander, 433 So. 2d 125 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) which held
"[the law does not give children the unfettered discretion to choose the parent with whom
they will live")).
136. See Zediker, 444 So. 2d at 1038 (noting that the appellate court's task is only to
determine whether the trial judge's discretion is supported in the record).
137. Id. (quoting Steams v. Szikney, 386 So. 2d 592, 594 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980)).
138. Id. at 1036 (quoting McGregor v. McGregor, 418 So. 2d 1073, 1074 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
139. 649 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
140. The children were twelve year old twin daughters. Id. at 303.
141. Id. at 304.
142. Id.
143. The evidence presented demonstrated domestic violence and marital disharmony
in the mother's home and that the mother worked odd hours and weekends. Id at 303.
144. Holmes, 649 So. 2d at 304. "The evidence is insufficient to sustain the trial
court's order changing the primary residence of the parties' children. Accordingly, that order
is reversed." Id. at 305.
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The First District-lacks confidence in children's ability to make deci-
sions about their residence. 45 Although the court declared that if the child
possesses sufficient maturity and understanding to make an intelligent
choice, it will be considered, it did not accept that two twelve year old girls
have this intelligence level. 14 In Holmes, the court opinioned that even if
the child is shown to possess the necessary traits to make the decision, this
preference alone is not sufficient to sustain a change in primary residence.' 47
The case of Brown v. Brown'48 exemplifies the First District's lack of
confidence in children's decision making ability. In Brown, the final judg-
ment dissolving the marriage of the parties gave custody of the children to
the mother; but included a clause allowing the children to live with their
father if they chose without further order of the court. 49 The First District
found this clause to be in error, holding that allowing minor children to pick
which parent they live with is not in the best interests of the children.150
One case anomaly in the First District, upheld a change of custody. In
Martin v. Martin,'51 the First District held that the two-part test had been
satisfied. 152 In Martin, the father requested a permanent change in custody
based on the children' expressed preference to remain with the father and
evidence of the poor condition of their mother's home.
54
Notwithstanding the Martin opinion, the general opinion of the First
District is summarized in this quotation from Holmes v. Green:
The law does not give children the unfettered discretion to choose
the parent with whom they will live.... or gratify the wishes of
children at the expense of the rights of a parent.... Were it other-
wise, the law would encourage manipulation by both children and
145. See Brown, 300 So. 2d at 726. "Allowing minor children to pick and choose at
their will the parent with whom they will reside only invites then to 'play one parent against
the other."' Icl
146. Holmes, 649 So. 2d at 305.
147. Id. at 305.
148. 300 So. 2d at 719.
149. 1L at 720. The final judgment dissolving the marriage included the statement
"[t]he wife shall have custody of the children of the parties... with the court allow-
ing ... [the children] to live with their father if this is their desire, without further order of this
Court." Id.
150. Id. at 726.
151. 215 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
152. 1l at 82.
153. The children were eleven and thirteen years of age. Id. at 81.
154. The mother lived in Italy and had written the father requesting he take the children
because of the poor conditions in her home. Id.
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parents and foster a breakdown in discipline, neither of which is in
the best interests of the children.' 
55
2. Second District Court of Appeal of Florida: Change of Viewpoint
Over the years, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal changed its
position on the weight given to a child's preference in custody proceedings.
Historically, the Second District gave deference to the child's preference in
custody determinations. 156 In the past decade, however, the Second District
has required the extraordinary burden test to be satisfied before upholding a
modification to a child custody decree.1
57
In~~~ ~  194 na l158
In 1974. in an opinion combining the cases of Taylor v. Schlt 8 and
Gregory v. Gregory, the Second District considered the weight to be given
to children's preferences in custody litigation.16  In Taylor, the second
district held that children old enough to have a well considered judgment,
who unanimously want to live with their mother, in whose home they find
love and good care, should be placed with their mother.1 61 Both parents in
Taylor were found to be fit parents, and the children aged eleven to fifteen
years old testified that their mother's home was full of love and the father's
full of fear. 62 Based upon the children's preferences and testimony, the
court allowed the change of custody, recognizing that the course of a child's
life might be adversely affected by the court's refusal to consider his/her
155. Holmes, 649 So. 2d at 305 (quoting Elkins v. Vanden Bosch, 433 So. 2d 1251,
1253 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
156. See Taylor v. Schilt, 292 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (noting that
"children old enough to have well considered judgment, who unanimously want to live with
their mother, in whose home they find love and good care, should be placed with their
mother"); see also Udell v. Udell, 151 So. 2d 863, 864 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (noting
that a "judge should and does give weight to the expressed desires of a child to be in the
custody of a particular parent").
157. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Gibbs, 686 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (two
consistent requirements to explain the extraordinary burden test).
First, the party seeking to modify a custody decree must plead and es-
tablish that circumstances have substantially changed since the final
judgment.... Second, the petitioner must establish that the change has
such an important impact on the child that the court is justified in im-
posing a change of custody in the 'best interest' of the child.
Id. at 641.
158. 292 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
159. 313 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1975).
160. 292 So. 2d at 48.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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preference. 163  Similarly, in Udell, the court upheld a thirteen-year-old
child's preference to remain with her father.'6 In Udell, both the father and
mother were found to be proper custodians of the child.165 Thus, preference
of the child became the deciding factor.
166
In Eades v. Dorio,167 a case deciding custody between a father and the
maternal grandparents, the Second District allowed the children to remain
with the grandparents based on the expressed preferences of the children.
168
Although the appellate court admitted that the rights of parents would not be
disregarded to meet the wishes of a child, it further held that the court of
appeals cannot overturn a decision by a chancellor who had the opportunity
to observe the parties and witnesses and other intangibles.
1 69
In the past decade, however, the Second District Court of Appeal
completely reversed its position, and has typically overturned modifications
of child custody granted by lower courts.' The Second District's interpre-
tation of the two-part extraordinary burden test outlined in Gibbs v. Gibbs'7'
created a new requirement that there be some significant inadequacy of care
provided by the custodial parent before a modification of custody would be
considered.17 2  The difficulty in proving significant inadequacy of care
provided by the custodial parent has led to a consistent overturning of modi-
fication decrees. The Second District Court of Appeal justified it's deaf ear
towards the child's wishes in Chant by stating that courts should not micro-
manage a child's custody. 73 In contrast to this excuse made in Chant, in
163. kI. at 50.
164. 151 So. 2d 863, 865 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
165. Id. at 864.
166. Id The appellate court opinioned that the testimony before the court could have
shown that it was better for the minor daughter to remain in the custody of either parent and
therefor the lower court's discretion would not be disturbed. Id.
167. 113 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
168. Id at 234. The children were eleven and thirteen, expressed a desire to live with
the maternal grandparents and no desire to remain with the natural father. Id.
169. Id
170. See Chant v. Chant, 725 So. 2d 445, 448 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing
lower court's ruling with directions to reinstate the mother as the children's primary residen-
tial parent); see also Gibbs, 686 So. 2d at 645 ("reversing and remanding for entry of an order
reinstating the mother as custodial parent").
171. See Gibbs, 686 So. 2d at 639.
172. See Chant, 725 So. 2d at 447 (quoting Gibbs, 686 So. 2d at 641. "This test
involves more than a decision that the petitioning parent's home would be 'better' for the
child, and requires a determination that there is some significant inadequacy in the care
provided by the custodial parent.").
173. Chant, 725 So. 2d at 448. "[IThe best interests test is not intended to allow the
court to micromanage a child's custody from the entry of the final judgment until the child
becomes an adult." Id.
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Heatherington v. Heatherington,'74 the court did micromanage the child's
custody by not allowing the child's preference to be adhered to even when
the child threatened to run away if made to live with the other parent.
75
Observe how the court changes its reasoning based on the overriding desire
not to listen to children's preferences. This "new" Second District Court of
Appeals apparently does not see the adverse impact it's decision not to
consider a child's preference has on that child's life.
3. Third District Court of Appeal of Florida: Confusion
Until the mid-1970s, the Third District Court of Appeal gave control-
ling weight to a child's preference in child custody proceedings. During
that time period, the Third District consistently held the belief that the
custody of a minor child is a proper subject for judicial consideration at any
time by the court that granted the divorce decree. 177 In Goldstein v. Gold-
stein,' the court stated that a child's preference was entitled to great weight
in cases where the child is mature enough to make a reasonable choice. 7
Although both parents were found to be fit in Goldstein, the child's prefer-
ence and statements that he would leave home if his wishes were not adhered
to was found to be detrimental enough to accord the modification of cus-
tody.1
80
In Pollak v. Pollak,"' the Third District Court of Appeal upheld a
chancellor's determination of custody in accordance with each of the chil-
dren's expressed individual preferences even though it meant splitting up the
children. r82 Likewise, in Borden v. Borden, 1 3 the fifteen year old son pre-
174. 677 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
175. Id. at 1314. The child commented that she might run away if forced to live with
her father and the trial judge was concerned with this comment. Id. at 1313. The appellate
court disregarded the trial judge's discretion and reversed. Id. at 1314.
176. See Goldstein v. Goldstein, 264 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that the desire of a mature child is entitled to weight); see also Pollak v. Pollak, 196
So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that children's preferences are to be
given some weight); Borden v. Borden, 193 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(holding that the desires of a fifteen year old should be given great weight).
177. Goldstein, 264 So. 2d at 51 (quoting Frazier v. Frazier, 147 So. 464 (Fla.1933)).
178. 264 So. 2d 49 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App 1972).
179. Id. at 52.
180. Id. The child, Herbert Goldstein, was fourteen years of age and the trial court had
found that there was a likelihood that the boy would leave home if required to remain with his
mother. Id.
181. 196 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
182. Id. at 772. In this case two of the sons preferred to be with their father, one son
had no preference, and the daughter preferred to remain with their mother. Id. The court
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ferred to live with the father, whereas the twelve year old daughter preferred
not to make a choice. 1 4 The Borden court held that the son's preference was
sufficient to grant custody of both children to the father.'85
In 1975, a major departure in the consistent Third District Court of
Appeal's opinions occurred. From that time forward, this court's diverse
handling of children's preferences in custody proceedings has created major
confusion in the district. The cause of this diversity appears to be the inter-
pretation of the Third District's requirement that the parent seeking to
reverse a custody order modification must establish its unreasonableness or
an abuse of discretion. 186 In one interpretation, Gaber v. Gaber,187 a child's
preference was the key factor in modification of custody by the trial court.
188
The Third District Court reversed the trial court's decision stating that "the
child's wish is merely a factor to be considered... [but] not a dispositive
factor."' Similarly, in Kitchens v. Kitchens,' the court stated that it is not
required to consider a child's preference in modification of custody proceed-
ings. 9, Most recently, in Perez v. Perez,192 the court held that the stated
preference of a fifteen and eleven year old child without more, was insuffi-
cient to sustain a change in primary residence. In contrast, in Walfish v.
Walfish,94 the Third District stated that the trial court, in making a determi-
nation of custody, may properly consider the wishes of the child. 95 In still
another interpretation, Berlin v. Berlin,'96 the court held that consideration of
children's preferences was limited to those of a child mature enough to make
a reasonable choice.
197
disregarded a policy proposed by the mother that the children all be awarded to one parent in
favor of adhering to the children's individual preferences. Id.
183. 193 So. 2d 15, 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
184. d at 16.
185. Id
186. ld.
187. 536 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
188. Id. at 382.
189. Id. The dissent in this case argues that the trial court's decision should be upheld
based on principles set forth in Goldstein, Epperson, and Purdon. Id.
190. 305 So. 2d 249(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
191. Il at250.
192. 767 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
193. Id. at519.
194. 383 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
195. Il at n.1. Note the contrast in the fourteen year old Gaber child's preferences not
being accorded consideration and the eight and ten year old Walfish children's preferences
being accorded consideration.
196. 386 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
197. Id. at 579.
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Factual similarities do not necessarily lead to similar opinions in the
Third District Court of Appeal. For example, the court in Walfish held that
despite the child's preference to live with their father and the findings that
the father was a fit parent, the failure to show that the mother was unfit
prohibited the modification granted by the lower court.198 In a similar
factual case, Elkins v. Vanden Bosch'9 the court held that the stated prefer-
ence of children to be in the custody of the father is not a material change of
circumstance that will support a custody change.2 The inconsistency or
vacillation of this court over similar facts and circumstances tends to give
the impression of indecision over the subject matter.
4. Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida: Quiet Consideration
In the handful of cases heard on the subject, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal has considered the child's preference as one of a number of equally
considered factors in a custody determination. 20 ' For example, in Burley v.
Burley the Fourth District held that a change in preference by a minor child
may be considered and "given such weight as the trial court determines
202appropriate." The Fourth District supports the belief that the parent
seeking a change in custody shoulders a heavy burden.20 3 Further, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal gives general deference to the trial court's
decisions in such cases.2W Preference by one or more minor children as to
which parent shall have custody is given as much weight as the trial court
determines appropriate. 205 In Brown v. Brown,2 6 the Fourth District Court
of Appeals upheld the trial court's determination of custody based on themi-
nor children's wishes.2°7 The lower court in Brown had placed the fourteen
and sixteen year old children in the custody of their father based on the
children electing to live with their father.208 Although only a few cases have
been considered by the Fourth District in recent years, it's quiet avocation of
children's rights to be heard in custody decisions follows the national trend
admirably.
198. Walfish, 383 So. 2d at 276.
199. 433 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
200. Id. at 1252.
201. See Burley v. Burley, 438 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 409 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1035.
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5. Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida: The Advocate
The Fifth District Court of Appeal consistently advocates giving weight
to the preferences of children in custody determinations.209 In Greene v.
Kelly, the Fifth District Court of Appeal relied heavily on the national trend
rather than the Florida trend to give greater deference to the child's prefer-
ence and opinion.2 10 Further in Greene, the Fifth District opinioned that the
law recognizes a child's preference, if the child is of sufficient maturity, as a
factor in the determination of custody.21' This court equated a child now
being able to realistically make a preference when she could not do so at the
time of the original custody order as a change in circumstances sufficient to
make a custody modification.2 1 2 In Greene, the thirteen year old daughter
was awarded to the mother at the time of the dissolution of marriage, when
the daughter was less than four years old.2 3 Ten years later, she requested a
214
change in custody to live with her father. The Fifth District upheld the
modification based on the daughter's preference.215 In another case regard-
ing grandparent visitation, Ward v. Dibble,21 6 the children, aged fifteen and
sixteen, testified that they did not want to go on visitation with their grand-
217
mother. The court upheld the children's wishes and denied the visitation
with the grandmother. 2r8 The consistency of the Fifth District in upholding
the rights of children to be heard in Florida's custody decisions should serve
as a role model for the rest of the Florida court system.
V. JUDGES ARE NOT LISTENING
Although Florida statutes do not require a court to follow the expressed
wishes of a child in a custody case, they do suggest the judge consider the
- 219
child's preferences as one factor. In Florida, the weight that judges actu-
ally give to a child's preference varies greatly as illustrated in the previous
209. See, e.g., Greene v. Kelly, 712 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). "A
child's preference is a consideration even in the determination of whether a change of circum-
stances has occurred." Id at 1202.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Il
213. Greene, 712 So. 2d at 1202.
214. Id
215. Id. at 1203.
216. 683 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
217. Id. at 668.
218. Id at670.
219. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(i) (2000).
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discussion of Florida's courts.2 ° Judges typically base decisions on intuition
and a common understanding of social norms as opposed to any systematic
221use of child development theory and research to inform such decisions.
Studies of the attitudes of judges towards children's participation in
custody proceedings indicate that the child's preference was typically not
accorded significant weight.222 In fact, in one study 115 Indiana judges were
asked to rank factors important to custody decisions, children's preferences
regarding where they want to live was at the bottom of the list of factors.
223
However, in Virginia, one survey of judges found that there was a clear
correlation between the age of the child and the weight given her prefer-
ence. Nearly ninety percent of the judges surveyed indicated that the
preference of children aged fourteen and older was either dispositive or
extremely important; whereas that of children aged below ten were dis-
counted significantly.2 5
Indicative of judges' general disregard for the importance of listening to
children in custody determinations is the small amount of time the judges
typically spend with the children to evaluate their preferences. For example,
a study of twenty-six judges in Michigan found that judges spent an average
of only eighteen minutes with children who were the subject of custody
226battles. Another study indicated that fifteen minutes was the norm for
227judges in Colorado.
Critics suggest that the brief judicial interviews are an inadequate
means for ascertaining a child's real preference in a custody dispute. 2 One
major source of error is the judges' reluctance to ask direct questions of the
child for fear of causing pain to the child.229 Judges instead infer preference
from other questions asked of the child, leading to frequent error in the
judge's inference.2 0
Although not a complete solution, a statutory mandate to consider
children's preferences in custody determinations would at least remove a
major part of the disorder created by the combination of the inconsistency in
220. See discussion supra Part IV.
221. Mlyniac, supra note 10, at 1889.
222. Scott, supra note 11, at 1043 n.22.
223. Michael H. Hodges, Judges Agree on the Issues in Divorces, Study Says, DETorr
NEWS, June 17, 1996 at B1.
224. Scott, supra note 11, at 1050.
225. Id.
226. Mlyniac, supra note 10, at 1887.
227. Id. at n.86.
228. Scott, supra note 11, at 1055.
229. Id. at 1056.
230. Id.
[Vol. 25:815
290
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss3/1
Dulaney
the Florida courts and the tendency of the judges not to correctly interpret
children's wishes.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
The broad grant of discretion given judges by Florida's custody statute
does not always result in providing for the best interests of the child. The
result includes indeterminate outcomes and difficult settlement negotia-
tions.231 Explicit statutory guidance is required. Statutory guidance would
enhance certainty and predictability in the decision making process. Statu-
tory guidance would further eliminate the likelihood of misunderstandilg
facts and circumstances and allowing biases to interfere with decisions:
Lending certainty to custody determinations through the use of an easily
applied rule leads to an outcome in line with the lefal objective: a custody
decision that reflects the best interests of the child.2
3
Florida legislators have taken the first step with statutes mandating
consideration of children's preference in other related issues. It's now time
to align Florida's custody statute with these other Florida statutes and with
the statutes and case law of the rest of the nation.
Understandably, it is expected that Florida judges will be opposed to
such statutory mandates. For example, a Virginia study revealed that al-
though in practice the judges were deferential towards the wishes of older
children, many judges were opposed to limits on judicial discretion."3 4 Such
opposition is outweighed by the benefit to Florida's growing population of
single-parent households.
VII. CONCLUSION
The parameters established by the United States Supreme Court's
jurisprudence demonstrate that the way to secure children's rights is to
empower them to exercise those-rights as soon as they are able to do so.235
The Supreme Court of Florida in 1887 initiated the national trend towards
listening to children's wishes in custody determinations. It is now time for
Florida to go back to its roots and re-institutionalize this policy; to follow the
guidelines of the United States Supreme Court, and empower the children of
Florida by statutorily mandating that they be seen and heard in Florida
custody determinations.
Randi L Dulaney
231. Kandel, supra note 8, at 338.
232. Id.
233. Scott, supra note 11, at 1063.
234. Id. at 1051.
235. Kandel, supra note 8, at 348.
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